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  This	   dissertation	   examines	   the	   impact	   of	   a	   semi-­‐presidential	   system	   on	  democratic	  performance.	  Does	   semi-­‐presidentialism	  encourage	   institutional	  cooperation	   and	   promote	   successful	   democratization,	   or	   does	   it	   provoke	   a	  power	   struggle,	   leading	   to	   political	   instability	   and	   democratic	   breakdown?	  We	   examine	   this	   question	   in	   the	   context	   of	   Timor-­‐Leste	   from	   2002-­‐2012.	  During	   this	   time,	  Timor-­‐Leste	  experienced	  a	  period	  of	  cohabitation,	  divided	  government	   and	   unified	   majority	   government.	   We	   identify	   the	   different	  levels	  of	   institutional	   conflict	  during	   the	   three	  periods.	  We	  show	   that	   there	  was	  more	  conflict	  under	  cohabitation	  than	  under	  the	  other	  two	  periods	  and	  more	   conflict	   under	   a	   divided	   government	   than	   under	   unified	   majority	  government.	   This	   work	   provides	   qualified	   support	   for	   some	   of	   the	  hypotheses	  associated	  with	  semi-­‐presidentialism.	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INTRODUCTION	  	  One	  leading	  scholar	  wrote	  that	  semi-­‐presidentialism	  ‘apparently	  is	  a	  regime	  type	  whose	  time	  has	  come’	  (Shugart,	  2005:	  344).	  There	  are	  now	  51	  countries	  with	  a	  semi-­‐presidential	  constitution.1	  Yet,	  in	  the	  academic	  world	  the	  system	  is	  highly	  criticized,	  even	   if	   it	  has	  some	  supporters.	  Most	  scholars	  argue	  that	  semi-­‐presidentialism	  provokes	  a	  damaging	  power	  struggle	  that	  threatens	  the	  stability	   of	   young	   democracies,	   whereas	   some	   others	   maintain	   that	   the	  system	   can	   allow	   power-­‐sharing	   between	   competing	   forces,	   increasing	   the	  prospects	  of	  democratic	  consolidation.	  This	  thesis	  tests	  whether	  or	  not	  semi-­‐presidentialism	  is	  associated	  with	  the	  level	  and	  type	  of	  conflict	  that	  is	  said	  to	  hinder	   or	   help	   democratic	   consolidation	   respectively.	   It	   does	   so	   in	   the	  context	  of	  Timor-­‐Leste2,	  a	  new	  semi-­‐presidential	  democracy	  in	  a	  post-­‐conflict	  setting.	  Arguments	   that	   associate	   semi-­‐presidentialism	   with	   democratic	  performance	   are	   premised	   on	   a	   two-­‐step	   logic;	   first,	   that	   semi-­‐presidentialism	   encourages	   a	   certain	   level	   of	   institutional	   conflict	   and	  second,	   that	   the	   presence	   of	   such	   conflict	   explains	   variance	   in	   democratic	  performance.	  This	   thesis	  examines	  only	   the	   first	   step	  of	   this	  argument.	  The	  literature	   identifies	   four	   types	  of	   situations	   -­‐	   divided	  minority	   government,	  cohabitation,	  divided	  government	  and	  unified	  majority	  government.	  Each	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Elgie,	  R.	  2013.	  Egypt	  –	  Constitution	  suspended.	  The	  Semi-­Presidential	  One	  [Online].	  Available	  from:	  http://www.semipresidentialism.com/?p=3034&utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=egypt-­‐constitution-­‐suspended	  [Accessed	  4	  July	  2013].	  2	  Formerly	  known	  as	  East	  Timor.	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these	   situations	   is	   associated	   with	   a	   particular	   level	   of	   conflict.	   Scholars	  expect	   more	   conflict	   under	   divided	   minority	   government	   than	   under	   the	  other	   three	   periods	   and	   more	   conflict	   under	   cohabitation	   than	   under	   a	  divided	  government.	  Unified	  majority	  government	  is	  believed	  to	  be	  the	  least	  conflictual	  institutional	  configuration,	  though	  some	  fear	  that	  it	  will	  lead	  to	  an	  accumulation	   of	   presidential	   power	   that	   can	   be	   damaging	   for	   democracy.	  From	   May	   2002	   to	   May	   2012	   Timor-­‐Leste’s	   semi-­‐presidential	   system	  generated	   three	   different	   political	   situations:	   cohabitation,	   divided	  government	  and	  unified	  majority	  government.	  Using	  Timor-­‐Leste	  as	  a	   case,	  this	   project	   tests	   whether	   the	   political	   situations	   generated	   the	   level	   of	  conflict	  that	  theory	  predicts.	  	  	   This	   thesis	   adopts	   a	   variable-­‐oriented	   approach.	   It	   examines	   the	  relationship	   between	   semi-­‐presidentialism	   and	   political	   behaviour,	   namely	  institutional	   conflict.	   The	   observable	   implications	   of	   institutional	   conflict	  include	   the	   use	   of	   formal	   powers	   such	   as	   vetoes,	   but	   also	   informal	   powers	  like	   presidential	   statements.	   An	   increase	   in	   the	   use	   of	   powers	   correlates	  positively	  with	  conflict	  and	  the	  absence	  of	  the	  use	  of	  these	  powers	  points	  to	  the	   absence	   of	   conflict.	   In	   three	   in-­‐depth	   case	   studies	   we	   test	   whether	  empirical	  evidence	  supports	  the	  expectations	  about	  these	  situations.	  In	  these	  case	   studies,	   this	   thesis	   utilized	   data	   from	   multiple	   sources	   such	   as	  presidential	   speeches,	   parliamentary	   reports,	   UN	   documents,	   research	  reports,	   journal	   and	   newspaper	   articles	   and	   news	   releases.	   In	   addition,	  several	   interviews	   were	   conducted	   with	   key	   Timorese	   political	   figures,	  journalists	  and	  university	  professors	  during	  field	  research	  in	  Timor-­‐Leste.	  	  
	   XIV	  
We	  found	  more	  institutional	  conflict	  during	  the	  period	  of	  cohabitation	  than	   under	   divided	   government.	   In	   the	   period	   of	   unified	   majority	  government	   institutional	   relations	   were	   the	   least	   conflictual.	   This	   study,	  therefore,	   gives	   qualified	   support	   to	   the	   general	   argument	   about	   semi-­‐presidentialism	  and	  the	  various	   levels	  of	  conflict	   that	  are	  expected	   to	  occur	  under	  this	  type	  of	  system.	  While	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  make	  generalisations	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  only	  one	  case,	  nonetheless	  we	  can	  draw	  a	  general	  conclusion	  about	  semi-­‐presidentialism	   and	   institutional	   conflict.	   In	   Timor-­‐Leste,	   democracy	  survived	   despite	   intense	   institutional	   conflict.	   Future	   research	   should	   thus	  test	   the	   second	   step	   of	   the	   argument,	   namely	   the	   relationship	   between	  institutional	  conflict	  and	  the	  performance	  of	  semi-­‐presidential	  democracies.	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CHAPTER	  1	  
Presidentialism,	  Parliamentarism,	  Semi-­Presidentialism	  and	  
Democracy	  
	  Political	  institutions	  are	  rules	  and	  constraints	  that	  shape	  political	  interaction	  and	  as	  a	  consequence	  help	  to	  structure	  political	  behaviour.	  Hence	  the	  system	  of	   government	   at	   least	   partially	   conditions	   the	   extent	   of	   conflict	   between	  political	   actors.	   Ideally,	   political	   institutions	   should	   regulate	   conflict,	   not	  generate	   conflict.	   If	   institutions	   can	   regulate	   conflict,	   then,	   all	   else	   being	  equal,	   young	   democracies	   are	   likely	   to	   be	   more	   stable	   and	   less	   likely	   to	  collapse.	   Equally,	   if	   institutions	   fail	   to	   encourage	   political	   compromise	   and	  conflict	  does	  occur,	  nascent	  democracies,	  ceteris	  paribus,	  run	  a	  greater	  risk	  to	  collapse.	  To	  many	  scholars,	  pure	  parliamentary	  systems	  are	  more	  successful	  in	   promoting	   democratic	   stability	   than	   pure	   presidential	   systems.	   Yet,	   less	  academic	  consensus	  exists	  about	  the	  effect	  that	  semi-­‐presidential	  institutions	  have	  on	  political	  behaviour	  and,	  by	  extension,	  democratic	  stability.	  Whereas	  some	   predict	   that	   a	   semi-­‐presidential	   constitutional	   framework	   supports	  democratic	   stability,	   others	   maintain	   that	   such	   a	   system	   provokes	   a	  damaging	  power	  struggle	  between	  the	  president	  and	  the	  prime	  minister	  and,	  by	   extension,	   destabilises	   young	   democracies.	   This	   case	   study	   tests	   the	  different	  arguments	  in	  Timor-­‐Leste,	  a	  new	  semi-­‐presidential	  democracy	  in	  a	  post-­‐conflict	  setting.	  By	  doing	  so,	  it	  aims	  to	  provide	  a	  better	  insight	  into	  the	  workings	  of	  semi-­‐presidential	  systems	  on	  young	  democratic	  regimes.	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Democracy	  and	  democratisation	  The	   literature	  on	  why	  some	  young	  democracies	  succeed	  while	  others	   fail	   is	  vast.	   Much	   of	   this	   literature	   singles	   out	   explanatory	   variables	   that	   are	  exogenous	  to	  the	  government	  system.	  Academics	  consider	  structural	  factors	  like	   the	   level	   of	   economic	   development	   (Moore,	   1966;	   Lipset,	   1981;	  Huntington,	   1991;	   Diamond,	   1992;	   Huber	   et	   al.,	   1993;	   Gasiorowski,	   1995;	  Inglehart,	  1997;	  Przeworski	  et	  al.,	  2000),	  political	  culture	  (Tocqueville,	  1945;	  Almond	   and	   Verba,	   1963;	   Muller	   and	   Seligson,	   1994;	   Putnam,	   2000)	   the	  geopolitical	  position	  of	  new	  states	  (Linz	  and	  Stepan,	  1996;	  Whitehead,	  1996;	  Levitsky	   and	   Way,	   2005)	   as	   crucial	   to	   the	   success	   or	   failure	   of	   young	  democracies.	  To	   many	   scholars	   the	   state	   of	   economic	   development	   crucially	  determines	  the	  fate	  of	  young	  democracies	  (Moore,	  1966;	  Lipset,	  1981;	  Huber	  et	  al.,	  1993;	  Przeworski	  et	  al.,	  2000).	  Lipset	  (1981)	  argues	  that	  development	  leads	  people	  to	  embrace	  values	  and	  attitudes	  that	  are	  friendly	  to	  democracy’s	  emergence	   and	   viability.	   Only	   in	   a	   wealthy	   society	   can	   a	   situation	   exist	   in	  which	   ‘the	  mass	   of	   the	   population	   could	   intelligently	   participate	   in	   politics	  and	   could	   develop	   the	   self-­‐restraint	   necessary	   to	   avoid	   succumbing	   to	   the	  appeals	   of	   irresponsible	   demagogues.	   A	   society	   divided	   between	   a	   large	  impoverished	   mass	   and	   a	   small	   favoured	   elite	   would	   result	   either	   in	  oligarchy	   …	   or	   in	   tyranny’	   (Lipset,	   1981:	   31).	   The	   positive	   relationship	  between	   development	   and	   democracy	   was	   supported	   by	   the	   work	   of,	   for	  instance,	   Diamond	   (1992),	   Gasiorowski,	   (1995)	   and	   Inglehart	   (1997).	  Scholars	   like	   Huntington	   (1991)	   refine	   the	   hypothesis	   by	   arguing	   that	  economic	   development	   increases	   the	   likelihood	   that	   countries	   make	   a	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transition	   to	   democracy.	  Huntington	   argues	   that	   democratic	   transitions	   are	  most	  likely	  in	  the	  countries	  at	  the	  middle	  levels	  of	  economic	  development.	  In	  poor	  and	  rich	  countries,	  he	  concluded,	  transitions	  to	  democracy	  are	  unlikely.	  Others	   have	   emphasized	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	   level	   of	   economic	  development	   and	   the	   sustainability	   of	   democracy.	   Przeworski	   et	   al.	   (2000)	  explain	   that	   democratic	   transitions	   occur	   randomly,	   but,	   once	   they	   have	  occurred,	  countries	  with	  higher	  levels	  of	  GDP	  per	  capita	  remain	  democratic.	  Thus	   to	   Przeworski	   et	   al.,	   there	   is	   a	   relationship	   between	   the	   level	   of	  economic	  development	  and	  the	  durability	  of	  democracy.	  In	  the	  literature	  on	  democracy	  and	  democratisation	  scholars	  have	  also	  emphasised	   that	  political	  culture	   is	   likely	   to	  have	  a	  profound	   impact	  on	   the	  viability	   of	   democratic	   regimes	   (Almond	   and	   Verba,	   1963;	   Muller	   and	  Seligson,	  1994).	  According	  to	  this	  line	  of	  thinking,	  the	  most	  important	  reason	  why	  a	   country	   is	   able	   to	   sustain	  democracy	   is	   that	   the	  people	  believe	   in	   it.	  Larry	   Diamond	   explains	   that	   ‘political	   competitors	   must	   come	   to	   regard	  democracy	   as	   ‘the	   only	   game	   in	   town,’	   the	   only	   viable	   framework	   for	  governing	   the	   society	  and	  advancing	   their	  own	   interests.	  At	   the	  mass	   level,	  there	  must	  be	  a	  broad	  normative	  and	  behavioural	  consensus	  –	  one	  that	  cuts	  across	  class,	  ethnic,	  nationality,	  and	  other	  cleavages	  –	  on	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  constitutional	   system,	   however	   poor	   and	   unsatisfying	   its	   performance	  may	  be	   at	   any	   point	   in	   time’	   (Diamond,	   1999:	   65).	   In	   this	   context,	   a	   strong	   and	  vibrant	   civil	   society	   enhances	   the	   legitimacy	   of	   the	   democratic	   system	   and	  therefore	   strengthens	   and	   deepens	   a	   democratic	   political	   culture.	   A	   robust	  civil	   society	   allows	   individuals	   to	   express	   their	   interests	   and	   demands	   on	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government	   and	   to	   protect	   themselves	   from	   abuses	   of	   power	   by	   their	  political	  leaders	  (Tocqueville,	  1945;	  Putnam,	  2000).	  	  The	  development	  of	  a	  democratic	  political	  culture	  may	  be	  problematic	  in	   deeply	   divided	   societies.	   Scholars	   like	   Horowitz	   (1993)	   and	   Huntington	  (1996)	  found	  that	  societal	  cleavages	  may	  aggravate	  inter-­‐group	  rivalries	  and	  political	   instability.	   However,	   Lijphart	   (1969)	   explains	   that	   not	   all	  fragmented	  societies	  are	  politically	  unstable;	  consociational	  democracies	  like	  Lebanon,	  Switzerland	  and	  The	  Netherlands	  were	  able	  to	  manage	  inter-­‐group	  conflict	  as	   the	  model	  allowed	   for	  peaceful	  power-­‐sharing	  between	  different	  subcultures.	  Horowitz	   (2002)	   notes	   that	   these	   states	   are	  multi-­‐polar	   states	  and	  insisted	  that	  bi-­‐polar	  states,	  with	  a	  majority	  and	  minority,	  are	  the	  more	  seriously	   conflicted.	   The	   key	   question	   is	   thus	   whether	   the	   inclusion	   of	  different	  political	  forces	  in	  the	  political	  decision-­‐making	  process	  will	  reduce	  mutual	  tensions	  and	  strengthen	  political	  stability.	  As	  we	  will	  see	  later	  in	  this	  chapter,	  a	  similar	  debate	  exists	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  semi-­‐presidential	  system,	  a	   government	   system	   that	   includes	   different,	   and	   sometimes	   opposing	  political	  groups	  in	  the	  political	  process.	  International	  forces	  are	  also	  considered	  to	  determine	  the	  fate	  of	  young	  democracies	   (Linz	   and	   Stepan,	   1996;	  Whitehead,	   1996;	   Levitsky	   and	  Way,	  2005).	   Linz	   and	   Stepan	   (1996:	   76),	   for	   example,	   emphasized	   the	   role	   of	  diffusion	   in	   democratization	   processes,	   positing	   that	   ‘the	   more	   tightly	  coupled	   a	   group	   of	   countries	   are,	   the	   more	   a	   successful	   transition	   in	   any	  country	   in	   the	  group	  will	   tend	   to	   transform	  the	  range	  of	  perceived	  political	  alternatives	  for	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  group.	  Indeed,	  …	  international	  diffusion	  effects	  can	   change	   political	   expectations,	   crowd	  behaviour,	   and	   relations	   of	   power	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within	  the	  regime	  almost	  overnight.’	  Foreign	  policy	  and	   ‘zeitgeist’	  (i.e.	  spirit	  of	   the	  times)	  are,	  according	  to	  Linz	  and	  Stepan,	  other	  types	  of	   international	  influence	  that	  may	  affect	  domestic	  affairs	  (Linz	  and	  Stepan,	  1996:	  72-­‐76).	  	  This	   thesis	   does	   not	   aim	   to	   examine	   the	   impact	   of	   factors	   that	   are	  exogenous	   to	   the	   political	   system.	   It	   is	   not	   concerned	  with	   the	   question	   of	  whether,	   for	   example,	   economic	   or	   cultural	   factors	   have	   undermined	   or	  reinforced	  democratic	  performance.	  We	  do	  not	  dismiss	   the	  claim	  that	   these	  factors	  affect	  the	  performance	  of	  democracy,	  however	  the	  focus	  of	  this	  study	  lies	  elsewhere.	  Our	  concern	   is	  with	  political	   institutions,	  or,	  more	  precisely,	  the	   constitutional	  design	  of	   executive-­‐legislative	   relations.	  We	  do	  not	  argue	  that	   executive-­‐legislative	   relations	   have	   greater	   explanatory	   power	   than	  other	   factors	   on	   democratic	   performance.	  We	   wish	   to	   test	   the	   effects	   of	   a	  certain	  system	  of	  government	  and,	  in	  particular,	  whether	  this	  system	  has	  the	  effect	   that	   people	   believe	   it	   has.	   This	   approach	   forms	   part	   of	   the	   so-­‐called	  new	   institutionalism	   literature,	  which	   is	  premised	  upon	   the	  notion	   that	   the	  viability	  of	  democracy	  depends	  not	  only	  on	  economic	  and	   social	   conditions	  but	   also	   on	   the	   design	   of	   political	   institutions	   (March	   and	   Olsen,	   1984).	  According	   to	   this	   line	   of	   thinking,	   institutional	   rules	   and	   procedures	   are	  believed	  to	  shape	  political	  behaviour;	  in	  so	  doing	  they	  set	  out	  the	  parameters	  for	   the	   success	   or	   failure	   of	   democratic	   regimes.	   This	   thesis	   examines	  whether	  or	  not	  there	  is	  evidence	  to	  support	  the	  hypothesized	  effects	  of	  semi-­‐presidential	  institutional	  structures	  on	  the	  level	  of	  political	  conflict	  within	  the	  executive	  and	  between	  the	  executive	  and	  the	  legislature.	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Presidential	  vs	  parliamentary	  systems	  In	  the	  literature	  there	  has	  been	  a	  debate	  as	  to	  which	  institutional	  framework	  best	   promotes	   democracy.	   Most	   scholars	   conclude	   that	   a	   parliamentary	  system	   is	   a	   more	   supportive	   constitutional	   framework	   for	   consolidating	  democracy	  than	  a	  presidential	  system	  (Linz,	  1990;	  Riggs,	  1992;	  Mainwaring,	  1993;	  Linz,	  1994).	  Presidential	  democracies,	  they	  argue,	  are	  more	  vulnerable	  to	   political	   instability	   and	   democratic	   breakdown	   than	   parliamentary	  democracies.	  Mainwaring	  and	  Shugart	  (1997)	  identify	  five	  elements	  to	  Linz’s	  critique	  of	  presidentialism.	  	  First,	   and	   foremost,	  presidential	   systems	  generate	  a	   ‘dual	   legitimacy’	  problem	   (Linz,	   1994:	   6).	   Under	   presidentialism	   both	   the	   president,	   who	  controls	   the	   executive	   and	   is	   elected	   by	   the	   people	   (or	   an	   electoral	   college	  elected	   by	   the	   people	   for	   that	   sole	   purpose),	   and	   an	   elected	   legislature	  (unicameral	   or	   bicameral)	   enjoy	   democratic	   legitimacy.	   When	   the	   two	  democratically	  elected	  institutions	  are	  controlled	  by	  opposing	  political	  forces	  ‘who,	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  democratic	  principles,	   is	  better	  legitimated	  to	  speak	  in	  the	   name	   of	   the	   people:	   the	   president,	   or	   the	   congressional	   majority	   that	  opposes	  his	  policies?’	  (1994:	  7).	  Institutional	  tensions	  that	  in	  some	  countries	  can	   be	   peacefully	   settled	   through	   negotiation	   or	   legal	  means	  may	   in	   other,	  less	   happy	   lands,	   encourage	   either	   the	   president	   or	   the	   prime	   minister	   to	  seek	  the	  help	  of	  the	  military	  to	  assume	  all	  power.	  In	  a	  parliamentary	  system	  the	  ‘dual	  democratic	  legitimacy	  problem’	  is	  absent,	  because	  executive	  power	  is	  generated	  by	  the	   legislature,	  which	   is	   the	  only	  democratically	   legitimated	  institution	  (Linz,	  1994:	  6).	  If	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  parliament	  favours	  a	  change	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in	  policy	  direction,	  it	  can	  dismiss	  the	  government	  by	  passing	  a	  no-­‐confidence	  vote.	   Second,	  presidential	  systems	  are	  too	  ‘rigid’	  to	  overcome	  a	  problematic	  executive-­‐legislative	  relationship,	  or	  political	  stalemate	  (Linz,	  1994:	  8).	  Both	  the	  president	  and	  the	  legislature	  are	  elected	  for	  a	  fixed	  term,	  the	  president’s	  tenure	   in	   office	   is	   independent	   of	   the	   legislature,	   and	   the	   survival	   of	   the	  legislature	  is	  independent	  of	  the	  president.	  For	  Linz	  this	  institutional	  feature	  introduces	  a	  ‘rigidity’	  in	  the	  presidential	  system	  that	  means	  it	  cannot	  react	  to	  changing	  political	  situations:	  when	  the	  president	  cannot	  be	  substituted	  with	  someone	   more	   willing	   to	   compromise	   with	   the	   opposition	   executive-­‐legislative	   conflicts	   may	   reach	   an	   intensity	   that	   threatens	   violence	   and	   an	  illegal	  overthrow	  of	  the	  regime.	  Parliamentary	  systems,	  by	  contrast,	  allow	  for	  removal	   of	   the	   executive,	   thereby	   preventing	   a	   political	   crisis	   from	   turning	  into	  a	  regime	  crisis	  (Linz,	  1994:	  9-­‐10).	  	  Third,	  the	  office	  of	  the	  president	  is	  indivisible,	  which	  is	  considered	  not	  to	  be	  conducive	  to	  coalition-­‐building	  and,	  by	  extension,	  democratic	  stability.	  Presidentialism	   ‘introduces	   strong	   element	   of	   zero-­‐sum	   game	   into	  democratic	  politics	  with	  rules	  that	  tend	  toward	  a	   'winner-­‐take-­‐all'	  outcome’	  (Linz,	   1994:	   18).	   The	   president	   cannot	   represent	   more	   than	   one	   political	  party.	  So	  the	  president’s	  party	  ‘takes	  it	  all’,	  whereas	  the	  party	  of	  the	  defeated	  candidate	   ‘loses	  all’.	  Presidential	  elections	   tend	   to	  make	  politics	  a	  zero-­‐sum	  game,	  encouraging	  centrifugal	  and	  polarizing	  tendencies	  in	  the	  electorate.	  A	  parliamentary	  system,	  by	  contrast,	  encourages	  political	  power-­‐sharing	  (Linz,	  1994:	  18).	  A	  leader	  who	  wishes	  to	  be	  the	  head	  of	  the	  government	  but	  whose	  
	   8	  
party	  gains	   less	  than	  a	  majority	  of	   the	  seats	   in	  the	   legislature	   is	   likely	  to	  be	  forced	  to	  share	  power	  with	  another	  party.	  	  Fourth,	  presidentialism	   is	  believed	   to	  encourage	   the	  president	   to	  act	  beyond	   the	  mandate	   that	   is	   legally	   assigned	   to	   him	  or	   her.	   The	   president’s	  sense	  of	   being	   the	   elected	   representative	  of	   the	  whole	  people	   and	   thus	   the	  propensity	   to	   identify	   the	   people	   as	   a	   whole	   with	   his	   or	   her	   constituency	  encourages	   ‘a	   certain	   neglect	   of,	   sometimes	   disrespect	   toward,	   and	   even	  hostile	   relations	   with	   the	   opposition’	   (Linz,	   1994:	   25).	   The	   fact	   that	   the	  president’s	   survival	   does	   not	   depend	   on	   the	   confidence	   of	   the	   legislature	  means	  that	  inter-­‐branch	  conflict	  is	  always	  latent.	  	  Fifth,	   the	   election	   of	   a	   ‘political	   outsider’	   complicates	   effective	  executive-­‐legislative	   relations.	   Linz	   defines	   a	   political	   outsider	   as	   someone	  who	  rises	   to	  a	   top	  position	  and	  who	   is	   ‘not	   identified	  with	  or	  supported	  by	  any	   political	   party,	   sometimes	   without	   any	   governmental	   or	   political	  experience,	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  populist	  appeal,	  [and]	  often	  based	  on	  hostility	  to	  parties	  and	  ‘politicians’’	  (Linz,	  1994:	  26).	  Linz	  insists	  that	  political	  outsiders	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  win	  the	  chief	  executive	  office	  in	  presidential	  systems,	  with	  potentially	   destabilizing	   effects.	   Individuals	   selected	   by	   direct	   popular	   vote	  are	  less	  dependent	  on	  and	  less	  beholden	  to	  political	  parties.	  Such	  individuals,	  concluded	  Linz,	   are	  more	   likely	   to	   govern	   in	   a	  populist,	   anti-­‐institutionalist	  fashion.	  Scholars	  explain	  that	  presidential	  democracies	  face	  increased	  risks	  of	  termination	  when	   combined	  with	   other	   characteristics	   such	   as	   fragmented	  party	   systems.	   Scott	   Mainwaring	   (1993)	   argues	   that	   the	   combination	   of	  presidential	  government	  and	  a	  multiparty	  system	  is	  problematic.	  Multiparty	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presidential	   democracies	   often	   produce	  minority	   governments	   because	   the	  president	  has	  more	  difficulty	  building	  reliable	  governing	  coalitions.	  Together	  with	   Matthew	   Shugart	   he	   tested	   and	   confirmed	   that	   what	   matters	   for	   the	  functioning	   of	   democratic	   regimes	   is	   not	   presidentialism	   per	   se,	   but	   the	  combination	  of	  an	  independently	  elected	  president	  with	  a	  multiparty	  system	  (Shugart	  and	  Mainwaring,	  1997).	  Valenzuela	  explains:	  ‘the	  more	  fragmented	  the	   opposition	   and	   the	   smaller	   the	   president’s	   own	   party,	   the	   greater	  becomes	  the	  challenge	  of	  cobbling	  together	  a	  majority	  ruling	  coalition’	  (2004:	  13).	  	  	   So,	   the	  separation	  of	  powers	  that	  defines	  presidentialism	  encourages	  presidential	   institutions	   to	   govern	   against	   each	   other.	   Given	   presidential	  systems	   lack	   an	   effective	   mechanism	   to	   resolve	   executive-­‐legislative	  gridlocks,	  political	  instability	  may	  lead	  to	  regime	  instability.	  ‘It	  is	  therefore	  no	  accident’,	   Linz	   concluded,	   ‘that	   in	   some	   of	   these	   situations	   the	   military	  intervenes	  as	  the	  poder	  moderador	  [emphasis	  in	  the	  original]’	  (Linz,	  1994:	  7).	  In	   parliamentary	   governments,	   the	   structure	   of	   the	   executive-­‐legislative	  relationship	   is	   ‘hierarchical’	   (Shugart,	   2006:	   353)	   because	   the	   executive	  power	   is	   subordinated	   to	   the	   legislature.3	   The	   legislature	   can	   dismiss	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Shugart	  explains	  that	  the	  extent	  of	  hierarchical	  or	  transactional	  relationships	  between	  executive	  and	  legislative	  institutions	  in	  parliamentary	  regimes	  depend	  on	  whether	  in	  practice	  a	  single-­‐party	  obtains	  a	  parliamentary	  majority	  result	  or	  not.	  Majoritarian	  systems,	  according	  to	  him,	  preserve	  the	  hierarchy	  in	  its	  purest	  form,	  whereas	  multiparty	  systems	  tend	  towards	  a	  more	  transactional	  form	  of	  parliamentarism.	  See:	  Shugart,	  M.	  S.	  (2006)	  'Comparative	  Executive-­‐Legislative	  Relations',	  in	  Rhodes,	  R.	  a.	  W.,	  Binder,	  S.	  A.	  and	  Rockman,	  B.	  A.	  (eds)	  The	  Oxford	  
Handbook	  of	  Political	  Institutions:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  344-­‐365.	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government,	  prevent	  the	  escalation	  of	  institutional	  conflict	  and,	  by	  extension,	  democratic	  instability.	  	  Several	   empirical	   quantitative	   studies	   have	   tested	   Linz’s	   thesis	   that	  parliamentary	   systems	   are	  more	   conducive	   to	   democracy	   than	  presidential	  systems.	   Alfred	   Stepan	   and	   Cindy	   Skach's	   (1993)	   study	   of	   43	   consolidated	  democracies	  confirm	  that	  parliamentary	  systems	  provide	  a	  more	  supportive	  constitutional	   framework	   for	   consolidating	   democracy	   than	   presidential	  systems.	   As	   compared	   to	   presidentialism,	   parliamentary	   systems	   have	   ‘a	  greater	   propensity	   for	   governments	   to	   have	   majorities	   to	   implement	   their	  programs;	  a	  greater	  ability	  to	  rule	  in	  a	  multiparty	  setting;	  a	  lower	  propensity	  for	  executives	  to	  rule	  at	  the	  edge	  of	  the	  constitution	  and	  a	  greater	  facility	  at	  removing	   a	   chief	   executive	   who	   does	   so;	   a	   lower	   susceptibility	   to	  military	  coups;	   and	   a	   greater	   tendency	   to	   provide	   long	   party-­‐government	   careers,	  which	  add	  loyalty	  and	  experience	  to	  political	  society’	  (1993:	  22).	  In	  a	  similar	  vein	  Przeworski	   et	   al.	   (2000)	   conclude	   that	   parliamentary	  democracies	   are	  more	  likely	  to	  remain	  democratic	  than	  their	  presidential	  counterparts.	  Their	  study	  of	  regime	  changes	  examined	  141	  countries	  in	  the	  period	  between	  1950	  and	   1990.	   They	   confirm	   that	   presidential	   systems	   are	   less	   durable	   than	  parliamentary	  ones.	  Przeworski	  et	  al.	  conclude:	  ‘The	  difference	  is	  not	  due	  to	  the	  wealth	  of	  the	  countries	  in	  which	  these	  institutions	  were	  observed,	  nor	  to	  their	   economic	   performance.	   Neither	   it	   is	   due	   to	   any	   of	   the	   political	  conditions	   under	  which	   they	   function.	   Presidential	   democracies	   are	   simply	  more	   brittle	   under	   all	   economic	   and	   political	   conditions’	   (2000:	   136).	  Likewise,	  Maeda	  (2010)	  finds	  that	  presidential	  systems	  are	  inherently	  more	  prone	  to	  democratic	  breakdown	  than	  parliamentary	  systems.	  The	  separation	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of	   powers,	   according	   to	   this	   scholar,	   tempts	   presidents	   into	   seeking	  unconstitutional	   measures	   to	   achieve	   their	   goals,	   leading	   to	   conflicts	   with	  other	  governmental	  institutions	  and	  political	  instability.	  	  	   By	   contrast,	   José	   Cheibub	   (2007)	   and	   Timothy	   Power	   and	   Mark	  Gasiorowski	   (1997)	   dismiss	   Linz’s	   argument	   that	   presidentialism	   is	  inherently	  more	  perilous	   for	   the	  prospects	   of	   democratic	   survival	   in	   newly	  democratising	   countries	   than	   parliamentarism.	   Cheibub	   acknowledges	   that	  presidential	  regimes	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  collapse	  than	  parliamentary	  regimes.	  However,	  presidential	  democracies	  are	  unstable	  because	  they	  tend	  to	  exist	  in	  countries	  that	  have	  experienced	  military	  dictatorships.	  Democracies	  that	  are	  preceded	   by	   military	   dictatorships,	   he	   explained,	   are	   more	   unstable	   than	  those	   that	   are	   preceded	   by	   civilian	   dictatorships.	   Thus	   the	   real	   problem	   of	  presidential	   democracies	   is	   not	   that	   they	   are	   ‘institutionally	   flawed’	   but	  rather	  that	  they	  tend	  to	  exist	  in	  societies	  where	  democracies	  of	  any	  type	  are	  likely	   to	   be	   unstable	   (Cheibub,	   2007:	   3).	   Equally,	   Power	   and	   Gasiorowski’s	  (1997)	  tested	  Linz’s	  hypothesis	  concerning	  the	  superiority	  of	  parliamentary	  institutions	  as	  they	  relate	  to	  democratic	  survival	  in	  the	  third	  world	  between	  1930	  and	  1995.	  Using	  Gasiorowski’s	  Political	  Regime	  Change	  (PRC)	  dataset,	  they	   conclude	   that	   the	   ‘breakdown	   rates	   of	   presidential	   and	   parliamentary	  democracies	   are	   nearly	   identical’	   (Power	   and	   Gasiorowski,	   1997:	   137).	  Likewise,	  their	  findings	  contradict	  Mainwaring	  and	  Shugart’s	  hypothesis	  that	  presidentialism	   and	   multipartism	   constitute	   a	   difficult	   combination.	   Yet,	  Power	  and	  Gasiorowski’s	  study	  examined	  the	  effect	  of	  institutions	  in	  terms	  of	  democratic	   survival	   or	   collapse	   whereas	   Reich	   (2002:	   1)	   points	   out	   that	  many	   third	   wave	   democracies	   are,	   in	   fact,	   ‘semi-­‐democracies’	   in	   which	  
	   12	  
competitive	   party	   politics	   coexist	   with	   executives	   who	   rely	   extensively	   on	  authoritarian	   practices.	   In	   other	   words,	   Linz’s	   thesis	   that	   parliamentary	  systems	   are	   more	   conducive	   to	   (semi-­‐)	   democracies	   than	   presidential	  systems	   could,	   therefore,	   still	   be	   valid.	   Sing	   (2010)	   rejects	   Linz’s	   (1994)	  argument	  altogether.	  Using	  an	  original	  dataset	  containing	  85	  countries	  in	  the	  world	   from	  1946	   to	   2002,	   he	   found	   that	   a	   presidential	   regime	   is	   not	  more	  likely	   to	   bring	   about	   democratic	   breakdown	   than	   a	   parliamentary	   regime.	  Also,	   he	   rejects	   Cheibub’s	   (2007)	   claim	   that	   a	   military	   legacy	   explains	   the	  breakdown	   of	   presidential	   democracies.	   His	   research	   showed	   that	  presidential	  systems	  collapse	  because	  of,	  first,	  ineffective	  legislatures	  that	  are	  unable	  to	  keep	  civil	  oversight	  over	  the	  military	  and,	  second,	  an	  unfavourable	  U.S.	   foreign	   policy.	   Finally,	   recent	   research	   has	   questioned	   the	   validity	   of	  concepts	   like	   ‘presidentialism’	  and	   ‘parliamentarism’	   (Cheibub	  et	  al.,	  2010	   ;	  Fortin,	   2012).	   Given	   the	   institutional	   variation	   within,	   in	   particular,	  presidential	   systems	   the	   explanatory	   power	   of	   the	   concept	   is,	   according	   to	  these	  scholars,	  open	  to	  question.	  	   In	   sum,	   there	   are	   strong	   theoretical	   arguments	   against	   presidential	  government.	   While	   the	   empirical	   evidence	   to	   support	   these	   arguments	   is	  disputed,	   there	   are	   also	   plenty	   of	   studies	   that	   seem	   to	   confirm	   these	  theoretical	   arguments	   in	   practice.	   Whatever	   the	   validity	   of	   the	   arguments	  and	  the	  status	  of	  the	  empirical	  evidence,	  we	  can	  at	  least	  safely	  conclude	  that	  most	  scholars	  support	  the	  notion	  that	  parliamentary	  democracies	  live	  longer	  than	  their	  presidential	  counterparts	  (Lijphart,	  2004:	  102).	  This	  conclusion	  is	  based	  on	  the	  underlying	  assumption	  that	  presidential	  systems	  are	  inherently	  more	  prone	   to	   institutional	   conflicts	   than	  parliamentary	   systems.	  But	  what	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about	  semi-­‐presidentialism?	  During	  the	  third	  wave	  of	  democratisation,	  many	  newly	  independent	  states	  opted	  for	  a	  semi-­‐presidential	  form	  of	  government.	  What	  are	  the	  theoretical	  arguments	  for	  and	  against	  this	  system	  and	  what	   is	  the	  empirical	  evidence	  to	  support	  these	  arguments?	  	  
Semi-­presidential	  systems	  Does	   a	   semi-­‐presidential	   framework	   promote	   political	   stability	   and	  strengthen	   a	   democratic	   system?	  Or,	   perhaps	  more	   precisely,	   does	   a	   semi-­‐presidential	  institutional	  framework	  encourage	  political	  actors	  to	  respect	  the	  rule	   of	   law	   and	   democracy?	   This	   is	   an	   important	   theoretical	   question	  with	  high	   practical	   relevance.	   Almost	   one-­‐third	   of	   the	   countries	   currently	   in	  existence	  operate	  under	  a	  semi-­‐presidential	  system	  and	  many	  of	  them	  have	  little	  or	  no	  democratic	   tradition	  (Elgie,	  2007b:	  1).	  Yet,	   there	   is	  no	  academic	  consensus	   as	   to	   whether	   a	   semi-­‐presidential	   system	   makes	   or	   breaks	   a	  democratic	   regime.	   Most	   of	   the	   young	   semi-­‐presidential	   democracies	   in	  Central	   and	   in	   Eastern	   Europe,	   in	   Africa,	   and	   in	   Asia	   have	   previously	  experienced	   nothing	   but	   non-­‐democratic	   rule	   by	   the	   military,	   dictators	   or	  authoritarian	   leaders.	   These	   new	   and	   thus	   often	   fragile	   democracies	  therefore	  need	  a	  supportive	  institutional	  framework	  that	  provides	  incentives	  for	   efficient	   co-­‐operation	   and	   effective	   governance.	   To	   what	   extent	   does	  semi-­‐presidentialism	  generate	  such	  a	  framework?	  When	   discussing	   semi-­‐presidentialism,	   the	   first	   issue	   that	   arises	   is	  how	  to	  define	  semi-­‐presidentialism	  and,	  thus,	  how	  to	  classify	  the	  set	  of	  semi-­‐presidential	   countries.	  Maurice	  Duverger	   (1980:	  166)	  defines	   the	  system	   in	  the	   following	  way:	   ‘[a]	  political	   regime	   is	   considered	  as	   semi-­‐presidential	   if	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the	   constitution	   which	   established	   it	   combines	   three	   elements:	   (1)	   the	  president	   of	   the	   republic	   is	   elected	   by	   universal	   suffrage;	   (2)	   he	   possesses	  quite	   considerable	   powers;	   (3)	   he	   has	   opposite	   him,	   however,	   a	   prime	  minister	  and	  ministers	  who	  possess	  executive	  and	  governmental	  power	  and	  can	  stay	  in	  office	  only	  if	  the	  parliament	  does	  not	  show	  its	  opposition	  to	  them’.	  His	  definition	  has	  often	  been	  criticised	  for	  being	  vague	  (Bahro	  et	  al.,	  1998)	  or	  imprecise	   (Pasquino,	   2005)	   and	   led	   other	   scholars	   to	   redefine	   the	   concept	  (Sartori,	  1994;	  Elgie,	  1999;	  Elgie,	  2004)	  or	  to	  specify	  semi-­‐presidentialism	  by	  subdividing	   it	   into	   premier-­‐presidential	   and	   president-­‐parliamentarian	  systems	  (Shugart	  and	  Carey,	  1992).	  	  Essentially,	   some	   authors	   consider	   Duverger’s	   definition	   inadequate	  because	   it	   does	   not	   set	   boundaries	   with	   respect	   to	   presidential	   powers.	  Duverger’s	   second	   characteristic	   of	   semi-­‐presidential	   systems,	   namely	   that	  the	   president	   ‘possesses	   quite	   considerable	   powers’	   does	   not	   explain	   the	  scope	  of	   powers	   a	  president.	  Additionally,	   Samuels	   and	   Shugart	   (2010:	   29)	  point	   out	   that	   the	   definition	   is	   also	   vague	   about	   the	   1)	   the	   survival	   of	   the	  president,	   2)	   the	   origin	   of	   the	   prime	   minister	   and	   the	   cabinet,	   and	   3)	   the	  sources	   of	   prime	   ministerial	   and	   cabinet	   survival.	   Thus	   to	   whom	   is	   the	  president	   accountable?	   How	   are	   the	   prime	   and	   the	   cabinet	   selected	   and	  removed	   from	   office	   in	   semi-­‐presidential	   systems?	   Moreover,	   some	   semi-­‐presidential	   systems	   allow	   the	   president	   to	   select	   and	   deselect	   the	   prime	  minister	   and	   cabinet.	   So,	   the	   third	   property	   of	  Duverger’s	   concept	   of	   semi-­‐presidentialism,	  namely	  that	  ‘the	  prime	  minister	  and	  ministers	  can	  only	  stay	  in	  office	  if	  the	  parliament	  does	  not	  show	  its	  opposition	  to	  them’	  is,	  therefore,	  inadequate.	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The	   dubious	   validity	   of	   Duverger’s	   definition	   complicated	   the	   study	  into	   the	   effects	   of	   semi-­‐presidentialism	   because	   scholars	   could	   not	   agree	  which	  countries	  should	  be	  classed	  as	  semi-­‐presidential	  regimes.	   In	  order	   to	  distinguish	   semi-­‐presidential	   regimes	   from	   their	   presidential	   and	  parliamentary	  counterparts	  Elgie	  (1999:	  13)	  defined	  semi-­‐presidentialism	  as	  ‘the	  situation	  where	  a	  popularly	  elected	  fixed-­‐term	  president	  exist	  alongside	  a	   prime	  minister	   and	   a	   cabinet	  who	   are	   responsible	   to	   parliament’.	   Elgie’s	  definition	   leaves	   out	   ‘the	   power	   of	   the	   president’	   as	   a	   discriminatory	  property	  of	  semi-­‐presidential	  regimes.	  His	  definition	  has	  generally	  been	  used	  by	   scholars	   on	   semi-­‐presidentialism	   (Neto	   and	   Strøm,	   2006;	   Cheibub	   and	  Chernykh,	   2009;	   Schleiter	   and	  Morgan-­‐Jones,	   2009)	   and	  will	   be	   adopted	   in	  this	  work	  as	  well.	  	  	  
Theoretical	  arguments	  The	   outstanding	   feature	   of	   semi-­‐presidentialism	   is	   the	   existence	   of	   an	  executive	  with	  two	  sources	  of	  legitimacy:	  one	  direct	  and	  one	  indirect.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  there	  is	  a	  popularly	  elected	  president	  and,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  there	  is	   a	   prime	   minister	   whose	   mandate	   is	   founded	   upon	   the	   confidence	   of	  parliament.	   Most,	   if	   not	   all,	   of	   the	   arguments	   for	   and	   against	   semi-­‐presidentialism	   are	   based	   upon	   this	   particular	   feature.	   According	   to	  supporters,	  this	  organisation	  of	  the	  executive	  has	  three	  advantages.	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First,	  some	  scholars	  argue	  that	  a	  dual	  authority	  structure	  encourages	  horizontal	   accountability	   (Blondel,	   1984;	   Novais,	   2007;	   Pasquino,	   2007).4	  Under	  presidentialism,	  executive	  power	   is	   concentrated	   in	   the	  hands	  of	   the	  president,	  whereas	  in	  a	  semi-­‐presidential	  system	  this	  power	  is	  shared	  by	  the	  president	  and	  the	  prime	  minister.	  The	  separation	  of	  power	  encourages	  each	  of	   the	   executive	   authorities	   to	   check	   the	   power	   of	   the	   other.	   Jean	   Blondel	  (1984:	  87)	   suggests	   that	   in	  particular	   countries	  with	   a	  plural	   society	   and	  a	  weak	   party	   system,	   presidential	   systems	   easily	   slip	   down	   into	   ‘Caesarism’,	  whereas	   parliamentary	   systems	  widen	   social	   divisions	   .	   He	   points	   out	   that	  ‘neither	  parliamentarism	  nor	  constitutional	  presidentialism	  can	  be	  expected	  to	  bring	   about	   a	   solution	   to	   the	  problems	  of	   a	   country	   in	  which	   efforts	   are	  made	  to	  set	  up	  a	  pluralist	  system	  but	  where	  the	  party	  configuration	  is	  weak	  or	   insufficiently	   streamlined’	   (1984:	   88).	   ‘A	   dual	   leadership	   system’,	   he	  continues,	  ‘may	  provide	  a	  combination	  of	  authority	  and	  flexibility	  which	  can	  create	   the	   necessary	   conditions	   for	   a	   more	   stable	   regime’	   (1984:	   88).	   A	  similar	   conclusion,	   but	   one	   based	   on	   a	   West	   European	   context,	   has	   been	  drawn	   by	   Gianfranco	   Pasquino	   (2007).	   According	   to	   him,	   power-­‐sharing	  within	  the	  executive	  offers	  the	  possibility	  to	  check	  the	  power	  of	   institutions	  and	   office	   holders	   ‘especially,	   though	   not	   at	   all	   exclusively,	   in	   times	   of	  cohabitation’	   (2007:	   27).	   In	   short,	   the	   dual	   authority	   structure	   limits	  executive	  authority	  and,	  by	  doing	  so,	  it	  improves	  the	  quality	  and	  durability	  of	  new	  democratic	  regimes.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	   Horizontal	   accountability	   is	   the	   capacity	   of	   state	   institutions	   to	   check	   abuses	   by	  other	   public	   agencies	   and	   branches	   of	   government.	   See:	   O'Donnell,	   G.	   A.	   (1998)	  'Horizontal	  Accountability	  in	  New	  Democracies',	  Journal	  of	  Democracy,	  9,	  112-­‐126.	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Second,	   the	   dual	   nature	   of	   executive	   authority	   in	   semi-­‐presidential	  regimes	  may	   encourage	   power-­‐sharing	   in	   young	   democracies	   (Shugart	   and	  Carey,	   1992;	   Elgie,	   2007a).	   Elgie	   explains:	   ‘In	   a	   country	   where	   there	   is	   an	  intense	  political	  conflict	  between	  two	  opposing	  forces,	  semi-­‐presidentialism	  creates	   the	   potential	   for	   power	   to	   be	   shared.	   One	   force	   can	   hold	   the	  presidency	  at	  the	  same	  time	  as	  the	  other	  force	  holds	  the	  premiership.	  If	  each	  force	   has	   an	   institutional	   stake	   in	   the	   system,	   then	   the	   chances	   of	   both	  supporting	  the	  system	  as	  a	  whole	  are	  assumed	  to	  be	  greater	  than	  if	  there	  is	  a	  presidential-­‐style	  winner-­‐take-­‐all	   system’	   (2007a:	   55).	   A	   somewhat	   similar	  position	   is	   taken	   by	   Shugart	   and	   Carey	   who	   consider	   that	   premier-­‐presidentialism	  –	  a	  semi-­‐presidential	   subtype	  –	  encourages	  negotiation	  and	  compromise	   between	   political	   opponents	   (1992:	   120).	   Thus,	   according	   to	  this	   line	   of	   thinking,	   semi-­‐presidentialism	   with	   its	   dual	   executive	   has	   the	  potential	   to	   motivate	   group	   leaders	   to	   resolve	   inter-­‐group	   conflict	   and	  support	  the	  democratic	  system.	  	  Third,	   a	   semi-­‐presidential	   constitution	   combines	   the	   strength	   of	   a	  presidential	   system	  with	   the	   flexibility	   of	   a	   parliamentary	   system	   (Sartori,	  1994;	   Pasquino,	   1997).	   Indeed,	   Arend	   Lijphart	   argues	   that	   semi-­‐presidentialism	   ‘combines	   the	   best	   of	   both	   [constitutional]	   worlds’	   (1994:	  104,	  fn.7).	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  direct	  election	  of	  a	  fixed-­‐term	  president	  can	  provide	  the	  system	  with	  political	  stability	  and	  legitimacy.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  semi-­‐presidential	  systems	  are	  flexible	  and	  able	  to	  adapt	  to	  changing	  political	  circumstances	  (Blondel,	  1984:	  88).	  Even	  one	  of	  the	  staunchest	  opponents	  of	  semi-­‐presidential	   regimes	   admitted	   that	   ‘a	   bipolar	   system	   allows	   the	  president	   to	   change	   the	   prime	   minister	   and	   to	   change	   policies	   without	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creating	   a	   crisis	   in	   the	   system	   or	   even	   within	   the	   party	   that	   forms	   the	  government’	   (Linz,	   1994:	   54).	   Giovanni	   Sartori	   (1994)	   asserts	   that	   semi-­‐presidential	   systems	   can	   much	   better	   cope	   with	   a	   split	   majority	   than	  presidential	  regimes.	  In	  semi-­‐presidential	  system,	  he	  explained,	  ‘the	  problem	  of	   divided	   majorities	   finds	   a	   solution	   by	   ‘head	   shifting’	   by	   reinforcing	   the	  authority	   of	  whoever	   obtains	   the	  majority	   (Sartori,	   1994:	   125).’	   He	   argues	  that	  the	  flexible	  dual	  authority	  structure	  allows	  changes	  in	  the	  relative	  power	  of	  the	  president	  and	  prime	  minister	  as	  the	  majority	  combinations	  change.	  A	  split	  majority	   in	   semi-­‐presidential	   systems	  may	   even	   release	   some	   societal	  pressure:	  during	  mid-­‐term	  elections	  people	  may	  opt	  for	  cohabitation	  in	  order	  to	  show	  their	  displeasure	  with	  the	  government	  (Samuels	  and	  Shugart,	  2010:	  260).	   In	   sum,	   the	   dual	   executive	   of	   semi-­‐presidential	   systems	   enhances	  democratic	   stability	   not	   only	   because	   it	   has	   all	   the	   advantages	   of	   the	  existence	  of	   a	  president	  but	   also	  because	   the	   system	  can	  better	   respond	   to	  changing	   political	   preferences	   and,	   by	   doing	   so,	   help	   to	   release	   societal	  pressure.	  	  An	   important	  part	  of	   scholarship	  on	   constitutional	  design	   concludes,	  however,	   that	   institutional	   tensions	   are	   inherent	   in	   the	   semi-­‐presidential	  structure	   (Linz,	   1994;	   Linz	   and	   Stepan,	   1996;	   Skach,	   2005a).	   According	   to	  these	   academics,	   semi-­‐presidential	   constitutions	   produce	   a	   number	   of	  volatile	  institutional	  configurations,	  or	  situations,	  in	  which	  tensions	  between	  the	  president,	  the	  prime	  minister	  and	  the	  legislature	  may	  evolve	  into	  serious	  conflict	   and	   sometimes	   in	   a	   democratic	   breakdown.	   In	   addition,	   the	   semi-­‐presidential	   system	   is	   supposed	   to	   encourage	   ‘hyper-­‐presidentialism’	  (Lijphart,	  2004)	  and	  coups	  d’état.	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Cohabitation	   is	  a	   situation	  specific	   to	   semi-­‐presidentialism	  and	  often	  associated	  with	  democratic	  instability	  (Linz	  and	  Stepan,	  1996;	  Skach,	  2005a;	  Kirschke,	   2007).	   Under	   cohabitation	   the	   cabinet	   is	   supported	   by	   a	  parliamentary	   majority	   but	   the	   president	   and	   prime	   minister	   are	   from	  
opposing	  parties	  and	  the	  president’s	  party	  is	  not	  represented	  in	  the	  cabinet.	  In	   such	   circumstances,	   the	   semi-­‐presidential	   system	   induces	   a	   struggle	   for	  power	  between	  the	  president	  and	  the	  prime	  minister	  and	  creates	  a	  situation	  in	  which	  at	  best	  decision-­‐making	  will	  be	  paralysed	  and	  at	  worst	  will	  lead	  to	  a	  constitutional	   crisis.	   A	   legislative	   paralysis	   is	   the	   likely	   outcome	   when	   the	  president	   uses	   his	   or	   her	   power	   to	   delay	   or	   to	   block	   decision-­‐making.	   A	  constitutional	   crisis	   may	   occur	   when	   a	   political	   actor	   (often	   the	   military	  and/or	   the	   president)	   feels	   the	   need	   to	   resolve	   the	   political	   stalemate	   by	  illegal	   means.	   As	   a	   consequence,	   Linz	   and	   Stepan	   explain,	   the	   system	   is	  delegitimized:	   ‘When	   supporters	   of	   one	   or	   the	   other	   component	   of	   semi-­‐presidentialism	  feel	  that	  the	  country	  would	  be	  better	  of	  if	  one	  branch	  of	  the	  democratically	   legitimated	   structure	   of	   rule	   would	   disappear	   or	   be	   closed,	  the	  democratic	  system	  is	  endangered	  and	  suffers	  an	  overall	  loss	  of	  legitimacy,	  since	   those	   questioning	   one	   or	   the	   other	  will	   tend	   to	   consider	   the	   political	  system	  undesirable	  as	  long	  as	  the	  side	  they	  favour	  does	  not	  prevail’	  (Linz	  and	  Stepan,	   1996:	   286).	   In	   sum,	   these	   scholars	   reveal	   a	   causal	   relationship	  between	  cohabitation	  and	  democratic	  breakdown.	  A	   second	   problematic	   scenario	   is	   designated	   by	   Skach	   as	   ‘divided	  minority	   government’	   (2005a;	   2005c).	   These	   are	   governments	   that,	  according	   to	   her,	   combine	   ‘the	  most	   risk-­‐prone	   subtype	   of	   presidentialism	  (divided	  government)	  with	  the	  most	  risk-­‐prone	  subtype	  of	  parliamentarism	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(minority	   government).	   It	   combines,	   potentially,	   the	  worst-­‐case	   scenario	   of	  both	   these	   frameworks	   –	   the	   gridlock	   of	   presidentialism	   with	   the	   cabinet	  instability	   of	   parliamentarism	   –	   into	   one’	   (Skach,	   2005c:	   124).	   In	   a	   divided	  minority	  government	  neither	   the	  president	  nor	   the	  prime	  minister,	  nor	  any	  party	   or	   coalition,	   enjoys	   a	  majority	   in	   the	   legislature.	   ‘The	   absence	   of	   any	  clear	   majority	   in	   a	   semi-­‐presidential	   system’,	   she	   argues,	   ‘can	   predictably	  lead	   to	   an	   unstable	   scenario,	   characterized	   by	   shifting	   legislative	   coalitions	  and	   government	   reshuffles,	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   and	   continuous	   presidential	  intervention	  and	   the	  use	  of	   reserved	  powers,	   on	   the	  other’	   (2005a:	  17-­‐18).	  Furthermore,	   instability	  may	  grow:	   ‘The	  greater	   the	   legislative	   immobilism,	  governmental	  instability,	  and	  cabinet	  reshuffling	  resulting	  from	  the	  minority	  position	   of	   the	   government,	   the	   more	   justified	   or	   pressured	   the	   president	  may	  feel	  to	  use	  his	  powers	  beyond	  their	  constitutional	  limit,	  for	  a	  prolonged	  period	  of	  time’	  (2005a:	  18).	  	  Divided	   government	   is	   another	   situation	   that	   is	   likely	   to	   provoke	  institutional	   confrontations.	   Shugart	   defines	   a	   divided	   government	   as	   a	  situation	   in	   which	   a	   legislative	   majority	   is	   held	   by	   a	   party	   or	   pre-­‐election	  coalition	  which	  is	  different	  from	  that	  of	  the	  president	  (as	  cited	  in	  Elgie,	  2001:	  4).	   This	   form	  of	   ‘cohabitation	   between	   the	   government	   and	   the	   legislature’	  may	  paralyse	  the	  legislative	  process	  (Paloheimo,	  2001).	  Friction	  between	  the	  government	   and	   the	   legislature	   may	   lead	   to	   a	   low	   number	   of	   government	  bills	  presented	  to	  the	  parliament.	  	  The	   inverse	   of	   cohabitation,	   namely	   the	   situation	   where	   the	  president’s	  party	   is	   represented	   in	   the	  cabinet	  perhaps	  as	   the	   sole	  party,	   is	  also	   considered	  by	   some	   to	  be	  dangerous.	  For	   some,	   this	   scenario	  provides	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room	   for	   the	   president	   to	   accumulate	   executive	   and	   legislative	   power,	  leading	  to	  hyper-­‐presidentialism	  (Lijphart,	  2004;	  Pasquino,	  2007).	  When	  the	  president	   is	   the	   de	   facto	   party	   leader,	   the	   importance	   of	   the	   government’s	  accountability	   to	   the	  parliament	  vanishes	  because	   the	  prime	  minister	   is	   the	  president’s	   subordinate	   (Duverger,	   1980;	   Samuels	   and	   Shugart,	   2010).	   In	  other	  words,	  the	  ambition	  of	  the	  president	  is	  not	  countered	  by	  the	  ambition	  of	  the	  prime	  minister,	  leading	  the	  former	  to	  encroach	  upon	  the	  power	  of	  the	  government	  and	  parliament.	  The	  concentration	  of	  power	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  one	  popularly	   elected	   office	   holder	   may	   result	   in	   ‘political	   and	   institutional	  degeneration’	  (Pasquino,	  2007:	  25).	  Another	   argument	   is	   that	   semi-­‐presidential	   systems	   are	   inherently	  susceptible	  to	  institutional	  conflicts	  in	  the	  area	  of	  defence.	  This	  argument	  is	  again	  formulated	  by	  Linz	  (1994:	  57-­‐59)	  who	  examined	  the	   impact	  of	  a	  dual	  executive	   on	   the	   command	   and	   control	   of	   the	   armed	   forces.	   According	   to	  Linz,	   a	   dual	   executive	   system	   complicates	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	  executive	   and	   the	  military.	  Under	   semi-­‐presidentialism,	   there	  may	  be	   three	  or	   even	   four	   actors	   in	   this	   domain:	   the	   president,	   the	   prime	   minister,	   the	  minister	  of	  defence,	  and	  generally	  a	  joint	  chief	  of	  staff	  who	  has	  the	  immediate	  command	   of	   the	   forces.	   This	   complexity	   provides	   room	   for	   the	  military	   to	  manoeuvre	  by	  playing	  the	  democratically	  elected	  authorities	  off	  against	  each	  other	  in	  order	  to	  promote	  its	  own	  interests.	  Thus,	  to	  Linz,	  the	  involvement	  of	  many	   actors	   in	   command	   and	   control	   of	   the	   armed	   forces	   complicates	   the	  relationship	   between	   the	   executive	   and	   the	   military	   and	   leaves	   room	   for	  ‘constitutional	   ambiguities	   regarding	   one	   of	   the	   central	   issues	   of	   many	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democracies:	  the	  subordination	  of	  the	  military	  to	  the	  democratically	  elected	  authorities	  and	  hopefully	  civilian	  supremacy’	  (Linz,	  1994:	  59).	  	  A	  final	  argument	  is	  of	  a	  different	  nature.	  Scholars	  like	  Elgie	  (2005)	  and	  Shugart	   (Shugart	   and	   Carey,	   1992;	   Shugart,	   2005;	   Samuels	   and	   Shugart,	  2010)	   do	   not	   condemn	   semi-­‐presidentialism	   as	   a	   whole	   but	   single	   out	  specific	   semi-­‐presidential	   forms	   that	   they	   consider	   perilous	   to	   the	  institutional	   stability	   of	   new	   democracies.	   Elgie	   (2005)	   distinguishes	   three	  semi-­‐presidential	   formats:	   1)	   highly	   presidentialised	   semi-­‐presidential	  regimes,	   2)	   semi-­‐presidential	   regimes	   with	   ceremonial	   presidents,	   and	   3)	  semi-­‐presidential	   regimes	   with	   a	   balance	   of	   presidential	   and	   prime-­‐ministerial	   powers.	   He	   concludes	   that	   the	   experience	   of	   highly	  presidentialised	  semi-­‐presidential	  countries	  has	  tended	  to	  be	  negative,	  while	  the	   experience	   of	   parliamentary-­‐like	   semi-­‐presidential	   regimes	   with	  ceremonial	  presidents	  and	  strong	  prime	  ministers	  has	  tended	  to	  be	  positive.	  The	   democratic	   performance	   of	   balanced	   semi-­‐presidential	   systems	   is	  unclear:	   ‘whereas	   some	   regimes	   have	   managed	   to	   navigate	   potentially	  problematic	   democratization	   processes,	   others	   have	   ended	   up	  with	   failure’	  (2005:	  110).	  Shugart	  and	  Carey	  (1992:	  55)	  introduce	  a	  further	  subdivision	  of	  semi-­‐presidentialism	   into	   premier-­‐presidential	   and	   president-­‐parliamentary	  systems.	   The	   principal	   difference	   between	   both	   subtypes	   of	   semi-­‐presidentialism	  is	  that	  in	  president-­‐parliamentary	  systems	  the	  head	  of	  state	  is	   empowered	   to	   dismiss	   the	   prime	   minister	   and	   his	   or	   her	   cabinet.	   To	  Shugart	   and	   Carey	   this	   particular	   trait	   leads	   to	   unstable	   cabinets	   and	  regimes,	   in	   particular	   when	   the	   president	   and	   assembly	   are	   of	   opposing	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tendencies	   (1992:	   125).	   The	   root	   of	   the	   problem,	   according	   to	   them,	   is	  related	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   presidential-­‐parliamentary	   institutions	   provide	   no	  incentive	   for	   negotiation	   between	   the	   two	   democratically	   elected	   players	  over	   the	   composition	   of	   the	   cabinet.	   Simply	   put,	  why	   should	   the	   president	  nominate	  a	  prime	  minister	   that	   is	  more	  acceptable	   to	   the	  assembly	   than	   to	  his	   or	   her	   own	   liking?	  Whilst	   the	   assembly	   can	   fire	   a	   prime	   minister,	   she	  cannot	  appoint	  him	  or	  her.	  As	  a	  consequence,	   the	  assembly’s	  only	  means	  of	  affecting	  the	  constitution	  of	  the	  cabinet	  is	  just	  to	  dismiss	  it.	  The	  asymmetrical	  power	   balance	   creates	   an	   ‘appointment	   and	   dismissal	   game’:	   the	   president	  appoints	  his	   favourite	  candidate	   for	   the	  post	  of	  prime	  minister	  who	   then	   is	  dismissed	   by	   an	   unhappy	   assembly	   (Shugart	   and	   Carey,	   1992:	   121).	   They	  conclude	   that	   when	   the	   president	   and	   the	   assembly	   are	   at	   odds,	   the	  arrangement	   is	   disadvantageous	   for	   the	   cabinet	   and	   regime	   stability.	  Premier-­‐presidentialism,	   they	  hold,	  does	  not	   incite	  a	   similar	   cat-­‐and-­‐mouse	  game	   but	   encourages	   negotiation	   and	   compromise	   between	   the	   president	  and	  the	  assembly	  over	  the	  appointment	  of	  cabinet	  members	  at	  the	  outset	  of	  the	   appointment	   game	   (Shugart	   and	   Carey,	   1992:	   120).	   Under	   this	  democratic	  formula	  only	  the	  assembly	  may	  dismiss	  the	  cabinet.	  Whereas	  the	  president	  is	  empowered	  to	  nominate	  the	  prime	  minister,	  the	  final	  cabinet	  is	  dependent	  exclusively	  on	  the	  assembly	  for	  survival.	  In	  order	  to	  avoid	  cabinet	  instability	  or	  empty	  cabinet	  positions	  (when	  the	  assembly	  does	  not	  approve	  the	   presidential	   nominees)	   both	   actors	   need	   to	   come	   to	   a	   compromise.	   So	  premier-­‐presidentialism	  stimulates	  inclusive	  government	  where	  a	  president	  chooses	  a	  prime	  minister	  who	  is	  both	  acceptable	  to	  him	  or	  herself	  and	  to	  the	  legislature.	   In	   sum,	   a	   situation	   of	   cohabitation	   in	   premier-­‐presidential	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regimes	   may	   generate	   a	   problematic	   relationship	   within	   the	   executive,	  whereas	   in	   president-­‐parliamentary	   systems	   cohabitation	   may	   generate	  conflict	   between	   the	   president	   and	   the	   assembly.5	   Both	   situations	   are	  potentially	   destabilizing	   but	   according	   to	   Shugart	   and	   Carey,	   the	   risk	   of	   a	  regime	   crisis	   is	   especially	   great	   in	   president-­‐parliamentary	   regimes	   (1992:	  57).6	  	   A	   final	   word	   needs	   to	   be	   said	   about	   the	   theoretical	   arguments	   in	  favour	  and	  against	  semi-­‐presidential	  systems.	  Scholars	  that	  take	  up	  a	  positive	  stance	  on	  semi-­‐presidential	  systems	  generally	  assess	  its	  effect	  on	  ‘democratic	  quality’	   whereas	   critics	   measure	   the	   system’s	   impact	   on	   ‘democratic	  survival’.	   These	   dependent	   variables	   are	   empirically	   different:	  whereas	   the	  critics	   tend	   to	   examine	  whether	  or	  not	   a	  democratic	   regimes	  breaks	  down,	  supporters	   usually	   analyse	   to	   what	   extent	   the	   system	   enhances	   or	  undermines	  democratic	  development.	  	  
Empirical	  evidence	  Does	   the	   empirical	   evidence	   support	   the	   hypothesis	   that	   semi-­‐presidentialism	   has	   a	   positive	   impact	   on	   new	   democratic	   regimes?	   Firstly,	  does	   dual	   leadership	   indeed	   encourage	   horizontal	   accountability	   and	  peaceful	  power-­‐sharing?	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  case-­‐study	  research	  confirms	  that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Therefore,	  intra-­‐executive	  problems	  in	  premier-­‐presidential	  system	  are	  expected	  to	  occur	  after	  the	  inauguration	  of	  a	  new	  cabinet	  whereas	  executive-­‐legislative	  conflicts	  in	  president-­‐parliamentary	  regimes	  may	  take	  place	  before,	  during	  and	  after	  the	  installation	  of	  a	  new	  government.	  6	  Shugart	  and	  Carey	  thus	  assume	  that	  intra-­‐executive	  conflicts	  are	  less	  damaging	  to	  cabinet	  stability	  than	  institutional	  conflict	  between	  the	  executive	  and	  the	  assembly.	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in	  countries	  like	  Slovakia,	  Croatia	  and	  Lithuania	  the	  semi-­‐presidential	  system	  constrained	  the	  executive	  power	  (Kasapovic,	  2008;	  Malova	  and	  Rybar,	  2008).	  In	   Slovakia,	   the	   president	   effectively	   balanced	   the	   power	   of	   the	   ruling	  Merčiar	   government,	   whereas	   in	   Lithuania	   the	   semi-­‐presidential	   system	  ‘meant	   that	   too	   much	   power	   was	   not	   concentrated	   in	   the	   hands	   of	   one	  institution;	   it	   prevented	   the	   implementation	   of	   extreme	   policies’	  (Krupavičius,	   2008).	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   the	   semi-­‐presidential	   regimes	   of	  Guinea-­‐Bissau	   (Azevedo	   and	  Nijzink,	   2007),	  Mozambique	   (Manning,	   2007),	  Taiwan	  (Wu,	  2007),	  and	  some	  Eurasian	  countries	  (Huskey,	  2007;	  Arkadyev,	  2008;	   Birch,	   2008;	   Schleiter	   and	   Morgan-­‐Jones,	   2008)	   do	   not	   encourage	  horizontal	   accountability	   for	   the	   simple	   reason	   that	   the	   president	   chooses	  him/herself	   with	   whom	   to	   ‘share’	   power.	   Pasquino’s	   claim	   (2007)	   that	  power-­‐sharing	  within	  the	  executive	  offers	  the	  possibility	  to	  check	  the	  power	  of	  institutions	  and	  office	  holders	  especially	  in	  times	  of	  cohabitation	  does	  not	  hold	  when	  the	  president	  can	  select	  and	  sack	  a	  prime	  minister	  at	  will.	  To	  be	  sure,	   cohabitation	  does	  not	   restrain	  executive	  power	  when	   the	  constitution	  provides	  the	  president	  with	  legal	  means	  to	  prevent	  this	  situation.	  	  The	   case	   of	   Guinea-­‐Bissau	   also	   enfeebles	   the	   hypothesis	   that	   the	  flexibility	   of	   the	   system	   encourages	   democratic	   stability.	   As	   Azevedo	   and	  Nijzink	  (2007:	  156)	  explain:	   ‘In	  theory,	  a	  semi-­‐presidential	  design	   is	  said	  to	  keep	  the	  president	  more	  or	  less	  removed	  from	  daily	  politics,	  thus	  providing	  a	  degree	  of	  institutional	  flexibility.	  To	  the	  extent	  that	  this	  can	  be	  regarded	  as	  an	  advantage	   of	   semi-­‐presidentialism,	   Guinea-­‐Bissau	   does	   not	   experience	   this	  beneficial	   effect.’	   Taking	   Moldova	   as	   a	   case-­‐study,	   Steven	   Roper	   (2008b)	  argues	   that	   the	   flexibility	   found	   between	   the	   executives	   is	   a	   source	   of	   vice	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instead	  of	   strength.	  According	   to	  him,	   ‘the	  Moldova	   case	  demonstrates	   that	  this	   flexibility	   may	   actually	   lead	   to	   the	   entire	   political	   system	   being	  undermined	  and	  the	  end	  of	  semi-­‐presidentialism’	  (2008b:	  118).	  	  To	  what	  extent	  do	  arguments	  against	  semi-­‐presidential	  systems	  hold	  in	  a	  real-­‐world	  context?	  Are	  semi-­‐presidential	  systems	  indeed	  more	  prone	  to	  instability	   and	   democratic	   breakdown	   in	   new	   and	   fragile	   democracies?	   To	  what	   extent	   does	   a	   situation	   of	   cohabitation	   encourage	   intra-­‐executive	  conflict	  and	  democratic	  breakdown?	  Case-­‐study	  research	  reveals	  that	  only	  in	  Niger	   did	   a	   situation	   of	   cohabitation	   contribute	   directly	   to	   the	   fall	   of	  democracy.	   Niger	   exemplifies,	   to	   Sophia	   Moestrup,	   ‘a	   classical	   case	   of	  gridlock	  within	  the	  dual	  executive	  resulting	  in	  the	  breakdown	  of	  democracy’	  (Moestrup,	  2007:	  105).	  The	  president	  and	  the	  legislature’s	  jostling	  for	  control	  of	  government	  ended	  up	  in	  a	  presidential	  defeat	  when	  the	  former	  was	  forced	  to	  appoint	  a	  political	  opponent	  to	  head	  the	  government.	  The	  following	  period	  of	   cohabitation	   paralysed	   political-­‐decision-­‐making	   and	   encouraged	   the	  military	   to	   restore	   executive	   authority.	   Moestrup	   confirms	   the	   causal	  relationship	  between	  cohabitation	  and	  democratic	  breakdown:	  ‘The	  standoff	  between	   the	   president	   and	   the	   prime	   minister	   seriously	   discredited	   the	  democratic	   government	   and	   opened	   an	   opportunity	   for	   an	   authoritarian	  reversal.	   The	  political	   tensions	   resulting	   from	   cohabitation	   finally	   provided	  an	   excuse	   for	   the	   military	   to	   intervene	   on	   the	   political	   scene:	   the	   military	  took	   power	   in	   a	   coup	   on	   27	   January	   1996,	   justifying	   its	   action	   with	   the	  supposed	  threat	  of	  a	  civil	  war’	  (Moestrup,	  2007:	  114).	  In	  other	  countries,	  like	  Mongolia,	  cohabitation	  is	  said	  to	  have	  contributed	  to	  political	   instability	  but	  did	   not	   cause	   a	   democratic	   breakdown	   (Moestrup	   and	   Ganzorig,	   2007),	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whereas	   in	   Macedonia	   cohabitation	   even	   encouraged	   efficient	   governance	  (Frison-­‐Roche,	  2008:	  113).	  In	  his	  cross-­‐national	  study	  on	  the	  impact	  of	  semi-­‐presidentialism	   on	   democratic	   survival,	   Elgie	   (2008)	   confirms	   that	  cohabitation	  seldom	  leads	  to	  the	  fall	  of	  a	  democratic	  regime.	  Linda	  Kirschke	  (2007)	   draws,	   by	   contrast,	   a	   very	   different	   conclusion.	   She	   posits	   that	  executive	   power-­‐sharing	   or	   cohabitation	   under	   semi-­‐presidential	   systems	  leads	   to	   a	   high	   risk	   of	   authoritarian	   reversal	   in	   countries	   in	   Sub-­‐Sahara	  Africa.	   According	   to	   Kirschke’s	   regional	   study,	   between	   1990	   and	   October	  2005	   a	   total	   of	   twelve	   of	   the	   twenty-­‐three	   countries	   (52%)	   with	   semi-­‐presidential	  systems	  experienced	  a	  politically	  divided	  executive.	  Ten	  of	  these	  twelve	  cases	  (83%)	  suffered	  one	  or	  more	  coups.	  These	  research	  results,	  she	  maintained,	   ‘raise	   serious	   doubts	   regarding	   the	   compatibility	   of	  semipresidentialism	  with	  this	  region’	  (2007:	  1390).	  However,	  Kirschke	  does	  not	   classify	   relatively	   stable	   democracies,	   like	   Mozambique,	   as	   a	   semi-­‐presidential	  and	  used	   ‘cohabitation’	  as	  an	  umbrella	  term	  for	  different	  forms	  of	  political	  configurations.	  Military	  coups	  in	  Guinea-­‐Bissau	  were,	  according	  to	  Kirschke,	   provoked	   by	   a	   situation	   of	   cohabitation	   despite	   the	   fact	   that	   the	  President	  and	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  were	  members	  of	  the	  same	  political	  party	  (2007:	  fn.	  11).	  Empirical	   evidence	   supports	   Skach’s	   hypothesis	   that	   presupposes	   a	  relationship	  between	  a	  divided	  minority	  government	  and	  political	  instability.	  In	   Kyrgyzstan	   divided	   minority	   government	   compromised	   government	  performance	   and	   impeded	   democratic	   development	   (Huskey,	   2007)	   and	   in	  Lithuania	   it	   generated	   conflicts	   between	   presidents	   and	   parliaments	  (Krupavičius,	   2008).	   Divided	   minority	   government	   in	   Russia	   impaired	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governmental	   effectiveness	   (Schleiter	   and	  Morgan-­‐Jones,	  2008),	  whereas	   in	  Taiwan	   it	   led	   to	   a	   deterioration	   in	   effectiveness	   the	   country’s	   semi-­‐presidential	   system	   (Wu,	   2007).	   Russia	   is	   perhaps	   the	   clearest	   example	   of	  how	   a	   divided	   minority	   government	   may	   prevent	   a	   democracy	   from	  consolidating.	   According	   to	   Colton	   and	   Skach	   (2005),	   given	   Russia’s	   fluid,	  poorly	  institutionalized	  party	  system,	  neither	  the	  head	  of	  state	  nor	  the	  prime	  minister	  could	  count	  on	  a	  solid	  party	  majority	  in	  the	  legislature.	  As	  a	  result,	  they	   explain,	   Russia	   found	   itself	   with	   a	   divided	  minority	   government	   from	  day	  one.	  ‘It	  was	  a	  highly	  unstable	  structure,	  because	  neither	  executive	  had	  a	  legislative	   majority,	   but	   both	   had	   substantial	   access	   to	   decree-­‐making	  authority	  for	  bypassing	  the	  other	  branches	  of	  government.	  In	  short,	  ‘the	  stage	  was	  set	  for	  collision’	  (Colton	  and	  Skach,	  2005:	  118).	  The	  destabilizing	  effect	  of	   a	   divided	   minority	   government	   has	   also	   been	   tested	   and	   confirmed	   by	  Elgie’s	  (2008)	  cross-­‐national	  study.	  	  Case-­‐study	   research	   also	   confirms	   another	   peril	   of	   semi-­‐presidentialism,	   namely	   its	   tendency	   towards	   hyper-­‐presidentialism.	   In	  Guinea-­‐Bissau,	  Kyrgyzstan,	  Madagascar	  and	  Russia	  presidents	  have	  tended	  to	  personalise	   power.7	   In	   Guinea-­‐Bissau	   the	   return	   of	   Vieira	   (the	   former	  president	  of	  Guinea-­‐Bissau)	  on	  the	  political	  scene	  without	  the	  support	  of	  his	  former	  party	  and	  his	  subsequent	  return	  to	  power	   ‘are	  clear	   indications	  of	  a	  growing	   personalization	   of	   the	   presidency	   that	   could	   be	   an	   obstacle	   to	   the	  survival	  of	  democracy	  in	  Guinea-­‐Bissau’	  (Azevedo	  and	  Nijzink,	  2007:	  156).	  In	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  The	  so-­‐called	  ‘highly	  presidentialized	  semi-­‐presidential	  systems’	  see	  footnote	  4.	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Madagascar	  Charles	   Cadoux	   claims	   that	   the	  direct	   election	   of	   the	  president	  has	   ‘undoubtedly’	   contributed	   to	   the	   personalisation	   of	   power’	   (2007:	   96).	  According	  to	  him,	  presidential	  elections	  have	  ‘led	  to	  a	  very	  serious	  social	  and	  political	  crisis	  that	  was	  deeply	  disturbing	  for	  the	  people	  of	  Madagascar,	  as	  the	  country	  hovered	  on	  the	  edge	  of	  civil	  war’	  (2007:	  93).	  He	  concluded	  by	  saying	  that	   the	   Malagasy	   semi-­‐presidential	   model	   sometimes	   encourages	   certain	  authoritarian	  excesses.	  In	  2009,	  President	  Ravolamanana	  was	  removed	  from	  office	   for	   the	  very	  reason	   that	   the	  opposition	  no	   longer	  accepted	  what	   they	  claimed	   to	   be	   his	   dictatorial	   leadership.	   Also	   in	   Kyrgyzstan	   presidential	  elections	   led	   to	  a	   slide	   towards	  authoritarianism.	  Huskey	  points	  out:	   ‘Fresh	  off	  this	  victory,	  he	  [President	  Akaev]	  placed	  a	  referendum	  before	  the	  nation	  in	   February	   1996	   that	   included	   wholesale	   revisions	   to	   the	   Constitution,	  revisions	  that	  granted	  expansive	  powers	  to	  the	  presidency	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  parliament	   and	  prime	  minister.	   Eurasian	   semi-­‐presidentialism	  had	   come	  of	  age.	   Throughout	   his	   rule,	   Akaev	   used	   popular	   referendums	   to	   revise	   the	  constitution	   in	  ways	   that	   shored	   up	   presidential	   authority’	   (2007:	   166).	   In	  Russia,	  Timothy	  Colton	  and	  Skach	  (2005)	  insist	  that	  the	  president’s	  extensive	  legislative	  decree	  powers	  allow	  him	  to	  dominate	   the	  political	  process.	  They	  hold	   that	  Russia’s	  constitution	  potentially	   inspires	  governmental	   instability,	  parliamentary	  dissolutions	  and	  presidential	  dominance.	  The	  danger,	  as	  they	  see	  it,	  is	  that	  ‘(a)	  president	  who	  relies	  extensively	  on	  decrees	  and	  ignores	  the	  democratically	   elected	   legislature	   may	   move	   the	   country	   toward	  constitutional	  dictatorship’	  (2005:	  117).	  Moreover,	   empirical	   evidence	   neither	   supports	   nor	   rejects	   the	  hypothesis	   that	   suggests	   a	   causal	   relationship	   between	   the	   occurrence	   of	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military	   coups	   and	   semi-­‐presidential	   systems.	   Comparative	   research	   on	  military	   coups	   has	   not	   included	   the	   constitutional	   framework	   as	   a	   likely	  motive	   for	   the	   military	   to	   mix	   into	   politics.	   That	   said,	   a	   regional	   study	   on	  military	   coups	   in	   West-­‐Africa	   reveals	   that	   Cape-­‐Verde,	   a	   semi-­‐presidential	  democracy,	  has	  been	  the	  only	  country	  that	  did	  not	  experience	  a	  military	  coup	  between	  1955	  and	  2004	  (McGowan,	  2005).	  In	  their	  case-­‐study	  on	  the	  impact	  of	   semi-­‐presidentialism	   on	   democratic	   development	   in	   Guinea-­‐Bissau	  Azevedo	  and	  Nijzink	  conclude	  that	  the	  military	  play	  an	  important	  role	  in	  the	  functioning	   of	   the	   semi-­‐presidential	   system	   ‘especially	   because	   the	   highly	  presidentialised	  design	  seems	  to	  do	  little	  to	  keep	  non-­‐democratic	  tendencies	  in	   check’	   (2007:	   156).	   They	  do	  not	   explain,	   however,	   if	   and	   to	  what	   extent	  military	  coups	  are	  a	   result	   the	   supposed	  complex	  civil-­‐military	   relationship	  of	  semi-­‐presidential	  systems.	  The	  argument	  brought	  forward	  by	  Elgie	  (2005)	  and	  Shugart	  and	  Carey	  (Shugart	  and	  Carey,	  1992;	  Shugart,	  2005)	  that	  semi-­‐presidential	  systems	  do	  not	  form	  a	  coherent	  group	  and	  that	  under	  the	  rubric	  of	  semi-­‐presidentialism	  there	  is	  much	  variation	  both	  institutionally	  and	  behaviourally	  seems	  to	  hold	  out	   in	   practice.	   Cohabitation	   does	   not,	   for	   example,	   cause	   instability	   in	  president-­‐parliamentary	  regimes	   for	   in	   this	  system	  the	  president	  can	  select	  and	  sack	  the	  prime	  minister	  at	  will.	  In	  Russia	  or	  in	  Guinea-­‐Bissau	  presidents	  have	   simply	   fired	   their	   prime	  ministers	  when	   the	   latter	  disagreed	  with	   the	  former’s	  policy.	  So	  conflict	  between	  president	  and	  prime	  minister	  will	  not	  be	  expected	  when	   their	   relationship	   is	  hierarchical;	  only	  when	  both	  actors	  are	  forced	   to	   work	   (or	   transact)	   together	   can	   political	   infighting	   be	   expected.	  Thus,	  whereas	  cohabitation	  may	  provoke	  conflict	  between	  the	  president	  and	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the	   prime	  minister	   under	   a	   premier-­‐presidential	   system,	   inter-­‐institutional	  conflicts	  between	  the	  president	  and	  the	  legislature	  may	  disrupt	  a	  president-­‐parliamentary	   democracy.	   In	   practice,	   the	   president-­‐parliamentary	   regimes	  of	   Africa	   and	   Eurasia	   have	   proven	   to	   be	   much	   more	   unstable	   than	   their	  premier-­‐presidential	  counterparts	  predominantly	  located	  in	  Eastern	  Europe.	  Elgie’s	  study	  (2011a)	  compares	  the	  relative	  effects	  of	  the	  two	  main	  subtypes	  of	   semi-­‐presidentialism	   and	   confirmed	   that	   countries	   with	   president-­‐parliamentary	  constitutions	  have	  performed	  worse	  than	  those	  with	  premier-­‐presidential	   constitutions.	   He	   finds	   that	   ‘presidents	   and	   legislatures	   in	  president-­‐parliamentary	   systems	   have	   tried	   to	   govern	   against	   each	   other,	  whereas	   under	  premier-­‐presidentialism	   there	  has	   been	   a	   greater	   degree	   of	  cooperation’	   (2011a:	   176).	   So,	   premier-­‐parliamentary	   systems	   are	   less	  susceptible	   to	   institutional	   conflict	   than	   president-­‐parliamentary	   systems.	  Premier-­‐presidential	  democracies,	  therefore,	  live	  longer	  than	  their	  president-­‐parliamentary	  counterparts.	  	  In	  sum,	  scholars	  on	  semi-­‐presidentialism	  are	  divided	  as	  to	  whether	  or	  not	   the	   system	   supports	   the	  performance	  of	   democracy.	   Some	   scholars	   are	  convinced	   that	   semi-­‐presidential	   systems	   can	   provide	   the	   conditions	   for	  power-­‐sharing	   that	   can	   improve	   the	   democratic	   performance	   of	   young	  democracies,	  whereas	  many	  others	  claim	  that	  the	  system	  encourages	  tension	  within	  and	  between	  government	  institutions	  and	  that	  this	  leads	  to	  problems	  with	   democratic	   performance.	   Likewise,	   empirical	   evidence	   in	   support	   or	  against	  these	  arguments	  is	  contradictory	  and	  often	  contested.	  	  
	   32	  
Conclusion	  The	  global	  spread	  of	  the	  democratic	  political	  system	  has	  led	  to	  a	  voluminous	  literature	   that	   attempts	   to	   explain	   why	   some	   democracies	   survive	   while	  others	  collapse.	  Within	   this	  body	  of	   literature	   there	   is	  a	  debate	  as	   to	  which	  variable	   has	   the	   greatest	   explanatory	   power.	   One	   of	   the	   proposed	  mechanisms	  is	  the	  institutional	  design.	  An	  important	  strand	  of	  the	  literature	  on	   political	   institutions	   focuses	   on	   the	   executive-­‐legislative	   relations,	  more	  specifically,	   on	   the	   relative	   merits	   of	   presidentialism	   or	   parliamentarism.	  Most	   scholars	   conclude	   that	   parliamentarism	   is	   a	   more	   supportive	  constitutional	  framework	  for	  consolidating	  democracy	  than	  presidentialism.	  So	   far,	   the	   semi-­‐presidential	   system	   has	   been	   largely	   excluded	   from	   this	  debate.	   Initially,	   semi-­‐presidential	   studies	   focused	   on	   the	   definition	   of	   the	  concept	   in	   an	   attempt	   to	   theoretically	   emancipate	   the	   system	   from	  parliamentarism	  and	  presidentialism.	  Although	  by	  now	  there	  is	  an	  academic	  consensus	  on	  the	  definition	  of	  semi-­‐presidentialism,	  scholars	  are	  still	  divided	  on	   the	   issue	   as	   to	  whether	   the	   system	   strengthens	   or	  weakens	   democratic	  performance.	   Some	   authors	   believe	   that	   semi-­‐presidentialism	   provokes	   a	  damaging	  power	  struggle	   that	   threatens	   the	  stability	  of	  young	  democracies,	  whereas	   others	   are	   convinced	   that	   it	   can	   allow	   power	   sharing	   between	  competing	   forces,	   increasing	   the	   prospects	   of	   democratic	   consolidation.	   In	  addition,	   empirical	   evidence	   in	   support	   or	   against	   these	   arguments	   is	  contested.	   This	   thesis	   examines	   the	   political	   effects	   of	   a	   semi-­‐presidential	  system	  in	  a	  country	  specific	  context.	  Using	  Timor-­‐Leste	  as	  a	  case,	  it	  will	  test	  the	   hypotheses	   against	   and	   in	   favour	   of	   semi-­‐presidential	   systems.	   In	   the	  next	  chapter	  we	  will	  explain	  how	  we	  will	  test	  the	  rival	  hypotheses.	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CHAPTER	  2	  
Research	  Design	  	  The	  previous	  chapter	  demonstrated	  that	  scholars	  of	  semi-­‐presidentialism	  are	  divided	  on	  the	  question	  as	  to	  whether	  the	  system	  strengthens	  or	  weakens	  the	  performance	  of	  democracy.	  For	  the	  most	  part,	  the	  discussion	  focuses	  on	  the	  relative	   advantages	   and	   disadvantages	   of	   a	   dual	   executive.8	   Some	   scholars	  are	   convinced	   that	   the	   division	   of	   executive	   power	   between	   the	   president	  and	   the	  prime	  minister	   constrains	   executive	  power	   (Blondel,	   1984;	   Sartori,	  1994;	   Pasquino,	   2007),	   others	   think	   that	   a	   dual	   executive	   power	   may	  maintain	   or	   provoke	   serious	   conflict	   between	   the	   president	   and	   the	   prime	  minister	   (Skach,	   2005b;	  Kirschke,	   2007)	   and	   between	   the	   president,	   prime	  minister	  and	  defence	  minister	  (Linz,	  1994).	  Others	  claim	  that	  under	  certain	  political	  circumstances	  semi-­‐presidentialism	  allows	  presidents	  to	  accumulate	  hyper-­‐powers	   (Lijphart,	   2004).	   Moreover,	   there	   is	   conflicting	   empirical	  evidence	  in	  support	  or	  against	  these	  arguments.	  The	   aim	   of	   this	   work	   is	   to	   test	   these	   rival	   explanations.	   Do	  we	   find	  evidence	   in	   support	   of	   arguments	   that	   predict	   institutional	   conflict	   that	   is	  likely	   to	   lead	   to	   democratic	   collapse	   or	   do	   our	   findings	   indicate	   that	   semi-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  The	  term	  ‘dual	  executive’	  may	  be	  misleading	  since	  semi-­‐presidential	  constitutions	  often	  vest	  presidents	  and	  cabinets	  with	  legislative	  power.	  In	  order	  to	  avoid	  conceptual	  ambiguity	  we	  use	  president,	  prime	  minister	  and	  cabinet.	  Similarly,	  we	  use	  the	  term	  ‘parliament’	  instead	  of	  ‘legislature’	  since	  legislation	  is	  only	  one	  function	  of	  a	  parliament.	  The	  term	  ‘government’	  includes	  both	  ministers	  and	  secretaries	  of	  state.	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presidentialism	  does	  not	  encourage	  political	  conflict	  and,	  hence,	  that	  is	  likely	  to	  strengthen	  democratic	  performance?	  	  This	  chapter	   identifies	  how	  the	  rival	   interpretations	  will	  be	  tested.	   It	  opens	   by	   identifying	   the	   research	   question.	   The	   ‘case	   selection’	   section	  justifies	  the	  choice	  of	  a	  single	  country,	  Timor-­‐Leste,	  to	  examine	  the	  effects	  of	  semi-­‐presidentialism.	   Thereafter	   the	   dependent	   and	   independent	   variables	  are	   presented.	   The	   relationship	   between	   the	  president,	   prime	  minister	   and	  parliament	   is	   the	   dependent	   variable	   and	   may	   vary	   from	   cooperative	   to	  conflictual.	  The	  different	  institutional	  relationships	  within	  the	  executive	  and	  between	  the	  executive	  and	  the	  legislature	  are	  the	  independent	  variables.	  The	  subsequent	   section	   ‘observing	   conflict	   and	   cooperation’	   presents	   a	   list	   of	  indicators	  and	  the	  ‘sources’	  section	  discusses	  primary	  and	  secondary	  sources	  that	   have	   been	  used	   to	   observe	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	  president,	   prime	   minister	   and	   the	   parliamentary	   majority	   in	   Timor-­‐Leste.	  The	  chapter	  closes	  with	  an	  outline	  of	  structure	  of	  the	  thesis	  and	  a	  conclusion.	  	  
	  
Research	  question	  In	  the	  literature	  review,	  we	  singled	  out	  two	  general	  but	  opposing	  views	  of	  the	  effects	   that	   a	   semi-­‐presidential	   type	  of	   government	   is	   supposed	   to	  have	  on	  the	   democratic	   performance	   of	   nascent	   democracies.	   The	   central	   point	   of	  disagreement	   is	  whether	   power-­‐sharing	   between	   the	  president,	   on	   the	   one	  hand,	  and	  the	  prime	  minister	  on	  the	  other,	  discourages	  conflict	  that	  may	  help	  the	  consolidation	  of	  young	  democracies	  or	  whether,	  by	  contrast,	  it	  reflects	  or	  deepens	   political	   divisions	   that	   may	   paralyse	   the	   political	   process	   and,	   by	  extension,	  cause	  a	  democracy	  to	  breakdown.	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   Scholars	   assume	   that	   different	   government	   situations	   under	   semi-­‐presidentialism	   are	   associated	   with	   different	   outcomes	   in	   terms	   of	  democratic	  performance	  because	  of	   the	  different	   levels	   and	   type	  of	   conflict	  that	  these	  situations	  generate.	  For	  example,	  Linz	  (1994:	  55)	  argues	  that	  the	  result	  of	  cohabitation	  ‘inevitably	  is	  a	  lot	  of	  politicking	  and	  intrigues	  that	  may	  delay	  decision-­‐making	  and	  lead	  to	  contradictory	  policies	  due	  to	  the	  struggle	  between	   the	   president	   and	   prime	   minister’.	   Skach	   (2005b)	   uses	   the	   same	  logic	   when	   she	   wrote	   about	   the	   inherent	   risks	   of	   a	   divided	   minority	  government	  for	  the	  stability	  of	  young	  democracies:	  ‘the	  greater	  the	  legislative	  immobilism,	   government	   instability	   and	   cabinet	   reshuffling	   resulting	   from	  the	  minority	  position	  of	  the	  government,	  the	  more	  justified	  or	  pressured	  the	  president	  may	  feel	  to	  use	  his	  powers	  beyond	  their	  constitutional	   limit,	   for	  a	  prolonged	  period	  of	  time.	  […]	  This	  is	  why	  divided	  minority	  government,	  more	  than	   the	   other	   subtypes	   of	   semi-­‐presidentialism,	   has	   a	   greater	   risk	   for	  democratic	  breakdown’	  (2005b:	  18).	   In	  other	  words,	   the	   literature	  suggests	  the	  following	  causal	  sequence:	  	  	  
Figure	  2.1:	  Causal	  chain	  between	  semi-­presidential	  situations	  and	  
democratic	  performance	  	  Step	  1.	  Semi-­‐Presidential	  Situations	  -­‐>	  Step	  2.	  Conflict	  -­‐>	  	  Step	  3.	  Democratic	  Performance	  	  	   This	   project	   does	   not	   examine	   whether	   semi-­‐presidentialism	   affects	  democratic	   performance	   (i.e.	   steps	   1,	   2	   and	   3	   in	   Figure	   2.1),	   nor	   is	   it	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concerned	   whether	   institutional	   conflict	   supports	   or	   threatens	   democratic	  regimes	  (i.e.	  steps	  2	  and	  3).	  Instead,	  we	  focus	  on	  the	  first	  stage	  of	  the	  causal	  chain	  (steps	  1	  and	  2).	  This	  study	  aims	  to	  evaluate	  the	  relationship	  between	  semi-­‐presidential	   situations	   and	   institutional	   conflict.	   Scholars	   predict	   a	  certain	   political	   behaviour	   under	   different	   semi-­‐presidential	   situations.	   For	  instance,	   scholars	   assume	   that	   political	   situations	  where	   the	   president	   and	  prime	   minister	   are	   political	   opponents	   provoke	   more	   institutional	   conflict	  than	   situations	   in	  which	   both	   actors	   are	   political	   allies.	   If	  we	   do	   not	   find	   a	  relationship	   between	   semi-­‐presidential	   situations	   and	   institutional	   conflict	  (steps	   1	   to	   2),	   the	   general	   argument	   that	   semi-­‐presidentialism	   leads	   to	  democratic	   collapse	   (steps	   1	   to	   3)	   cannot	   be	   supported	   because	   this	  argument	   presupposes	   that	   democratic	   performance	   is	   caused	   by	  institutional	  conflict.	  	  	  	   It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  scholars	  draw	  different	  conclusions	  about	  the	  strength	   of	   the	   relationship	   between	   semi-­‐presidentialism	   and	   political	  behaviour.	   For	   instance,	   in	   the	   classic	   case	   of	   Weimar	   Germany	   Skach	  (2005b)	  found	  that	  semi-­‐presidentialism	  created	  institutional	  conflict,	  but	  in	  countries	   like	   Mongolia	   the	   system	   is	   said	   to	   have	   facilitated	   political	  instability	   (Moestrup	  and	  Ganzorig,	  2007).	   In	   the	  case	  of	  Weimar	  Germany,	  the	  claim	  about	  the	  relationship	   is	  very	  strong.	  Semi-­‐presidentialism	  causes	  conflict.	   By	   contrast,	   in	   Mongolia	   the	   claim	   is	   weaker.	   Here,	   the	   semi-­‐presidential	   system	   merely	   provided	   a	   forum	   where	   existing	   political	  preferences	   were	   expressed.	   In	   other	   words,	   in	   this	   latter	   case	   semi-­‐presidentialism	  did	  not	  necessarily	  create	  more	  conflict	  or	  cooperation,	  but	  provided	  an	   institutional	   framework	  within	  which	  existing	   levels	  of	   conflict	  
	   37	  
or	  cooperation	  could	  be	  expressed.	  In	  this	  thesis	  we	  are	  not	  concerned	  as	  to	  whether	  semi-­‐presidentialism	  causes	  or	  reflects	  conflict	   for	  both	  arguments	  are	  consistent	  with	  the	  first	  stage	  (steps	  1	  and	  2)	  of	  the	  causal	  chain.	  	   In	   sum,	   this	   thesis	   tests	   arguments	   that	   associate	   semi-­‐presidential	  situations	   with	   a	   political	   behaviour,	   that	   is,	   institutional	   conflict.	   Some	  political	  situations	  are	  expected	   to	  generate	  more	   institutional	  conflict	   than	  others.	   So,	   if	   the	   change	   in	   the	   government	   situation	   does	   not	   lead	   to	   a	  change	   in	   level	  of	   conflict	   there	  will	  be	   little	   to	   support	   these	  arguments.	   If	  we	  observe	  that	  the	  change	   in	  the	  government	  situation	  corresponds	  to	  the	  hypothesized	  variation	  in	  institutional	  conflict,	  then	  we	  have	  found	  evidence	  in	  favour	  of	  those	  arguments.	  In	  the	  latter	  case,	  our	  conclusion	  would	  support	  the	   critics	   of	   semi-­‐presidentialism	   who	   hold	   that	   the	   system	   generates	  institutional	   conflict.	   Such	  a	  conclusion	  might	   serve	  as	  a	  warning	   for	  young	  democracies	   given	   that	   the	   arguments	   are	   largely	   derived	   from	   empirical	  studies	   of	   nascent	   semi-­‐presidential	   democracies.	   Yet,	   it	   needs	   to	   be	  emphasized	   that	   this	   study	   does	   not	   and	   cannot	   support	   the	   general	  argument	   that	   links	   institutional	   conflict	   to	   democratic	   collapse.	   The	   key	  question	   that	   informs	   this	   project	   is	   to	   understand	   the	   effect	   of	   semi-­‐presidentialism	   on	   cooperation	   and	   conflict	   between	   the	   president,	  government	  and	  parliament.	  	  
Case	  selection	  We	  wish	  to	  test	  the	  empirical	  effects	  of	  different	  semi-­‐presidential	  situations	  on	  the	  level	  of	  conflict	  between	  the	  president,	  government	  and	  parliament.	  As	  noted	  in	  chapter	  1,	  scholars	  have	  studied	  the	  effect	  of	  semi-­‐presidentialism	  in	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large-­‐n	   studies	   (Cheibub	   and	   Chernykh,	   2009;	   Elgie,	   2011a;	   Elgie	   and	  McMenamin,	  2011),	  medium-­‐n	  studies	  (Elgie,	  1999;	  Protsyk,	  2006;	  Elgie	  and	  Moestrup,	   2007;	   Elgie	   and	  Moestrup,	   2008;	   Lobo	   and	  Neto,	   2009;	   Sedelius	  and	   Ekman,	   2010)	   and	   small-­‐n	   studies	   (Shoesmith,	   2003;	   Skach,	   2005b;	  Roper,	  2008a;	  Passarelli,	  2010).	  This	   thesis	  will	   focus	  on	   the	  effect	  of	  semi-­‐presidentialism	  in	  one	  country,	  Timor-­‐Leste.	  There	  are	  reasons	  why	  a	  single-­‐case	  study	  is	  an	  appropriate	  research	  strategy	  and	  there	  are	  various	  reasons	  why	   Timor-­‐Leste	   is	   an	   appropriate	   single	   case	   to	   address	   our	   research	  question.	  	   The	   first	   reason	  why	   a	   single-­‐case	   study	   is	   an	   appropriate	   research	  design	  is	  that	  it	  controls	  for	  the	  influence	  of	  many	  other	  contextual	  variables	  that	   scholars	   generally	   hold	   responsible	   for	   democratic	   change.	   Chapter	   1	  identified	  factors	  such	  as	  economic	  development,	  socio-­‐political	  divisions	  and	  international	   influences	   that	   are	   likely	   to	   have	   a	   profound	   impact	   on	  democratic	   performance.	  We	   accept	   that	   these	  non-­‐institutional	   factors	   are	  likely	   to	  affect	  democratic	  performance.	  Therefore,	  we	  have	  chosen	  a	  single	  case	  study	  so	  as	  to	  control	  for	  the	  influence	  of	  these	  factors	  and	  concentrate	  on	  the	  effect	  of	  semi-­‐presidentialism	  on	  the	  level	  of	  institutional	  conflict,	  the	  focus	  of	  this	  study.	  	   In	   addition,	   the	   utility	   of	   a	   single	   country	   case	   study	   relates	   to	   the	  state	   of	   current	   research	   in	   a	   particular	   field	   (Gerring,	   2007).	   In	   a	   field	  dominated	  by	  case	  studies	  there	  may	  be	  little	  need	  for	  another	  one,	  whereas	  in	   a	   field	   where	   cross-­‐case	   analyses	   are	   common	   in-­‐depth	   studies	   may	   be	  needed	   to	   focus	   on	   understudied	   cases.	   To	   date,	   multiple	   country	   studies	  (Duverger,	   1980;	   Kirschke,	   2007;	   Cheibub	   and	   Chernykh,	   2009;	   Elgie	   and	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McMenamin,	   2011)	   dominate	   the	   research	   field	   of	   semi-­‐presidentialism	  while	   within-­‐case	   analyses	   have	   been	   restricted	   to	   book	   sections	   (Shugart	  and	  Carey,	  1992;	  Elgie,	  1999;	  Elgie	  and	  Moestrup,	  2007;	  Elgie	  and	  Moestrup,	  2008;	  Lobo	  and	  Neto,	  2009;	  Elgie,	  2011a;	  Elgie	  et	  al.,	  2011)	  or	  journal	  articles	  (Fish,	   2001;	   Shoesmith,	   2003;	   Colton	   and	   Skach,	   2005).	   No	   large	   single-­‐country	   study	   has	   been	   devoted	   to	   examine	   the	   effects	   of	   semi-­‐presidentialism	  on	  institutional	  conflict.	  	   The	  main	  limitation	  of	  singe-­‐case	  study	  research	  is	  that	  it	  suffers	  from	  problems	   of	   representativeness	   because	   it	   includes	   only	   one	   case.	   Case	  studies	   can,	   however,	   test	   theories	   (King	   et	   al.,	   1994;	   George	   and	   Bennett,	  2005).	  By	  organizing	  facts	  in	  terms	  of	  observable	  implications	  of	  a	  theory	  we	  can	   evaluate	   the	   theory	   in	   question.	   Such	   a	   strategy,	   King	   et	   al.	   insist,	   ‘link	  theory	  and	  empirical	  work	  and	  can	  help	  overcome	  the	  dilemmas	  of	   small-­‐n	  research’	  (1994:	  227).	  To	  be	  sure,	  our	  study	  is	  not	  a	  chronological	  narrative	  but	  focused	  theory-­‐testing	  as	   it	   intends	  to	  evaluate	  different	  hypotheses.	  By	  engaging	   in	   theory-­‐testing	   we	   increase	   the	   opportunity	   to	   generalize	   the	  findings	   of	   this	   study	   for	   the	   literature	   on	   semi-­‐presidentialism	   and	  democratic	  performance.	  	   We	  chose	  Timor-­‐Leste	   to	   study	   the	  effect	  of	   semi-­‐presidentialism	  on	  institutional	   conflict.	   There	   are	   plenty	   of	   other	   young	   semi-­‐presidential	  democracies	  that	  could	  have	  been	  chosen	  and,	  as	  noted	  previously,	  scholars	  have	   studied	   different	   countries.	   Yet,	   we	   argue	   that	   Timor-­‐Leste	   is	   an	  appropriate	   choice	   to	   answer	   the	   central	   research	   question	   of	   this	   project.	  The	   reason	   for	   selecting	   Timor-­‐Leste	   is,	   first,	   that	   in	   the	   literature	   no	  confusion	  exists	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  country’s	  system	  of	  government.	  The	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previous	   chapter	   has	   demonstrated	   that	   scholars	   are	   divided	   about	   the	  classification	   of	   some	   countries	   as	   examples	   of	   semi-­‐presidential	   regimes.	  For	   instance,	   the	   political	   system	   of	   Tunisia	   or	   Djibouti	   is	   not	   always	  considered	   semi-­‐presidential	   (Elgie,	   2007b;	   Kirschke,	   2007)	   nor	   does	  scholarly	  consensus	  exist	  about	  the	  nature	  of,	  for	  example,	  the	  system	  of	  Sri	  Lanka,	   Ireland,	   Iceland	   or	   Austria	   (Sartori,	   1994).	   The	   political	   regime	   of	  Timor-­‐Leste	   has	   not	   been	   subject	   of	   academic	   controversy	   and	   has	   been	  consistently	  classified	  as	  semi-­‐presidential	  (Smith,	  2004b;	  Feijó,	  2006;	  Leach,	  2006;	   Simonsen,	   2006;	   Elgie,	   2007b;	   Shoesmith,	   2007;	   Vasconcelos	   and	  Cunha,	  2008;	  Reilly,	  2011).9	  	  Yet,	   the	   principal	   argument	   for	   selecting	   Timor-­‐Leste	   to	   study	   the	  effects	   of	   semi-­‐presidentialism	   is	   based	   on	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   country	  experienced	  different	  semi-­‐presidential	  situations	  in	  a	  relatively	  short	  period	  of	   time.	   As	   we	   shall	   see,	   over	   a	   ten-­‐year	   period	   Timor-­‐Leste’s	   semi-­‐presidential	   system	   generated	   three	   different	   political	   situations:	  cohabitation,	   divided	   government	   and	   unified	  majority	   government.	   In	   the	  literature,	   each	  of	   these	   situations	   is	   associated	  with	   a	   political	   outcome	   in	  terms	   of	   conflict.	   So,	   using	   Timor-­‐Leste	   as	   a	   case	   allows	   us	   to	   test	   these	  hypotheses	   about	   different	   semi-­‐presidential	   political	   situations	   and	  institutional	   conflict.	   Simply	   put,	   if	   we	   find	   that	   a	   change	   in	   the	   political	  situation	  does	  not	  lead	  to	  variation	  in	  the	  level	  of	   institutional	  conflict,	  then	  we	   can	   conclude	   that	   semi-­‐presidentialism	  does	  not	   have	   the	  hypothesized	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  Damien	  Kingsbury	  considers	  the	  functioning	  of	  Timor-­‐Leste’s	  system	  parliamentary.	  See:	  Kingsbury,	  D.	  (2007)	  'Timor-­‐Leste:	  The	  Harsh	  Reality	  after	  Independence',	  Southeast	  Asian	  Affairs,	  363	  -­‐	  377.	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effects	  identified	  from	  the	  literature	  review.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  claim	  that	  semi-­‐presidentialism	  was	  good	  or	  bad	  for	  democracy	  would	  fall	  at	  the	  first	  hurdle	  (step	   2	   in	   Figure	   2.1).	   However,	   if	   we	   find	   that	   that	   the	   change	   in	   the	  government	   situation	   corresponds	   to	   the	   hypothesized	   variation	   in	  institutional	  conflict,	   then	  we	  have	   found	  corroborating	  evidence	  that	  semi-­‐presidentialism	  might	  have	  an	  effect	  on	  democratic	  performance.	  However,	  this	  claim	  would	  have	  to	  be	  tested	  separately.	  	   Even	   though	  a	   case	   study	  of	  Timor-­‐Leste	   is	  an	  appropriate	   choice	   to	  test	  the	  research	  question,	  the	  limitations	  of	  the	  study	  should	  be	  noted.	  This	  project	   does	   not	   ‘contribute’	   to	   the	   literature	   on	   the	   relative	   merits	   of	  premier-­‐presidential	   versus	   president-­‐parliamentary	   subtypes	   of	   semi-­‐presidentialism.	   Given	   our	   focus	   on	   a	   premier-­‐presidential	   system,	   we	   can	  only	   confirm	   whether	   the	   arguments	   against	   or	   in	   favour	   of	   semi-­‐presidentialism	   hold	   out	   in	   this	   particular	   semi-­‐presidential	   subtype.	  Likewise,	   as	   we	   shall	   see,	   this	   work	   does	   not	   test	   the	   effects	   of	   the	   most	  conflict-­‐prone	   semi-­‐presidential	   situation,	   namely	   divided	   minority	  government.	  Yet,	   this	  political	   configuration	   is	  perhaps	   less	   relevant	   from	  a	  theoretical	   point	   of	   view	   for	   several	   scholars	   have	   indicated	   that	   semi-­‐presidential	   systems	   rarely	  produce	  divide	  minority	   governments	   (Samuels	  and	  Shugart,	  2010).	  Despite	   these	  caveats,	   this	   study	  can	  provide	  us	  with	  a	  greater	   understanding	   about	   the	   effects	   of	   different	   semi-­‐presidential	  situations	   on	   institutional	   conflict.	   Future	   research	  may	   use	   this	   insight	   to	  support	   or	   oppose	   the	   more	   general	   arguments	   that	   associate	   semi-­‐presidentialism	  with	  democratic	  performance.	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Dependent	  variable:	  level	  of	  conflict	  The	   dependent	   variable	   in	   this	   study	   is	   institutional	   conflict	   and,	   by	  extension,	  the	  absence	  of	  institutional	  conflict.	  Researchers	  predict	  that	  semi-­‐presidential	   situations	   provoke	   different	   levels	   of	   institutional	   conflict.	   The	  literature	   identifies	   four	   different	   types	   of	   situations:	   divided	   minority	  government,	   cohabitation,	   divided	   government	   and	   unified	   majority	  government.	   Divided	   minority	   government	   is	   the	   most	   conflict-­‐prone	  situation.	  Here	   the	  president	  and	  prime	  minister	  are	   from	  opposing	  parties	  and	  the	  president’s	  party	  is	  not	  represented	  in	  the	  cabinet.	  As	  opposed	  to	  the	  other	   three	  situations,	  divided	  minority	  governments	  are	  not	  supported	  (as	  the	   term	   indicates)	   by	   a	   parliamentary	   majority.	   Cohabitation	   refers	   to	   a	  situation	  where	  the	  president	  and	  prime	  minister	  are	  from	  opposing	  parties	  and	   the	   president’s	   party	   is	   not	   represented	   in	   the	   cabinet.	   Divided	  government	  refers	  to	  the	  situation	  in	  which	  a	  legislative	  majority	  is	  held	  by	  a	  party	  or	  pre-­‐election	  coalition	  which	   is	  different	   from	  that	  of	   the	  president.	  As	  compared	  to	  the	  other	  three	  scenarios,	  the	  unified	  majority	  government	  is	  the	   least	   conflictual	   political	   situation	   under	   semi-­‐presidentialism.	   Unified	  majority	   government	   is	   the	   situation	   where	   the	   president	   and	   the	   prime	  minister	  are	  from	  the	  same	  party	  or	  party	  coalition	  and	  where	  that	  party	  or	  coalition	   has	   a	   majority	   in	   the	   parliament.	   If	   we	   place	   the	   four	   types	   of	  political	   situations	   along	   a	   conflict-­‐intensity	   continuum	   we	   find	   at	   one	  extreme	  divided	  minority	  government	  where	   there	   is	   intensive	  conflict	  and	  at	   the	   other	   extreme	   unified	   majority	   government	   where	   there	   is	   little	  conflict.	  Table	  2.1	  provides	  a	  quick	  overview	  of	  the	  intensity	  and	  location	  of	  potential	   conflicts	   between	  political	   actors	   that,	   according	   to	   the	   literature,	  
	   43	  
may	   occur	   under	   the	   different	   semi-­‐presidential	   situations.	   A	   score	   of	   0	   is	  given	  to	  situations	  where	  no	  conflict	  is	  expected	  to	  take	  place	  and	  a	  score	  of	  1	  point	  to	  potentially	  conflictual	  relationships.	  	  
Table	  2.1:	  Location	  and	  intensity	  of	  potential	  conflict	  under	  different	  
semi-­presidential	  situations	  	   President	  vs	  PM	   President	  vs	  Parliament	  
PM	  vs	  Parliament	   Total	  
Divided	  Minority	  Government	  	   1	   1	   1	   3	  Cohabitation	   1	   1	   0	   2	  Divided	  Government	  	   0	   1	   0	   1	  Unified	  Majority	  Government*	   0	   0	   0	   0	  	  	   If	  we	  observe	  that	  variation	  in	  the	  situation	  of	  government	  goes	  hand	  in	  hand	  with	  a	  variation	  in	  political	  behaviour,	  that	  is,	  the	  level	  of	  conflict,	  we	  will	   have	   found	   evidence	   in	   favour	   of	   particular	   arguments.	   If	   there	   is	   no	  correlation	  or	  if	  there	  is	  a	  correlation	  but	  it	   is	   in	  a	  different	  direction	  to	  the	  one	  expected,	   then	  there	  will	  be	   little	   to	  support	   the	  work	  of	  such	  scholars.	  From	  these	  findings,	  we	  will	  be	  able	  to	  generalise	  from	  the	  Timor-­‐Leste	  case.	  	  	  
Independent	  variables:	  political	  situations	  under	  semi-­presidential	  
systems	  The	   choice	   of	   a	   single	   case	   study	   over	   a	   short	   period	   of	   time	   allows	  many	  economic,	  social	  and	  historical	  variables	   to	  be	  held	  constant.	  Here	  we	   focus	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on	   the	   impact	   of	   different	   semi-­‐presidential	   situations	   on	   institutional	  conflict.	   In	   the	   literature,	   semi-­‐presidentialism	   is	   associated	   with	   four	  political	   situations:	   unified	   majority	   government,	   divided	   government,	  cohabitation	   and	   divided	   minority	   government.	   The	   propositions	   that	   are	  associated	   with	   three	   semi-­‐presidential	   situations	   will	   be	   tested	   in	   Timor-­‐Leste.	   Table	   2.2	   demonstrates	   that,	   between	   2002	   and	   2012,	   Timor-­‐Leste’s	  semi-­‐presidential	   system	   generated	   four	   periods	   of	   government	  with	   three	  different	   political	   situations:	   cohabitation	   (period	   1	   and	   3,	   respectively	  between	   May	   2002	   and	   June	   2006,	   and	   between	   May	   and	   August	   2007)	  divided	   government	   (period	   2,	   between	   June	   2006	   and	   May	   2007)	   and	  unified	   majority	   government	   (period	   4,	   between	   August	   2007	   and	   May	  2012).	  	  	   We	   choose	   to	   disregard	   the	   third	   period	   for	   the	   reason	   that	   this	  government	   lasted	   only	   four	   months	   and	   occurred	   in	   between	   the	  presidential	  elections	  of	  May	  2007	  and	  the	  parliamentary	  elections	  of	  August	  the	   same	   year.	   Therefore,	   it	  was	   an	   interim	  period.	  Here	  we	  will	   study	   the	  effects	  of	  cohabitation,	  divided	  government	  and	  unified	  majority	  government.	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Table	  2.2:	  Political	  situations	  in	  Timor-­Leste’s	  semi-­presidential	  system	  Period	  of	  Government	   Political	  situations	   Party	  affiliation	  executives	  May	  2002	  –	  June	  2006	   Cohabitation	   President	  Gusmão	  vs	  Prime	  Minister	  Alkatiri	  (FRETILIN)	  July	  2006	  –	  May	  2007	   Divided	  Government	  	   President	  Gusmão	  vs	  Prime	  Minister	  Ramos-­‐Horta	  (N/P)	  May	  2007	  –	  August	  2007	   Cohabitation	   President	  Ramos-­‐Horta	  (N/P)	  vs	  Prime	  Minister	  Estanislau	  da	  Silva	  (FRETILIN)	  August	  2007	  –	  May	  2012	  	   Unified	  Majority	  Government	   President	  Ramos-­‐Horta	  (N/P)	  vs	  Prime	  Minister	  Gusmão	  (CNRT)	  	  
Situation	  1:	  Cohabitation	  In	   August	   2001	   elections	   for	   a	   Constituent	   Assembly	   (CA)	   were	   held.	  According	   to	   UN	   Regulation	   2001/2,	   the	   CA	   would	   prepare	   and	   adopt	   a	  constitution	   within	   90	   days	   after	   its	   election.10	   FRETILIN	   won	   a	   landslide	  victory	   in	   the	   CA	   elections.	   The	   CA	   turned	   into	   parliament	   and,	   hence,	  FRETILIN	  secured	  a	  parliamentary	  majority.	  FRETILIN’s	  leader,	  Marí	  Alkatiri,	  became	   Prime	   Minister	   in	   the	   First	   Constitutional	   Government	   of	   Timor-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  UNTAET.	  2001a.	  On	  the	  Election	  of	  a	  Constituent	  Assembly	  to	  Prepare	  a	  Constitution	  for	  an	  Independent	  and	  Democratic	  East	  Timor.	  Regulation	  No.	  2001/2,	  16	  March	  2001.	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Leste	  and,	  apart	   from	  two	  non-­‐partisan	  ministers,	  his	  Cabinet	  was	  made	  up	  exclusively	   of	   members	   of	   the	   FRETILIN	   party.	   In	   March	   2002	   the	  Constitution	   was	   adopted	   that	   ushered	   a	   semi-­‐presidential	   form	   of	  government.	  In	  April	  2002	  José	  Alexandre	  Gusmão,	  (better	  known	  under	  the	  
nom	   de	   guerre	   Kay	   Rala	   Xanana)	   became	   President	   after	   winning	   the	   first	  presidential	   elections.	   On	   May	   2002	   Timor-­‐Leste	   was	   officially	   declared	  independent.	   Gusmão	   and	   Alkatiri	   are	   divided	   by	   political	   beliefs.	   The	  divisions	  between	  the	  two	  leaders	  will	  be	  outlined	  in	  chapter	  3.	  	  	   According	  to	  the	  theoretical	  predictions	  summarised	  in	  Table	  2.1,	  we	  expect	  to	  find	  the	  President	  to	  be	  embroiled	  in	  a	  conflict	  with	  both	  the	  Prime	  Minister	   and	   the	   parliamentary	   majority.	   So,	   we	   foresee	   a	   conflictual	  relationship	   between	  President	  Gusmão	   and	  Prime	  Minister	  Alkatiri	   on	   the	  one	  hand,	  and	  between	  President	  Gusmão	  and	  the	  parliamentary	  majority,	  on	  the	  other	  hand.	  	  
Situation	  2:	  Divided	  Government	  A	   new	   type	   of	   situation	   emerged	   when	   José	   Ramos-­‐Horta	   was	   appointed	  Prime	  Minister	  in	  July	  2006.	  The	  change	  of	  Prime	  Minister	  Alkatiri	  narrowed	  the	   ideological	   cleavage	   between	   President	   and	   Prime	   Minister.	   Although	  Ramos-­‐Horta	  had	  previously	  served	  as	  the	  Minister	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  under	  the	   Cabinet	   of	   Prime	   Minister	   Alkatiri,	   several	   recent	   events	   have	  demonstrated	   that	   he	  was	   closely	   allied	  with	   President	   Gusmão:	   the	   latter	  not	   only	   wanted	   him	   to	   succeed	   Prime	   Minister	   Alkatiri,	   he	   also	   actively	  supported	   Ramos-­‐Horta’s	   candidacy	   during	   the	   presidential	   campaign	   of	  2007	   (Vasconcelos	   and	   Cunha,	   2008).	   On	   20	   May	   2007	   Ramos-­‐Horta	   was	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sworn	   in	   as	   the	   President	   of	   Timor-­‐Leste.	   Table	   2.1	   demonstrated	   that	   a	  divided	   government	   generates	   conflicts	   between	   the	   President	   and	   the	  parliamentary	  majority.	  Accordingly,	   in	  Timor-­‐Leste	  we	  expect	  a	   conflictual	  relationship	   between	   President	   Gusmão	   and	   the	   parliamentary	   majority	  controlled	  by	  FRETILIN.	  	  
Situation	  3:	  Unified	  Majority	  Government	  From	  August	   2007	   to	  May	  2012	   a	  majority	   coalition	   government	   governed	  Timor-­‐Leste.	  The	  Aliança	  da	  Maioria	  Parlamentar	  (AMP11)	  coalition	  included	  four	  parties	  −	  CNRT,	  PSD/ASDT,	  PD,	  UNDERTIM12	  −	  and	  was	  headed	  by	  the	  former	   President	   and	   now	   secretary-­‐general	   of	   the	   CNRT,	   Gusmão.	   This	  period	   is	   designated	   as	   a	   unified	   majority	   government	   because	   President	  Ramos-­‐Horta	   and	   Prime	   Minister	   Gusmão	   were	   political	   allies	   and	   a	  parliamentary	  majority	  supported	  the	  AMP	  government.	  	   Under	   unified	   majority	   government	   few	   conflicts	   are	   anticipated	  between	   the	   President	   and	   the	   Prime	   Minister	   and	   the	   President	   and	   the	  parliamentary	   majority.	   In	   Timor-­‐Leste,	   the	   President	   claims	   to	   be	   non-­‐partisan:	   he	   is	   not	   a	   member	   of	   a	   political	   party	   since	   the	   country	   was	  declared	  independent.	  However,	  as	  noted	  previously,	  and	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  3	  and	  chapter	  6,	  the	  President	  and	  Prime	  Minister	  are	  political	  allies.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  AMP/Aliança	  da	  Maioria	  Parlamentar	  (Parliamentary	  Majority	  Alliance).	  12	  PSD/Partido	  Social	  Democrata	  (Democratic	  Social	  Party);	  ASDT/Associação	  Social-­‐Democrata	  Timorense	  (Social	  Democratic	  Association	  of	  Timorese);	  PD/Partido	  Democrático	  (Democratic	  Party);	  UNDERTIM/Unidade	  Nacional	  Democrática	  da	  Resistência	  (National	  Democratic	  Unity	  for	  the	  Resistance).	  UNDERTIM	  formally	  joined	  the	  AMP	  Government	  in	  2008.	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So,	  we	  expect	  to	  observe	  only	  moderate	  conflicts	  between	  the	  President	  and	  Prime	  Minister	  and	  between	  the	  President	  and	  the	  parliamentary	  majority.	  	  	   In	   general	   terms	   and	   in	   accordance	   with	   the	   theory	   summarised	   in	  Table	   2.1,	   each	   political	   situation	   should	   correspond	   to	   a	   different	   level	   of	  conflict:	   in	  theory,	  cohabitation	  is	  supposed	  to	  generate	  the	  most	  amount	  of	  conflict,	   followed	   by	   divided	   government	   and	   then	   unified	   majority	  government.	  If	  we	  do	  not	  observe	  that	  the	  level	  of	  institutional	  conflict	  varies	  with	  the	  government	  situation	  this	  study	  will	  not	  support	  the	  argument	  that	  semi-­‐presidentialism	   generates	   or	   reflects	   institutional	   conflict.	   The	   next	  section	  will	  identify	  the	  indicators	  that	  will	  be	  used	  to	  identify	  conflict	  or	  the	  absence	  thereof.	  	  	  
Observing	  institutional	  conflict	  Figure	  2.1	  demonstrated	  that	  conflict	  between	  the	  president,	  prime	  minister	  and	   the	   parliamentary	   majority	   is	   a	   function	   of	   the	   different	   political	  configurations	   that	   are	   generated	   by	   semi-­‐presidential	   systems.	   Having	  identified	   variation	   in	   the	   political	   situations	   (cohabitation,	   divided	  government,	   unified	   majority	   government)	   in	   the	   expectation	   that	   these	  situations	  will	  lead	  to	  different	  types	  and	  levels	  of	  conflict,	  in	  this	  section	  we	  identify	  indicators	  of	  political	  conflict.	  We	  would	  expect	  the	  different	  political	  situations	   in	   Timor-­‐Leste	   from	   2002-­‐2012	   to	   be	   associated	   with	   different	  forms	  of	  conflict	  and	  to	  different	  degrees	  of	  intensity.	  	   This	   work	   tests	   the	   institutionalist	   approach	   to	   explain	   political	  behaviour.	  The	  division	  of	  power	  is	  regulated	  by	  constitutional	  rules.	  The	  set	  of	  rules	  that	  define	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  executive	  and	  the	  legislature	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are	  of	  central	  importance	  to	  this	  work.	  Thus,	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  Constitution	  of	   Timor-­‐Leste,	  we	   single	   out	   those	   rules	   that	   define	   the	   division	   of	   power	  between	   the	  President,	   the	  Prime	  Minister	   and	   the	  parliamentary	  majority.	  The	  way	  political	  actors	  use	  these	  powers	  –	  in	  conflict	  or	  not	  –	  serves,	  then,	  as	   evidence	   for	   or	   against	   the	   causal	   arguments	   that	   relate	   different	   semi-­‐presidential	   types	   of	   political	   situations	   to	   a	   certain	   level	   of	   conflict.	   This	  study	  assumes	  that	  political	  actors	  use	  their	  powers	  to	  try	  to	  maximize	  their	  preferences.	   So,	   an	   increase	   in	   the	  use	  of	  powers	   correlates	  positively	  with	  conflict	  and	  the	  absence	  of	  the	  use	  of	  these	  powers	  points	  to	  the	  absence	  of	  conflict.	   When	   there	   is	   no	   conflict	   politicians	   are	   expected	   to	   refrain	   from	  using	  their	  powers	  because	  there	  is	  no	  need	  to	  do	  so.	  	  	   The	   Constitution13	   establishes	   ‘four	   organs	   of	   sovereignty’	   (Section	  67):	  the	  President,	  the	  Government,	  the	  National	  Parliament	  and	  the	  Courts.	  This	  work,	  however,	  concentrates	  on	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  president,	  prime	  minister	  and	  the	  parliamentary	  majority.	  The	  Constitution	  states	  that	  the	  Government	   is	  accountable	  to	  both	  the	  President	  of	  the	  Republic	  and	  to	  the	   National	   Parliament	   for	   conducting	   and	   executing	   the	   domestic	   and	  foreign	  policy	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  Constitution	  and	  the	  law	  (Section	  107).	  The	   triangular	   relationship	   between	   the	   President,	   Government	   and	  Parliament	   is	  governed	   ‘by	  the	  principle	  of	  separation	  and	   interdependence	  of	   powers’	   (Section	   69).	   The	   interdependence	   (or	   overlap)	   of	   institutional	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  Constituição	  República	  Democrática	  de	  Timor-­‐Leste	  (RDTL),	  Jornal	  da	  República,	  http://www.jornal.gov.tl/	  (Portuguese/Tetum).	  An	  English	  translation	  of	  the	  Constitution	  can	  be	  found	  on	  the	  website	  of	  the	  Government	  of	  Timor-­‐Leste,	  http://timor-­‐leste.gov.tl/?cat=37&lang=en.	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jurisdiction	   deserves	   extra	   attention	   here:	   policy	   areas	   where	   the	  implementation	  of	  political	  decisions	  depends	  on	  dual,	  and	  sometimes	  triple	  consent	   are	   vulnerable	   to	   conflict.	   We	   will	   see	   that	   policy	   in	   the	   areas	   of	  defence	  and	  foreign	  affairs	  are	  examples	  in	  this	  regard.	  	   The	  Constitution	  of	  Timor-­‐Leste	  defines	   the	  President	  as	   the	  head	  of	  State	   and	   the	   symbol	   and	   guarantor	   of	   national	   independence	   and	  unity	   of	  the	   State	   and	   of	   the	   smooth	   functioning	   of	   democratic	   institutions	   (Section	  74:1).	   To	   fulfil	   this	   mandate	   the	   President	   is	   endowed	   with	   legislative	  powers,	  appointment	  and	  dismissal	  powers,	  and	  certain	  prerogatives	   in	   the	  area	   of	   defence	   and	   foreign	   affairs.	   In	   this	   context,	   the	   Constitution	  empowers	  the	  President	  to:	  	   1. veto	  any	  statute	  (Section	  85c);	  2. request	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   of	   Justice	   to	   undertake	   preventive	  appraisal	   and	   abstract	   review	   of	   the	   constitutionality	   of	   the	   rules	  (Section	  85e);	  3. submit	  relevant	  issues	  of	  national	  interest	  to	  a	  referendum	  (85f);	  4. declare	   the	   state	   of	   siege	   or	   the	   state	   of	   emergency	   following	  authorisation	   of	   the	  National	   Parliament,	   after	   consultation	  with	   the	  Council	  of	  State,	  the	  Government	  and	  the	  Supreme	  Council	  of	  Defence	  and	  Security	  (Section	  85g);	  5. grant	   pardons	   and	   commute	   sentences	   after	   consultation	   with	   the	  Government	  (Section	  85i);	  
	   51	  
6. appoint	   and	   swear	   in	   the	  Prime	  Minister	   designated	  by	   the	  party	   or	  alliance	  of	  parties	  with	  parliamentary	  majority	  after	  consultation	  with	  political	  parties	  sitting	  in	  the	  National	  Parliament	  (Section	  85d);	  7. address	  messages	  to	  the	  National	  Parliament	  and	  the	  country	  (Section	  86e)	  8. appoint,	   swear	   in	   and	   remove	   Government	   members	   from	   office,	  following	  a	  proposal	  by	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  (Section	  86h);	  9. appoint	  the	  President	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Justice	  and	  swear	  in	  the	  President	   of	   the	   High	   Administrative,	   Tax	   and	   Audit	   Court	   (Section	  86j);	  10. appoint	  the	  Prosecutor-­‐General	  for	  a	  term	  of	  four	  years	  (Section	  86k);	  11. appoint	   and	   dismiss,	   following	   proposal	   by	   the	   Government,	   the	  General	  Chief	  of	  Staff	  of	  the	  Defence	  Force,	  the	  Deputy	  General	  Chief	  of	  Staff	  of	  the	  Defence	  Force,	  and	  the	  Chiefs	  of	  Staff	  of	  the	  Defence	  Force,	  after	  consultation	  with	   the	  General	  Chief	  of	  Staff	   regarding	   the	   latter	  two	  cases	  (Section	  86m);	  12. appoint	   and	   dismiss	   ambassadors,	   permanent	   representatives	   and	  special	  envoys,	  following	  proposal	  by	  the	  Government	  (Section	  87b);	  13. conduct,	  in	  consultation	  with	  the	  Government,	  any	  negotiation	  process	  towards	   the	   completion	   of	   international	   agreements	   in	   the	   field	   of	  defence	  and	  security	  (Section	  87d).	  14. dissolve	  the	  National	  Parliament	  in	  case	  of	  a	  serious	  institutional	  crisis	  preventing	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  government	  or	  the	  approval	  of	  the	  state	  budget	   and	   lasting	   more	   than	   sixty	   days,	   after	   consultation	   with	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political	  parties	  sitting	  in	  the	  parliament	  and	  with	  the	  council	  of	  state	  (Section	  86f);	  15. dismiss	   the	   Government	   and	   remove	   the	   Prime	  Minister	   from	   office	  after	   the	  National	  Parliament	  has	   rejected	  his	  or	  her	  programme	   for	  two	  consecutive	  times	  (Section	  86g);	  	  	   It	  will	   be	   noted	   that	   the	   powers	   of	   the	  President	   of	   Timor-­‐Leste	   are	  not	   proactive	  powers.	   They	   are	   reactive,	   corresponding	   to	   the	  notion	  of	   an	  arbiter,	   as	   referred	   to	   in	   Section	   74	   of	   the	   Constitution.	   These	   powers14	  enable	   the	  President	   to	  oversee	   the	  work	  of	   the	  Government	   (Section	  107).	  Institutional	  conflict	  is	  likely	  to	  occur	  in	  areas	  where	  the	  President	  can	  hold	  the	  Government	  accountable.	  When	  the	  President	  and	  Prime	  Minister	  fail	  to	  align	  their	  political	  preferences	  we	  may	  expect	  the	  President	  to	  his	  powers	  as	  an	  agenda-­‐setting	  device.	  	  	   Second,	   the	   Constitution	   allows	   the	   National	   Parliament	   to	   curb	  presidential	  powers.	  The	  parliamentary	  majority	  can:	  	  16. override	  presidential	  vetoes	  (Section	  88);	  17. disapprove	  the	  appointment	  of	  the	  President	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Justice	  and	  of	   the	  High	  Administrative,	  Tax	  and	  Audit	  Court	   (Section	  95:3a);	  18. reject	  the	  President’s	  request	  to	  make	  state	  visits	  (Section	  95:3h);	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  Shugart	  and	  Carey	  call	  such	  presidential	  powers	  ‘negative	  powers’.	  See:	  SHUGART,	  M.	  S.	  &	  CAREY,	  J.	  M.	  (1992)	  Presidents	  and	  Assemblies:	  Constitutional	  Design	  and	  Electoral	  Dynamics,	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  p.	  107.	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19. reject	   the	  President’s	  declaration	  of	   the	   state	  of	   siege	  or	   the	   state	  of	  emergency	  (Section	  95:3j).	  	  	   Conflict	   between	   the	   President	   and	   parliamentary	   majority	   may	  encourage	  the	  latter	  to	  limit	  presidential	  power.	  The	  parliamentary	  majority	  may	  decide	   to	  overrule	  presidential	   vetoes,	   refuse	   to	   ratify	   the	  presidential	  appointment	  of	  the	  President	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Justice	  and	  of	  the	  High	  Administrative,	  Tax	  and	  Audit	  Court,	  refuse	  permission	  for	  presidential	  state	  visits.	  	  	   In	  2002,	  Timor-­‐Leste’s	  semi-­‐presidential	  system	  generated	  a	  period	  of	  cohabitation	   that	   lasted	   until	   2006.	   In	   times	   of	   cohabitation	   we	   expect	  conflict	  between	   the	  President	  and	  Prime	  Minister	   (indicators	  1-­‐15).	   It	  also	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  Constitution	  delineates	  the	  conditions	  under	  which	  the	   National	   Parliament	   can	   be	   dissolved,	   namely	   ‘in	   case	   of	   a	   serious	  institutional	  crisis	  preventing	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  government	  or	  the	  approval	  of	  the	  state	  budget	  and	  lasting	  more	  than	  sixty	  days’	  (indicator	  14).	  Likewise,	  the	  Government	  and	   the	  Prime	  Minister	  cannot	  be	  dismissed	  under	  normal	  circumstances	  where	  the	  Government	  enjoys	  the	  support	  of	  a	  parliamentary	  majority	   (Section	   112:2)	   (indicator	   15).	   The	   precise	   definition	   of	   the	  conditions	  under	  which	  the	  President	  can	  use	  these	  powers	  prevents	  that	  the	  President	   can	   use	   this	   power	   as	   an	   agenda-­‐setting	   mechanism.	   Therefore,	  indicator	  14	  and	  15	  will	  also	  not	  be	  considered	  as	  indicators	  of	  institutional	  conflict.	  To	  be	  sure,	  in	  the	  case	  that	  the	  President	  would	  dissolve	  Parliament	  or	   dismiss	   the	   Government	   under	   other	   conditions	   than	   those	   that	   are	  specified	   in	   the	   Constitution,	   such	   an	   act	  would	   be	   an	   indicator	   of	   political	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conflict,	  not	  of	  institutional	  conflict.	  The	  parliamentary	  majority,	  in	  turn,	  may	  use	   its	   power	   (indicators	   16–19)	   to	   limit	   presidential	   influence	   in	   the	  political	  process,	  and	  hence	  it	  will	  seek	  to	  override	  presidential	  vetoes,	  reject	  presidential	  appointments,	  renounce	  the	  state	  of	  emergency	  and	  so	  on.	  	  	   The	  second	  period,	  divided	  government,	  is	  a	  short	  period	  of	  less	  than	  a	  year.	   Under	   divided	   government	   we	   expect	   to	   observe	   less	   intensive	  institutional	   conflict	   than	   under	   cohabitation.	   Although	   the	   parliamentary	  majority	  is	  likely	  to	  (continue	  to)	  obstruct	  the	  policy	  agenda	  of	  the	  President	  (indicators	  16-­‐19)	  conflict	  between	  the	  President	  and	  the	  Prime	  Minister	   is	  likely	  to	  decrease	  given	  that	  Gusmão	  and	  Ramos-­‐Horta	  are	  political	  allies.	  So,	  under	   divided	   government,	   conflict	   is	   less	   likely	   in	   policy	   areas	   in	   which	  President	  and	  Prime	  Minister	  share	  power	  (indicators	  5,	  8,	  11,	  12,	  13).	  	  	   Under	   unified	   majority	   government	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	  President	   and	   Prime	   Minister	   is	   likely	   to	   be	   less	   conflictual	   than	   under	  cohabitation	  and	  divided	  government.	  The	  President	  is	   likely	  to	  support	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  and	  the	  Parliament	  is	  expected	  to	  support	  the	  Prime	  Minister.	  In	  sum,	  the	  Government	  enjoys	  the	  support	  of	  the	  two	  offices	  that,	  according	  to	   the	  Constitution,	  are	  empowered	   to	  hold	   it	  accountable	   (Section	  107).	   In	  the	   case	   that	   the	   President	  will	   encroach	   on	   the	   power	   of	   the	   Government	  and	   the	   parliamentary	  majority,	   the	   latter	   may	   whistle	   back	   the	   President	  (indicators	  16-­‐19).	  	  	   The	   observable	   implications	   of	   institutional	   conflict	   are	   likely	   to	  manifest	   themselves	   not	   exclusively	   through	   formal	   procedures	   but	  informally	   too.	   The	   President	   may	   resort	   to	   informal	   ways	   to	   influence	  executive	   policy.	   For	   example,	   the	  President	  may	  use	   anti-­‐party	   rhetoric	   in	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the	  media	  to	  boost	  his	  own	  standing	  at	  the	  Government’s	  expense	  or	  resort	  to	  populist	   rhetoric	   aimed	   at	   putting	   pressure	   on	   the	   Government.	   The	  President	   can	   also	   threaten	   to	   use	   the	   powers	   of	   the	   office.	   These	   conflicts	  occur	   within	   constitutional	   limits	   but	   are	   not	   regulated	   through	   formal	  procedures.	   In	   addition,	  we	  might	   observe	   conflict	  when	   the	  President,	   the	  Prime	   Minister	   or	   the	   parliamentary	   majority	   do	   not	   fulfil	   or	   refuse	   to	  perform	   their	   constitutional	   duties.	   Examples	   include	   situations	   where	   the	  President	   refuses	   to	   nominate	   a	   minister	   at	   the	   proposal	   of	   the	   prime	  minister,	   or	   when	   the	   prime	   minister	   refuses	   to	   propose	   a	   replacement	  minister	  when	  the	  initial	  proposal	  was	  refused	  by	  the	  President.	  	  	   In	   brief,	   this	   section	   presented	   a	   list	   of	   observable	   implications	   that	  will	  be	  used	   to	   identify	   formal	  and	   informal	   institutional	  conflict.	   If	  we	   find	  that	   there	  was	  more	   conflict	   under	   cohabitation	   than	   under	   the	   other	   two	  periods	   and	  more	   conflict	   under	   a	   divided	   government	   than	   under	   unified	  majority	  government,	  then	  the	  expectations	  of	  the	  literature	  are	  met.	  If	  we	  do	  not	   find	   that	   the	   change	   in	   the	   government	   situation	   corresponds	   to	   the	  hypothesized	  variation	  in	  conflict,	  then	  we	  would	  conclude	  that	  the	  evidence	  does	  not	  support	  the	  arguments	  about	  semi-­‐presidentialism.	  	  
Sources	  To	   identify	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	  President,	   Prime	  Minister	   and	   the	  parliamentary	   majority	   we	   will	   make	   use	   of	   both	   primary	   and	   secondary	  sources.	   Primary	   sources	   include	   the	   online	   government	   gazette	   of	   Timor-­‐Leste,	   parliamentary	   reports	   on	   the	   legislative	   process	   in	   Timor-­‐Leste	   and	  presidential	   speeches	   published	   online	   and	   in	   books.	   The	   presidential	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discourses	   form	  an	   important	  source	  of	   information	   for	   the	  President	  often	  used	  public	   speeches	   to	  criticise	   the	  Government	  and	   its	  policies.	  Empirical	  data	   from	   secondary	   sources	   are	   collected	   from	   electronic	   databases	   of	  LexisNexis	   and	   Lusa,	   a	   Portuguese	   news	   agency.	   Also,	   two	   websites	   were	  consulted,	   the	  East	  Timor	  news	  blog	   ‘Riseup’	  and	   the	  Asia	  Pacific	  Solidarity	  Network	  (APSN).	  Both	  sites	  contain	  an	  extensive	  archive	  with	  both	  national	  and	   international	   news	   reports,	   articles	   and	  press	   releases	  on	  Timor-­‐Leste.	  The	   archive	   also	   includes	   news	   reports	   that	   have	   been	   broadcast	   on	   radio	  and	  national	  television.	  We	  also	  consulted	  the	  website	  of	  local	  NGOs	  like	  the	  Judicial	   System	   Monitoring	   Programme	   (JSMP)	   and	   La’o	   Hamutuk	   for	  background	   information	   on	   legislative	  matters	   and	   the	   UNMIT	  website	   for	  UN	   reports,	   statements	   and	   letters	   of	   the	   Secretary	  General	   to	   the	   Security	  Council	  and	  General	  Assembly	  on	  institutional	  developments	  in	  Timor-­‐Leste.	  In	  addition,	  secondary	  empirical	  material	  was	  collected	  during	  field	  research	  in	  Timor-­‐Leste.	  	  	   In	   the	  LexisNexis	  database,	   the	   terms	   ‘Timor’,	   ‘Gusmão’	  and	   ‘Alkatiri’	  were	   introduced	  to	   find	  empirical	  evidence	  of	   institutional	  conflict	  between	  14	   April	   2002	   and	   26	   June	   2006.	   On	   14	   April	   2002,	   Gusmão	   was	   elected	  President	  and	  on	  26	  June	  2006	  Prime	  Minister	  Alkatiri	  resigned.	  In	  addition,	  the	   terms	   ‘Gusmão’	   and	   ‘parliament’	  were	   used	   to	   find	   evidence	   of	   conflict	  between	   the	   President	   and	   the	   parliamentary	  majority	   in	   the	   same	   period.	  The	  same	  procedure	  was	  used	  to	  identify	  conflicts	  in	  the	  other	  two	  periods.	  The	  LexisNexis	  database	   returned	  6,677	  hits	  which	  needed	   to	  be	  examined	  on	   a	   case-­‐by-­‐case	   basis.	   We	   also	   examined	   the	   news	   reports,	   press	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statements,	  media	  releases	  that	  have	  been	  published	  on	  the	  websites	  of	   the	  two	  news	  blogs	  between	  April	  2002	  and	  May	  2012,	  a	  total	  number	  of	  40,023.	  	  	   In	   addition,	   we	   conducted	   field-­‐work	   in	   Timor-­‐Leste.	   There,	   we	  conducted	  in-­‐depth	  interviews	  with	  key	  figures	  in	  Timor-­‐Leste	  politics,	  legal	  advisors	   of	   the	   President,	   Prime	   Minister	   and	   Parliament.	   We	   talked	   to	  former	   Prime	  Minister	   Alkatiri,	   former	  Defence	  Minister	   Rodrigues,	   former	  Foreign	  Minister	  da	  Costa,	   former	  President	  Gusmão’s	   former	  Chief	  of	  Staff,	  Pereira,	   former	  vice-­‐Prime	  Minister	  Mário	  Carrascalão	  and	  conducted	  an	  e-­‐mail	   interview	   with	   former	   President	   Ramos-­‐Horta.	   This	   thesis	   does	   not	  derive	   its	  main	   conclusions	   from	   in-­‐depth	   interviews.	   For	   one	   thing,	   these	  politicians	   sometimes	   gave	   contradictory	   accounts	   of	   political	   events.	  Although	  we	  will	   report	   their	   accounts,	   they	   do	   not	   serve	   as	   ‘evidence’	   on	  which	  this	  project	  stands	  or	  falls.	  In	  addition,	  we	  spoke	  to	  the	  legal	  advisor	  of	  President	  Taur	  Matan	  Ruak,	  Mr.	  Rosário	  Soares	  and	  the	   legal	  advisor	  of	   the	  National	  Parliament,	  Mr.	  Cruz.	  We	  also	  met	  with	  Mr.	  Oliveira	  Sampaio	  and	  Mr.	  da	  Costa	  Bobo,	  members	  of	  the	  Judicial	  Monitoring	  Programme,	  a	  local	  NGO	  sponsored	  by	   the	  United	  Nations.	  We	   spoke	   to	   former	  Lusa	   correspondent,	  Mr.	   Rosa	   Mendes,	   and	   questioned	   Professor	   Carrascalão,	   Dean	   of	   the	   Law	  Faculty	   at	   National	   University	   Timor-­‐Leste	   about	   issues	   related	   to	   the	  Constitution	  of	  Timor-­‐Leste.	  The	  material	   collected	  during	   field	   research	   in	  Timor-­‐Leste	   sometimes	   corroborated	   earlier	   findings	   and	   have	   been	  reported	  in	  this	  thesis.	  Again,	  while	  these	  interviews	  are	  useful	  they	  are	  not	  the	  main	  source	  of	  information.	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Structure	  The	   effects	   of	   semi-­‐presidentialism	   on	   conflict	   within	   the	   executive	   and	  between	  the	  executive	  and	  the	  legislature	  in	  Timor-­‐Leste	  will	  be	  examined	  in	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  thesis.	  The	  next	  chapter	  elaborates	  on	  the	  political	  context	  in	  which	  the	  semi-­‐presidential	  system	  was	  introduced.	  The	  aim	  is	  to	  provide	  the	  context	   with	   which	   the	   independent	   institutional	   effects	   of	   semi-­‐presidentialism	   can	   be	   identified	   in	   the	   post-­‐independence	   period.	   In	  chapters	   4,	   5	   and	   6	   we	   examine	   this	   period,	   identifying	   the	   impact	   of	   the	  three	  different	  semi-­‐presidential	   situations	  on	   the	  relationship	  between	   the	  President,	   Prime	   minister	   and	   the	   parliamentary	   majority.	   These	   chapters	  will	   analyse	   respectively	   the	   influence	   of	   cohabitation,	   divided	   government	  and	   unified	   majority	   government;	   to	   what	   extent	   have	   these	   types	   of	  situations	  generated	  conflict	  in	  ways	  suggested	  by	  the	  theories	  presented	  in	  chapter	   1.	   In	   chapter	   7	   we	   provide	   an	   overview	   of	   the	   findings,	   draw	  conclusions	   about	   the	   hypothesised	   effects	   of	   semi-­‐presidentialism,	   and	  identify	  avenues	  for	  future	  research.	  	  	  
Conclusion	  	  Critics	   of	   semi-­‐presidentialism	   hold	   that	   the	   system	   provokes	   institutional	  conflict	   which	   leads	   to	   democratic	   collapse.	   Proponents	   of	   semi-­‐presidentialism	   argue	   that	   it	   encourages	   cooperation	   that	   may	   facilitate	  democratic	  consolidation.	  In	  this	  thesis	  we	  test	  the	  first	  stage	  of	  these	  causal	  arguments,	   namely	  whether	   or	   not	   semi-­‐presidentialism	  maintains/creates	  institutional	  cooperation	  or	  conflict.	  We	  explained	  that	  we	  test	  the	  arguments	  about	  semi-­‐presidentialism	  and	  institutional	  conflict	  in	  one	  country	  in	  order	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to	  control	  for	  the	  influence	  of	  many	  other	  contextual	  variables.	  We	  provided	  reasons	   for	   choosing	   Timor-­‐Leste.	   This	   is	   mainly	   because	   semi-­‐presidentialism	  produced	  three	  government	  situations:	  cohabitation,	  divided	  government	  and	  unified	  majority	  government.	  In	  the	  literature,	  cohabitation	  is	   supposed	   to	   generate	   the	   most	   amount	   of	   conflict,	   followed	   by	   divided	  government	   and	   then	   unified	   majority	   government.	   A	   list	   of	   observable	  implications	  of	  institutional	  conflict	  was	  presented	  that	  will	  be	  used	  to	  assess	  whether	   the	   three	   political	   situations	   entrenched	   or	   bridged	   political	  differences.	  We	  support	  the	  general	  argument	  that	  semi-­‐presidentialism,	  due	  its	   dual	   executive,	   generates	   institutional	   conflict	   if	   we	   observe	   that	   the	  change	   in	   the	   government	   situation	   corresponds	   with	   a	   linear	   decrease	   of	  institutional	   conflicts.	   However,	   if	   we	   do	   not	   observe	   that	   a	   change	   in	   the	  government	  situation	  varies	  with	  variation	  in	  institutional	  conflict	  and	  in	  the	  right	   direction	   arguments	   that	   associate	   semi-­‐presidentialism	   with	  institutional	   conflict	   are	   unsupported.	   The	   next	   chapter	   describes	   the	  political	  context	  in	  which	  the	  semi-­‐presidential	  system	  was	  introduced.	  




In	  Timor-­Leste	  the	  view	  commonly	  heard	  is	  that	  ‘we	  can’t	  write	  our	  own	  history	  
because	  everybody	  disagrees.’	  (Leach,	  2010,	  126)	  
	  The	   history	   of	   Timor-­‐Leste	   is	   largely	   dominated	   by	   foreign	   rule.	   The	   first	  Portuguese	  traders	  set	  foot	  on	  the	  island	  around	  the	  year	  1515.	  Around	  460	  years	   later,	   the	   remnants	   Portuguese	   administration	   withdrew	   from	   the	  former	   colony	   in	   1975.	   After	   a	   brief	   armed	   conflict	   between	   Timorese	  factions,	   Indonesian	   forces	   invaded	   the	   country	   on	  December	  1975.	  During	  24	  years	  of	  repressive	  occupation,	  Indonesia	  never	  succeeded	  in	  winning	  the	  hearts	   and	   minds	   of	   the	   Timorese.	   So,	   in	   1999,	   when	   the	   United	   Nations	  organised	  a	  popular	  consultation,	  an	  overall	  majority	  of	  Timorese	  voted	   for	  independence.	   A	   United	   Nations	   Transitional	   Administration	   (UNAET)	   was	  then	  called	  upon	  to	  support	  the	  people	  of	  Timor-­‐Leste	  building	  a	  modern	  and	  democratic	   state.	   On	   May	   2002,	   Timor-­‐Leste	   was	   officially	   declared	  independent.	  The	   aim	   of	   this	   chapter	   is	   to	   provide	   the	   context	   with	   which	   the	  independent	  institutional	  effects	  of	  semi-­‐presidentialism	  can	  be	  identified	  in	  post-­‐independence	  Timor-­‐Leste.	  The	  chapter	  focuses	  on	  the	  development	  of	  
informal	   power	   structures	   given	   that	   the	   Timorese	   were	   largely	   excluded	  from	   formal	   power	   structures,	   which	   were	   dominated	   by	   Indonesia,	   the	  occupying	   power.	   It	   concludes	   that	   Timor-­‐Leste’s	   political	   society	   was	  divided	   before	   it	   adopted	   the	   semi-­‐presidential	   system.	   In	   so	   doing,	   it	  demonstrates	   that	   we	   do	   not	   assume	   Timor-­‐Leste	   was	   a	   terra	   nullius	   or	   a	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political	   no-­‐man’s-­‐land	   before	   the	   introduction	   of	   the	   semi-­‐presidential	  system.	   Thus,	   when	   we	   examine	   the	   period	   2002-­‐2012	   in	   the	   next	   three	  chapters	  we	  will	  effectively	  control	  for	  the	  conflict	  that	  was	  present	  prior	  to	  independence.	  In	  that	  context,	  we	  will	  then	  aim	  to	  demonstrate	  whether	  the	  country's	   semi-­‐presidential	   institutions	   reflected	   existing	   and	   potentially	  destabilising	   conflict,	   whether	   they	   exacerbated	   such	   conflicts,	   or	   whether	  they	  reduced	  their	  intensity.	  	   This	   chapter	   is	   structured	   as	   follows.	   First,	   we	   briefly	   explain	   the	  influence	   of	   Portuguese	   colonization	   on	   the	   development	   of	   a	   Timorese	  political	  society.	  We	  then	  examine	  the	  dynamics	  of	  political	  relations	  between	  Timorese	   political	   parties	   under	   Indonesian	   occupation.	   Likewise,	   we	  examine	  how	  the	  UN	  Transitional	  Administration	  affected	  power	  structures	  in	  Timor-­‐Leste.	  Finally,	  we	  draw	  a	  conclusion	  about	  the	  relative	  cohesion	  of	  Timor-­‐Leste’s	  political	  society	  when	  Timor-­‐Leste	  adopted	  a	  semi-­‐presidential	  constitution.	  	  
Party	  formation	  after	  Portuguese	  colonisation	  The	  Portuguese	  presence	   in	  Timor-­‐Leste	  used	   local	  divisions	   to	  consolidate	  power.	   The	   Portuguese	   colonial	   administration	   exploited	   rivalries	   between	  the	  indigenous	  groups	  to	  quell	  local	  uprisings	  (Pélissier,	  2006).	  At	  the	  end	  of	  the	   19th	   century	   and	   beginning	   of	   the	   20th	   century,	   the	   Portuguese	   faced	   a	  growing	  number	  of	  local	  uprisings,	  which	  were	  quashed	  with	  the	  support	  of	  benevolent	   traditional	   leaders	   (luirais)	   who	   recognized	   the	   Portuguese	  authority.	  For	  example,	  the	  ethno-­‐linguistic	  division	  between	  the	  Firaku	  and	  the	   Kaladi,	   or,	   respectively,	   the	   native	   Westerners	   versus	   the	   native	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Easterners	   of	   Timor-­‐Leste,	   persisted	   under	   Portuguese	   rule.15	   A	   number	   of	  
liurai	   that	  were	   loyal	   to	   the	  Portuguese	   colonial	  power	  were	   recruited	   into	  the	   local	   administration.	   The	   practice	   of	   forming	   alliances	   with	   external	  powers	   to	  gain	   local	  political	  advantage	  was	  encouraged	  during	  Portuguese	  colonisation	   and	   continued	   in	   the	   post-­‐independence	   period	   (Kingsbury,	  2009).	  	  In	   1974,	   the	   fall	   of	   the	   authoritarian	   regime	   in	   Portugal	   opened	   the	  way	   for	   the	   Timorese	   to	   form	   political	   parties.	   In	   Lisbon,	   the	   ruling	   MFA	  (Movimento	  das	  Forças	  Armadas16)	  issued	  law	  7/1974	  by	  which	  Timor-­‐Leste	  was	  granted	  self-­‐determination.	  The	  tiny	  group	  of	  the	  educated	  elite,	  most	  of	  whom	   had	   gained	   some	   political	   experience	   under	   the	   Portuguese	  administration,	  established	  the	  first	  political	  parties.17	  Thus	  far,	   the	  colonial	  administration	  had	  prohibited	  the	  creation	  of	  national	  political	  organisations.	  The	  one	  party	  that	  had	  been	  allowed	  to	  exist,	   the	  UN	  (União	  Nacional18),	  an	  extreme	   rightist	   party,	   was	   supported	   by	   the	   Lisbon	   government.	   Yet,	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  During	  Manufahi	  uprising	  of	  1900-­‐1912,	  for	  example,	  Portuguese	  co-­‐opted	  easterners	  (known	  as	  the	  Firaku)	  in	  their	  battle	  against	  the	  western	  (Kaladi)	  ‘king’	  of	  Same-­‐Manufahi.	  See:	  Pélissier,	  R.	  (2006)	  As	  Campanhas	  Coloniais	  de	  Portugal	  (1844-­‐1941).	  Lisbon:	  Editorial	  Estampa.	  The	  east-­‐west	  divide,	  or	  the	  Firaku-­‐Kaladi	  rivalry,	  was	  considered	  to	  be	  one	  of	  the	  principal	  motors	  behind	  several	  security	  crises	  in	  post-­‐independent	  Timor-­‐Leste.	  Simonsen,	  S.	  G.	  (2006)	  'The	  Authoritarian	  Temptation	  in	  East	  Timor:	  Nation-­‐Building	  and	  the	  Need	  for	  Inclusive	  Governance',	  Asian	  Survey,	  46,	  575-­‐596.	  About	  the	  origins	  of	  the	  Kaladi-­‐Firaku	  division,	  see:	  Hicks,	  D.	  (2009)	  '"Ema	  Lorosa'e",	  "Ema	  Loromonu":	  Identity	  and	  Politics	  in	  Timor-­‐Leste',	  in	  Cabasset-­‐Semedo,	  C.	  and	  Durand,	  F.	  D.	  R.	  (eds)	  East-­Timor:	  how	  to	  build	  a	  
new	  nation	  in	  Southeast	  Asia	  in	  the	  21st	  century?,	  Bangkok:	  Research	  Institute	  on	  Contemporary	  Southeast	  Asia	  (IRASEC),	  81-­‐95.	  16	  Armed	  Forces	  Movement.	  17	  The	  first	  Timorese	  were	  recruited	  only	  in	  1968	  into	  the	  Portuguese	  government.	  See:	  Guterres,	  F.	  D.	  C.	  2006.	  Elites	  and	  Prospects	  of	  Democracy	  in	  East	  Timor.	  PhD	  thesis,	  Griffith	  University.	  18	  National	  Union.	  In	  1970	  the	  name	  of	  the	  party	  was	  altered	  to	  ANP	  (Acção	  Nacional	  
Popular),	  Popular	  National	  Action.	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newly	   acquired	   freedom	   of	   association	   went	   hand	   in	   hand	   with	   growing	  inter-­‐party	   tensions.	   The	   Timorese	   not	   only	   lacked	   democratic	   experience,	  but	  also	  the	  uncertainty	  about	  the	  political	  future	  of	  Timor-­‐Leste	  meant	  that	  political	   parties	   were	   more	   susceptible	   to	   external	   influence.	   The	  interference	  of	   foreign	  powers	   in	   local	  politics	  sharpened	  political	  divisions	  and	  hampered	  inter-­‐party	  cooperation.	  	  The	  UDT	  (União	  Democrática	  Timorense19)	  was	  the	  first	  political	  party	  to	  emerge	  in	  Timor-­‐Leste	  on	  11	  May	  1974.	  Members	  of	  the	  party	  included	  the	  colony’s	   traditional	   elite,	   small	   businessmen,	   and	   plantation	   owners	   who	  owed	  their	  status	  and	  prosperity	  to	  Portuguese	  rule.	  Most	  UDT	  members	  had	  been	   employed	   by	   the	   Portuguese	   Administration	   or	   were	   descendants	   of	  such	   appointees.20	   The	   party’s	   political	   outlook	   can	   be	   characterised	   as	  conservative,	   and,	   not	   surprisingly,	   pro-­‐Portugal.	   It	   wanted	   gradual	  independence	   and	   favoured	   continuing	   links	   with	   Portugal.	   UDT’s	  programme	  called	  for	  democratisation,	  income	  redistribution,	  human	  rights,	  and,	  above	  all,	  self-­‐determination	  for	  the	  Timorese	  people	  oriented	  towards	  a	  federation	   with	   Portugal	   with	   an	   intermediate	   stage	   for	   the	   attainment	   of	  independence,	  and	  a	  rejection	  of	  the	  integration	  of	  Timor	  into	  any	  potential	  foreign	  country	  (Taylor,	  1999).	  Later,	  during	  Indonesian	  occupation,	  the	  UDT	  changed	  its	  political	  objective	  from	  a	  federation	  with	  Portugal	  to	  integration	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  Timorese	  Democratic	  Union.	  20	  Manuel	  Carrascalão,	  for	  example,	  was	  one	  of	  the	  founding	  members	  of	  the	  UDT,	  and	  had	  been	  elected	  to	  become	  part	  of	  a	  Legislative	  Council	  that	  was	  created	  in	  1968	  by	  the	  Portuguese	  Administration	  to	  support	  the	  governor	  in	  administering	  the	  territory.	  Another	  prominent	  member,	  Francisco	  Lopes	  da	  Cruz,	  served	  as	  a	  Custom	  Officer	  within	  the	  Portuguese	  Administration.	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with	   Indonesia.	   Owing	   to	   their	   support	   for	   the	   Indonesian	  military	   regime,	  the	  UDT	  members	  were	  given	  prominent	  positions	   in	   local	  government	  and	  the	   Indonesian	   army	   (Guterres,	   2006).	   One	   of	   the	   co-­‐founders	   of	   the	   UDT,	  Mário	   Carrascalão,	   was	   Timor-­‐Leste’s	   appointed	   governor	   for	   ten	   years	  during	  Indonesian	  occupation.	  	  FRETILIN	   (Frente	  Revolutionário	   de	  Timor-­Leste	   Independente21)	  was	  originally	  founded	  as	  the	  ASDT	  (Associação	  Social	  Democrata	  Timorense22)	  on	  20	  May	  1974.	  Its	  leadership	  shared	  some	  unifying	  characteristics.	  They	  were	  almost	   all	   around	   30	   years	   old,	   all	   of	   them	   had	   been	   educated	   at	   Catholic	  schools	  (several	  of	  them	  had	  been	  trained	  for	  the	  priesthood),	  and	  a	  number	  of	  the	  most	  prominent	  leaders	  were	  sons	  of	  liurai	  or	  suco23	  chiefs.	  However,	  a	  number	  of	  distinct	   strands	  existed	   in	   the	  party.	  The	  dominant	   trend	  within	  the	  ASDT	  was	  social	  democratic	  and	  was	  represented	  by	  leaders	  such	  as	  José	  Ramos-­‐Horta,	   the	   Prime	   Minister	   of	   Timor-­‐Leste	   from	   2006-­‐2007	   and	  President	   from	   2007-­‐2012.	   Another	   trend	   was	   represented	   by	   Nicolau	  Lobato,	   who	   combined	   a	   fervent	   anti-­‐colonial	   nationalism	   with	   notions	   of	  economic	  self-­‐reliance	  and	  political	  development	  based	  on	   the	  Angolan	  and	  Mozambican	  experience.	  A	  third	  group	  including	  Vicente	  Sa´he	  and	  Mau	  Lear	  (António	   Carvarinho)	   attempted	   to	   use	   Marxist	   politics	   in	   a	   nationalist	  Timorese	  context.	  Prominent	  members	  like	  Marí	  Alkatiri	  had	  close	  ties	  with	  the	  latter	  two	  groups	  and	  linked	  Lobato’s	  perspective	  with	  that	  of	  Mau	  Lear	  (Taylor,	  1991).	  Alkatiri,	  who	  would	  become	  the	  first	  Prime	  Minister	  of	  post-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21	  Revolutionary	  Front	  for	  an	  Independent	  Timor-­‐Leste.	  22	  Timorese	  Social	  Democratic	  Association.	  23	  Elected	  heads	  of	  villages.	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independent	   Timor-­‐Leste	   serving	   from	   2002-­‐2006,	   belonged	   to	   the	   leftist	  nationalist	  camp.	  In	   September	   1974,	   the	   ASDT	   was	   renamed	   FRETILIN.	   However,	  FRETILIN	  was	  a	  more	  radical	  party	  than	  its	  predecessor.	  According	  to	  one	  of	  its	   founding	   members,	   the	   ASDT	   was	   formed	   to	   defend	   the	   idea	   of	  independence	   whereas	   FRETILIN	   was	   formed	   to	   fight	   for	   independence	  (Taylor,	   1999).	   Its	   political	   programme	   called	   for	   ultimate	   de	   jure	  independence	   from	   Portugal,	   with	   de	   facto	   independence	   through	   a	   rapid	  process	   of	   decolonisation	   in	   the	   areas	   of	   administration,	   and	   control	   of	   the	  state,	   institutional	   racism,	  cultural	   transformation,	  education,	  and	  economic	  organisation.	  By	  the	  end	  of	  1974,	  FRETILIN	  was	  the	   largest	  party	   in	  Timor-­‐Leste,	   surpassing	   the	   more	   conservative	   UDT.24	   The	   party	   drifted	  increasingly	   to	   the	   left	   and	   associated	   itself	   with	   other	   Marxist	   national	  liberation	   movements.	   In	   1977,	   FRETILIN	   officially	   adopted	   Marxism-­‐Leninism.	   José	   Alexandre	   (Xanana)	   Gusmão,	   one	   of	   the	   three	   FRETILIN	  central	   committee	   members	   who	   survived	   the	   Indonesian	   military	  campaigns,	   was	   elected	   president	   of	   FRETILIN	   in	   1981.	   Gusmão	   would	  become	  the	  symbol	  of	   the	  resistance	  against	   Indonesian	  occupation	  and	  the	  first	  president	  of	  an	  independent	  Timor-­‐Leste	  serving	  from	  2002-­‐2007.	  	  The	   pro-­‐Indonesian	   APODETI	   (Associação	   Popular	   Democrática	   da	  
Timor25)	  was	   established	   in	  May	  1974.	  The	  party	  was	   funded	  by	   Indonesia	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  FRETILIN	  won	  55%	  of	  the	  votes	  during	  the	  1975	  elections	  for	  local	  councils.	  See:	  Taylor,	  J.	  G.	  (1991)	  Indonesia's	  Forgotten	  War:	  The	  Hidden	  Story	  of	  East	  Timor.	  London:	  Zed	  Books.	  25	  Timorese	  Popular	  Democratic	  Association.	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and	   guided	   by	   that	   nation’s	   military	   and	   security	   apparatus.	   Its	   manifesto	  called	   for	   ‘an	   autonomous	   integration	   into	   the	   Republic	   of	   Indonesia	   in	  accordance	   with	   international	   law’	   and	   the	   ‘teaching	   of	   the	   Indonesian	  language	  as	  a	  compulsory	  subject’	  (CAVR,	  2005).	  The	  President	  of	  APODETI,	  Arnaldo	  dos	  Reis	  Araújo,	   collaborated	  with	   the	   Japanese	  during	   the	  Second	  World	  War	  and	   spent	   several	  months	   in	   Jakarta	  where	  he	  met	  government	  officials	   to	   organise	   support	   for	   the	  party.	  Another	   prominent	   figure	   in	   the	  party,	  Guilherme	  Gonçalves,	  was	  a	  descendant	  of	  a	  long	  line	  of	  liurai	  who	  had	  rebelled	  against	  the	  Portuguese	  authority	  (Kingsbury,	  2009).	  Whilst	  the	  UDT	  and	  the	  ASDT	  membership	  grew	  rapidly	  into	  the	  thousands,	  APODETI	  never	  had	  more	  than	  300	  members	  throughout	  the	  whole	  of	  1974	  (Taylor,	  1999).	  During	  the	  Indonesian	  occupation	  many	  APODETI’s	  affiliates	  were	  recruited	  into	   local	   government.26	   Some	   of	   the	   founding	   members	   of	   the	   party,	   like	  Abílio	  Osório	  Soares,	  would	  become	  involved	  in	  the	  atrocities	  committed	  by	  pro-­‐integration	  political	  groups	  in	  Timor-­‐Leste	  in	  1999	  when	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  Timorese	  voted	  for	  independence	  (CAVR,	  2005).	  In	   addition,	   three	   other	   small	   political	   parties	   were	   founded.	   There	  was	   a	  monarchist	   grouping	   of	   traditional	   leaders,	   KOTA	   (Klibur	   Oan	   Timor	  
Ass’wain27),	   a	   small	   Labour	   Party	   (Trabalhista),	   and	   ADITLA	   (Associação	  
Democrática	   para	   a	   Integração	   de	   Timor-­Leste	   na	   Austrália28).	   KOTA	   was	  formed	   in	  November	   1974	   and	   advocated	   a	   return	   to	   a	   traditional	   form	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26	  The	  President	  of	  APODETI,	  dos	  Reis	  Araújo,	  was	  appointed	  head	  of	  the	  Provisional	  Government	  of	  Timor-­‐Leste.	  27	  Association	  of	  Timorese	  Heroes	  or	  Sons	  of	  the	  Mountain	  Warriors.	  28	  Democratic	  Association	  for	  the	  Integration	  of	  Timor-­‐Leste	  into	  Australia.	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political	  organisation	  that	  focused	  on	  liurai,	  but	  only	  those	  liurai	  who	  traced	  their	  decent	  from	  the	  Topasses29	  (Taylor,	  1991).	  The	  Labour	  Party	  supported	  independence	   but	   favoured	   a	   phased	   process	   and	   continuing	   links	   with	  Portugal.	  ADITLA	  proposed	  joining	  Australia	  but	  disappeared	  once	  Australia	  ruled	  it	  out	  in	  March	  1975.	  Effectively	  there	  were	  two	  genuine	  parties	  vying	  for	   popular	   support,	   and	   one	   created	   by	   Indonesia	   for	   its	   own	   purpose	  (Taylor,	  1999).	  	  
Internal	  armed	  conflict	  The	   process	   of	   political	   party	   formation	   went	   hand	   in	   hand	   with	   growing	  inter-­‐party	   tensions	   despite	   the	   fact	   that	   party	   members	   often	   shared	   the	  same	   background,	   knew	   each	   other	   well,	   and	   sometimes	   belonged	   to	   the	  same	  family.30	  The	  prospect	  of	  independence	  seemed	  to	  deepen	  and	  intensify	  differences,	   in	   particular	   between	   the	   two	  most	   important	   national	   parties,	  the	   UDT	   and	   FRETILIN.	   In	   January	   1975,	   supported	   by	   the	   Portuguese	  Governor,	  Mário	  Lemos	  Pires,	  both	  parties	  agreed	  to	  collaborate	  ‘on	  the	  basis	  of	  their	  joint	  commitment	  to	  full	  independence,	  the	  rejection	  of	  APODETI	  and	  of	   integration	   with	   Indonesia,	   and	   the	   establishment	   of	   a	   transitional	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29	  The	  Topasses,	  also	  called	  the	  ‘black	  Portuguese’,	  belong	  to	  a	  mixed	  race	  group	  fathered	  by	  Portuguese	  sailors,	  traders	  and	  soldiers	  whose	  descendents	  remain	  in	  Timor	  to	  this	  day.	  30	  Xanana	  Gusmão	  wrote	  in	  his	  autobiography	  about	  his	  disappointment	  with	  the	  growing	  inter-­‐party	  tensions	  that	  even	  divided	  his	  own	  family.	  ‘This	  really	  was	  not	  what	  I	  wanted.	  UDT	  parents,	  APODETI	  uncles,	  FRETILIN	  children.	  What	  a	  shit	  this	  freedom	  was!’	  See,	  Gusmão,	  X.	  (2000)	  To	  resist	  is	  to	  win!:	  the	  autobiography	  of	  Xanana	  Gusmão	  with	  selected	  letters	  &	  speeches.	  Richmond,	  Vic.:	  Aurora	  Books	  with	  David	  Lovell	  Publishing.	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government	  in	  which	  the	  two	  parties	  would	  take	  part’	  (CAVR,	  2005,	  Chapter	  7,	  31).	  	  Although	   FRETILIN	   and	   the	   UDT	   both	   supported	   independence,	   the	  relationship	   was	   an	   uncomfortable	   one;	   the	   UDT	   in	   particular	   felt	  increasingly	   threatened	   by	   FRETILIN’s	   mass	   following	   and	   its	   continuing	  claim	  to	  be	  the	  sole	  representative	  of	  the	  people	  of	  Timor-­‐Leste.	  What	  really	  divided	   these	   parties,	   however,	   were	   the	   militant	   ideologies	   on	   their	  extremes	  who	  accused	  each	  other,	  and,	  by	  extension	  each	  other’s	  parties,	  of	  being	  ‘fascist’	  or	  ‘communist’.	  For	  example,	  the	  UDT	  accused	  some	  members	  of	  FRETILIN	  of	  being	  former	  elements	  of	  the	  PIDE	  (Portuguese	  Secret	  Police),	  while	   FRETILIN	   accused	   the	   UDT	   of	   being	   opportunists	   and	   wanting	   to	  maintain	  the	  fascist	  regime	  in	  Timor-­‐Leste.	  FRETILIN	  also	  accused	  APODETI	  members	  of	  being	  traitors	  and	  reactionaries	  who	  wanted	  to	  sell	  Timor-­‐Leste	  to	  Indonesia	  (Guterres,	  2006).	  	  The	   UDT-­‐FRETILIN	   coalition	   was	   put	   under	   pressure	   by	   external	  powers.	   The	   Portuguese	   administration,	   first,	   was	   internally	   divided	   and	  hence	   lacked	   sufficient	   political	   backing	   to	   carry	   out	   its	   decolonisation	  programme.31	  Indonesia,	  for	  its	  part,	  deliberately	  incited	  friction	  between	  the	  coalition	  partners	  through,	  for	  example,	  its	  special	  relationship	  with	  the	  UDT	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31	  According	  to	  the	  British	  newspaper	  The	  Guardian,	  inter-­‐party	  tensions	  were	  exacerbated	  by	  extreme	  leftist	  and	  rightist	  elements	  in	  the	  Portuguese	  delegation	  of	  Timor-­‐Leste:	  ‘They	  [the	  UDT	  and	  FRETILIN]	  appear	  to	  have	  stumbled	  into	  a	  conflict	  in	  the	  interests	  of	  neither	  because	  of	  Portuguese	  meddling	  by	  both	  right	  and	  leftwing	  elements.	  (…)	  Between	  them,	  they	  [the	  Portuguese]	  injected	  into	  the	  two	  little	  half-­‐baked	  political	  parties	  some	  of	  the	  hatred	  and	  the	  suicidal	  hostility	  of	  the	  struggle	  in	  Portugal	  itself.’	  Woollacott,	  M.	  (1975,	  20	  October)	  'Timor	  is	  ripe	  for	  Jakarta	  plucking',	  The	  Guardian.	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party	  leaders.	  Less	  than	  six	  months	  after	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  UDT-­‐FRETILIN	  coalition,	  the	  UDT	  decided	  to	  withdraw.	  In	  the	  context	  of	  the	  decolonisation	  programme,	   the	   Portuguese	   Governor	   tried	   to	   get	   all	   parties	   at	   the	  negotiating	   table	   in	   Macau	   but	   failed	   as	   FRETILIN	   refused	   to	   participate.	  FRETILIN	  members	  with	   a	   nationalist-­‐Marxist	   view	  who	   gained	   a	  majority	  position	   in	   the	  party	  considered	  FRETILIN	  as	   the	  sole	  representative	  of	   the	  Timorese	  people	  and	  disparaged	  negotiations	  with	  other	  parties.	  In	  addition,	  they	  considered	  Portuguese	  officials	  to	  be	  imperialists	  (Taylor,	  1999).	  For	  the	  leadership	  of	  the	  UDT,	  FRETILIN’s	  absence	  at	  the	  Macau	  meeting	  confirmed	  the	   idea	   that	   FRETILIN	   had	   radicalised.	   Indonesia,	   meanwhile,	   planted	  rumours	  of	  a	  planned	  FRETILIN	  coup	  and	  of	  arms	  entering	  Timor-­‐Leste	  from	  China.	  In	  addition,	  Indonesian	  officials	  assured	  the	  UDT	  leadership	  of	  military	  support	  if	  they	  could	  prevent	  a	  left-­‐wing	  regime	  coming	  to	  power	  in	  Timor-­‐Leste	  (Taylor,	  1999:	  50).	  	  On	   11	   August	   1975	   the	   UDT	   launched	   an	   ‘attempted	   coup’	   and	  detained	   hundreds	   of	   FRETILIN	   leaders	   and	   supporters	   throughout	   the	  territory.	  On	  15	  August	  FRETILIN’s	  military	  wing,	  FALINTIL	  (Forças	  Armadas	  
de	   Libertação	   de	   Timor-­Leste32),	   was	   established.	   Under	   the	   command	   of	  Rogério	  Lobato33,	   FALINTIL	   responded	  with	  a	   ‘counter	   coup’	  on	  20	  August.	  With	  the	  backing	  of	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  Timorese	  members	  of	  the	  Portuguese	  military,	   it	   effectively	   regained	   control	   of	   Timor-­‐Leste	   on	   24	   August.	   It	   is	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32	  Armed	  Forces	  for	  the	  National	  Liberation	  of	  Timor-­‐Leste.	  33	  Lobato	  would	  become	  Minister	  of	  Interior	  Affairs	  in	  the	  FRETILIN-­‐led	  Government	  between	  2002	  and	  2006.	  His	  involvement	  in	  the	  crisis	  of	  2006	  in	  which	  the	  army	  clashed	  with	  the	  police	  forces	  led	  to	  his	  resignation.	  See,	  ICG	  (2006)	  'Resolving	  Timor-­‐Leste's	  Crisis',	  Jakarta/Brussels:	  International	  Crisis	  Group.	  
	   70	  
worth	  underlining	  that	  FALINTIL	  was,	  therefore,	  not	  born	  out	  of	  the	  struggle	  against	   Indonesia	   but	   in	   the	   context	   of	   an	   internal	   armed	   conflict	   in	  which	  between	   1,500	   and	   3,000	   Timorese	   and	   several	   Portuguese	   were	   killed	  (CAVR,	  2005).	  When	   the	  UDT	   carried	  out	   its	   coup,	   it	   killed	   some	  FRETILIN	  members	   and,	   in	   retaliation,	   FRETILIN	   arrested	   and	   killed	  many	   APODETI	  and	   UDT	   leaders	   in	   late	   1975	   and	   early	   1976	   (CAVR,	   2005).34	   The	   former	  President	  of	  FRETILIN,	  Xavier	  do	  Amaral,	  told	  the	  Commission	  for	  Reception,	  Truth	  and	  Reconciliation	  (CAVR):	  	  
‘We	  were	   in	  the	  midst	  of	  war,	  we	  had	  no	  transport,	  medicines	  or	   food,’	  
he	  said.	  ‘Some	  of	  the	  prisoners	  were	  very	  ill.	  If	  we	  let	  them	  survive,	  they	  
could	  have	  fallen	  into	  enemy	  hands,	  to	  be	  used	  against	  us.	  So	  we	  took	  a	  
decision	  to	  kill	  them.	  That	  was	  a	  common	  decision,	  taken	  by	  every	  level	  
of	  the	  leadership’	  (CAVR,	  2005).	  	  The	   CAVR	   (2005)	   reported	   that	   several	   hundred	   people,	  predominantly	   UDT	   detainees	   imprisoned	   during	   FRETILIN’s	   rule,	   were	  tortured	  and	  killed	  by	  FRETILIN	  sympathisers	  between	  December	  1975	  and	  January	  1976.35	  The	  remnants	  of	  the	  Portuguese	  administration	  retreated	  to	  the	  island	  of	  Ataúro,	  and	  left	  Timor-­‐Leste	  for	  good	  on	  8	  December	  1975.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34	  One	  of	  the	  most	  serious	  attacks	  was,	  according	  to	  CAVR’s	  report	  a	  FRETILIN	  assault	  on	  the	  village	  of	  Maulau	  (Maubisse,	  Ainaro)	  in	  which	  around	  40	  people,	  mainly	  UDT	  supporters,	  were	  killed.	  35	  During	  this	  time	  several	  hundreds	  of	  detainees	  were	  killed	  in	  Alieu,	  Maubisse	  (Ainaro),	  and	  the	  area	  of	  Same	  (Manufahi)	  as	  FRETILIN/FALINTIL	  retreated	  from	  the	  advancing	  Indonesian	  forces.	  Several	  senior	  FRETILIN	  leaders	  were	  directly	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With	   FRETLIN	   in	   power,	   the	   leaders	   of	   UDT,	   KOTA,	  Trabalhista	   and	  APODETI	   fled	   to	   the	   border	   region	   that	   fell	   more	   firmly	   under	   Indonesian	  military	  control.	  Under	  the	  tutelage	  of	  Indonesia	  these	  parties	  were	  joined	  in	  the	   MAC	   (Movimento	   Anti-­Communista36)	   (Lawless,	   1976).	   This	   anti-­‐FRETILIN	   coalition	   signed	   the	   ‘Balibo	   Declaration’	   in	   which	   it	   accused	   the	  party	   of	   obstructing	   a	   peaceful	   solution	   to	   the	   conflict	   and	   the	   right	   of	   the	  people	   of	   Portuguese	  Timor	   to	   self-­‐determination.	  The	  proclamation	   stated	  that	   the	   whole	   former	   Portuguese	   Timor	   colony	   would	   be	   integrated	   with	  Indonesia,	   and	  described	   this	   as	   the	   strongest	   avowal	  of	   the	   feelings	  of	   the	  people	  of	  Portuguese	  Timor.	  It	  asked	  the	  Indonesian	  government	  and	  people	  to	   take	   the	   necessary	   steps	   to	   protect	   the	   lives	   of	   the	   people	   who	   now	  considered	  themselves	   Indonesian	  but	  who	   lived	  under	  FRETILIN’s	  reign	  of	  terror	   and	   fascist	   practices	   with	   the	   acquiescence	   of	   the	   Portuguese	  government	   (CAVR,	   2005,	   Chapter	   3:	   57).	   In	   anticipation	   of	   an	   Indonesian	  invasion,	   on	   4	   December,	   Alkatiri,	   Ramos-­‐Horta,	   Abílio	   Araújo,	   Rogério	  Lobato,	  and	  Roque	  Rodrigues	  left	  Dili,	  not	  to	  return	  for	  twenty-­‐four	  years.	  In	  exile	  in	  Mozambique,	  they	  formed	  the	  external	  delegation	  of	  FRETILIN	  (Hill,	  2002,	  172).37	  	  Exploiting	   the	   pretext	   that	   Timor-­‐Leste	   was	   in	   political	   chaos	   and	  suffering	   from	  FRETILIN’s	  communist	  yoke,	  on	  7	  December	  1975	  Indonesia	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  implicated	  in	  the	  killing.	  CAVR	  (2005)	  'Chega!'.	  Available	  at	  http://www.cavr-­‐timorleste.org/en/chegaReport.htm	  (last	  accessed	  11	  September	  2013).	  36	  Anti-­‐Communist	  Movement.	  37	  These	  expatriates	  would	  take	  up	  important	  positions	  in	  the	  first	  cabinet	  of	  an	  independent	  Timor-­‐Leste.	  This	  group	  became	  known	  as	  the	  ‘Maputo	  Group’	  or	  ‘Mozambique	  Clique’.	  See:	  Kingsbury,	  D.	  (2009)	  East	  Timor:	  The	  Price	  of	  Liberty.	  New	  York:	  Palgrave	  Macmillan.	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invaded	   Timor-­‐Leste.	   According	   to	   Indonesian	   officials,	   its	   army	   did	   not	  invade	   Timor–Leste,	   but	   helped	   to	   ‘liberate’	   it	   by	   allowing	   ‘Indonesian	  volunteers	   to	   put	   an	   end	   to	   FRETILIN’s	   reign	   of	   terror’	   (Department	   of	  Information	  Republic	  of	  Indonesia,	  1983).	  The	  resultant	  deaths	  (an	  estimated	  80,000	   by	   April	   1977)	   were	   thus	   not	   the	   responsibility	   of	   the	   Indonesian	  army,	   but	   the	   ‘tragic	   consequences	   of	   the	   fratricidal	   struggle	   between	   the	  Timorese	  belligerents	  themselves’	  (Dunn,	  1983).	  	  In	  sum,	  in	  1974	  a	  tiny	  group	  of	  educated	  Timorese	  founded	  no	  fewer	  than	   six	   different	   political	   parties.	   The	   majority	   of	   the	   party	   leaders	   were	  descendants	   of	   the	   liurai	   that	   had	   been	   recruited	   into	   the	   Portuguese	  administration.	   Some	   of	   these	   parties	   gambled	   on	   external	   support	   in	   an	  effort	   to	   strengthen	   their	   position	   inside	   Timor-­‐Leste:	   the	   UDT	   (initially)	  hoped	   for	   Portuguese	   support,	   APODETI	   anticipated	   Indonesian	   feedback,	  whilst	  ADITLA	  expected	  to	  be	  supported	  by	  Australia.	  The	  KOTA	  leadership,	  finally,	   wanted	   to	   return	   to	   the	   indigenous	   kinship	   system	   where	   they	  traditionally	  held	  prominent	  positions.	   FRETILIN	  with	  an	  overly	  nationalist	  agenda	  was	  the	  most	  popular	  party	  in	  Timor-­‐Leste.38	  Its	  growing	  popularity	  triggered,	   however,	   a	   genuine	   power	   struggle	   between	   FRETILIN	   and,	  principally,	  UDT.	  Tensions	  between	  both	  parties	  culminated	  into	  a	  short	  but	  intense	  armed	  conflict	  in	  which	  thousands	  of	  Timorese	  were	  killed.	  The	  CAVR	  report	   noted	   that	   the	   internal	   armed	   conflict	   ‘left	   deep	   wounds	   in	   East	  Timorese	  society	  which	  continue	  to	  be	  felt	  to	  this	  day’	  (2005,	  Chapter	  3:	  43).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38	  FRETILIN	  won	  55%	  of	  the	  votes	  during	  the	  1975	  elections	  for	  local	  councils.	  See:	  Taylor,	  J.	  G.	  (1991)	  Indonesia's	  Forgotten	  War:	  The	  Hidden	  Story	  of	  East	  Timor.	  London:	  Zed	  Books.	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Party	  relations	  under	  Indonesian	  occupation	  When	   the	   Indonesian	   forces	   invaded	   Timor-­‐Leste	   in	   December	   1975	   the	  country	  was	  still	  embroiled	   in	  an	   internal	  conflict.	  The	  brief	  armed	  struggle	  caused	  a	  new	  rift	  between	  political	  factions	  that	  Indonesia	  exploited	  in	  order	  to	  control	  the	  area.	  During	  the	  24	  years	  of	  Indonesian	  occupation,	  new	  fault	  lines	  developed	  between	  the	  Timorese.	  First,	  tensions	  emerged	  between	  the	  pro-­‐integrationist	  parties	  APODETI	  and	  UDT.	  Second,	  violent	  clashes	  erupted	  between	  members	  of	  the	  resistance	  movement.	  Third,	  a	  fault	  line	  developed	  between	  political	  leaders	  of	  the	  old	  resistance	  movement	  and	  the	  leaders	  of	  a	  new	  independence	  movement.	  	  Shortly	   after	   its	   invasion,	   Indonesia	   established	   the	   first	   Provisional	  Government	   (Pemerintahan	   Sementara	   Timor	   Timur,	   PSTT)	   of	   Timor-­‐Leste.	  Most	   positions	   in	   the	   Provisional	   Government	   were	   filled	   with	   Timorese	  supporters	   of	   integration,	   predominantly	   prominent	   members	   of	   APODETI	  and	   the	   UDT	   (CAVR,	   2005).	   For	   example,	   Arnaldo	   dos	   Reis	   de	   Araújo,	   the	  President	   of	   APODETI,	   and	   Francisco	   Lopes	   da	   Cruz,	   the	   President	   of	   the	  UDT,	   were	   appointed	   as	   the	   Head	   and	   Deputy	   Head	   of	   the	   Provisional	  Government	   respectively.	   One	   of	   the	   tasks	   assigned	   to	   this	   Provisional	  Government	  was	  to	  carry	  out	  propaganda	  against	  FRETILIN	  (Guterres,	  2006).	  When,	  on	  July	  1976,	  Timor-­‐Leste	  was	  formally	  declared	  as	  the	  27th	  province	  of	   the	   Republic	   of	   Indonesia,	   Araújo	  was	   appointed	   Governor	   and	   Da	   Cruz	  Vice-­‐Governor	  of	  the	  new	  Provincial	  Government.	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Friction	  between	  pro-­Indonesian	  parties	  The	   inclusion	  of	  both	  APODETI	  and	  the	  UDT	  in	   local	  government	  generated	  conflict	  between	  the	  two	  parties.	  Conflicts	  arose	  over,	  amongst	  other	  issues,	  the	  control	  of	  positions	  in	  the	  Indonesian	  administration.	  The	  CAVR	  reported	  that	  in	  appointing	  local	  government	  officials	  the	  Indonesians	  gave	  priority	  to	  former	  members	  of	  APODETI,	  while	   former	  members	  of	   the	  UDT	  had	   to	  be	  content	  to	  be	  their	  assistants	  and	  deputies.	  An	  example	  of	  conflict	  within	  the	  integrationist	  camp	  occurred	  between	  one	  of	  the	  founders	  of	  the	  UDT,	  Mário	  Carrascalão,	   and	  APODETI	  member,	   Abílio	  Osório	   Soares,	   over	   government	  appointments.	  Carrascalão,	  as	  governor	  of	  Timor-­‐Leste,	  marginalised	  some	  of	  Soares’	   political	   allies	   from	   APODETI	   by	   appointing	   his	   friends	   to	   key	  government	  posts	  (Guterres,	  2006).	  When,	  in	  1992,	  Soares	  was	  nominated	  as	  governor	   of	   Timor-­‐Leste,	   Carrascalão	   mounted	   opposition.	   Later,	  Carrascalão’s	   faction	   of	   the	   UDT	   decided	   to	   join	   the	   resistance	   movement.	  APODETI	  leaders	  were	  then	  appointed	  to	  high	  positions,	  while	  Carrascalão’s	  close	  friends	  were	  sidelined.	  	  Divisions	   within	   Timorese	   pro-­‐Indonesian	   parties	   were	   encouraged	  by	   the	   Indonesian	   military	   as	   well.	   For	   example,	   the	   Indonesian	   military	  encouraged	   APODETI	   members,	   Tito	   Baptista,	   Domingos	   Koli	   Soares	   and	  Armindo	   Mariano,	   to	   accuse	   governor	   Soares	   of	   cooperating	   with	   the	  resistance	  when	  the	  latter	  became	  too	  critical	  of	  Indonesian	  policy	  in	  Timor-­‐Leste	   (Guterres,	   2006).	  With	   the	   support	   of	   Indonesia	   both	   factions	  would	  form	  pro-­‐autonomy	  groups	  that	  were	  reported	  to	  be	  involved	  in	  the	  violence	  that	   surrounded	   the	   1999	   UN-­‐sponsored	   popular	   consultation.	   The	  Domingos,	   Armindo	   and	  Tito	   faction	   formed	   a	   pro-­‐autonomy	   radical	   group	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FPDK	   (Forum	   Persatuan,	   Demokrasi	   dan	   Keadilan39)	   that	   carried	   out	  campaigns	   of	   intimidation	   and	   terror	   against	   members	   of	   the	   Resistance	  throughout	  1999.	  Soares’	  group,	  with	  the	  support	  of	  the	  UDT	  leader,	  Lopes	  da	  Cruz,	  established	  the	  BRTT	  (Barisan	  Rakyat	  Timor	  Timur40),	  a	  more	  moderate	  pro-­‐autonomy	  faction.	  	  
Conflicts	  in	  the	  resistance	  movement	  Hostilities	   also	   developed	   between	   members	   of	   the	   resistance	   movement.	  The	   growing	   number	   of	   Indonesian	   troops	   deployed	   to	   Timor-­‐Leste,	   using	  increasingly	  aggressive	  methods	  to	  crush	  the	  Resistance,	  put	  severe	  pressure	  on	  the	  organisation	  and	  hence	  provoked	  violent	  internal	  conflicts.	  During	  the	  course	  of	  1976,	  tensions	  in	  the	  Resistance	  developed	  between	  the	  dominant	  faction	   of	   FRETILIN	   and	   other	   nationalists	   (often	   ex-­‐Portuguese	   army	  soldiers	   who	   came	   from	   strong	   Catholic	   and	   politically	   conservative	  backgrounds)	  who	  opposed	  that	  faction’s	  strategies	  and	  leadership	  that	  was	  based	  on	  a	  radical	   leftist	   ideology.41	  The	  idea	  of	  a	  single	  revolutionary	  front	  was	   enforced	   and	   anyone	   who	   rejected	   this	   was	   seen	   as	   a	   ‘counter-­‐revolutionary’	   and	   denounced	   as	   ‘reactionary’.	   This	   led	   to	   a	   series	   of	  ‘counter-­‐revolutionary’	  arrests	  and	  executions	  (Niner,	  2000).42	  By	  the	  end	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39	  Forum	  for	  unity,	  democracy	  and	  justice.	  40	  Front	  of	  the	  people	  of	  Timor-­‐Leste.	  41	  FRETILIN	  officially	  adopted	  Marxism	  in	  1977	  and	  with	  it	  came	  intolerance	  of	  dissent.	  	  42	  Differences	  within	  the	  leadership	  of	  FRETILIN	  were	  largely	  over	  the	  role	  of	  the	  civilian	  population	  in	  the	  Resistance	  and	  they	  often	  had	  a	  damaging	  and	  sometimes	  fatal	  impact	  on	  the	  already	  disrupted	  lives	  of	  ordinary	  people	  who	  had	  evacuated	  to	  the	  mountains	  and	  forests	  with	  FRETILIN.	  Throughout	  these	  years,	  like	  their	  	  
	   76	  
1976,	   confrontations	   resulted	   in	   the	   execution	   of	   a	   number	   of	   prominent	  members	   of	   the	   internal	   opposition	  within	   FRETILIN	   and	   their	   supporters	  (CAVR,	   2005).	   In	   the	   second	  half	   of	   1977	  differences	  within	   the	   leadership	  over	  ideology	  and	  military	  strategy	  sparked	  another	  internal	  purge	  in	  which	  Francisco	   Xavier	   do	   Amaral,	   President	   of	   FRETILIN	   and	   the	   Democratic	  Republic	   of	   Timor-­‐Leste,	   was	   arrested	   for	   treason	   and	   expelled	   from	   the	  party.43	  Amaral’s	  alleged	  supporters	  were	  arrested,	  and	  many	  of	  them	  were	  subsequently	  executed	  or	  died	  in	  detention	  (CAVR,	  2005).	  	  It	   was	   during	   these	   years	   that	   Indonesia	   commenced	   the	  ‘Encirclement	   and	   Annihilation’	   operation	   designed	   to	   undermine	   the	  Resistance	   by	   destroying	   its	   base	   areas,	   especially	   its	   food	   production	  capacity,	   and	   torching	   houses	   belonging	   to	   known	   FRETILIN	   sympathizers.	  This	   operation	   started	   off	   with	   saturation	   bombing	   to	   clear	   the	   way	   for	  military	   advances	   and	   napalm	   bombardments	   to	   defoliate	   the	   trees	   (Pinto	  and	   Jardine,	   1997).	   The	   bombardments	   were	   followed	   by	   artillery	   attacks	  and	  military	  incursions.	  The	  military	  surrounded	  the	  bombarded	  villages	  and	  compelled	  the	  villagers	  to	  move	  to	  newly	  created	  ‘transit	  camps’.44	  FRETILIN	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  leaders,	  ordinary	  civilians,	  particularly	  those	  suspected	  of	  wanting	  to	  leave	  FRETILIN	  base	  areas	  and	  return	  to	  their	  homes,	  also	  risked	  being	  dubbed	  ‘traitors’,	  one	  consequence	  of	  which	  might	  be	  their	  execution	  or	  their	  death	  in	  detention.	  See,	  CAVR	  (2005)	  'Chega!'.	  Available	  at	  http://www.cavr-­‐timorleste.org/en/chegaReport.htm	  (last	  accessed	  11	  September	  2013).	  43	  Amaral	  suffered	  severe	  torture	  and	  deprivation,	  but	  survived.	  Several	  of	  those	  closest	  to	  him,	  were	  executed	  and	  two	  of	  his	  children	  are	  reported	  to	  have	  died	  in	  detention	  of	  hunger.	  Ibid.	  44	  By	  late	  1979	  an	  estimated	  300,000	  to	  370,000	  people	  were	  detained	  into	  these	  camps,	  which	  lacked	  sanitation,	  food	  or	  medical	  supply.	  The	  aim	  of	  internment	  was	  to	  break	  the	  linkages	  between	  those	  who	  had	  surrendered	  to	  the	  Indonesian	  armed	  forces	  and	  FALINTIL,	  in	  order	  to	  cut	  off	  civilian	  support	  to	  the	  guerrilla	  fighters	  and	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members	  and	  its	  sympathisers	  were	  executed,	  imprisoned	  or	  deported	  to	  the	  island	   of	   Atáuro.	   At	   the	   first	   National	   Conference	   in	   1981	   FRETILIN	  leadership	  summed	  up	  its	  losses:	  85	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  members	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Command	   had	   been	   killed;	   80	   per	   cent	   of	   the	   FALINTIL	   troops	   was	   lost,	  together	  with	  90	  per	  cent	  of	  their	  weapons;	  all	  FRETILIN	  support	  bases	  were	  destroyed	  and	  Indonesian	  troops	  were	  in	  control	  of	  the	  surviving	  population;	  all	   lines	   of	   communication	   between	   the	   remaining	   resistance	   fighters	  were	  severed	  and	  communication	  with	  the	  outside	  world	  cut,	  making	  it	  impossible	  to	  channel	  information	  to	  supporters	  overseas	  (Carey,	  1996).	  	  	  
Gusmão’s	  policy	  of	  national	  unity:	  from	  FRETILIN	  to	  CRRN,	  to	  CNRM,	  and	  
CNRT	  The	  near	  annihilation	  of	  the	  Resistance	  forced	  the	  organisation	  to	  change	  its	  military	  strategy	   from	  a	  protracted	  people’s	  war	   into	  a	  guerrilla	  war	   fought	  by	  FALINTIL	  fighters.	  The	  near	  defeat	  made	  it	  clear	  that	  FRETILIN	  needed	  to	  shake	  off	  its	  radical	  Marxist	  ideology	  in	  order	  to	  enlarge	  its	  political	  platform.	  The	   National	   Conference	   of	   1981	   resulted	   in	   the	   foundation	   of	   the	   CRRN	  (Conselho	  Revolucionário	  de	  Resistência	  Nacional45)	   that	  was	   intended	   to	  be	  an	   umbrella	   organisation	   for	   all	   the	   various	   nationalist	   groups	   fighting	   for	  Timorese	   independence,	  both	   inside	  and	  outside	  Timor.	  Although	  the	  CRRN	  was	  dominated	  by	  FRETILIN	  members,	   the	   organisation	  was	   considered	   as	  the	   first	   significant	   step	   towards	   national	   unity	   (CAVR,	   2005).	   During	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  thus	  to	  destroy	  the	  tattered	  remnants	  of	  the	  armed	  resistance	  still	  in	  the	  mountains	  and	  forests.	  Ibid.	  45	  Revolutionary	  Council	  of	  National	  Resistance.	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1981	   conference	   Gusmão	   was	   elected	   National	   Political	   Commissar46,	  President	  of	  the	  CRRN	  and	  Commander	  in	  Chief	  of	  FALINTIL.	  	  These	   structural	   and,	   in	   particular,	   ideological	   changes	   within	   the	  resistance	  movement	  did	  not	  go	  unchallenged.	  Senior	  deputies	  in	  FALINTIL’s	  General	  staff	   (all	  party	  hardliners)	  Kilik	  Wae	  Gae,	  Mauk	  Moruk,	  and	  Oligary	  Asswain,	  opposed	  Gusmão’s	  ceasefire	  with	  the	  Indonesian	  military	  forces	  in	  early	   1983,	   and	   his	   policy	   of	   uniting	   the	   Resistance	   under	   the	   banner	   of	  national	  unity,	  stripping	  FRETILIN	  of	   its	  dominant	  position	  and	  forcing	  it	  to	  give	   the	   UDT	   a	   seat	   at	   the	   table	   (Rees,	   2004).	   An	   attempted	   coup	   by	   this	  faction	   failed	   but	   the	   fallout	   was	   heavy.	   Mauk	   Moruk	   surrendered	   to	   the	  Indonesians.	  His	  brother,	  Cornelio	  Gama	   (also	  known	  as	  L-­‐7	  or	  Ely	  Fohorai	  Bo’ot)	   was	   purged,	   and	   although	   later	   taken	   back,	   developed	   a	   separate	  power	   base	   through	   a	   cult-­‐like	   organisation,	   Sagrada	   Família.	   Oligari	   was	  removed	   from	   FALINTIL	   and	   resurfaced	   in	   independent	   Timor-­‐Leste	   as	   a	  leader	   of	   a	   dissident	   group,	   CPD-­‐RDTL	   (Conselho	   Popular	   pela	   Defesa	   da	  
República	   Democrática	   de	   Timor-­Leste47),	   that	   for	   the	   first	   years	   after	   the	  Indonesian	  departure	  was	  a	  major	  security	  headache	  for	  the	  UN	  Transitional	  Government.	  Kilik	  died	  under	  disputed	  circumstances	  and	  his	  wife	  became	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46	  This	  post	  previously	  was	  occupied	  by	  Alkatiri.	  In	  1984	  the	  party	  was	  dissolved,	  Marxism-­‐Leninism	  ceased	  to	  be	  FRETILIN’s	  ideology	  and	  the	  PMLF	  (Partido	  
Marxista-­Leninista	  FRETILIN,	  FRETILIN	  Marxist-­‐Leninist	  Party,	  simply	  became	  FRETILIN	  again.	  CAVR	  (2005)	  'Chega!'.	  Available	  at	  http://www.cavr-­‐timorleste.org/en/chegaReport.htm	  (last	  accessed	  11	  September	  2013).	  47	  Popular	  Council	  for	  the	  Defense	  of	  the	  Democratic	  Republic	  of	  Timor-­‐Leste.	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FRETILIN	   central	   committee	   member	   and	   eventually	   Deputy	   Minister	   for	  State	  Administration	  in	  the	  Alkatiri	  government	  (ICG,	  2006).48	  	  The	  deaths	  and	   surrender	  of	   the	  opponents	  of	   the	  policy	  of	  national	  unity	  strengthened	  the	  position	  of	  Gusmão	  as	  leader	  of	  the	  Resistance	  (Niner,	  2000).	   In	   1986	   a	   National	   Convergence	  was	   signed	   in	   Lisbon	   between	   the	  UDT	   and	   FRETILIN	   leaders	   but	  working	   together	   still	   proved	   difficult.	   The	  perceived	   ‘radicalism’	   of	   the	   DFSE	   (Delegação	   da	   FRETILIN	   em	   Serviço	   no	  
Exterior49)	  was	   one	   sticking	   point	   (CAVR,	   2005).	   Reflecting	   on	   that	   period,	  Gusmão	  later	  commented:	  	  
‘In	   1986,	   the	   Nationalist	   Convergence	   was	   formed	   in	   an	   attempt	   to	  
dispel	  the	  climate	  of	  suspicion	  that	  existed	  between	  the	  political	  parties	  
but,	   once	   again,	   good	   intentions	   were	   not	   enough	   to	   create	   harmony	  
between	  our	  separate	  objectives.’	  (CAVR,	  2005,	  Chapter	  5:	  34)	  
	  	   In	   1987,	   Gusmão	   and	   Ramos-­‐Horta	   decided	   to	   resign	   from	   FRETILIN	  and	  to	  transform	  the	  CRRN	  into	  the	  CNRM	  (Conselho	  Nacional	  de	  Resistência	  
Maubere50),	   an	   umbrella	   council	   that	   they	   hoped	   would	   encompass	   all	  political	   ideologies.	   According	   to	   both	   men,	   independence	   could	   only	   be	  achieved	   if	   the	  military	  struggle	  was	  supported	  by	  a	  diplomatic	   struggle.	   In	  the	  eyes	  of	   the	   international	  community	  a	  resistance	  movement	  would	  only	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48	  It	  is	  believed	  that	  he	  [Kilik	  Wae	  Gae]	  was	  executed	  under	  Gusmao’s	  orders’.	  See,	  Kingsbury,	  D.	  (2009)	  East	  Timor:	  The	  Price	  of	  Liberty.	  New	  York:	  Palgrave	  Macmillan.	  49	  FRETILIN	  Delegation	  for	  the	  Exterior.	  	  50	  National	  Council	  of	  Maubere	  Resistance.	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be	   legitimate	   if	   it	   included	  all	  pro-­‐independence	  movements,	   irrespective	  of	  their	  political	  colour.	  	  	   In	   1988,	   Gusmão	   introduced	   a	   fundamental	   reorganisation	   of	   the	  Resistance:	   first,	   the	  CNRM	  leadership	  broke	  party	   ties	  with	  FRETILIN,	  and,	  second,	   it	   declared	   FALINTIL	   to	   be	   unaligned	  with	   any	   political	   party,	   and	  commanded	   by	   the	   CNRM.	   Gusmão	   also	   imposed	   the	   restructuring	   of	   the	  DFSE	   into	   DRSE	   (Delegação	   da	   Resistência	   em	   Serviço	   no	   Exterior51)	   in	   an	  attempt	   to	   reinforce	   the	   new	   non-­‐partisan	   approach	   and	   combat	   the	  perceived	   ineffectiveness	   of	   the	   DFSE,	   which	   was	   attributed	   to	   internal	  conflicts	   (CAVR,	   2005,	   Chapter	   5:	   36).	   In	   essence,	   FRETILIN	   lost	   absolute	  control	  over	  the	  policies	  that	  the	  Resistance	  would	  follow.	  The	  fallout	  of	  this	  series	  of	  events	  reverberates	  in	  Timor-­‐Leste	  today	  (Shoesmith,	  2003).	  	  	   The	   reorganisation	   of	   the	   Resistance	   provoked	   serious	   tensions	  between	   the	   CNRM	   and	   FRETILIN	   (Mattoso,	   2005).	   FRETILIN’s	   leadership	  and	  in	  particular	  the	  external	  delegation	  largely	  rejected	  Gusmão’s	  policy	  of	  national	  unity.	  The	  Secretary-­‐General	  of	  FRETILIN,	  Abílio	  de	  Araújo,	  was	  the	  leader	  of	  a	  faction	  that	  became	  ever	  more	  critical	  of	  the	  restructuring	  of	  the	  Resistance	   in	   general	   and	   of	   Gusmão	   in	   particular.	   Gusmão	   responded	   by	  having	   de	   Araújo	   and	   others	   replaced,	   claiming	   the	   party	   could	   not	   be	   led	  from	   abroad,	   and	   installing	   veteran	   resistance	   fighters,	   Lu-­‐Olo,	   Mau	   Hudo,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51	  Delegation	  of	  Resistance	  in	  Overseas	  Service.	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and	   Ma’Huno	   (Kingsbury,	   2009).52	   Ramos-­‐Horta	   became	   the	   special	  representative	  of	  the	  CNRM	  abroad.53	  	  	   The	   CNRM	   did	   not	   represent	   all	   pro-­‐independence	   groups,	   however.	  Both	  the	  UDT	  and	  KOTA	  refused	  to	  join	  the	  organisation	  for	  various	  reasons.	  First,	   the	   UDT	   rejected	   the	   organisation	   claiming	   it	   was	   another	  metamorphosis	   of	   FRETILIN.	   Second,	   both	   the	   UDT	   and	   KOTA	   could	   not	  identify	   themselves	  with	   the	   name	   of	   the	   organisation:	   the	   term	   ‘Maubere’	  was	   during	   the	   Portuguese	   colonial	   period	   used	   to	   distinguish	   the	   native	  Timorese	   from	   the	   upper	   class,	   the	   educated	   Portuguese	   and,	   to	   a	   certain	  degree,	   the	   mestizos,	   a	   half-­‐caste	   group.	   Parties	   such	   as	   the	   UDT,	   which	  advocated	  continued	  affiliation	  with	  Portugal,	  and	  KOTA,	  the	  feudal-­‐oriented	  political	   party,	   did	   not	   identify	   themselves	   with	   the	   ‘common	   people’	   and	  therefore	  rejected	  the	  term	   ‘Maubere’	  and,	  by	  extension,	   the	  CNRM	  (Soares,	  2000).	  	  	   The	   last	   but	   most	   successful	   attempt	   to	   establish	   an	   all-­‐inclusive	  national	  unity	  movement	  was	  the	  foundation	  of	  the	  CNRT	  (Conselho	  Nacional	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52	  Another	  example	  of	  the	  problematic	  relationship	  between	  the	  CNRM	  and	  FRETILIN’s	  external	  delegation	  (DFSE)	  was	  the	  latter’s	  refusal	  to	  change	  into	  an	  external	  delegation	  of	  the	  Resistance	  (Delegação	  da	  Resistência	  em	  Serviço	  no	  Exterior,	  DRSE).	  Instead,	  it	  turned	  itself	  into	  FRETILIN	  External	  Delegation	  (Delegação	  Externa	  da	  FRETILIN,	  DEF).	  CAVR	  (2005)	  'Chega!'.	  Available	  at	  http://www.cavr-­‐timorleste.org/en/chegaReport.htm	  (last	  accessed	  11	  September	  2013).	  53	  Federer	  explains	  that	  Ramos-­‐Horta’s	  mixed	  Portuguese-­‐Timorese	  racial	  background	  prevented	  him	  from	  being	  genuinely	  accepted	  as	  a	  popular	  leader	  of	  the	  people	  of	  Timor-­‐Leste.	  Ramos-­‐Horta	  therefore	  chose	  Gusmão,	  to	  whom	  he	  always	  demonstrated	  great	  loyalty,	  to	  become	  the	  president	  of	  CNRM.	  See,	  Federer,	  J.	  (2005)	  The	  UN	  in	  East	  Timor:	  Building	  Timor	  Leste,	  a	  Fragile	  State.	  Darwin:	  Charles	  Darwin	  University	  Press.	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da	  Resistência	  Timorense54)	   in	  April	  1998.	   ‘Maubere’	  was	  removed	   from	  the	  title	   and	   replaced	   with	   ‘Timorense’.	   As	   an	   umbrella	   organisation	   for	   pro-­‐independence	  groups,	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  CNRT	  was	  to	  facilitate	  the	  transition	  towards	   self-­‐government	   and	   independence.	   It	   claimed	   to	   represent	   a	  rejection	  of	  party	  politics	  in	  favour	  of	  an	  inclusive,	  pluralist	  system	  based	  on	  the	   need	   to	   build	   national	   unity	   and	   engage	   all	   sections	   of	   Timor-­‐Leste’s	  society	   in	   the	   common	   cause	  of	   national	   liberation	   (Walsh,	   1999).	   In	  1992,	  Gusmão,	   together	  with	  other	  members	  of	   the	  resistance,	  had	  been	  captured	  and	  imprisoned	  in	  Indonesia.	  Nevertheless,	  he	  was	  elected	  as	  the	  President	  of	  the	   CNRT	   and	   Ramos-­‐Horta	   was	   appointed	   Vice-­‐President.	   Inside	   Timor-­‐Leste,	   Mario	   Carrascalão	   was	   appointed	   as	   ‘silent’	   (secret)	   Vice-­‐President.	  The	  CNRT	  included	  -­‐	  besides	  FRETILIN	  and	  the	  UDT	  -­‐	  parties	  such	  as	  KOTA,	  the	   pro-­‐autonomy	   party	   APODETI,	   and	   non-­‐political	   organisations	   such	   as	  the	  Church.	  	  	   Although	   the	   CNRT	   incorporated	   and	   represented	   the	  main	   Timorese	  political	   parties,	   internal	   co-­‐operation	   still	   proved	   difficult.	   According	   to	  Federer	  (2005),	  internal	  friction	  existed	  because	  some	  members	  of	  the	  CNRT	  lacked	  democratic	  experience,	  he	  explains:	  	  
	  
‘The	  gathering	  of	  East	  Timorese	  from	  inside	  and	  outside,	  with	  different	  
levels	   of	   exposure	   to	   the	   modern	   world	   led	   to	   contradictions.	   As	   was	  
natural,	   principles	   applying	   to	   traditional	   forms	   of	   organization	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54	  National	  Council	  of	  Timorese	  Resistance.	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featured	  strongly,	  and	  led	  to	  dissatisfaction	  on	  the	  part	  of	  those	  who	  had	  
a	   greater	   exposure	   to	   modern	   practices.	   As	   a	   result,	   the	   selection	   of	  
delegates	  was	  bitterly	  criticised	  for	  the	  lack	  of	  procedures	  to	  ensure	  true	  
representation.	  Similarly,	  the	  deliberation,	  decision-­making,	  and	  voting-­
procedures	   were	   denounced	   as	   insufficiently	   democratic,	   lacking	  
candour	  and	  transparency’	  (Federer,	  2005,	  54).	  	  	   One	  month	  after	  the	  foundation	  of	  the	  CNRT,	  in	  May	  1998,	  the	  President	  of	   Indonesia,	   General	   Suharto,	   was	   forced	   to	   resign.	   President	   Habibie,	   his	  successor,	  demonstrated	  a	  more	   flexible	   attitude	  with	   regard	   to	   the	  Timor-­‐Leste	   issue.	   Habibie	   announced	   that	   he	   was	   willing	   to	   allow	   a	   ‘popular	  consultation’	  on	  autonomy	  in	  Timor-­‐Leste,	  and,	  most	  importantly,	  should	  the	  vote	   for	   autonomy	   be	   rejected,	   Indonesia	   would	   be	   willing	   to	   grant	   full	  independence.	  	  	   The	   political	   breakthrough	   provoked	   a	   backlash	   in	   Timor-­‐Leste,	  however.	   Tensions	   developed	   between	   the	   pro-­‐autonomy	   and	   the	   pro-­‐independence	   supporters	   and	  were	   deliberately	   encouraged	   by	   Indonesia’s	  military	  apparatus	  that	  opposed	  Habibie’s	  policy	  of	  appeasement.	  Indonesian	  military	  officials	  formed,	  trained	  and	  financed	  Timorese	  militias.	  Often	  acting	  together	  with	   Indonesian	   forces,	   the	   same	  militias	   instigated	  a	   campaign	  of	  violence	   designed	   to	   intimidate	   the	   pro-­‐independence	   movement	   and	   to	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ensure	   a	   pro-­‐Indonesian	   result	   in	   the	   popular	   consultation.55	   Many	   of	   the	  pro-­‐autonomy	   supporters	   were	   members	   of	   APODETI	   and	   the	   UDT.	   For	  example,	   the	   political	   wing	   of	   the	   pro-­‐autonomy	   campaign	   included	   the	  FPDK56,	   which	   was	   led	   by	   the	   former	   district	   administrator	   of	   Dili	   and	  APODETI	  member	  Domingos	  Soares,	  whereas	  the	  BRTT57	  was	  being	  directed	  by	  the	  UDT	  President	  Lopes	  da	  Cruz.	  These	  groups	  were	  closely	  linked	  to	  and	  funded	   by	   the	   civil	   administration	   and	   used	   to	   channel	   funds	   from	   the	  government	   and	   the	   military	   to	   the	   pro-­‐Indonesia	   militia	   forces	   (CAVR,	  2005).	  	  	   The	   popular	   consultation	   took	   place	   on	   30	   August	   1999.	   Despite	  intimidation	   by	   militia	   groups,	   98	   per	   cent	   of	   the	   population	   went	   to	   the	  polls.	  An	  overwhelming	  majority	  rejected	  autonomy	  (78.5	  per	  cent)	  and	  thus	  voted	   for	   independence.	   In	   the	   militia	   violence	   between	   1,200	   and	   1,500	  civilians	  were	  killed	  (Robinson,	  2003).	  The	  World	  Bank	  reports	  that	  over	  75	  per	   cent	   of	   the	   population	  was	   displaced	   in	   the	  weeks	   following	   the	   ballot	  results,	   and	  almost	  70	  per	   cent	  of	  physical	   infrastructure	  was	  destroyed	  or	  rendered	  inoperable	  (World	  Bank,	  1999).	  During	  the	  violence,	  FALINTIL,	  the	  armed	   wing	   of	   the	   resistance	   movement,	   remained	   confined	   to	   military	  camps	  in	  five	  locations	  across	  the	  territory	  on	  the	  orders	  of	   its	  commander,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55	  ‘Those	  who	  betrayed	  integration’	  formed	  a	  particular	  target	  for	  militia	  groups.	  Members	  of	  the	  Carrascalão	  family,	  for	  example,	  were	  considered	  as	  traitors.	  In	  1999,	  12	  people	  were	  killed	  when	  militiamen	  and	  TNI	  attacked	  the	  house	  of	  Manuel	  Carrascalão.	  Robinson,	  G.	  (2003)	  'East	  Timor	  1999:	  Crimes	  Against	  Humanity',	  OHCHR	  (United	  Nations	  Office	  of	  the	  High	  Commissioner	  for	  Human	  Rights).	  56	  See	  fn.	  39.	  57	  See	  fn.	  40.	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Xanana	   Gusmão.58	   The	   UN	   force	   International	   Force	   in	   East	   Timor	  (INTERFET)	  was	   deployed	   in	   September	   1999	   to	   restore	   security	   and	   deal	  forcefully	   with	   pro-­‐Indonesian	   militias	   (United	   Nations	   Security	   Council,	  1999a).	  Two	  months	  later,	  peace	  was	  restored.	  	  	   In	   sum,	   throughout	   the	   Indonesian	   occupation	   new	   political	   divisions	  emerged.	   One	   fault-­‐line	   ran	   through	   pro-­‐independence	   and	   pro-­‐integration	  supporters,	   more	   specifically	   between	   FRETILIN	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   and	   the	  UDT,	  APODETI	  and	  some	  other	  small	  parties	  on	  the	  other	  hand.	  The	  division	  was	   deliberately	   encouraged	   by	   the	   Indonesian	   armed	   forces	   that	   used	  members	  of	  the	  UDT	  and	  APODETI	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  roles	  during	  and	  after	  the	  occupation,	   including	   as	   auxiliaries,	   translators,	   informants	   and	  administrators.	   In	   1999,	   Indonesian	  military	   officers	   recruited	  members	   of	  roughly	   the	   same	   parties	   into	   pro-­‐autonomy	  militia	   groups	   in	   an	   effort	   to	  intimidate	  the	  pro-­‐independence	  supporters	  and	  to	  ensure	  a	  pro-­‐Indonesian	  result	   in	   the	   popular	   consultation.	   Several	  members	   of	   these	  militias	  were	  local	  government	  officials	  who	  felt	  threatened	  by	  the	  imminent	  referendum.	  	  	   Another	   fault-­‐line	  developed	  between	  the	  more	  moderate	  members	  of	  the	  resistance	  movement	  and	   their	   radical,	  Marxist	   counterparts.	  The	   latter	  group	   won	   out	   and	   purged	   the	   so-­‐called	   counter-­‐revolutionaries	   from	   the	  party.	  FRETILIN	  members	  who	  were	  willing	   to	   co-­‐operate	  with	   the	  UDT	  or	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58	  Gusmão	  ordered	  a	  unilateral	  cantonment	  of	  FALINTIL	  forces	  in	  1999	  to	  prevent	  more	  killings	  by	  pro-­‐Indonesian	  militias.	  He	  explained:	  ‘We	  knew	  the	  strategy	  of	  the	  Indonesian	  generals,	  and	  we	  wanted	  to	  avoid	  falling	  into	  their	  trap.	  They	  wanted	  to	  show	  that	  East	  Timorese	  were	  fighting	  each	  other,	  so	  no	  UN	  intervention	  would	  have	  come.’	  Cristalis,	  I.	  (2009)	  East	  Timor:	  A	  nation’s	  bitter	  dawn.	  London:	  Zed	  Books.	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other	   political	   parties	   sometimes	   risked	   being	   imprisoned,	   tortured	   and	  sometimes	  killed	  by	  their	  fellow	  party	  members.	  When	  Gusmão	  assumed	  the	  leadership	  of	  the	  Resistance	  the	  number	  of	  these	  executions	  was	  curtailed.59	  	  	   Instead	   of	   changing	   the	   party	   from	   the	   inside,	   Gusmão	   and	   Ramos-­‐Horta	   decided	   in	   1988	   to	   resign	   from	   FRETILIN	   to	   form	   a	   new	   resistance	  movement,	   the	   CNRM.	   This	   development	   gave	   rise	   to	   a	   third	   fault-­‐line	  between	  the	  Timorese,	  more	  specifically	  between	  the	  leadership	  of	  FRETILIN	  and	   the	   CNRM.	   Only	   ten	   years	   later,	   in	   1998,	   the	   CNRT	   successfully	  incorporated	   all	   Timorese	   political	   parties.	   So,	   the	   creation	   of	   the	   CNRT	  demonstrates	   the	   adaptability	   of	   the	   member	   parties	   to	   work	   together	  toward	   the	   common	   goal	   of	   independence.	   Yet,	   the	   fact	   that	   political	  cooperation	   took	   almost	   twenty-­‐five	   years	   and	   was	   only	   realized	   when	  independence	   became	   a	   real	   political	   option	   gave	   evidence	   of	   distrust	  between	   the	  members	  of	   the	  historical	  political	  parties	  of	  Timor-­‐Leste.	  The	  violence	   inflicted	  by	   Indonesian-­‐backed	  militias	   created	  a	  new	  rift	  between	  supporters	  and	  opponents	  of	  independence.	  Unlike	  in	  1975,	  however,	  most	  of	  the	  people	  who	  opposed	  independence	  left	  Timor-­‐Leste.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59	  While	  49%	  (561/1,145)	  of	  documented	  killings	  and	  disappearances	  in	  1975	  were	  attributed	  to	  FRETILIN/FALINTIL,	  its	  share	  of	  the	  total	  fell	  to	  16.6%	  (563/3,398)	  in	  the	  period	  1976-­‐84	  and	  kept	  on	  falling	  during	  the	  remaining	  years	  of	  the	  conflict,	  to	  3.7%	  (18/488)	  of	  killings	  and	  disappearances	  in	  1985-­‐98	  and	  to	  0.6%	  (5/898)	  in	  1999.	  See,	  CAVR	  (2005)	  'Chega!'.	  Available	  at	  http://www.cavr-­‐timorleste.org/en/chegaReport.htm	  (last	  accessed	  11	  September	  2013).	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Reorientation	  under	  the	  UN	  Transitional	  Administration	  The	   UN	   Security	   Council	   decided	   to	   fill	   the	   administrative	   vacuum	   that	  emerged	  in	  Timor-­‐Leste	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  conflict.	  To	  this	  end,	  the	  Security	  Council	  created	  the	  United	  Nations	  Transitional	  Administration	  in	  East	  Timor	  (UNTAET)	   that	   assumed	   overall	   responsibility	   for	   the	   administration	   of	  Timor-­‐Leste	   (United	   Nations	   Security	   Council,	   1999b).	   This	   responsibility	  included	   the	   development	   of	   the	   capacity	   for	   self-­‐government.	   Under	   the	  transitional	  administration	  of	   the	  UN	  a	  power	  struggle	   took	  place	  along	   the	  political	   lines	   that	   were	   drawn	   by	   divisions	   in	   the	   former	   resistance	  movement.	   In	   addition,	   the	   politicisation	   of	   the	   new	   security	   sector	  demonstrated	  that	  old	  feuds	  still	  dictated	  Timorese	  politics.	  	   In	   July	  2000,	  seven	  months	  after	   the	   installation	  of	  UNTAET,	  a	  kind	  of	  proto-­‐government	   was	   established	   where	   power	   was	   shared	   between	   UN	  officials	   and	   the	   leadership	   of	   Timor-­‐Leste.	   The	   ‘First	   Transitional	  Government’	   included	   a	   National	   Council	   (NC)	   with	   representatives	  exclusively	  from	  Timor-­‐Leste,	  and	  a	  Transitional	  Cabinet	  where	  the	  Timorese	  held	   four	   of	   the	   eight	   portfolios	   (see	  Table	   3.1).	   The	  National	   Council	   (NC)	  was	   established	   as	   a	   type	   of	   transitional	   ‘proto-­‐parliament’,	   authorised	   to	  initiate,	   modify,	   and	   recommend	   draft	   regulations,	   and	   to	   amend	   draft	  regulations	   subject	   to	   the	   approval	   of	   the	   head	   of	   the	   UNTAET,	   the	  Transitional	   Administrator	   (TA)	   Sergio	   Vieira	   de	   Mello	   (UNTAET,	   2000a).	  Similarly,	   all	   decisions	   taken	   by	   the	   Transitional	   Cabinet	   were	   ultimately	  subject	  to	  the	  approval	  of	  the	  TA	  (UNTAET,	  2000b).	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Table	  3.1:	   Composition	  of	  the	  Transitional	  Cabinet,	  July	  2000	  Department	   Name	   International	  /	  National	  Political	  Affairs	   Peter	  Galbraith	   International	  Police	   and	   Emergency	  Services	   Jean-­‐Christian	  Cady	   International	  Finance	   Michael	  Francino	   International	  Justice	   Gita	  Honwana-­‐Welch	   International	  Economy	   Marí	  Alkatiri	   National	  Internal	  Administration	   Ana	  Pessoa	   National	  Infrastructure	   João	  Carrascalão	   National	  Social	  Affairs	   Filomeno	  Jacob	   National	  Source:	   Nassrine	   Azimi	   and	   Chang	   Li	   Lin	   (2003)	   ‘The	  United	  Nations	   Transitional	  Administration	   in	   East	   Timor	   (UNTAET):	   Debriefing	   and	   Lessons’,	   Leiden:	   Brill	  Academic	  Publishers,	  p.	  289.	  	  	   	  On	  paper	   the	  TA	  appointed	   the	  members	  of	   the	  Cabinet,	   in	   reality	  he	  left	   the	   selection	   of	   the	   four	   domestic	   ministers	   largely	   to	   Gusmão	  (Chesterman,	  2002).	  Gusmão	  and	  (initially)	  Ramos-­‐Horta	  did	  not	  participate	  in	   the	  Transitional	  Cabinet	  but	  remained	   in	   the	  CNRT	  to	  help	  with	  the	  civic	  education	  of	  the	  Timorese	  and	  to	  prepare	  them	  for	  elections	  (BBC	  Summary	  of	   World	   Broadcasts,	   15	   July	   2000).	   Two	   of	   the	   chosen	   ministers	   were	  FRETILIN	  members	  (Ana	  Pessoa	  and	  Marí	  Alkatiri)	  and	  one	  was	  the	  head	  of	  the	  UDT	  party	  (João	  Carrascalã̃o).	  The	  final	  representative	  came	  from	  outside	  the	  political	  establishment,	  with	  Filomeno	  Jacob	  of	  the	  Catholic	  Church	  taking	  the	   fourth	   post.	   Ramos-­‐Horta	   joined	   the	   Transitional	   Cabinet	   in	   October	  2000.	   His	   belated	   appointment	   was	   the	   outcome	   of	   a	   political	   struggle	  between	   the	   FRETILIN	   leadership	   that	   opposed	   his	   appointment	   and	   the	  CNRT	  leaders	  Gusmão,	  Mário	  Carrascalão	  and	  Ramos-­‐Horta	  who	  wanted	  the	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latter	   to	   be	   included	   in	   the	   cabinet.	   The	   CNRT	   troika	  won	   out	   and	  Ramos-­‐Horta	   was	   appointed	   minister	   of	   foreign	   affairs	   in	   the	   First	   Transitional	  Cabinet.60	  	  	   The	  development	  of	   formal	   institutions	  of	  political	   representation	  and	  the	   inclusion	  of	   local	   actors	   in	   these	   institutions	  went	  hand	   in	  hand	  with	   a	  gradual	  break	  up	  of	  the	  CNRT	  and	  the	  emergence	  of	  new	  Timorese	  political	  parties.	  In	  his	  report	  to	  the	  Security	  Council	  delivered	  on	  29	  September	  2000,	  the	  TA	  Sergio	  Vieira	  de	  Mello	  pointed	  out	  that	  the	  CNRT	  congress	  of	  August	  2000	  brought	  to	  light	  differences	  between	  the	  leadership	  of	  CNRT.	  According	  to	  him,	  there	  was	  a	  friction	  between	  the	  main	  party,	  FRETILIN,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  UDT,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  the	  CNRT	  leadership,	  on	  the	  other,	  leading	  to	  the	  emergence	  of	  new	  political	  parties	  and	  an	  intensification	  of	  political	  activity	  and	   discord	   amongst	   the	   Timorese	   political	   leaders	   (United	   Nations	  Secretary-­‐General,	  2001).61	  In	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  CNRT	  Congress,	  FRETILIN	  rejected	  all	  resolutions	  made	  during	  the	  Congress	  and	  officially	  declared	  their	  withdrawal	   from	   the	   national	   unity	   body.	   An	   important	   reason	   for	  FRETILIN’s	  withdraw	   from	   the	   organisation	  was	   the	   party’s	   dissatisfaction	  with	   the	   newly	   elected	   leadership.	   According	   to	   the	   Secretary	   General	   of	  FRETILIN,	  Alkatiri,	  the	  only	  change	  that	  was	  made	  during	  the	  congress	  was	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60	  The	  CNRT	  leaders	  resigned	  from	  the	  umbrella	  organisation	  in	  order	  to	  exert	  pressure	  on	  the	  UNTAET	  to	  include	  Ramos-­‐Horta	  in	  the	  Transitional	  Cabinet.	  See:	  Dodd,	  M.	  (2000,	  28th	  August)	  'Timor	  in	  crisis	  as	  leaders	  resign'.	  Available	  at:	  http://www.lexisnexis.com.	  	  61	  In	  2001	  three	  new	  parties	  were	  established:	  PSD	  (Partido	  Social	  Democrata),	  Social	  Democratic	  Party;	  PDC	  (Partido	  Democrata	  Cristão),	  Christian	  Democratic	  Party	  and	  PST	  (Partido	  Socialista	  de	  Timor),	  Socialist	  Party	  of	  Timor.	  In	  addition,	  KOTA	  (Klibur	  Oan	  Timor	  Ass’wain),	  Association	  of	  Timorese	  Heroes	  or	  Sons	  of	  the	  Mountain	  Warriors,	  was	  originally	  established	  in	  1974	  but	  revived	  in	  2000.	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strengthen	   the	   power	   base	   of	   three	   people	   -­‐	   Gusmão,	   Ramos-­‐Horta,	   and	  Mario	   Carrascalão.	   So,	   he	   concluded,	   ‘the	   change	   has	   been	   for	   the	   worse’	  (BBC	  Summary	  of	  World	  Broadcasts,	  2	  September	  2000).	  	   After	   the	   CNRT	   Congress	   verbal	   disagreements	   escalated	   into	   street	  battles,	  and	  ethnically-­‐motivated,	  geographically-­‐oriented	  and	  racially-­‐driven	  conflicts	  (Soares,	  2003).	  According	  to	  Garrison	  (2005),	  the	  frustration	  of	  the	  expected	   partnership	   between	   the	   UN	   and	   the	   CNRT	   during	   the	   transition	  period	  contributed	  to	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  CNRT	  as	  an	  umbrella	  organisation	  in	  August	   2000	   and,	   thus,	   to	   the	   emergence	   of	   political	   competition	   for	  dominance.	  The	  CNRT	  was	  formally	  dissolved	  on	  9	  June	  2001.	  
	  
Elections	  for	  a	  Constituent	  Assembly	  On	   16	   March	   2001	   the	   TA	   decided	   that	   the	   elections	   for	   a	   Constituent	  Assembly	   (CA)	   would	   be	   held	   the	   following	   August.	   To	   this	   end,	   the	   UN	  issued	  regulation	  2001/2	  establishing	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  election	  of	  a	  CA	  to	  draft	  a	  Constitution	  that	  would	  enter	  into	  force	  on	  Timor-­‐Leste’s	   independence.62	  According	   to	   the	   regulation,	   a	   CA	   would	   prepare	   and	   adopt	   a	   constitution	  within	  90	  days	  after	  its	  election.	  Most	  importantly,	  the	  regulation	  stipulated	  that	   the	   CA	  would	   turn	   into	   the	   first	   parliament	   of	   an	   independent	   Timor-­‐Leste,	   if	   so	   provided	   in	   the	   Constitution.63	   In	   addition,	   it	   defined	   a	   mixed	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62	  UNTAET.	  2001a.	  On	  the	  Election	  of	  a	  Constituent	  Assembly	  to	  Prepare	  a	  Constitution	  for	  an	  Independent	  and	  Democratic	  East	  Timor.	  Regulation	  No.	  2001/2,	  16	  March	  2001.	  63	  The	  resolution	  ruled	  out	  the	  idea	  of	  adopting	  an	  Interim	  Constitution	  to	  allow	  for	  more	  extensive	  civic	  education	  and	  consultation	  as	  some	  in	  the	  NGO	  community	  had	  suggested.	  Moreover,	  it	  dispensed	  with	  the	  TA’s	  preference	  to	  authorize	  a	  non-­‐	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system	  for	  the	  CA	  elections:	  75	  representatives	  would	  be	  elected	  at	  a	  national	  level	   by	   proportional	   representation,	   and	   13	   representatives	   (one	   for	   each	  district)	   would	   be	   elected	   on	   a	   plurality	   basis	   (first-­‐past-­‐the-­‐post).	   The	  purpose	   of	   this	   mixed	   system	   was	   to	   promote	   representativeness	   and	  inclusion,	  enabling	  as	  many	  organised	  parties	  and	  social	  groups	  as	  possible	  to	  participate	  in	  writing	  the	  constitution.64	  Finally,	  the	  regulation	  established	  an	  Independent	  Electoral	  Commission	  entrusted	  with	  preparing	  and	  conducting	  the	   elections	   and	   formulating	   the	   registration	   requirements	   for	   parties	  wishing	   to	   contest	   the	  30	  August	  2001	  CA	  election.	   In	  order	   to	  prevent	   the	  participation	   of	   parties	   with	   pro-­‐Indonesian	   leanings,	   and	   to	   clarify	   the	  position	   of	   parties	  with	   ‘doubtful’	   policies,	   political	   parties	   needed	   to	  meet	  some	   requirements	   to	   be	   registered.65	   These	   requirements	   did	   not	   prevent	  any	   pre-­‐existing	   parties	   from	   registering	   however	   (Morrow	   and	   White,	  2002).	  In	  total	  sixteen	  political	  parties	  registered:	  968	  party	  candidates	  and	  five	  national	  independent	  candidates	  competed	  for	  the	  75	  national	  seats	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  elected	  Constitutional	  Convention	  to	  draft	  the	  constitution	  Morrow,	  J.	  and	  White,	  R.	  (2002)	  'The	  United	  Nations	  in	  Transitional	  East	  Timor:	  International	  Standards	  and	  the	  Reality	  of	  Governance',	  Australian	  Year	  Book	  of	  International	  Law,	  22,	  1-­‐46.	  64	  Chesterman	  claims	  that	  the	  choice	  for	  proportional	  representation	  was	  politically	  motivated,	  an	  effort	  at	  ‘electoral	  engineering’	  intended	  to	  reduce	  the	  likelihood	  of	  FRETILIN	  winning	  a	  large	  majority	  that	  was	  considered	  ‘undesirable’	  for	  an	  emerging	  democracy.	  See,	  Chesterman,	  S.	  (2005)	  You,	  the	  people:	  the	  United	  Nations,	  transitional	  administration,	  and	  state-­‐building.	  New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  65	  All	  political	  parties	  and	  candidates	  seeking	  to	  contest	  the	  election	  were	  required	  to	  endorse	  a	  legislatively	  prescribed	  notice	  that	  they	  were	  registering	  ‘for	  the	  purpose	  of	  nominating	  candidates	  for	  election	  to	  a	  Constituent	  Assembly	  to	  prepare	  a	  constitution	  of	  an	  independent	  and	  democratic	  East	  Timor’.	  Additionally,	  a	  registering	  party	  was	  required	  to	  provide	  a	  ‘written	  declaration	  signed	  by	  the	  leader	  and	  all	  other	  officers	  of	  the	  political	  party	  that	  they	  will	  continuously	  reside	  in	  East	  Timor	  for	  at	  least	  three	  months	  prior	  to	  the	  date	  of	  the	  election’.	  UNTAET.	  2001a.	  On	  the	  Election	  of	  a	  Constituent	  Assembly	  to	  Prepare	  a	  Constitution	  for	  an	  Independent	  and	  Democratic	  East	  Timor.	  Regulation	  No.	  2001/2,	  16	  March	  2001.	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84	  party	  district	  candidates	  and	  eleven	  independent	  candidates	  campaigned	  for	  the	  thirteen	  district	  seats	  in	  the	  CA.	  Each	  voter	  had	  the	  right	  to	  cast	  two	  ballots;	   one	   for	   a	   national	   representative	   (either	   a	   political	   party	   or	   an	  independent	   candidate)	   and	   one	   for	   a	   district	   representative	   (a	   party	   or	  independent	  candidate).	  	   The	   CA	   election	   campaigns	   incited	   open	   conflict	   not	   only	   between	  political	   parties	   but	   also	   among	   their	   sympathizers	   (Soares,	   2003).	   During	  the	   election	   campaigns	   old	   rivalries	   re-­‐emerged.	   Alkatiri,	   for	   example,	  denounced	  Xavier	  do	  Amaral,	  the	  current	  president	  of	  the	  ASDT	  party,	  as	  an	  Indonesian	   collaborator.	   In	   addition,	   FRETILIN	   leadership	   accused	   the	  UDT	  party	   of	   masterminding	   the	   Indonesian	   takeover.	   As	   a	   response	   to	   the	  allegation,	   the	  UDT	   leaders	  accused	  FRETILIN	  of	  having	  been	  communist	   in	  1975,	   prompting	   the	   UDT	   to	   mount	   an	   anti-­‐communist	   coup	   (Guterres,	  2006).	   The	   election	   campaigns	   also	   displayed	   on-­‐going	   animosity	   between	  Alkatiri	   and	   Gusmão:	   the	   latter	   not	   only	   ignored	   FRETILIN	   rallies	   and	  attended	   a	   rival	   Democratic	   Party	   (PD)	   rally	   instead,	   but	   also	   publicly	  rebuked	   Alkatiri	   for	   FRETILIN’s	   aggressive	   conduct	   of	   the	   campaign	  (Shoesmith,	  2003).	  As	  divisions	  deepened,	   fear	  of	   chaos	  during	   the	  election	  became	   widespread.	   To	   ensure	   that	   the	   election	   would	   proceed	   without	  violence,	   two	   legal	   documents	   were	   prepared.	   First,	   the	   sixteen	   contesting	  parties	  were	   invited	   to	  make	   a	   declaration	   of	   peace	   and	   renounce	   violence	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during	  the	  campaign.66	  The	  TA	  referred	  to	  the	  so-­‐called	  Pact	  of	  National	  Unity	  as	  ‘an	  essential	  part	  of	  our	  strategy	  to	  guarantee	  security	  during	  the	  electoral	  campaign’	   and	   suggested	   it	  was	   ‘intended	   to	   reassure	   those	   East	   Timorese	  who	  are	  fearful	  that	  the	  electoral	  process	  will	  be	  marred	  by	  political	  violence’	  (UNTAET,	  2001b).	   In	  addition,	   the	  UNTAET	  issued	  a	  regulation	  on	  electoral	  offences	   that	   ‘intends	   to	  enhance	   the	   safety,	   secrecy,	   freedom,	   fairness,	   and	  credibility	  of	  the	  elections	  and	  deter	  disruptions	  of	  the	  electoral	  period’.67	  	  	   The	   election	   for	   the	   88-­‐member	   CA	   took	   place	   on	   30	   August	   2001,	  precisely	   two	   years	   after	   the	   popular	   consultation	   on	   the	   future	   political	  status	   of	   Timor-­‐Leste.	   FRETILIN	   was	   the	   undisputed	   winner	   of	   the	   CA	  elections.	   On	   a	   national	   level	   it	  won	   43	   of	   the	   75	   seats.	   On	   a	   district	   level,	  twelve	  of	  the	  thirteen	  seats	  went	  to	  FRETILIN	  representatives;	  one	  seat	  was	  won	  by	  an	  independent	  candidate	  in	  the	  district	  of	  Oecussi.	  The	  results	  of	  the	  CA	  election	  are	  presented	  in	  Table	  3.2	  below.	  The	  elections	  went	  peacefully	  and	  the	  International	  Electoral	  Commission	  declared	  that	  the	  criteria	  of	  free	  and	   fair	   elections	   were	   met.	   The	   turnout	   was	   91.3	   per	   cent,	   which	   was	   a	  slight	  decrease	  as	  compared	  to	  the	  popular	  consultation	  of	  1999	  in	  which	  98	  per	   cent	   of	   the	   registered	   voters	   participated.	   In	   total	   384,248	   votes	  were	  casted,	  20,743	  of	  which	  (5.4	  per	  cent)	  were	  declared	  invalid.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66	  The	  National	  Party	  of	  Timor	  (PNT)	  and	  the	  National	  Republic	  Party	  of	  Timor-­‐Leste	  (PARENTIL)	  did	  not	  sign	  the	  pact	  of	  national	  unity.	  67	  UNTAET.	  2001e.	  On	  Electoral	  Offences	  for	  the	  Election	  of	  a	  Constituent	  Assembly.	  Regulation	  No.	  2001/11,	  13	  July	  2001.	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Table	  3.2:	  Timor-­Leste	  Constituent	  Assembly	  election	  results,	  30	  August	  
2001	  Party	  or	  Candidate*	   Total	  valid	  votes	   Votes	  as	  a	  %	  of	  total	  valid	  votes	   Seats	  FRETILIN	   208,531	   57.4	   55	  PD	   31,680	   8.7	   7	  PSD	  	   29,726	   8.2	   6	  ASDT	   28,495	   7.8	   6	  UDT	   8,584	   2.4	   2	  PNT	  	   8,035	   2.2	   2	  KOTA	   7,735	   2.1	   2	  PPT	   7,322	   2.0	   2	  PDC	   7,181	   2.0	   2	  PST	   6,483	   1.8	   1	  Independents	   5,341	   1.5	   1	  PL	   4,013	   1.1	   1	  UDC/PDC	   2,413	   0.7	   1	  APODETI	   2,181	   0.6	   0	  PPT	   2,026	   0.6	   0	  PARENTIL	   1,971	   0.5	   0	  PDM	   1,788	   0.5	   0	  Total	   363,505	   100	   88	  *See	  list	  of	  abbreviations	  Source:	  Vasconcelos,	   P.	   B.	  D.	   and	  Cunha,	  R.	   S.	  D.	   (2009)	   'Semipresidencialismo	   em	  Timor:	   Um	  Equilíbrio	   Institucional	  Dinâmico	   num	  Contexto	   Crítico',	   in	   Lobo,	  M.	   C.	  and	  Neto,	  O.	  A.	  (eds)	  O	  Semipresidencialismo	  nos	  Países	  de	  Língua	  Portuguesa,	  Lisbon:	  Impresa	  de	  Ciências	  Sociais,	  254.	   	  	  	   FRETILIN	  garnered	  57	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  vote	  and	  64	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  seats.	  Ultimately,	  representatives	  of	  twelve	  parties	  and	  one	  independent	  took	  seats	  in	  the	  CA.	  Given	  that	  FRETILIN	  won	  an	  overall	  majority	  in	  the	  CA	  election,	  the	  TA	   largely	   delegated	   the	   right	   to	   appoint	   the	   members	   of	   the	   second	  
	   95	  
transitional	   cabinet	   to	   the	   party.	   On	   September	   19	   2001,	   the	   Council	   of	  Ministers	  was	   formed	  and	   included	   ten	  ministers,	   three	   secretaries	  of	   state	  and	  seven	  vice-­‐ministers	  (see	  Table	  3.3	  below).	  	  	   Table	  3.3:	  Composition	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  Ministers,	  September	  2001	  Department	   Name	   Party	  affiliation	  Chief	  Minister	  &	  Minister	  of	  Economy	  and	  Development	   Marí	  Alkatiri	   FRETILIN	  Foreign	  Affairs	   José	  Ramos-­‐Horta	   N/P	  Justice	   Ana	  Pessoa	   FRETILIN	  Finance	   Fernanda	  Borges	   N/P	  Internal	  Administration	   Antoninho	  Branco	   FRETILIN	  Health	   Ruí	  Maria	  de	  Araújo	   N/P	  Water	  and	  Public	  Works	   César	  Vital	  Moreira	   FRETILIN	  Transport	  and	  Communication	   Ovídio	   de	   Jesus	  Amaral	   FRETILIN	  Education,	  Culture,	  and	  Youth	   Armindo	  Maia	   N/P	  Agriculture	  and	  Fisheries	   Estanislau	  da	  Silva	   FRETILIN	  Source:	   UNTAET	   Daily	   Briefing	   ‘New	   East	   Timorese	   Government	   Sworn-­‐In’,	   20	  September	  2001.	  	  	   Of	  the	  ten	  ministers,	  six	  were	  FRETILIN	  affiliates	  and	  four	  independent.	  The	  development	  of	  a	  defence	   force	  and	  a	  police	  service	   formally	  remained	  the	  responsibility	  of	   the	  TA,	  Vieira	  de	  Mello.	  Despite	   international	  pressure,	  FRETILIN	  did	  not	  include	  Gusmão	  in	  the	  FRETILIN-­‐dominated	  Council	  (Dodd,	  2001).	   Two	   members	   of	   Timor-­‐Leste’s	   second	   largest	   party,	   the	   PD,	   were	  appointed	   to	   the	  position	  of	   vice-­‐minister.	  According	   to	  Tansey	   (2009),	   the	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second	  transitional	  government	   included	  independents	  and	  members	  of	  the	  PD	  because	  of	  the	  sustained	  pressure	  the	  TA	  placed	  on	  FRETILIN	  leadership.	  It	  needs	  to	  be	  emphasised,	  however,	  that	  the	  Chief	  Minister	  Alkatiri	  refrained	  from	  including	  members	  of	  the	  PD	  in	  the	  Council	  of	  Ministers.	  Moreover,	  the	  non-­‐partisanship	  of	  two	  ministers	  is	  open	  to	  question.68	  	  
The	  constitution-­writing	  process	  The	  Constitutional	  Assembly	  formally	  commenced	  its	  work	  on	  15	  September	  2001.	   The	   process	   by	   which	   the	   constitution	   was	   drafted,	   amended,	   and	  finally	  adopted	  was,	  according	  to	  several	  observers,	  dominated	  by	  FRETILIN,	  the	  party	   that	  occupied	  55	  of	   the	  88	  seats	   in	   the	  CA	  (Baltazar,	  2004;	  Carter	  Center,	  2004;	  Tansey,	  2009).	  Of	  the	  twelve	  parties	  represented	  in	  the	  CA	  only	  five	  parties	  presented	  a	  draft	  of	   the	  new	  constitution	  (FRETILIN,	  UDT,	  PSD,	  KOTA,	   PPT).	   FRETILIN’s	   draft	   was	   used	   as	   the	   base	   text	   for	   discussion.	  However,	   the	  party	  was	   reluctant	   to	   accept	   amendments	   to	   its	   draft.	   Given	  that	  FRETILIN	  held	  a	  majority	  position	  in	  the	  CA	  and	  political	  parties	  such	  as	  ASDT	  and	  PDC	  voted	  with	  FRETILIN,	   recommendations	   for	  amendments	  or	  additions	   were	   easily	   voted	   down.	   Indeed,	   neither	   the	   team	   of	   five	  international	   constitutional	   experts	   brought	   in	   by	   UNTAET,	   nor	   the	   input	  from	   public	   consultations,	   nor	   drafts	   presented	   by	   the	   four	   other	   political	  parties	   brought	   any	   serious	  modifications	   to	   the	   FRETILIN	   draft	   (Garrison,	  2005).	  Of	  the	  twenty-­‐one	  amendment	  recommendations,	  the	  CA	  only	  adopted	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68	  According	  to	  Guterres,	  Ruí	  Maria	  de	  Araújo	  and	  Armindo	  Maia	  are	  in	  fact	  FRETILIN	  affiliates.	  See:	  Guterres,	  F.	  D.	  C.	  2006.	  Elites	  and	  Prospects	  of	  Democracy	  in	  East	  Timor.	  PhD	  thesis,	  Griffith	  University.	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four	   (Baltazar,	   2004).	  According	   to	   a	   North-­‐American	   NGO,	   the	   voting	  process	  in	  the	  CA	  led	  to	  ‘increasing	  frustration	  and	  a	  sense	  of	  futility	  among	  many	  of	  the	  smaller	  parties,	  who	  felt	  that	  their	  opinions	  and	  suggestions,	  as	  well	   as	   those	   of	   civil	   society,	   were	   disregarded	   in	   the	   drafting	   of	   the	  constitution.’	   (Carter	   Center,	   2004,	   43).	   In	   addition,	   Regulation	   2001/2	  stipulated	  that	  the	  CA	  ‘should	  become	  the	  legislature	  of	  an	  independent	  East	  Timor,	   if	   so	   provided	   in	   the	   Constitution’.69	   So,	   not	   only	   did	   FRETILIN’s	  majority	   position	   in	   the	   CA	   enable	   the	   party	   to	   dictate	   the	   content	   of	   the	  constitution,	  its	  de	  facto	  alliance	  with	  the	  ASDT	  also	  allowed	  the	  FRETILIN	  to	  define	  its	  own	  power	  in	  the	  first	  government	  of	  an	  independent	  Timor-­‐Leste.	  	   The	  prospect	  of	  governmental	  power	  may	  have	  motivated	  FRETILIN	  to	  minimize	   constitutional	   limits	   on	   the	   executive	   branch	   of	   government.	   The	  opposition	  wanted	  power	  to	  be	  distributed	  equally	  between	  the	  presidential	  office,	   the	   parliament	   and	   the	   government	   in	   order	   to	   create	   a	   system	   of	  ‘checks	   and	   balances’	   (Guterres,	   2006).70	   FRETILIN	   favoured	   a	   premier-­‐presidential	   system	   where	   the	   powers	   of	   the	   president	   would	   be	  constitutionally	  restricted	  (Tansey,	  2009).	  Alkatiri	  was	  aware	  not	  only	  that	  a	  government	   without	   Gusmão	   would	   lack	   legitimacy,	   but	   also	   that	   Gusmão	  was	   the	  most	   likely	  candidate	   to	  become	  president.	  FRETILIN’s	  proposal	   to	  adopt	  a	  premier-­‐presidential	  system	  was	  supported	  by	  TA	  De	  Mello	  and	  most	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69	  UNTAET.	  2001a.	  On	  the	  Election	  of	  a	  Constituent	  Assembly	  to	  Prepare	  a	  Constitution	  for	  an	  Independent	  and	  Democratic	  East	  Timor.	  Regulation	  No.	  2001/2,	  16	  March	  2001.	  70	  Guterres	  does	  not	  specify	  as	  to	  whether	  the	  opposition	  favoured	  a	  pure	  presidential	  system	  or	  a	  president-­‐parliamentary	  system.	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Portuguese	   legal	   advisors.71	   Gusmão,	   by	   contrast,	   favoured	   a	   presidential	  system.72	  Given	  the	  fact	  that	  FRETILIN	  dominated	  the	  CA	  with	  55	  of	  88	  seats,	  the	  party’s	  proposal	  passed	  and	  was	  enshrined	  in	  the	  new	  constitution.	  	   Another	  issue	  that	  generated	  inter-­‐party	  friction	  was	  the	  CA’s	  decision	  to	  transform	  itself	  into	  Timor-­‐Leste’s	  first	  parliament.	  UN	  Regulation	  2001/2	  that	   established	   the	   basis	   of	   the	   election	   of	   a	   CA	   to	   draft	   a	   constitution	  stipulated	   that	   the	   body	   would	   turn	   into	   the	   first	   parliament	   of	   an	  independent	   Timor-­‐Leste,	   if	   so	   provided	   in	   the	   constitution.73	   FRETILIN’s	  majority	   position	   in	   the	   CA	   allowed	   the	   party	   to	   appoint	   itself	   as	   the	   first	  legislature	  of	  an	  independent	  Timor-­‐Leste.	  Minority	  parties	  like	  PSD	  and	  PD	  were	   reported	   to	   be	   more	   upset	   with	   the	   Assembly’s	   decision	   to	   directly	  transform	  itself	  into	  the	  first	  Parliament	  than	  they	  were	  with	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  Constitution	   (Carter	   Center,	   2004).	   João	   Carrascalão,	   President	   of	   the	   UDT	  party,	   threatened	   to	   resign	   from	   the	   CA	   once	   the	   Constitution	   was	  promulgated.	  For	  his	  part,	  Alkatiri	  warned	   that	  he	  would	  not	  participate	   in	  any	   provisional	   government	   if	   the	   Assembly	   voted	   to	   hold	   legislative	  elections	   after	   independence.	   On	   31	   January,	   of	   the	   88-­‐member	   CA	   65	  representatives	   voted	   in	   favour	  of	   the	  Assembly’s	   transformation,	   16	  voted	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71	  De	  Mello	  did	  not	  want	  a	  presidential	  regime,	  since	  he	  thought	  a	  presidential	  regime	  led	  by	  Gusmão	  would	  be	  the	  shortest	  way	  to	  establish	  some	  kind	  of	  dictatorship	  in	  Timor-­‐Leste.	  According	  to	  Gaspar,	  a	  Portuguese	  university	  professor	  and	  political	  advisor	  to	  presidents	  Mário	  Soares	  and	  Jorge	  Sampaio	  on	  Macau	  and	  Timor-­‐Leste,	  Gusmão	  hated	  De	  Mello	  and	  De	  Mello	  hated	  Gusmão.	  Interview	  with	  Prof.	  Carlos	  Gaspar,	  Lisbon,	  30	  January	  2009.	  	  72	  Interview	  with	  Dr.	  Marí	  Alkatiri,	  Dili,	  17	  May	  2013	  	  73	  UNTAET.	  2001a.	  On	  the	  Election	  of	  a	  Constituent	  Assembly	  to	  Prepare	  a	  Constitution	  for	  an	  Independent	  and	  Democratic	  East	  Timor.	  Regulation	  No.	  2001/2,	  16	  March	  2001.	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against,	   two	   abstained	   and	   five	   representatives	   were	   absent	   (UNTAET,	  2002a).	  The	  constitution	  was	  finally	  adopted	  on	  the	  22	  March	  2002,	  with	  72	  of	   the	   88-­‐member	   assembly	   voting	   in	   favour	   and	   14	   against,	   with	   one	  abstention	  and	  one	  absentee	  (UNTAET,	  2002b)	  .	  	  
Presidential	  elections	  Presidential	   elections	   took	   place	   on	   14	   April	   2002.	   According	   to	   the	  Constitution,	   the	  president	   is	  popularly	  elected	   for	  a	  5-­‐year	  period	  and	  can	  serve	   two	   terms	   in	   office.	  He	  or	   she	   shall	   be	   elected	   from	  a	   single	  national	  constituency	   through	   a	   run-­‐off	   ballot	   system	   (UNTAET,	   2002d).	   Two	  candidates	  competed	   for	   the	  post	  of	  president:	  Francisco	  Xavier	  do	  Amaral,	  the	   President	   of	   ASDT,	   and	   independence	   leader	   Gusmão.	   Amaral	   was	  nominated	  by	  ASDT	  and	   the	  youth	  party,	  PARENTIL.	  Gusmão's	   candidature	  received	   the	   endorsement	   of	   nine	   parties:	   PSD,	   PD,	   UDT,	   KOTA,	   PNT,	   PST,	  UDC/PDC,	   PTT,	   and	   PDM	   (UNTAET,	   2002c).	   The	   largest	   party	   in	   the	  legislature,	   FRETILIN,	   officially	   did	   not	   support	   either	   candidate.74	   Despite	  the	   party	   support,	   Gusmão	   insisted	   that	   his	   name	   appeared	   on	   the	   ballot	  without	   party	   endorsement.	   In	   all	   364,780	   valid	   votes	  were	   cast,	   of	   which	  Gusmão	  received	  82.69	  per	   cent	  and	  Francisco	  Xavier	  do	  Amaral	  17.31	  per	  cent.	   A	   little	   over	   3.5	   per	   cent	   (13,768)	   of	   the	   total	   amount	   of	   ballots	  was	  declared	   invalid	   (United	   Nations	   Security	   Council,	   2002).	   The	   turnout	   was	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74	  Francisco	  Xavier	  do	  Amaral	  was	  the	  first	  president	  of	  FRETILIN	  in	  1975.	  Purged	  by	  FRETILIN’s	  central	  commission	  in	  1977	  do	  Amaral	  was	  officially	  rehabilitated	  by	  FRETILIN	  in	  May	  2000.	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estimated	   to	   be	   86.3	   per	   cent	   (UNTAET,	   2002c).	   The	   presidential	   elections	  were	  considered	  to	  be	  free	  and	  fair.	  	   In	  comparison	  to	  the	  2001	  elections	  for	  a	  CA,	  considerably	  less	  political	  party	  campaigning	  was	  observed	  over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  presidential	  election	  (Carter	   Center,	   2004).	   Yet,	   the	   real	   competition	   occurred	   between	   Gusmão	  and	   FRETILIN,	   the	   party	   that	   would	   dominate	   the	   first	   cabinet	   of	   an	  independent	  Timor-­‐Leste.	  During	  his	  electoral	  campaign	  Gusmão	  pledged	  to	  act	  as	  a	  countervailing	  power	  to	  FRETILIN.	  His	  objective	  as	  president	  would	  be	   ‘to	   look	  at	   those	  who	  rule	  and	  see	  that	   they	  can	  respond	  to	  the	  needs	  of	  the	   people’	   (McDonald,	   2002).	   For	   his	   part,	   Alkatiri	   urged	   FRETILIN	  supporters	  to	  vote	  for	  Francisco	  Xavier	  do	  Amaral,	  or	  to	  cast	  blank	  (invalid)	  votes	   (Guterres,	   2006).	  Members	   of	   FRETILIN	  who	   joined	   Gusmão’s	   rallies	  were	   disciplined.	   Lastly,	   but	   very	   significantly,	   Gusmão’s	   candidature	   was	  openly	  supported	  by	  high	  officials	  in	  the	  F-­‐FDTL	  (FALINTIL-­Forças	  de	  Defesa	  
de	  Timor-­Leste75)	  (Rees,	  2004).	  
	  
The	  formation	  and	  politicisation	  of	  the	  security	  sector	  A	  fundamental	  component	  in	  any	  state-­‐building	  mission	  is	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  legitimate	  coercive	  force.	  However,	  regulation	  1272	  that	  established	  UNTAET	  and	  endowed	   it	  with	  overall	   responsibility	   for	   the	  administration	  of	  Timor-­‐Leste	   did	   not	   elaborate	   on	   the	   development	   of	   the	  Defence	   Forces.	   Indeed,	  the	  mandate	   of	   an	   in	   essence	   state-­‐building	  mission	   did	   not	   provide	   direct	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75	  Defence	  forces	  of	  Timor-­‐Leste.	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guidance	   to	   UNTAET	   on	   the	   possible	   establishment	   of	   a	   Timorese	   Defence	  Force	   or	   on	   the	   future	   role	   of	   FALINTIL	   –	   the	  military	  wing	   of	   the	   former	  resistance	  movement.	  According	   to	  Hood	  (2006),	   the	   legal	  omission	  existed	  because	  UN	  officers	  doubted	  the	  appropriateness	  of	  engaging	   the	  UN	   in	   the	  development	  of	   a	  Defence	  Force	  and	   felt	   that	   the	  UN	  charter	  precluded	  UN	  peacekeeping	  missions	   such	   as	   UNTAET	   from	   assisting	   armed	   groups.	   The	  UNTAET	   and	   many	   other	   international	   actors	   considered	   the	   ‘FALINTIL-­‐issue’	   simply	   too	   controversial.	   The	   net	   result	   was	   that	   FALINTIL	   fighters	  were	   confined	   to	   barracks	   between	   1999	   and	   2001.76	   Poor	   physical	  conditions	   and	   the	   uncertainty	   over	   their	   future	   meant	   that	   FALINTIL	  became	   increasingly	   marginalised	   and	   faltering	   discipline	   within	   the	   force	  began	  to	  pose	  a	  security	  threat.77	  By	  23	  June	  2000,	  Gusmão	  -­‐	  Commander	  in	  Chief	  of	  FALINTIL	  and	  President	  of	  the	  CNRT	  -­‐	  reported	  that	  FALINTIL	  was	  in	  a	  state	  of	  revolt.	  In	  September	  2000,	  the	  First	  Transitional	  Cabinet	  approved	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  F-­‐FDTL	  consisting	  of	  1,500	  regular	  soldiers	  (divided	  into	  two	  battalions)	  and	  1,500	  reservists.	  	   The	  UNTAET	   transferred	   responsibility	   for	   the	   development	   of	   the	   F-­‐FDTL	  to	  the	  Office	  of	  Defence	  Force	  Development	  (ODFD),	  a	  proto-­‐ministry	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76	  After	  the	  post	  referendum	  destruction	  and	  violence	  and	  the	  arrival	  of	  International	  Force	  for	  East	  Timor	  (INTERFET)	  September	  1999,	  FALINTIL	  High	  Command	  agreed	  to	  a	  single	  cantonment	  in	  Aileu	  (a	  mountain	  village	  50	  km	  south	  of	  the	  capital,	  Dili)	  where	  some	  1,000-­‐1,300	  FALINTIL	  gathered.	  77	  Rees	  argues	  that	  conflicts	  within	  FALINTIL	  cantonments	  emerged	  since	  it	  was	  the	  first	  time	  that	  many	  FALINTIL	  had	  to	  cohabitate	  with	  each	  other	  and	  it	  created	  a	  situation	  where	  long	  standing	  differences	  of	  opinion	  and	  political	  rivalries	  became	  raw	  and	  exposed.	  See:	  Rees,	  E.	  (2004)	  'Under	  pressure:	  FALINTIL	  –	  Forças	  de	  Defesa	  de	  Timor-­‐Leste	  Three	  Decades	  of	  Defence	  Force	  Development	  in	  Timor-­‐Leste	  1975-­‐2004',	  Geneva:	  DCAF	  (Geneva	  centre	  for	  the	  Democratic	  Control	  of	  Armed	  Forces).	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defence	   headed	   by	   Roque	   Rodrigues78	   and	   staffed	   with	   bilaterally	   funded	  international	   military	   and	   civilian	   defence	   experts.	   The	   International	  Organisation	  of	  Migration	   (IOM)	  was	   assigned	   to	   conduct	   a	   socio-­‐economic	  survey	  of	  FALINTIL	  members.	  The	  UNTAET	  accepted	  a	   list	  compiled	  on	   the	  basis	  of	  the	  survey,	  which	  was	  vetted	  by	  the	  FALINTIL	  High	  Command,	  from	  which	   650	   were	   selected	   for	   the	   defence	   force	   and	   approximately	   1,300	  would	  be	  integrated	  into	  civilian	  life.79	  	  	   The	   process	   of	   recruitment	   and	   selection	   politicised	   Timor-­‐Leste’s	  security	   sector	   (Conflict	   Security	   and	  Development	   Group,	   2003).	   UNTAET,	  the	  sovereign	  power	  of	  Timor-­‐Leste,	  de	  facto	  delegated	  the	  selection	  for	  the	  F-­‐FDTL	  to	  the	  FALINTIL	  High	  Command	  –	  a	  group	  that	  consisted	  entirely	  of	  Gusmão	   loyalists	   (Rees,	  2004).	  Consequently,	   the	  FALINTIL	  High	  Command	  ensured	   that	   the	   officer	   corps	   of	   the	   F-­‐FDTL	   was	   selected	   from	   those	  FALINTIL	   commanders	   loyal	   to	   Gusmão	   and	   to	   FALINTIL	   commander,	  Brigadier-­‐General	   Taur	  Matan	  Ruak,	  who	   in	   2012	  was	   elected	   President	   of	  Timor-­‐Leste.	   The	   selection	   process	  was	  what	   one	  Western	   security	   analyst	  called	   ‘political	   demobilization’	   through	  which	   ‘Xanana's	   friends	   got	   in	   and	  his	  enemies	  were	  left	  out’	  (Dodd,	  2002).	  Some	  of	  the	  FALINTIL	  commanders	  that	   were	   excluded	   from	   the	   F-­‐FDTL	   and	   had	   a	   hostile	   relationship	   with	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78	  The	  appointee	  had	  previously	  been	  Chief	  of	  Staff	  to	  the	  CNRT	  President,	  Xanana	  Gusmão.	  79	  According	  to	  Rees,	  the	  FALINTIL	  High	  Command	  almost	  certainly	  exacted	  this	  price	  in	  exchange	  for	  their	  cooperation	  in	  retiring	  the	  majority	  of	  FALINTIL.	  See:	  Rees,	  E.	  (2004)	  'Under	  pressure:	  FALINTIL	  –	  Forças	  de	  Defesa	  de	  Timor-­‐Leste	  Three	  Decades	  of	  Defence	  Force	  Development	  in	  Timor-­‐Leste	  1975-­‐2004',	  Geneva:	  DCAF	  (Geneva	  centre	  for	  the	  Democratic	  Control	  of	  Armed	  Forces).	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Gusmão	   found	  a	  position	   in	  FRETILIN’s	  Central	  Committee.80	  The	  FALINTIL	  High	  Command	   also	   ensured	   effective	   control	   over	   the	   second	  battalion	   by	  limiting	   recruitment	   to	   18-­‐	   to	   21-­‐year-­‐olds	   with	   a	   high	   school	   education.	  According	  to	  Shoesmith	  (2003),	  these	  prerequisites	  effectively	  excluded	  from	  the	  national	  army	  those	  FALINTIL	  veterans	  who	  had	  not	  been	  recruited	  into	  the	  first	  battalion	  and	  whose	  loyalty	  to	  Ruak	  and	  Gusmão	  was	  questionable.	  	   The	  composition	  of	  the	  F-­‐FDTL	  revealed	  another	  much	  older	  fault	  line,	  namely	   between	   the	   two	   Timorese	   groups,	   the	   Firaku	   and	   the	   Kaladi.81	  Whereas	   this	   social	   division	   existed	   under	   Portuguese	   rule,	   it	   regained	  prominence	  during	  the	  resistance	  struggle.	  According	  to	  a	  popular	  belief,	  the	  Firaku,	   people	   from	   the	   eastern	   half	   of	   Timor-­‐Leste,	   resisted	   the	   invasion	  more	   and	   fought	   much	   harder	   against	   Indonesian	   occupation	   than	   the	  inhabitants	   of	   the	   western	   part	   of	   Timor-­‐Leste,	   the	   Kaladi.	   Most	   of	   the	  recruits	  that	  were	  selected	  for	  the	  first	  battalion	  of	  the	  F-­‐FDTL	  were	  Firaku.	  So,	   the	   core	   of	   the	   F-­‐FDTL	   was	   identified	   with	   the	   President	   and	   with	   a	  particular	   group,	   the	   Firaku.82	   The	   socio-­‐linguistic	   imbalance	   in	   the	  composition	   of	   the	   army	   was	   considered	   to	   be	   an	   important	   driving	   force	  behind	   the	   security	   crisis	   of	   2006	   (Simonsen,	   2009).	   This	   crisis	   stemmed	  largely	  from	  the	  sacking	  of	  soldiers	  from	  the	  mainly	  western	  part	  of	  Timor-­‐Leste.	  After	  their	  dismissal	  the	  ex-­‐soldiers	  became	  part	  of	  the	  power	  struggle	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80	  A	  number	  of	  younger	  Sagrada	  Familia	  activists	  were	  elected	  to	  FRETILIN	  Central	  Committee	  in	  August	  2001.	  See:	  ibid.	  81	  See	  fn.	  15.	  This	  split	  has	  also	  been	  described	  as	  the	  Loro	  sa’e-­‐Loro	  manu	  divide.	  82	  In	  a	  play	  on	  words,	  many	  western	  youth	  refer	  to	  the	  F-­‐FDTL	  as	  the	  as	  ‘Forces	  Firaku	  Distritu	  Tolu	  Lorosae’	  (Firaku	  forces	  of	  the	  three	  eastern	  districts).	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between	  President	  Gusmão	  and	  Prime	  Minister	  Alkatiri.	   In	   the	  next	  chapter	  we	  will	  further	  explain	  the	  causes	  and	  consequences	  of	  the	  2006	  crisis.	  	  	   The	  disgruntled	  ex-­‐FALINTIL	  fighters	  and	  other	  veterans	  who	  were	  not	  selected	  for	  the	  F-­‐FDTL	  threatened	  internal	  security	  as	  early	  as	  January	  2001	  (Conflict	   Security	   and	   Development	   Group,	   2003).	   On	   1	   February	   2001,	  FALINTIL	  was	  officially	  retired	  and	  the	  F-­‐FDTL	  was	  established	  in	  fact	  and	  in	  law.83	  Of	   the	   roughly	  1,900	  FALINTIL	  members,	  only	  650	  were	  selected	   for	  the	   F-­‐FDTL	   (Carthy,	   2002).	   Some	   of	   the	   excluded	   members,	   together	   with	  clandestine	   activists,	   founded	   the	   so-­‐called	   ‘political	   security	   groups’	   that	  challenged	   the	   legitimacy	   of	   the	   F-­‐FDTL	   between	   2001	   and	  May	   2002.	   An	  example	  is	  the	  CPD-­‐RDTL,	  headed	  by	  Oligari	  Asswain	  who	  was	  not	  recruited	  for	   the	   F-­‐FDTL.	   Asswain	   was	   one	   of	   the	   FALINTIL	   commanders	   that	  organized	  a	  (failed)	  coup	  against	  Gusmão	  in	  1983.	  Another	  group	  that	  rose	  to	  prominence	   at	   this	   time	   was	   Sagrada	   Família,	   led	   by	   a	   former	   FALINTIL	  Commander	   L-­‐7	   (also	   known	   as	   Cornelio	   Gama	   or	   Ely	   Fohorai	   Bo’ot)	   who	  also	   nurtured	   bitter,	   historical	   grievances	   against	   the	   FALINTIL	   Command	  and	   against	   Gusmão	   in	   particular. In	   August	   2001,	   during	   the	   election	  campaign,	   the	   first	   FALINTIL	   commander,	   Rogério	   Lobato,	   promised	   that	  since	   many	   fighters	   had	   not	   been	   absorbed	   into	   the	   new	   army,	   FRETILIN	  would	  create	  a	  ‘new	  concept’	  to	  accommodate	  them	  (ICG,	  2006).	  Lobato	  was,	  however,	  not	  given	  a	  position	  in	  the	  new	  FRETILIN	  government,	  a	  move	  that	  rankled	   the	   country’s	  1975-­‐era	  Defence	  Minister.	   In	   the	  beginning	  of	  2002,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83	  UNTAET.	  2001d.	  On	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  defence	  force	  for	  East	  Timor.	  Regulation	  no.	  2001/1,	  31	  January.	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Lobato	   founded	   the	   Association	   of	   Ex-­‐Combatants	   1975	   (AC75).	   The	  FRETILIN-­‐linked	   veteran	   group	   functioned	   as	   an	   umbrella	   organization	   for	  paramilitary	  security	  groups	  that	   included	  disaffected	  former	  FALINTIL	  and	  clandestine	  activists.84	   In	  May	  2002,	  Lobato	  organised	  several	   thousand	  ex-­‐FALINTIL	  to	  march	  on	  Dili,	  ostensibly	  to	  celebrate	  independence	  but	  almost	  certainly	  to	  show	  that	  he	  was	  a	  force	  to	  be	  reckoned	  with.	  On	  20	  May,	  he	  was	  taken	   into	   the	   council	   of	   ministers	   as	   minister	   for	   interior	   administration,	  overseeing	   local	   government	   and	   the	   police.	   He	   had	   gambled	   and	   won	   on	  Alkatiri’s	   deciding	   that	   he	   could	   control	   Lobato	   better	   on	   the	   inside	   than	  outside.85	   In	   April	   2002,	   after	   Gusmão	   was	   elected	   president,	   Roque	  Rodrigues	   was	   appointed	   Secretary	   of	   State	   for	   Defence.	   Rodrigues	  represented	   a	   compromise	   candidate	   for	   the	   highly	   sensitive	   position	   –	  acceptable	   to	   the	  President,	   the	  Prime	  Minister	  and	  F-­‐FDTL	  High	  Command	  (Rees,	   2004).	   However,	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	   Secretary	   of	   State	   for	  Defence,	   Rodrigues,	   and	   the	   Minister	   of	   Interior,	   Lobato,	   was	   considered	  tense	  (Rees,	  2004).86 	   Whereas	   UNTAET’s	   mandate	   had	   not	   made	   provision	   for	   a	   military	  force,	  it	  recognized	  the	  requirement	  of	  a	  police	  force	  and	  called	  for	  the	  rapid	  development	  of	  ‘a	  credible,	  professional	  and	  impartial	  police	  service’	  (United	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84	  FALINTIL	  constituted	  one	  of	  the	  three	  pillars	  of	  resistance,	  along	  with	  the	  external	  diplomatic	  and	  the	  internal	  (non-­‐combatant)	  clandestine	  network.	  85	  The	  decision	  to	  include	  Lobato	  was	  similar	  to	  ‘appointing	  Al	  Capone	  to	  run	  the	  bank	  or	  Imelda	  Marcos	  to	  run	  the	  shoe	  factory’	  see:	  McDonald,	  H.	  (2006,	  24	  June)	  'Timor	  on	  the	  tightrope'.	  Available	  at:	  http://www.lexisnexis.com.	  86	  Rodrigues	  and	  Lobato	  lived	  in	  exile	  in	  Mozambique	  and	  Angola	  during	  the	  Indonesian	  occupation	  of	  Timor-­‐Leste	  but	  fell	  out	  subsequent	  to	  Lobato’s	  1983	  conviction	  for	  diamond	  smuggling	  in	  southern	  Africa.	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Nations	   Secretary-­‐General,	   1999).	   The	   recruitment	   for	   the	   PNTL	   (Polícia	  
Nacional	  de	  Timor-­Leste87)	  started	  in	  January	  2000	  and	  only	  18	  months	  later,	  in	   August	   2001,	   the	   PNTL	   was	   created	   by	   law.88	   The	   UN	   Civilian	   Police	  (CIVPOL)	  was	   largely	  responsible	   for	  selecting	  the	  recruits	  of	   the	  PNTL	  and	  Timorese	  consultation	  and	  participation	  in	  the	  selection	  process	  was	  limited	  (Conflict	   Security	   and	   Development	   Group,	   2003).	   However,	   the	   CNRT	  leadership	  endorsed	  the	  recruitment	  of	  370	  former	  officers	  of	  the	  Indonesian	  National	  Police	   (POLRI)	  who	  were	  predominantly	   from	   the	  Western	  half	   of	  Timor-­‐Leste.	  The	  core	  of	   the	  F-­‐FDTL	  consisted	  of	   former	  FALINTIL	   fighters	  and	   veterans	   predominantly	   from	   the	   eastern	   part	   of	   Timor-­‐Leste.	  Consequently,	  the	  decision	  inflamed	  the	  relations	  with	  the	  former	  FALINTIL	  fighters	   and	   veterans	   and	   laid	   the	   foundations	   for	   a	   deeply	   fractionalized	  force	  and	  severe	  animosity	  between	  the	  PNTL	  and	  F-­‐FDTL.	  	  	   So,	   at	   the	   dawn	   of	   independence	   the	   Alkatiri	   Government	   inherited	   a	  politicised	   and	   internally	   fractionalized	   security	   apparatus.	  Old	   divisions	   in	  the	   anti-­‐Indonesian	   resistance	   movement	   were	   institutionalised	   in	   the	  Timorese	   security	   institutions	   with	   one	   political	   grouping	   (President	  Gusmão's	  allies)	  finding	  a	  home	  in	  the	  defence	  force	  and,	  as	  the	  next	  chapter	  will	  demonstrate,	  dissidents	  finding	  a	  home	  in	  the	  police	  service.89	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87	  National	  police	  of	  Timor-­‐Leste.	  88	  UNTAET.	  2001c.	  On	  the	  Establishment	  of	  the	  East	  Timor	  Police	  Service.	  Regulation	  no.	  2001/22,	  10	  August.	  89	  Dissidents	  in	  Timor-­‐Leste	  tend	  to	  fall	  into	  the	  category	  of	  those	  who	  consider	  themselves	  veterans	  of	  the	  resistance	  and	  who	  feel	  that	  they	  have	  received	  nothing	  in	  return.	  They	  can	  vary	  from	  FALINTIL	  to	  clandestine	  operatives,	  unemployed	  youth,	  or	  those	  who	  feel	  FALINTIL,	  as	  a	  historical	  institution	  and	  a	  modern	  institution,	  belongs	  to	  FRETILIN	  and	  not	  those	  who	  currently	  control	  it.	  See:	  Rees,	  E.	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   In	   sum,	   throughout	   the	  UN	   transitional	   administration	   in	  Timor-­‐Leste	  old	   rivalries	   between	  members	   of	   the	   so-­‐called	   historic	   parties	   resurfaced.	  First,	   conflicts	  within	   the	  umbrella	  organisation	   for	  national	  unity	  occurred	  between	   the	   former	   political	   opponents	   that	   led	   to	   the	   collapse	   of	   the	  organisation	  of	  national	  unity,	  the	  CNRT.	  FRETILIN	  withdrew	  from	  the	  CNRT	  because	   none	   of	   its	   party	   members	   was	   represented	   in	   the	   newly	   elected	  board.	   Second,	   the	   hostilities	   that	   surrounded	   the	   campaigns	   for	   the	   CA	  elections	   gave	   evidence	   of	   the	   conflictual	   nature	   of	   inter-­‐party	   relations	   in	  Timor-­‐Leste.	   In	  addition,	   the	  political	  discourse	  that	  was	  used	  by	   leaders	  of	  the	  different	  parties	  echoed	  old	  rivalries.	  For	  instance,	  FRETILIN	  denounced	  the	   former	   leader	   of	   the	   ASDT	   party	   as	   an	   Indonesian	   collaborator	   and	  accused	  the	  UDT	  party	  of	  masterminding	  the	  Indonesian	  takeover.	  For	  their	  part,	   UDT	   leaders	   accused	   FRETILIN	   of	   having	   been	   communist	   in	   1975,	  prompting	   the	   UDT	   to	   mount	   an	   anti-­‐communist	   coup.	   Third,	   using	   its	  dominant	   position	   in	   the	   CA,	   FRETILIN	   assigned	   limited	   power	   to	   the	  President	   in	   the	   Constitution.90	   The	   party	   anticipated	   a	   political	   or	   even	   a	  constitutional	   crisis	   if	  Gusmão	  as	   leader	  of	   the	  Resistance	  would	  be	  barred	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (2004)	  'Under	  pressure:	  FALINTIL	  –	  Forças	  de	  Defesa	  de	  Timor-­‐Leste	  Three	  Decades	  of	  Defence	  Force	  Development	  in	  Timor-­‐Leste	  1975-­‐2004',	  Geneva:	  DCAF	  (Geneva	  centre	  for	  the	  Democratic	  Control	  of	  Armed	  Forces).	  90	  Pedro	  Bacelar	  de	  Vasconcelos	  and	  Ricardo	  Sousa	  da	  Cunha	  used	  Shugart	  and	  Carey’s	  method,	  later	  modified	  by	  Metcalf	  (2000),	  to	  measure	  the	  powers	  of	  the	  president	  of	  Timor-­‐Leste.	  They	  rate	  the	  ‘legislative	  powers’	  of	  the	  president	  of	  Timor-­‐Leste	  at	  4.5	  on	  a	  scale	  of	  0–28	  and	  the	  ‘non-­‐legislative	  powers’	  at	  4	  on	  a	  scale	  of	  0–16,	  making	  the	  president	  of	  Timor-­‐Leste	  the	  one	  with	  the	  most	  limited	  powers	  in	  the	  Lusophone	  world.	  See:	  Vasconcelos,	  P.	  B.	  D.	  and	  Cunha,	  R.	  S.	  D.	  (2009)	  'Semipresidencialismo	  em	  Timor:	  Um	  Equilíbrio	  Institucional	  Dinâmico	  num	  Contexto	  Crítico',	  in	  Lobo,	  M.	  C.	  and	  Neto,	  O.	  A.	  (eds)	  O	  Semipresidencialismo	  nos	  Países	  de	  Língua	  Portuguesa,	  Lisbon:	  Impresa	  de	  Ciências	  Sociais,	  231-­‐260.	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from	  playing	   a	   political	   role	   in	   an	   independent	  Timor-­‐Leste.	   In	   an	   effort	   to	  silence	   Gusmão	   politically	   and,	   at	   the	   same	   time,	   to	   strengthen	   FRETILIN’s	  own	   relative	   power,	   the	   CA	   curtailed	   the	   President’s	   constitutional	   power.	  Fourth,	   the	   presidential	   elections	   of	   2002	   demonstrated	   that	   the	   political	  cleavage	   that	   separated	   the	   leader	   of	   the	   Resistance,	   Gusmão,	   from	   the	  secretary-­‐general	  of	   the	  most	  popular	  party,	  Alkatiri,	  was	   far	   from	  bridged.	  Gusmão’s	   presidential	   candidacy,	   for	   example,	  was	   supported	  by	   almost	   all	  parties	  but	  not	  FRETILIN.	  In	  addition,	  friction	  between	  both	  leaders	  surfaced	  in	  political	  discourse.	  Gusmão,	   for	  example,	   forewarned	  FRETILIN	  he	  would	  keep	   a	   close	   eye	   on	   the	   government	   whereas	   Alkatiri	   discouraged	   its	  electorate	  to	  vote	  for	  Gusmão.	  Finally,	  the	  politicisation	  of	  the	  security	  sector	  is,	   perhaps,	   the	  most	   vivid	   example	   that	   political	   rivalry	   did	   not	   end	  when	  UNTAET	   temporarily	   took	   control	   of	   Timor-­‐Leste.	   The	   core	   of	   the	   F-­‐FDTL	  consisted	  of	  Gusmão	  loyalists	  drawn	  from	  the	  Firaku	  area	  whereas	  the	  police	  service	   included	   former	   officers	   of	   the	   Indonesian	   national	   police	   and	  dissidents	  who	  predominantly	  came	  from	  the	  Kaladi	  area.	  The	  politicisation	  of	   the	   security	   sector	   caused	   divided	   loyalties	  within	   the	   very	   system	   that	  was	   supposed	   to	   provide	   security	   to	   the	   citizens	   of	   Timor-­‐Leste.	   The	  situation	  created	  a	  window	  of	  opportunity	  for	  the	  Timorese	  leadership	  to	  use	  non-­‐democratic	  and	  illegitimate	  means	  of	  coercion	  to	  compete	  for	  power.	  	  
Conclusion	  The	   aim	  of	   this	   chapter	  has	  been	   to	   control	   for	   the	   effect	   of	   existing	   socio-­‐political	   tensions	   on	   the	   relationship	   between	   semi-­‐presidentialism	   and	  political	  conflict	  in	  the	  post-­‐independence	  period.	  We	  focused	  on	  the	  relative	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cohesion	   of	   the	   political	   elite	   prior	   to	   its	   adoption	   of	   a	   semi-­‐presidential	  constitution.	  Our	   finding	  suggests	   that,	   contrary	   to	  what	  some	  scholars	  and	  journalists	   have	   claimed,	   the	   pro-­‐independence	   movement	   was	   marred	   by	  internal	   divisions.91	   This	   chapter	   demonstrated	   that	   the	   political	   elite	   of	  Timor-­‐Leste	   was	   not	   a	   monolithic	   entity.	   Differences	   between	   political	  leaders	   on	   ideology	   and	   policy	  waxed	   and	  waned	   during	   the	   period	   under	  study.	   Although	   political	   relations	   were	   highly	   conflictual	   in	   the	   middle	   to	  late	  1970s	  they	  gradually	  improved.	  In	  1998	  all	  political	  parties	  were	  unified	  in	   the	   national	   umbrella	   organisation	   for	   independence,	   the	   CNRT.	  Democratic	   elections	   in	   2001	   and	   2002	   to	   a	   certain	   extent	   revived	   old	  rivalries.	  In	  the	  next	  chapters	  we	  will	  analyse	  whether	  the	  semi-­‐presidential	  system	  has	  maintained	  or	  even	  worsened	  these	  differences	  or	  whether	  it	  has	  permitted	   some	   form	   of	   power-­‐sharing	   where	   these	   differences	   could	   be	  managed	  and	  perhaps	  eased.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91	  Jarat	  Chopra,	  for	  example,	  considered	  the	  pro-­‐independence	  movement	  stable	  and	  unified.	  See:	  Chopra,	  J.	  (2000)	  'The	  UN’s	  Kingdom	  of	  East	  Timor',	  Survival,	  42,	  27–39.	  Similarly,	  in	  The	  Economist	  it	  was	  argued	  that	  ‘if	  nation-­‐building	  cannot	  succeed	  in	  such	  a	  small	  and	  relatively	  homogeneous	  spot,	  it	  will	  have	  little	  chance	  in	  bigger	  and	  more	  complex	  places	  such	  as	  Afghanistan	  and	  Congo’.	  See:	  The	  Economist	  (2007)	  'Timor-­‐Leste:	  a	  half-­‐built	  nation'.	  Available	  at	  http://www.economist.com/node/9010794	  (last	  accessed	  21	  February	  2011).	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CHAPTER	  4	  
Cohabitation	  	  The	  Constitution	  of	  Timor-­‐Leste	  was	  adopted	  by	  the	  Constituent	  Assembly	  on	  22	  March	  2002	  and	  entered	  into	  force	  on	  20	  May	  2002.	  Gusmão	  was	  elected	  President	   in	   April	   2002.	   Alkatiri,	   Secretary-­‐General	   and	   leader	   of	   the	  most	  popular	  party	   in	  Timor-­‐Leste,	  FRETILIN,	  headed	  a	  one-­‐party	  cabinet	  with	  a	  comfortable	  parliamentary	  majority.	  This	  situation	  can	  be	  characterised	  as	  a	  period	  of	  cohabitation.	  Cohabitation	  refers	  to	  a	  situation	  where	  the	  president	  and	   prime	   minister	   are	   from	   opposing	   parties	   and	   where	   the	   president’s	  party	  is	  not	  represented	  in	  the	  cabinet.	  	  This	   chapter	   examines	   the	   effect	   of	   cohabitation	   on	   the	   relationship	  between	  the	  President,	  Prime	  Minister	  and	  the	  parliamentary	  majority	  from	  April	  2002	  to	  June	  2006.	  We	  find	  that	  cohabitation	  went	  hand	  in	  hand	  with	  conflict,	  especially	  but	  not	  exclusively	  over	  defence	  policy.	  We	  also	  find	  that	  Timor-­‐Leste’s	   post-­‐conflict	   context	   may	   have	   reduced	   the	   level	   of	  presidential	  activism.	  The	   fact	   that	  several	   institutions	  did	  not	  work	   in	  May	  2002	  may	  explain	  why	  the	  President	  did	  not	  exercise	  some	  powers	  that	  the	  constitution	  conferred	  on	  him.	  The	  empirical	  evidence	  supports	  the	  critics	  of	  semi-­‐presidentialism	  who	  associate	  cohabitation	  with	  institutional	  conflict.	  	  This	   chapter	   is	   structured	   as	   follows.	   In	   the	   next	   section	   we	   justify	  why	  we	  consider	  the	  first	  period	  of	  government	  a	  cohabitation	  situation	  and	  recapitulate	   the	   hypotheses	   about	   cohabitation	   that	   were	   identified	   in	  chapter	   1.	   The	   main	   findings	   are	   presented	   into	   three	   separate	   sections:	  ‘Conflict	  in	  the	  legislative	  process’,	  ‘Conflict	  in	  the	  appointment	  and	  dismissal	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process’	  and	  ‘Proclamatory	  powers’.	  The	  latter	  category	  includes	  institutional	  conflicts	   that	   manifested	   themselves	   in	   official	   speeches	   and	   press	  statements.	   In	   the	   concluding	   section,	   we	   discuss	   whether	   the	   empirical	  findings	  correspond	  to	  arguments	  about	  cohabitation.	  	  	  
Cohabitation	  in	  Timor-­Leste	  In	  this	  chapter,	  we	  consider	  the	  period	   from	  April	  2002	  when	  Gusmão	  won	  the	  presidential	  elections	  to	  June	  2006	  when	  Alkatiri	  resigned	  to	  be	  a	  period	  of	  cohabitation.	  In	  the	  literature	  cohabitation	  refers	  to	  a	  situation	  where	  the	  president	   and	   prime	   minister	   are	   from	   opposing	   parties	   and	   where	   the	  president’s	   party	   is	   not	   represented	   in	   the	   cabinet	   (Elgie,	   2010).	   In	   Timor-­‐Leste	  President	  Gusmão	  was	  not	   formally	   affiliated	   to	   a	  political	  party	   and,	  therefore	   was	   considered	   non-­‐partisan.	   According	   to	   Elgie	   (2008),	  cohabitation	   cannot	   emerge	   in	   semi-­‐presidential	   democracies	   were	   the	  president	   is	   non-­‐partisan.92	   Elgie’s	   definition,	   however,	   presupposes	   a	   full-­‐fledged	  political	   society	   in	  which	  political	   demands	   are	   channelled	   through	  political	   parties.	   In	   Timor-­‐Leste,	   like	   in	   many	   other	   new	   democracies,	  political	   organisation	   lagged	   behind	   political	   participation	   in	   the	   form	   of	  elections	   (Huntington,	   1996).	   Indeed,	   the	   party	   of	   President	   Gusmão	   was	  only	  established	  after	   the	  presidential	   elections	  and	   the	   introduction	  of	   the	  semi-­‐presidential	   system.	   In	   other	   words,	   party	   affiliation,	   or	   non-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92	   In	   his	   blog	   post	   on	   Timor-­‐Leste,	   Elgie	   identified	   the	   government	   period	   from	  2002-­‐2006	  as	  a	  possible	  period	  of	  cohabitation.	  See:	  Elgie,	  R.	  2011b.	  Difficult	  Cases	  of	   Cohabitation	   –	   East	   Timor.	   The	   Semi-­Presidential	   One	   [Online].	   Available	   from:	  http://www.semipresidentialism.com/?cat=23	  [Accessed	  25	  June	  2012].	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partisanship,	  should	  be	  regarded	  with	  some	  suspicion	  in	  Timor-­‐Leste.	  Here,	  though,	   following	   Dennis	   Shoesmith	   who	   defined	   this	   period	   as	   a	   form	   of	  ‘conflictual	   cohabitation’	   (2007:	   227),	   it	   is	   argued	   that	   Timor-­‐Leste’s	   first	  government	   period	  was	   a	   situation	   of	   cohabitation	   for	   two	   reasons.	   In	   the	  first	   place,	   long	   before	   the	   introduction	   of	   Timor-­‐Leste’s	   semi-­‐presidential	  system	   Gusmão	   and	   Alkatiri	   experienced	   serious	   difficulties	   working	  together.	   The	   previous	   chapter	   described	   at	   length	   their	   conflictual	  relationship.	  During	  this	  early	  period	  the	  competition	  between	  Gusmão	  and	  FRETILIN	   essentially	   was	   a	   struggle	   over	   the	   leadership	   and	   ideological	  foundation	  of	   the	   resistance	  movement.	  Gusmão	  wanted	  parties	   other	   than	  FRETILIN	  to	  become	  part	  of	  the	  independence	  struggle.	  However,	  Gusmão’s	  policy	  of	  national	  unity	  brought	  him	  into	  serious	  conflict	  with	  the	  FRETILIN	  leadership	   at	   the	   end	   of	   the	   1980s.	   A	   similar	   dispute	   arose	   during	   the	  formation	   of	   Alkatiri’s	   Cabinet	   in	   April	   2002.	   President	   Gusmão	   suggested	  forming	   a	   ‘Government	   of	   National	   Unity’,	   but	   the	   Prime	   Minister	   and	  Secretary	  General	  of	  FRETILIN	  decided	  otherwise.	  ‘There	  will	  not	  be	  this	  sort	  of	   government,’	   Alkatiri	   said.	   ‘If	   there	  was	   one,	   I	  would	   not	   be	   in	   it.’	   (Jolly,	  2002)	  True	  to	  his	  word,	   the	  Prime	  Minister	  exclusively	  appointed	  ministers	  from	  FRETILIN	  for	  his	  Cabinet.93	  	  A	  second	  reason	  to	  classify	  Timor-­‐Leste’s	   first	  government	  period	  as	  an	  example	  of	  cohabitation	  is	  that	  Gusmão’s	  was	  de	  facto	  partisan,	  that	  is	  to	  say,	  opposed	  to	  FRETILIN.	  Although	  in	  the	  presidential	  elections	  of	  2002	  he	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93	  Prime	  Minister	  Alkatiri’s	  Cabinet	  included	  two	  non-­‐partisan	  ministers:	  Minister	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs,	  José	  Ramos-­‐Horta	  and	  Minister	  of	  Health,	  Rui	  Araújo.	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ran	  as	  an	   independent,	  his	   candidature	  was	  publicly	   supported	  by	  virtually	  all	   political	   parties	   except	   for	   FRETILIN.	   FRETILIN	   had	   offered	   to	   support	  Gusmão’s	   presidential	   candidacy	   but	   the	   latter	   rejected	   the	   backing	   of	   the	  party.94	  The	  FRETILIN	  leadership,	  for	  its	  part,	  urged	  its	  members	  to	  vote	  for	  his	  opponent	  Francisco	  do	  Amaral	  (ASDT),	  or	  to	  cast	  blank	  votes.	  In	  addition,	  after	  the	  resignation	  of	  Prime	  Minister	  Alkatiri	  in	  2006	  Gusmão	  was	  quick	  to	  form	  a	  new	  party,	  the	  CNRT,	  which,	  according	  to	  its	  founder,	  was	  intended	  to	  ‘knock	  the	  FRETILIN	  party	  off	  its	  pedestal	  as	  the	  dominant	  political	  force	  and	  remove	   its	   majority	   in	   the	   parliament’	   (Patterson,	   2007).	   These	  developments	  cast	  doubt	  on	  Gusmão’s	  claim	  to	  be	  a	  non-­‐partisan	  President	  situated	  above	  party	  politics.	  In	  sum,	  the	  political	  configuration	  that	  emerged	  in	   Timor-­‐Leste	   in	   2002	   can	   reasonably	   be	   designated	   as	   a	   situation	   of	  cohabitation.	  	  
Hypotheses	  on	  cohabitation	  As	   demonstrated	   in	   chapter	   2,	   most	   scholars	   of	   semi-­‐presidential	   systems	  believe	  that	  a	  situation	  where	  the	  president	  and	  prime	  minister	  are	  political	  opponents	  and	  where	  the	  president’s	  party	  is	  not	  represented	  in	  the	  cabinet	  is	   likely	   to	   cause	   conflict	   that	   may	   ultimately	   threaten	   the	   stability	   of	  democratic	  regimes	  (Linz,	  1994;	  Skach,	  2005b;	  Kirschke,	  2007).	  In	  particular,	  young	  democracies	   are	   vulnerable	   to	   the	  political	   instability	   caused	  by	   this	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94	  Lusa	  (2002g,	  13	  February)	  'East	  Timor:	  Gusmao	  Rejects	  Fretilin	  'Pressure'	  To	  Run	  as	  Independent'.	  Available	  at:	  http://www.etan.org/et2002a/february/10-­‐16/14fretl.htm;	  Lusa	  (2002a,	  14	  February)	  'Fretilin	  Leader	  Offers	  Gusmao	  'Unconditional'	  Presidential	  Backing'.	  Available	  at:	  http://www.etan.org/et2002a/february/10-­‐16/14fretl.htm.	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type	  of	   situation.	  The	   tug-­‐of-­‐war	  over	   executive	  power	  may	   slow	  down	   the	  decision-­‐making	   process	   and	   cause	   political	   stalemate.	   Cohabitation	   may	  even	  lead	  to	  democratic	  collapse	  when	  the	  military	  supported	  or	  not	  by	  the	  president	  or	  prime	  minister	  usurps	  all	  power	  so	  as	   to	   ‘restore’	   the	  political	  process.	   Here,	   it	   needs	   to	   be	   emphasised	   that	   Timor-­‐Leste’s	   democratic	  system	   did	   not	   collapse	   during	   the	   period	   2002-­‐2006.	   However,	   if	   the	  expectations	  about	  semi-­‐presidentialism	  are	  correct,	  then	  we	  should	  observe	  conflict.	  Thus,	  the	  first	  hypothesis	  derived	  from	  work	  on	  cohabitation	  was:	  	  
H1:	  Under	   cohabitation,	   conflict	   is	   expected	   to	   take	  place	  between	   the	  
President	   and	   Prime	   Minister	   and	   between	   the	   President	   and	   the	  
parliamentary	  majority.	  
	   Under	   the	  Constitution	  of	  Timor-­‐Leste	   the	  President	  holds	  unilateral	  powers	   and	   shares	   power	   with	   other	   institutions.	   Unilateral	   powers	   are	  powers	  that	  are	  exclusively	  vested	  in	  the	  President.	  For	  example,	  presidential	  decrees	   do	   not	   require	   authorisation	   by	   either	   Government	   or	   Parliament.	  With	   regard	   to	   shared	  powers,	  presidential	   actions	  have	   to	  be	  validated	  by	  another	  institution.	  In	  case	  of	  foreign	  aggression,	  for	  instance,	  the	  President	  may	   only	   declare	   war	   following	   a	   Government	   proposal	   and	   after	  authorisation	   of	   the	   National	   Parliament	   (Section	   85h).	   In	   some	   semi-­‐presidential	  systems,	  like	  the	  one	  of	  Timor-­‐Leste,	  these	  shared	  powers	  in	  the	  legislative	  domain	  are	  negative	  powers.	  That	  is,	  they	  are	  powers	  of	  approval	  or	  disapproval	  but	  they	  do	  not	  give	  the	  President	  the	  initiative	  to	   introduce	  legislation.	  Policy	  areas	  where	  power	  is	  shared	  are	  particularly	  susceptible	  to	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institutional	   infighting.	  Foreign	  and	  defence	  policy	  are	  examples	  of	  areas	   in	  which	   institutional	   responsibility	   is	   shared.	   Linz	   (1994)	  has	   recognised	   the	  danger	  of	  shared	  power	  over	  the	  armed	  forces.	  He	  explained	  that	  presidents	  in	   semi-­‐presidential	   democracies	   traditionally	   hold	   constitutional/legal	  powers	  over	  the	  armed	  forces.	  The	  fusion	  of	  executive	  powers	  over	  defence	  policy,	  he	  argued,	  may	  generate	   institutional	   infighting	  (1994:	  58).	  Here	  we	  extrapolate	   that	   a	   similar	   power	   struggle	   is	   likely	   to	   occur	   in	   the	   area	   of	  foreign	  affairs	  where	  the	  president	  holds	  more	  constitutional/legal	  power	  as	  well.	  Thus,	  the	  second	  hypothesis	  is:	  	  
H2:	  Under	   cohabitation,	   conflict	   is	   expected	   to	   take	  place	  between	   the	  
President	  and	  Prime	  Minister	  over	  defence	  and	  foreign	  policy.	  	  	   In	   chapter	   2	   we	   identified	   how	   institutional	   conflict	   manifests	   itself	  under	   cohabitation	   both	   generally	   as	  well	   as	   in	   defence	   and	   foreign	   policy.	  These	   observable	   implications	   of	   institutional	   conflict	   included	   the	   use	   of	  formal	   powers	   such	   as	   vetoes,	   but	   also	   informal	   powers	   like	   presidential	  statements.	  To	  test	  these	  hypotheses,	  we	  identify	  the	  president’s	  use	  of	  legislative	  powers,	   special	   powers	   in	   the	   appointment	   and	   dismissal	   process	   and	  proclamatory	  powers.	  We	  do	  not	  test	  the	  hypotheses	  separately	  because	  H2	  is	  a	  sub-­‐hypothesis	  of	  H1.	  To	  be	  sure,	  evidence	  of	  institutional	  conflict	  about	  defence	   and	   foreign	   policy	   supports	   the	   larger	   hypothesis	   that	   predicts	  institutional	  conflict	  under	  cohabitation.	  Instead,	  we	  identify	  the	  President's	  use	   of	   these	   three	   powers	   generally	   and	   in	   the	   conclusion	   we	   reflect	   on	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whether	   or	   not	   there	   is	   evidence	   to	   support	   the	   hypotheses.	   Before	   we	  discuss	   incidences	   of	   conflict	   between	   President,	   Prime	   Minister	   and	   the	  parliamentary	   majority,	   we	   first	   analyse	   the	   President’s	   legislative	  framework.	  	  	  
The	  legislative	  framework	  As	   we	   demonstrated	   in	   the	   previous	   section,	   the	   Constitution	   of	   the	  Democratic	   Republic	   of	   Timor-­‐Leste	   gives	   the	   President	   certain	  constitutional	   powers.	   However,	   due	   to	   the	   absence	   of	   enabling	   legislation	  President	  Gusmão	  had	  less	  de	  facto	  power	  than	  de	  jure	  power	  during	  at	  least	  part	  of	  his	  time	  in	  office.	  	  Firstly,	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  started	  only	  to	  function	  in	  June	  2003,	  more	  than	   one	   year	   after	   the	   Constitution	   became	   effective.95	   Under	   the	  Constitution,	   it	   is	   incumbent	  upon	   the	  highest	   court	   of	   justice,	  which	   is	   the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  in	  Timor-­‐Leste,	  to	  review	  the	  constitutionality	  of	  legislation,	  to	  provide	  an	  anticipatory	  or	  verification	  of	  the	  legality	  and	  constitutionality	  of	   legislation	  and	  to	  verify	  cases	  of	  unconstitutionality	  by	  omission	  (Section	  126).	   So,	   between	   May	   2002	   and	   June	   2003	   President	   Gusmão	   was	  constitutionally	  precluded	  from	  submitting	  legislation	  to	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal.	  Moreover,	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   was	   not	   established	   and,	   therefore,	   Gusmão	  could	  not	  appoint	  the	  President	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  during	  his	  presidency.	  Secondly,	   the	   Council	   of	   State	   and	   the	   Superior	   Council	   for	   Defence	   and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95	   Judicial	   System	   Monitoring	   Programme	   (2003a)	   'Court	   of	   Appeal'.	   Available	   at	  http://www.jsmp.minihub.org/English/webpage/court/ca.htm	   (last	   accessed	   3	  May	  2012).	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Security	  were	  established	  only	  in	  March	  2005.96	  The	  non-­‐existence	  of	  the	  two	  consultative	  bodies	  may	  have	  limited	  the	  scope	  of	  presidential	  powers	  in	  the	  area	   of	   defence	   and	   international	   relations.	   Presidential	   acts,	   like	   the	  declaration	   of	   the	   state	   of	   siege,	   the	   state	   of	   emergency,	   the	   declaration	   of	  war	  and	  peace,	  to	  reach	  agreements	  in	  the	  area	  of	  defence	  and	  international	  relations	   need	   to	   be	   preceded	   by	   consultation	   with	   one	   or	   both	   of	   these	  institutions.	  Probably,	   it	  was	   left	   to	   the	  President’s	  own	   legal	   interpretation	  as	   to	  whether	   and	  when	  he	   could	  use	   these	  powers.	  Thirdly,	   given	   the	   fact	  that	  during	  Gusmão’s	  Presidency	  no	  organic	   law	  was	  passed	  to	  regulate	  the	  holding	  of	  a	  referendum,	  the	  President	  was	  not	  able	  to	  call	  on	  the	  population	  of	  Timor-­‐Leste	  to	  express	  their	  opinion	  in	  a	  referendum	  on	  issues	  of	  relevant	  national	   interest.	   Fourthly,	   the	  Constitution	   grants	   the	  President	   powers	   to	  appoint	  and	  dismiss	  military	  officials.	  The	  appointment	  of	  the	  General	  Chief	  of	   Staff	   of	   the	   Defence	   Force	   requires,	   however,	   a	   proposal	   of	   the	  Government.	   Major	   General	   Taur	   Matan	   Ruak	   was	   an	   ‘acting’	   chief	   of	   the	  armed	   forces	   given	   that	   the	   government	   failed	   to	   formally	   propose	   his	  appointment.97	   Indeed,	   only	   in	   June	   2010	   Ruak	   was	   officially	   appointed	  General	  Chief	  of	  Staff	  of	  the	  Defence	  Force.98	  Overall,	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  Government	  and	  the	  parliamentary	  majority	  to	   pass	   the	   necessary	   legislation	   significantly	   weakened	   the	   President’s	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96	   Parliamentary	   law	   1/2005	   of	   9	   February	   2005	   ‘Law	   on	   the	   Council	   of	   State’,	  Parliamentary	   law	   2/2005	   of	   3	   March	   2005	   ‘Law	   on	   the	   Superior	   Council	   for	  Defence	  and	  Security’.	  97	   Author	   e-­‐mail	   exchange	   with	   Dr.	   Rui	   Feijó,	   legal	   advisor	   of	   President	   Gusmão	  between	  2004	  –	  2006,	  14	  June	  2013	  ‘	  98	  Decreto	  do	  Presidente	  da	  República	  21/2010	  de	  18	  de	  Junho	  ‘Nomeação	  do	  Chefe	  do	  Estado-­‐Maior	  General	  das	  Forças	  Armadas,	  Major	  General	  Taur	  Matan	  Ruak’.	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constitutional	   position	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   the	   Government	   and	   the	   parliamentary	  majority.	   This	   form	   of	   legal	   obstructionism	   also	   delayed	   simple	   acts	   of	   the	  President	   for	   which	   he	   needed	   the	   authorisation	   of	   the	   Government.	   For	  example,	  the	  purchase	  of	  a	  system	  for	  microphones	  and	  recording	  equipment	  for	   the	  Council	  of	  State	  and	  the	  Council	  of	  Defence	  and	  Security,	  which	  was	  budgeted	   at	   about	   US$	   4000,	   took	   over	   six	  months	   to	   be	   approved	   by	   the	  government	   (Feijó,	   2006:	   124).	   So,	   for	   some	   time	   in	   the	   period	   2002-­‐2006	  President	  Gusmão’s	  power	  to	  intervene	  in	  the	  political	  process	  was	  limited	  to	  political	  vetoes	  and	  the	  use	  of	  proclamatory	  powers.	  	  	  
Conflict	  in	  the	  legislative	  process	  The	  President	  can	  influence	  legislation	  using	  legislative	  powers.	  According	  to	  the	  Constitution,	  the	  President	  can	  veto	  any	  statute	  (Section	  85c),	  request	  the	  Supreme	   Court	   of	   Justice	   to	   undertake	   preventive	   appraisal	   and	   abstract	  review	  of	  the	  constitutionality	  of	  rules	  (Section	  85e),	  submit	  relevant	  issues	  of	   national	   interest	   to	   a	   referendum	   (Section	   85f),	   call	   for	   a	   state	   of	  emergency	   or	   a	   state	   of	   siege	   (Section	   85g),	   grant	   pardons	   or	   commute	  sentences	  (Section	  85i)	  and	  to	  conduct	  in	  consultation	  with	  the	  Government	  any	  negotiation	  process	  towards	  the	  completion	  of	  international	  agreements	  in	   the	   field	   of	   defence	   and	   security	   (Section	  87d).	   As	   noted,	   the	   absence	   of	  enabling	   legislation	   and,	   hence,	   the	   non-­‐existence	   of	   the	   President’s	  consultative	  bodies	  may	  have	  discouraged	  the	  President	  from	  intervening	  in	  day-­‐to-­‐day	   state	   affairs.	   For	   some	   time	   in	   the	   period	   2002-­‐2006	   it	   was	  unclear	  whether	  President	  Gusmão	  could	  use	  his	  power	  to	  request	  the	  Court	  to	  review	  the	  constitutionality	  of	  legislation,	  to	  declare	  the	  state	  of	  siege,	  the	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state	  of	   emergency,	  war	   and	  peace,	   and	  play	   a	   role	   in	  policy	  making	   in	   the	  field	  of	  defence	  and	  international	  relations.	  In	  addition,	  the	  President	  was	  not	  able	   to	   call	   for	   a	   referendum.	   Despite	   the	   restrictions	   that	  were	   placed	   on	  presidential	   power,	   Gusmão	   intervened	   in	   the	   legislative	   process.	   The	  President	   used	   veto	   power	   and	   requested	   the	   Court	   to	   review	   the	  constitutionality	  of	  legislation.	  In	  addition,	  the	  President	  assumed	  emergency	  powers.	  	  	   The	   President	   has	   the	   power	   to	   veto	   government	   decree	   laws	   and	  legislative	   bills.	   We	   found	   conflicting	   evidence	   as	   to	   whether	   President	  Gusmão	  vetoed	  government	  decree	   laws.	   José	  António	  Rosário	  Soares,	   legal	  advisor	  to	  current	  President	  Taur	  Matan	  Ruak,	  claimed	  that	  Gusmão	  vetoed	  several	  decree	   laws,	  which	  was	  denied	  by	   former	  Prime	  Minister	  Alkatiri.99	  We	   could	   not	   verify	   the	   accuracy	   of	   these	   conflicting	   reports	   as	   official	  documents	   on	   vetoes	   against	   government	   decree	   laws	   are	   not	   publicly	  accessible	  in	  Timor-­‐Leste	  and	  were	  not	  made	  available	  to	  us	  despite	  a	  formal	  request	  for	  them.	  Therefore,	  we	  confine	  ourselves	  to	  vetoes	  of	  parliamentary	  legislation.	  On	   25	   July	   2002	   barely	   two	  months	   after	   the	   Constitution	   formally	  came	  into	  effect	  President	  Gusmão	  vetoed	  the	  Bill	  on	  the	  Modification	  of	  the	  Tax	   System.100	   In	   his	   communiqué	   to	   the	   Nation,	   Gusmão	   claimed	   that	   the	  fiscal	  bill	  included	  disproportionate	  tax	  hikes	  that	  would	  especially	  affect	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99	   Interview	  with	  Dr.	  Marí	  Alkatiri,	  Dili,	  17	  May	  2013	  and	  with	  Mr.	  Rosário	  Soares,	  Dili,	  18	  May	  2013.	  100	   Lei	   do	   Parlamento	   Nacional	   5/2002	   de	   16	   de	   Agosto	   ‘Lei	   de	   Modificação	   do	  Sistema	  Tributário’.	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most	   underprivileged	   (ETAN,	   2002a).	   He	   criticised	   the	   Government	   for	  pursuing	   an	   irrelevant	   and	   unrealistic	   economic	   policy,	  which	   contradicted	  the	   Government’s	   long-­‐term	   objectives	   of	   poverty	   reduction	   and	   urged	  Parliament	  to	  change	  the	  proposed	  bill	  (Gusmão,	  2005).	  The	  President	  stated	  that	  he	  would	  ‘leave	  it	  to	  the	  ‘distinguished’	  [quotations	  in	  original]	  deputies	  to	   study	   and	   to	   debate	   these	   incongruent	   policies	  with	   greater	   intellectual	  and	   political	   dimension	   in	   the	   decision-­‐making	   process	   …’	   (Gusmão,	   2005:	  207).	  	   Gusmão’s	  decision	  to	  veto	  the	  Tax	  Bill	  marked	  the	  deterioration	  in	  the	  already	  difficult	  relationship	  between	  the	  President	  and	  the	  Prime	  Minister.	  Just	  a	  week	  earlier,	  the	  President	  had	  discussed	  and	  criticised	  the	  Bill	  on	  the	  State	  Budget	  of	  2002-­‐2003	   in	  detail.101	  Although	   the	  Constitution	  of	  Timor-­‐Leste	   does	   not	   vest	   the	   head	   of	   state	   with	   explicit	   budgetary	   powers,	   the	  President	   seized	   the	   opportunity	   to	   criticise	   the	   Government’s	   economic	  policy	   in	   his	   speech	   to	   the	   National	   Parliament.	   Here	   he	   reminded	   its	  members	  that	  the	  exercise	  of	  the	  mandate	  conferred	  on	  them	  by	  the	  people	  was	   meant	   to	   safeguard	   the	   interests	   of	   the	   people	   and	   not	   merely	   the	  interests	  of	  the	  Administration	  (Gusmão,	  2005).	  Gusmão	  also	  accused	  Alkatiri	  of	  having	  used	  his	  legislative	  majority	  to	  speed-­‐up	  the	  approval	  of	  the	  budget	  by	   Parliament	   with	   limited	   debate	   (ETAN,	   2002b).	   The	   Bill	   on	   the	   State	  Budget	   was	   sent	   to	   the	   President	   for	   approval	   on	   28	   June	   but	   was	   only	  promulgated	  more	  than	  two	  weeks	  later,	  on	  16	  July	  2002.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101	  Lei	  do	  Parlamento	  Nacional	  3/2002	  de	  7	  de	  Agosto	   ‘Lei	  do	  Orçamento	  Geral	  do	  Estado	  Para	  o	  Ano	  Fiscal	  de	  2002-­‐2003’.	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In	  this	  context,	  the	  President’s	  decision	  to	  veto	  the	  Tax	  Bill	  infuriated	  the	   FRETILIN	   leadership.	   In	   a	   media	   statement,	   senior	   members	   of	   the	  FRETILIN	  party	  made	  it	  clear	  that	  Parliament	  would	  not	  amend	  the	  draft	  law	  (Lusa,	   2002b).	   Prime	   Minister	   Alkatiri	   accused	   the	   President	   of	   not	   being	  well	   acquainted	   with	   the	   Constitution’s	   content	   and,	   hence,	   his	   proper	  competencies.	  The	  Prime	  Minister	  maintained	  that	  the	  Constitution	  of	  Timor-­‐Leste	   does	   not	   give	   the	   President	   power	   to	   veto	   legislation	   on	   the	   basis	   of	  political	   objections	   (i.e.	   a	   political	   veto).	   So,	   according	   to	   Alkatiri,	   the	  President	  did	  not	  veto	  the	  bill	  but	  simply	  refused	  to	  sign	  it.	  He	  also	  pointed	  to	  a	  ‘flagrant	  contradiction’	  in	  the	  President’s	  policy:	  ‘the	  budget	  is	  a	  forecast	  of	  revenues	   and	   expenses’,	   Alkatiri	   argued,	   ‘so	   the	   President	   cannot	   first	  approve	   the	   budget	   and	   then	   cut	   its	   revenues’	   (Lusa,	   2002e).	   President	  Gusmão,	   for	   his	   part,	   said	   that	   he	   did	   not	   feel	   obliged	   to	   consult	   the	  Government	   before	   taking	   decisions.	   The	   President	   also	   confessed	   that	   he	  had	  not	  had	  any	  contact	  with	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  since	  the	  Government	  was	  sworn	   in	   on	   20	   May	   2002.	   As	   anticipated	   by	   FRETILIN	   party	   members,	  Parliament	  overrode	  the	  presidential	  veto	  with	  a	  two-­‐thirds	  majority	  (Lusa,	  2002f).	   The	   tug-­‐of-­‐war	   between	   the	   President	   and	   the	   Prime	   Minister	  delayed	  crucial	  legislation.	  The	  budgetary	  process	  was	  put	  on	  a	  hold	  for	  well	  over	   two	  weeks	  while	   the	  Tax	  Bill	  was	  promulgated	  one-­‐and-­‐a-­‐half	  months	  after	   it	   was	   first	   approved	   in	   Parliament.	   In	   sum,	   the	   presidential	   veto	  delayed	  decision-­‐making	  but	  did	  not	  encourage	  the	  Government	  to	  change	  its	  policy.	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President	   Gusmão	   also	   stepped	   in	   after	   the	   Bill	   on	   Immigration	   and	  Asylum102	  was	  approved	  by	  Parliament	  in	  May	  2003.103	  The	  bill	  regulated	  the	  entry,	  exit	  and	  status	  of	  foreigners	  in	  Timor-­‐Leste	  and	  applied	  to	  all	  persons	  who	   do	   not	   have	   Timor-­‐Leste	   citizenship.	   The	   legislation	   prevented,	   for	  example,	   foreigners	   from	   organizing	   political	   demonstrations.	   Parliament	  passed	   the	   Immigration	   and	   Asylum	   Bill	   despite	   protests	   from	   several	  national	  and	  international	  NGOs.	  Many	  people	  believed	  the	  bill	  would	  have	  a	  negative	   effect	   on	   the	   rights	   of	   foreigners	   working	   inside	   the	   country.104	  According	   to	   them,	   it	  would	   give	   the	  Ministry	   of	   the	   Interior	   the	   power	   to	  deport	   virtually	   any	   foreigner	   or	   shut	   down	   any	   organization	   that	   includes	  foreigners	   and	   is	   engaged	   in	   civic	   affairs	   or	   anything	   else	   the	   Government	  does	  not	  like	  (ETAN,	  2003b).	  	  When	  the	  President	  was	  asked	  to	  sign	  the	  legislation	  he	  chose	  first	  to	  send	  it	  to	  Timor-­‐Leste’s	  highest	  court,	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal,	  in	  order	  to	  verify	  the	   constitutionality	   of	   the	   bill	   (Lusa,	   2003b).	   It	   was	   the	   first	   time	   that	  President	   Gusmão	   had	   submitted	   legislation	   to	   the	   Court	   of	   Appeal.	   Again,	  before	   June	  2003	   the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  was	  not	  operational.	  The	  Court	   ruled	  that	   certain	   provisions	   in	   the	   bill	   were	   indeed	   unconstitutional	   (ETAN,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102	  Lei	  do	  Parlamento	  Nacional	  9/2003	  de	  18	  de	  Outubro	  ‘Lei	  da	  Imigração	  e	  Asilo’.	  103	   Secretariado	   Do	   Parlamento	   Nacional	   (2012)	   'Projectos	   e	   Propostas	   de	   Lei	  Vetados	   de	   2002	   a	   2012',	   Dili:	   Parlamento	  Nacional	   da	   República	   Democrática	   de	  Timor-­‐Leste.	  In	  author’s	  collection.	  104	   Judicial	   System	   Monitoriing	   Programme	   (Jsmp)	   (2003)	   'Report	   on	   the	  Immigration	   and	   Asylum	   Law	   (Short	   Version)'.	   Available	   at	  http://www.jsmp.minihub.org/Reports/jsmpreports/Imigration%20and%20Asylum%20law%202003/Imigration%20and%20Asylum%20law%202003(e).pdf	   (last	  accessed	   2	   June	   2011);	   La'o	   Hamutuk	   (2003,	   13	   May)	   'Article-­‐by-­‐article	  commentary	   on	   the	   Immigration	   and	   Asylum	   Bill'.	   Available	   at:	  http://www.laohamutuk.org/Justice/ImmigLaw/visacomment.html.	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2003c).	   Prime	  Minister	   Alkatiri,	   openly	   displeased	  with	   the	   ruling,	   accused	  the	  Court	  of	  being	  unprofessional	  and	  not	  acting	  within	  the	  spirit	  of	  the	  law.	  According	   to	   the	   Prime	   Minister,	   the	   Court	   had	   been	   subjected	   to	   outside	  pressures.	  Last	  but	  not	  least,	  Timor’s	  head	  of	  government	  pledged	  that	  ‘not	  a	  comma	   will	   be	   changed	   in	   the	   bill’	   and	   anticipated	   the	   legislation	   would	  receive	   more	   than	   the	   necessary	   two-­‐thirds	   parliamentary	   majority	   to	  override	  a	  possible	  constitutional	  veto	  (ETAN,	  2003c).	  	  Notwithstanding	   the	   Prime	   Minister’s	   warning,	   President	   Gusmão	  vetoed	   the	   Immigration	   and	   Asylum	   bill.105	   In	   his	   message	   to	   the	   nation	  Gusmão	   criticised	   Parliament	   for	   making	   laws	   that	   are	   against	   the	  constitution	   that	   they	   wrote	   themselves	   (Gusmão,	   2005).106	   Eventually,	  Parliament	   overrode	   the	   presidential	   veto	   with	   the	   necessary	   two-­‐thirds	  majority	  and	  the	  Law	  went	  into	  force	  on	  29	  September	  2003	  (Judicial	  System	  Monitoring	  Programme,	  2003b;	  Lusa,	  2003a).	  	   In	   2005	   President	   Gusmão	   vetoed	   the	   Freedom	   of	   Assembly	   and	  Demonstration	   Bill,	   which	   was	   designed	   to	   regulate	   political	   gatherings.107	  The	   bill	   included	   prohibitions	   on	   ‘demonstrations	   with	   the	   intent	   of	  questioning	   the	   constitutional	   order’	   and	   ‘demonstrations	   whose	   objective	  constitutes	  contempt	  of	   the	  good	  reputation	  and	  respect	  due	  to	   the	  head	  of	  state	  and	  other	  office	  holders	  of	  the	  state	  institutions.’	  The	  bill	  required	  that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105	   Secretariado	   Do	   Parlamento	   Nacional	   (2012)	   'Projectos	   e	   Propostas	   de	   Lei	  Vetados	   de	   2002	   a	   2012',	   Dili:	   Parlamento	  Nacional	   da	   República	   Democrática	   de	  Timor-­‐Leste.	  In	  author’s	  collection.	  106	   President	   Gusmão	   refers	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   Constituent	   Assembly,	   the	  forerunner	  of	  the	  National	  Parliament,	  wrote	  and	  approved	  the	  Constitution.	  107	  Lei	  do	  Parlamento	  Nacional	  1/2006	  de	  8	  de	  Fevereiro	  ‘Liberdade	  de	  Reunião	  e	  de	  Manifestação’.	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demonstrations	  and	  public	  protests	  be	  authorised	  by	  the	  police	  in	  advance.	  It	  prohibited	   demonstrations	   within	   100	   meters	   of	   government	   offices,	  diplomatic	   missions,	   political	   party	   headquarters,	   prisons,	   or	   key	  infrastructure	  sites,	  such	  as	  airports	  or	  telecommunication	  facilities.	  The	  bill	  was	  approved	  by	  the	  National	  Parliament	  in	  December	  2004	  and	  then	  sent	  to	  the	   President	   for	   promulgation.108	   In	   early	   2005	   the	   President	   decided	   to	  request	  the	  Court	  to	  review	  the	  constitutionality	  of	  several	  articles	  of	  the	  bill.	  The	   Court	   then	   ruled	   that	   sub-­‐article	   1	   and	   2	   of	   article	   4	   were	  unconstitutional	   (UNMIT,	   2005;	   Judicial	   System	   Monitoring	   Programme,	  2010).	  Following	  the	  Court’s	  decision	  in	  May	  2005,	  the	  President	  vetoed	  the	  bill.	  After	  Parliament	  had	  revoked	  sub-­‐article	  1	  and	  2	  of	  article	  4	  it	  was	  sent	  back	  to	  the	  President	  on	  18	  July	  2005.	  The	  President	  promulgated	  the	  law	  on	  16	  January	  2006,	  well	  outside	  of	  the	  time	  limits	  allowed	  by	  the	  Constitution.	  President	   Gusmão	   thus	   effectively	   delayed	   the	   legislative	   process	   of	   the	  Freedom	   of	   Assembly	   and	   Demonstration	   Law.	   First,	   it	   took	   him	   several	  months	   to	   send	   the	   law	   proposal	   to	   the	   Court	   of	   Appeal.	   Second,	   after	   the	  Parliament	  changed	  the	  content	  of	  certain	  articles	  in	  order	  to	  bring	  them	  into	  line	  with	  constitutional	  requirements	  in	  July	  2005	  the	  President	  promulgated	  the	  bill	  only	  in	  January	  2006.	  The	  net	  effect	  was	  that	  it	  took	  well	  over	  a	  year	  before	  the	  Law	  on	  Freedom	  of	  Assembly	  and	  Demonstration	  went	  into	  effect. 	  	   In	   February	   2006	   President	   Gusmão	   used	   his	   veto	   power	   for	   the	  fourth	   time	   and	   vetoed	   new	   criminal	   defamation	   provisions	   in	   the	   Timor-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108	   Secretariado	   Do	   Parlamento	   Nacional	   (2012)	   'Projectos	   e	   Propostas	   de	   Lei	  Vetados	   de	   2002	   a	   2012',	   Dili:	   Parlamento	  Nacional	   da	   República	   Democrática	   de	  Timor-­‐Leste.	  In	  author’s	  collection.	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Leste	   Penal	   Code.	   In	   May	   2004	   the	   Council	   of	   Ministers	   decided	   to	   (re-­‐)criminalise	  defamation	  in	  Timor-­‐Leste.	  The	  objective	  of	  the	  Defamation	  Bill	  was	   ‘to	   end	   the	   situation	   of	   impunity	   for	   whoever	   commits	   defamation	   or	  injures	  somebody’s	  reputation’	   (Siapno,	  2006).	   In	   July	  2005,	  more	   than	  one	  year	   later,	   the	  FRETILIN-­‐dominated	  Parliament	  authorised	   the	  Government	  to	  write	  the	  new	  Penal	  Code	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  decree.109	  The	  President	  signed	  and	   promulgated	   the	   decree	   in	   September	   the	   same	   year.	   It	   took	   the	  Government	   three	  more	  months	   to	  write	  and	  approve	   the	  new	  Penal	  Code.	  By	   then,	   the	   Government	   chose	   to	   send	   the	   decree	   to	   the	   President	   for	  promulgation.	   The	   draft	   law	   sparked	   off	   mass	   protest	   among	   national	   and	  international	   organisations	   dedicated	   to	   the	   defence	   of	   press	   freedom.	  President	  Gusmão	  then	  requested	  a	  constitutional	  review	  of	   the	  Penal	  Code	  in	   February	   2006,	   more	   than	   two	   months	   after	   the	   Parliament	   had	   first	  approved	  the	  legislation.	  Although	  the	  Court	  ruled	  that	  the	  Penal	  Code	  was	  in	  conformity	  with	   the	  Constitution,	   the	  President	   did	   not	   sign	   or	   promulgate	  the	   Penal	   Code	   and	   thus	   effectively	   used	   a	   pocket	   veto	   (Vasconcelos	   and	  Cunha,	   2009:	   239,	   fn.	   12).	   The	   Penal	   Code	  was	   eventually	   promulgated	   by	  President	  José	  Ramos-­‐Horta	  in	  April	  2009.110	  	   President	   Gusmão	   also	   threatened	   to	   veto	   the	   so-­‐called	   ‘Treaty	   on	  Certain	   Maritime	   Arrangements	   in	   the	   Timor	   Sea’	   (CMATS)	   that	   would	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109	   Lei	   do	   Parlamento	   Nacional	   15/2005	   de	   3	   de	   Setembro	   ‘Lei	   de	   Autorização	  Legislativa	  em	  Matéria	  de	  Processo	  Penal’;	  Lei	  do	  Parlamento	  Nacional	  16/2005	  de	  3	  de	  Setembro	  ‘Lei	  de	  Autorização	  Legislativa	  em	  Matéria	  Penal’;	  Lei	  do	  Parlamento	  Nacional	  17/2005	  de	  3	  de	  Setembro	   ‘Lei	  de	  Autorização	  Legislativa	  em	  Matéria	  de	  Processo	  Civil’.	  110	   Lei	   do	   Parlamento	   Nacional	   6/2009	   de	   15	   de	   Julho	   ‘Primeira	   Alteração,	   por	  Apreciação	  Parlamentar,	  do	  Código	  Penal’.	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establish	  a	  50-­‐50	  split	  of	  royalties	  from	  the	  Greater	  Sunrise	  oil	  and	  gas	  field	  in	  the	  Timor	  Sea.	  Under	  the	  treaty,	  Australia	  would	  pay	  Timor-­‐Leste	  US$13.9	  billion	  in	  exchange	  for	  postponing	  talks	  on	  the	  maritime	  boundary	  between	  the	   countries	   for	   the	   next	   50	   years.	   According	   to	  media	   sources,	   President	  Gusmão	   remained	   unconvinced	   that	   Timor-­‐Leste	   should	   give	   up	   its	  sovereignty	  over	  oil	  and	  gas	  reserves	  that	  the	  UN	  believed	  conservatively	  to	  be	  worth	  more	   than	  US$30	  billion	   (Wilson,	  2005).	   In	  his	  annual	   address	   to	  Parliament	  he	  accused	  the	  Government	  of	  backroom	  politics	  and	  shady	  deals	  with	  Australia.	  Gusmão	  notified	  the	  deputies	  that	  ‘questions	  arise	  around	  the	  term	   ‘creative	   solutions’	   [quotations	   in	   original]	   expressed	   by	   the	   Prime	  Minister,	   and	   that	   doubts	   persist	   in	   the	  minds	   of	   people	   in	   relation	   to	   the	  meeting	   between	   Foreign	   Minister	   José	   Ramos-­‐Horta	   and	   his	   Australian	  counterpart,	  when	   they	   spoke	   of	   an	   ‘open	  window’	   and	   of	   ‘Christmas	   gifts’	  [quotations	  in	  original]’	  (Gusmão,	  2012).	  	   The	   Constitution	   assigns	   no	   authority	   to	   the	   President	   to	   initiate	  legislation	   or	   to	  modify	   draft	   laws.	  However,	   Gusmão	   chose	   to	   criticise	   the	  draft	   law	   on	   National	   Liberation	   Combatants.111	   In	   his	   message	   to	   the	  National	  Parliament	  President	  Gusmão	  asked	  for	  several	  amendments	  to	  be	  made	  to	  the	  ‘Veterans	  Bill’.	  The	  bill	  set	  out	  the	  criteria	  that	  had	  to	  be	  met	  in	  order	   for	   someone	   to	   be	   legally	   recognised	   as	   a	   former	   combatant	   of	   the	  national	   liberation	   front.	   The	   President	   argued	   that	   national	   liberation	  started	   on	   20	   August	   instead	   of	   15	   August	   1975	   and,	   therefore,	   the	   date	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111	   Lei	   do	   Parlamento	   3/2006	   de	   12	   de	   Abril	   ‘Estatuto	   dos	   Combatentes	   da	  Libertação	  Nacional‘.	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should	  be	  changed	  in	  the	  bill.112	  Gusmão	  also	  disagreed	  with	  the	  criteria	  used	  to	   allow	   veterans	   to	   receive	   a	   pension,	   requesting	   that	   eight	   years	   as	   a	  combatant	   should	   be	   changed	   to	   15	   years.	   In	   addition,	   the	   President	  suggested	  that	  family	  members	  of	  former	  combatants	  who	  have	  passed	  away	  may	   receive	   a	   pension,	   whereas	   those	   who	   surrendered	   to	   Indonesia	   or	  political	   groups	   who	   provoked	   the	   surrender	   of	   large	   groups	   of	   people	  should	   not	   be	   recognised	   as	   former	   combatants	   (ETAN,	   2005).	  Most	   of	   the	  President’s	  suggestions	  were	  accepted	  by	  the	  Parliament	  and	  incorporated	  in	  the	  bill.	  	  In	   May	   2006	   President	   Gusmão	   assumed	   full	   executive	   authority	   in	  response	   to	   the	   April/May	   2006	   political	   crisis.113	   In	   the	   section	  ‘Proclamatory	   powers’	  we	  will	   discuss	   the	   causes	   and	   consequences	   of	   the	  crisis	   given	   that	   the	   President	   announced	   the	   state	   of	   emergency	   in	   an	  address	   to	   the	   Nation.	   Here	   we	   discuss	   the	   President’s	   use	   of	   emergency	  powers.	  On	  30	  May	  the	  President	  declared	  to	  ‘take	  the	  sole	  responsibility	  in	  the	  areas	  of	  defence	  and	  national	  security,	  in	  his	  capacity	  as	  the	  Commander-­‐in-­‐Chief	   of	   the	   Armed	   Forces’	   in	   order	   to	   ‘prevent	   the	   violence	   and	   avoid	  further	   fatalities,	   for	   the	   rapid	   reestablishment	   of	   the	   public	   order	   and	   the	  normal,	   functioning	   of	   the	   democratic	   institutions.’	   (ETAN,	   2006g).	   The	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112	  On	  15	  August,	  the	  Fretilin	  Central	  Committee	  announced	  what	  they	  called	  “the	  resumption	  of	  general	  armed	  struggle	  against	  all	  traitors	  and	  enemies	  of	  the	  people”	  CAVR	  (2005)	  'Chega!'.	  Available	  at	  http://www.cavr-­‐timorleste.org/en/chegaReport.htm	  (last	  accessed	  11	  September	  2013).	  On	  20	  August	  FRETILIN	  launched	  a	  “counter	  coup”	  against	  UDT	  and	  established	  de	  facto	  control	  over	  the	  territory.	  See	  chapter	  3.	  113	  This	  crisis	  stemmed	  largely	  from	  the	  sacking	  of	  soldiers	  from	  the	  mainly	  western	  part	  of	  Timor-­‐Leste.	  In	  armed	  clashes	  between	  the	  police,	  army	  and	  rebel	  soldiers	  more	  than	  30	  people	  were	  killed.	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presidential	  declaration	  of	  the	  state	  of	  emergency	  was,	  however,	  not	  ratified	  by	   a	   presidential	   decree.	   Moreover,	   the	   state	   of	   emergency	   was	   declared	  without	  the	  express	  consent	  of	  the	  National	  Parliament.	  The	  Parliament	  only	  authorized	   the	  President	   to	  declare	   the	  state	  of	  emergency	  on	  5	   June	  2006,	  six	  days	  after	  Gusmão’s	  speech	  to	  the	  nation.114	  What	  is	  more,	  Prime	  Minister	  Alkatiri	   denied	   that	   he	   handed	   over	   control	   of	   the	   country’s	   two	   security	  forces	   to	   the	  President	   (Newsfeed,	  2006).	  According	   to	  him,	   the	  President’s	  speech	  had	  been	  wrongly	   translated.	   ‘He	   is	  not	   taking	  control,’	  Alkatiri	   told	  ABC	   radio.	   ‘He	   is	   co-­‐ordinating	   with	   me	   in	   taking	   control	   of	   these	   two	   ...	  defence	  and	  security	  are	  still	  part	  of	  the	  Government	  and	  I	  am	  the	  head	  of	  the	  Government’	   (Taylor,	   2006).	   The	   political	   confrontation	   between	   the	  President	  and	  Prime	  Minister	  over	   the	  control	  over	  Timor-­‐Leste’s	   fractured	  security	   forces	  delayed	   the	  deployment	  of	   foreign	   troops	   in	  Timor-­‐Leste	   as	  well.	  Alkatiri	  seriously	  disagreed	  with	  Gusmão	  when	  the	  latter	  together	  with	  Foreign	   Minister	   Ramos-­‐Horta	   decided	   to	   appeal	   to	   Australia	   for	   military	  assistance	  in	  order	  to	  restore	  peace	  and	  order	  in	  Timor-­‐Leste	  (Agence	  France	  Presse,	   2006).	   Prime	   Minister	   Alkatiri	   was	   strongly	   opposed	   to	   foreign	  intervention	   and,	   reportedly,	   embroiled	  with	  Gusmão	   in	   a	   ‘shouting	  match’	  whether	   to	   invite	  Australian	  assistance	   (Butterly,	   2006).	  The	  President	   and	  Foreign	   Minister	   won	   out,	   and	   a	   formal	   appeal	   –	   that	   Alkatiri	   reluctantly	  signed	  –	  was	  sent	  to	  Australia,	  Portugal,	  Malaysia	  and	  New	  Zealand.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114	  Resolução	  do	  Parlamento	  12/2006	  de	  5	  de	  Junho	  ‘Sobre	  as	  medidas	  de	  emergência	  para	  ultrapassar	  a	  crise	  decretadas	  por	  sua	  excelência	  o	  presidente	  da	  república,	  Kay	  Rala	  Xanana’.	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In	  sum,	  President	  Gusmão	  often	  intervened	  in	  the	  legislative	  domain.	  The	  President’s	  relatively	  weak	  position	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   the	  other	  state	  organs	  did	  not	  discourage	  him	  from	  seeking	  confrontation	  with	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  and	  the	   parliamentary	   majority.	   Not	   only	   was	   Gusmão	   seriously	   debilitated	   by	  legislative	   voids,	   but	   he	   was	   also	   aware	   that	   a	   presidential	   veto	   could	   be	  overridden	  by	  FRETILIN,	  which	  held	  a	  majority	  the	  Parliament.	  Nevertheless,	  President	   Gusmão	   intervened	   in	   the	   legislative	   process.	   The	   President	   sent	  three	   laws	   to	   the	   Court	   of	   Appeal	   and	   vetoed	   four	   bills.	   The	   first	  (constitutional)	  veto	  was	  issued	  almost	  immediately	  after	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  began	   to	   operate	   in	   June	   2003.	   The	   President	   disrupted	   the	   legislative	  process	   in	   other,	   sometimes	   unconstitutional	   ways.	   Gusmão’s	   refusal	   to	  promulgate	  the	  Timorese	  Penal	  Code	  is	  a	  case	  in	  point.	  We	  also	  conclude	  that	  the	   President	   used	   his	   legislative	   power	   specifically,	   but	   not	   exclusively,	   to	  disrupt	   law-­‐making	  in	  the	  area	  of	  national	  security.	  Except	  for	  the	  Tax	  Law,	  the	   Immigration	   and	   Asylum	   Law,	   the	   Freedom	   of	   Assembly	   and	  Demonstration	  Law,	  Timor-­‐Leste’s	  Penal	  Code	  provided	  the	  legal	  framework	  for	  Timor-­‐Leste’s	  national	  security	  policy.	  Institutional	  relations	  deteriorated	  when	  the	  President	  assumed	  emergency	  powers.	  The	  Prime	  Minister	  denied	  the	   state	   of	   emergency	   and	   the	   Parliament	   hesitated	   to	   authorize	   the	  President	   to	   assume	   emergency	   powers.	   Finally,	   President	   and	   Prime	  Minister	  seriously	  disagreed	  on	  whether	  to	  ask	  foreign	  assistance	  to	  restore	  peace	   and	   security	   in	   Timor-­‐Leste.	   The	   Parliament,	   for	   its	   part,	   effectively	  reduced	   the	   President’s	   power	   to	   a	  minimum.	   All	   presidential	   vetoes	  were	  overridden	   by	   Parliament.	   The	   parliamentary	  majority	   even	   adopted	   a	   bill	  that	  had	  been	  declared	  unconstitutional.	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Conflict	  in	  the	  appointment	  and	  dismissal	  process	  As	  noted	  earlier,	  the	  President	  was	  stripped	  of	  some	  important	  appointment	  and	  dismissal	  powers.	  The	  President	  could	  not	  appoint	   the	  President	  of	   the	  Court	   because	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   was	   not	   established.	   Likewise,	   the	  President	   could	  not	   appoint	  military	   officials	   given	   that	   the	  Prime	  Minister	  did	   not	   propose	   candidates.	   Notwithstanding	   these	   restrictions,	   President	  Gusmão	   did	   intervene	   in	   the	   appointment	   and	   dismissal	   of	   officials.	   The	  Constitution	   authorizes	   the	   President	   to	   appoint	   and	   swear	   in	   the	   Prime	  Minister	   designated	   by	   the	   party	   or	   alliance	   of	   parties	   with	   parliamentary	  majority	   (85d),	   appoint,	   swear	   in	   and	   remove	   Government	   members	   from	  office	  following	  a	  proposal	  by	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  (Section	  86h),	  appoint	  the	  Prosecutor-­‐General	   for	   a	   term	   of	   four	   year	   (Section	   86k),	   appoint	   the	  President	  of	   the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	   Justice	  and	  swear	   in	  the	  President	  of	   the	  High	  Administrative,	  Tax	  and	  Audit	  Court	  (Section	  86j),	  appoint	  and	  dismiss,	  following	   a	   proposal	   by	   the	   Government,	   the	   General	   Chief	   of	   Staff	   of	   the	  Defence	  Force,	  the	  Deputy	  General	  Chief	  of	  Staff	  of	  the	  Defence	  Force,	  and	  the	  Chiefs	   of	   Staff	   of	   the	   Defence	   Force	   (Section	   86m)	   appoint	   and	   dismiss	  ambassadors,	   permanent	   representatives	   and	   special	   envoys,	   following	   a	  proposal	  by	  the	  Government	  (Section	  87b)	  	  First,	   Gusmão	   refused	   to	   appoint	   the	   Prime	  Minister’s	   candidate	   for	  the	   post	   of	   ambassador	   to	   Australia.	   Abel	   Guterres	   was	   the	   first	   choice	   of	  President	  and	  Foreign	  Minister,	  Ramos-­‐Horta,	  but	  his	  candidacy	  was	  vetoed	  in	   July	   2002	   by	   Prime	   Minister	   Alkatiri	   who	   backed	   Antoninho	   Bianco	  (Jolliffe,	   2002a).	   In	   an	   interview	   on	   13	   June	   2002,	   the	   Prime	  Minister	   was	  adamant	  that	  Bianco	  had	  been	  nominated,	  a	  statement	  confirmed	  by	  Bianco.	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Confronted	  with	   this	   declaration,	   Ramos-­‐Horta	   said	   the	   appointment	   could	  not	  be	  presented	   ‘as	  a	   fait	  accompli’,	  stressing	  that	  the	  final	  say	  rested	  with	  President	   Gusmão	   who	   had	   to	   approve	   diplomatic	   appointments	   (Jolliffe,	  2002a).	   Eventually,	   in	   March	   2003,	   a	   third	   candidate,	   Jorge	   Teme,	   was	  appointed	   ambassador	   (Jolliffe,	   2003a).	   All	   in	   all,	   then,	   Timor-­‐Leste	   was	  unrepresented	  in	  Australia	   for	  almost	  a	  year	  due	  to	  the	  tug-­‐of	  war	  between	  President	   and	   Prime	   Minister	   over	   the	   nomination	   of	   an	   ambassador	   to	  Canberra.	  In	   addition,	   even	   though	   had	   hesitated	   initially	   to	   nominate	  Rogério	  Lobato	  as	  the	  first	  Minister	  of	  Interior	  Affairs	  in	  an	  independent	  Timor-­‐Leste,	  tension	  developed	  between	   the	  President	  and	   the	  Prime	  Minister	  about	   the	  minister.	   Under	   the	   Constitution,	   the	   President	   can	   only	   dismiss	   cabinet	  ministers	   following	   a	   proposal	   by	   the	   Prime	   Minister	   (Section	   86h).	   So,	  President	   Gusmão	   sought	   alternative	   ways	   to	   have	   Lobato	   fired,	   which	  brought	  him	   into	  serious	  conflict	  with	   the	  Prime	  Minister.	   In	  no	   fewer	   than	  eight	   formal	  speeches	  addressed	  either	  to	  the	  National	  Parliament	  or	  to	  the	  Nation,	   President	   Gusmão	   criticised	   Lobato	   and	   in	   particular	   his	   policy	  regarding	   the	   establishment	   and	   development	   of	   the	   Timorese	   police	   force	  (PNTL115).	   For	   example,	   in	   one	   of	   his	   first	   official	   speeches	   to	   the	   nation,	  Gusmão	  accused	   the	   Interior	  Minister	  of	  demagoguery	  and	   reproached	  him	  for	   ‘exploiting	   the	   failures	   of	   the	   state’s	   institutions	   to	   mobilise	   the	  population’	  (Gusmão,	  2005:	  17).	  Tension	  grew	  between	  the	  President	  and	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115	  Portuguese	  acronym	  for	  ‘Policia	  Nacional	  de	  Timor-­‐Leste’.	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Prime	  Minister	  when,	  on	  28	  November	  2002,	  Gusmão	  publicly	   ‘ordered’	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  to	  dismiss	  the	  Minister	  of	  Interior.	  In	  his	  speech	  delivered	  on	  Independence	  Day,116	  Gusmão	  stated:	  	  	  
‘If	  independence	  belongs	  only	  to	  FRETILIN,	  I	  have	  no	  comments	  to	  make.	  
If	   	  independence	   belongs	   to	   all	   of	   us,	   to	   all	   the	   Timorese,	   I	   seize	   this	  
opportunity	   to	   demand	   of	   the	   Government	   to	   dismiss	   the	  Minister	   for	  
Internal	   Administration,	   Mr.	   Rogério	   Lobato,	   on	   the	   grounds	   of	  
incompetence	  	  and	  neglect’	  (ETAN,	  2002d).	  	  	  Prime	   Minister	   Alkatiri	   was	   quick	   to	   comment	   on	   the	   President’s	  demand	  and	  asserted:	  ‘As	  head	  of	  the	  Government	  I	  will	  see	  who	  has	  and	  has	  not	  the	  capacity	  to	  be	  minister.’	  The	  Prime	  Minister	  added:	  ‘I	  will	  be	  the	  one	  to	  dismiss	  those	  incapable	  of	  doing	  their	  duties.	  It	  doesn't	  have	  to	  come	  from	  the	  President's	  speech’	   (APSN,	  2002).	   In	   the	  aftermath	  of	   the	   Independence	  Day	  celebrations	  on	  28	  November	  2002	  anti-­‐Government	  protest	  erupted	  in	  the	   capital	   and	   turned	   violent.	   Two	   protesters	   died	   and	  many	   others	  were	  injured.	  One	  of	  the	  reasons	  for	  the	  escalation	  of	  violence	  in	  Dili	  was	  because	  the	   police	   had	   decided	   to	   use	   live	   rounds	   to	   control	   the	   crowd	   (Smith,	  2004a).	   Gusmão	   condemned	   the	   police	   performance	   as	   ‘inadequate’	   and	  concluded	   that	   the	   command	   structure	   of	   the	   Timor-­‐Leste	   police	   was	  ‘problematic’	  (Gusmão,	  2005:	  52).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116	   FRETILIN	   unilaterally	   declared	   the	   independence	   of	   Timor-­‐Leste	   on	   28	  November	  1975.	  See	  also	  chapter	  3.	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Conflict	  between	  the	  President	  and	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  about	  Lobato’s	  performance	  as	  Interior	  Minister	  generally	  and	  his	  policy	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  police	  specifically	  carried	  on	  in	  2003.	  In	  August	  2003,	  the	  President	  branded	  the	  police	  force	  as	  downright	  unprofessional,	  totally	  unethical	  and	  stated	  that	  some	  policemen	  acted	  like	  ‘proprietors	  of	  the	  state’	  (Gusmão,	  2005:	  242).	  In	  his	   end-­‐of-­‐year	   speech	   President	   Gusmão	   expressed	   his	   objection	   to	   the	  Government’s	  plans	   to	   invest	  more	  money	   in	   the	  development	  of	   the	  police	  forces.	  Given	   the	  budget	  deficit	  Timor-­‐Leste	   is	   facing,	  he	  argued,	   ‘instead	  of	  buying	   more	   weapons	   and	   ammunition,	   more	   cars	   and	   more	   fuel,	   more	  rations,	  more	  tents,	  or	  more	  uniforms	  for	  border	  operation	  funds	  should	  be	  allocated	  to	  education,	  health,	  infrastructure	  and	  agriculture,	  in	  sum,	  for	  the	  economic	  development	  of	  the	  country’	  (ETAN,	  2003a).	  	  He	  reiterated	  his	  opposition	  to	  ‘wasting	  money	  and	  energy	  in	  creating	  new	  police	  units’	   in	  his	  message	  to	  the	  nation	  on	  the	  second	  anniversary	  of	  restoration	   of	   independence	   in	   May	   2004	   (Gusmão,	   2012).	   Barely	   two	  months	   later	   new	   anti-­‐Government	   demonstrations	   ended	   in	   violence.	   The	  Timorese	  riot	  police	  fired	  tear	  gas	  to	  disperse	  a	  demonstration	  by	  hundreds	  of	   former	   resistance	   veterans	   and	   their	   supporters	  who	   were	   demanding	  more	  government	  support	  and	   the	  removal	  of	  Timorese	  police	  officers	  who	  formerly	  served	  in	  the	  Indonesian	  security	  forces	  (Dodd,	  2004).	  In	  his	  speech	  to	  Parliament,	  President	  Gusmão	  referred	  to	  the	  July	  riots	  and	  denounced	  the	  ‘extreme	   violence’	   used	   by	   the	   Timorese	   riot	   police	   to	   quell	   the	   unrest	  (Gusmão,	   2012).	   In	   addition,	   he	   used	   his	   annual	   address	   to	   the	   Nation	   to	  officially	  distance	  himself	   from	   the	  Government’s	  police	   and	  military	  policy	  and	  criticised	  the	  Government	  for	  being	  unable	  to	  solve	  the	  festering	  conflict	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between	  the	  army	  and	  the	  police	  (ETAN,	  2004).	  His	  caution	  proved	  justified.	  In	  clashes	  between	  the	  army	  and	  police	  nine	  police	  officers	  were	  killed	  when	  the	  army	  opened	  fire	  on	  one	  of	  the	  head	  offices	  of	  the	  police.	  The	  escalation	  of	  violence	   forced	   the	   Interior	  Minister	   to	   resign	   along	  with	  Defence	  Minister	  Roque	  Rodrigues	  in	  June	  2006,	  after	  intense	  pressure	  from	  President	  Gusmão	  (Murdoch	  and	  Allard,	  2006).	  Soon	  after	   their	   resignation	  President	  Gusmão	  accused	  Prime	  Minister	  Alkatiri	   of	   ‘dirty	   politics’	   regarding	  his	   relationship	  with	  the	  former	  Interior	  Minister	  (ETAN,	  2006f).	  Finally,	  on	  20	  June	  2006	  in	  a	  nationally	   televised	  speech	  President	  Gusmão	   threatened	   to	   resign	   if	  Prime	  Minister	  Alkatiri	  refused	  to	  do	  so.	  The	  President	  gave	  FRETILIN	  an	  ultimatum	  to	   either	   ask	   Alkatiri	   to	   resign	   immediately	   or	   he	   would	   tender	   his	  resignation	   to	   Parliament.	   Alkatiri	   resigned	   on	   26	   June	   2006.	   The	   Prime	  Minister	  stepped	  down	  because	  he	  learned	  that	  the	  President	  had	  been	  ready	  to	   resign	   or	   dissolve	   the	   FRETILIN-­‐controlled	   Parliament	   to	   press	   his	  demand	   for	   the	   Prime	   Minister’s	   move.	   ‘Either	   of	   these	   hypotheses	   would	  have	   been	   worse	   than	   my	   resignation’,	   leaving	   an	   ‘institutional	   vacuum’,	  according	  to	  the	  former	  Prime	  Minister	  (Lusa,	  2006).	  	  In	  sum,	  President	  Gusmão	  and	  Prime	  Minister	  Alkatiri	  were	  embroiled	  in	   a	   tug-­‐of-­‐war	   over	   the	   appointment	   and	   dismissal	   of	   state	   officials.	   The	  Constitution	  does	  not	  empower	  the	  President	  to	  dismiss	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  or	   Government	   members.	   Nevertheless,	   Gusmão	   succeeded	   in	   ‘convincing’	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  first,	   to	  dismiss	  the	  Interior	  Minister	  and	  the	  Minister	  of	  Defence	  and	  second,	  tender	  his	  own	  resignation.	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Proclamatory	  powers	  	  In	   addition	   to	   Gusmão’s	   intervention	   in	   the	   legislative	   domain	   and	   in	   the	  appointment	  and	  dismissal	  process,	  President	  Gusmão	  made	  use	  of	  his	  power	  to	   ‘address	   messages	   to	   the	   National	   Parliament	   and	   the	   country	   (Section	  86e)	   and	   express	   his	   opinion	   about	   the	   Government’s	   policies	   in	   press	  statements.	  	  The	  President	  and	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  frequently	  disagreed	  on	  issues	  related	   to	   foreign	   policy	   and,	   in	   particular,	   Timor-­‐Leste’s	   relationship	  with	  Indonesia.	  President	  Gusmão	  and	  Prime	  Minister	  Alkatiri	  were	  divided	  over	  how	   to	   deal	  with	   Indonesian	   officers	   and	  Timorese	   pro-­‐Indonesian	  militias	  who	  were	  involved	  in	  the	  1999	  atrocities	  before,	  during	  and	  after	  the	  UN-­‐run	  ballot	   on	   independence.	   Whereas	   Gusmão	   favoured	   a	   ‘forgive-­‐and-­‐forget’	  policy	  Alkatiri	   took	  a	  much	   tougher	   stance.	   In	  an	   interview	  with	  a	  London-­‐based	  Arabic	  newspaper	   the	  Prime	  Minister	  declared	   that	  he	  did	  not	   share	  the	   President’s	   view	   that	   Indonesian	   officials	   who	   had	   committed	   human	  rights	   violations	   in	   Timor-­‐Leste	   should	   not	   be	   tried.	   ‘I	   am	   for	   reforming	  things	  justly,	  since	  justice	  is	  our	  bridge	  to	  reform.	  Today,	  we	  can	  assess	  our	  ties	   with	   our	   former	   enemies	   [Indonesia],	   but	   this	   will	   bring	   back	   the	  problems	  between	  us.	   I	   think	   the	  amnesty	   is	   important,	  but	   after	  achieving	  justice	  and	  after	  everybody	  gets	  his	  right	  from	  the	  person	  who	  wronged	  him.	  Justice	  comes	   first’	   (Al-­‐Hayat,	  2002).	  Gusmão,	   for	  his	  part,	  believed	   that	  his	  approach	  was	   necessary	   to	  maintain	   the	   unity	   of	   Timor-­‐Leste.	   ‘Community	  building’,	  according	  to	  him,	  was	  the	  key	  to	  restoring	  East	  Timor's	  shattered	  social	   structure	   and	   trials	   would	   only	   discount	   the	   value	   of	   the	   sacrifices	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made	   for	   freedom.	  The	  President	   said	   that	  he	  believed	   in	   justice	  but	  not	   in	  revenge	  (Birnbauer,	  2003).	  	  One	   specific	   point	   on	   which	   the	   President	   and	   the	   Prime	   Minister	  disagreed	  concerned	  the	  payment	  of	  war-­‐reparations	  from	  and	  to	  Indonesia.	  In	  2001,	  Gusmão	  announced	   that	  he	   forgave	   Indonesia	   and	  would	  not	   seek	  reparation	  payments	   from	  Jakarta,	  which	  brought	  him	  on	  a	  collision	  course	  with	   the	   FRETILIN	   leadership	  who	   insisted	   that	   Jakarta	   should	   pay	   for	   the	  damage	  caused	  by	  its	  forces.	  However,	  while	  Alkatiri	  during	  his	  time	  as	  Prime	  Minister	   refrained	   from	   demanding	  war	   reparations,	   it	   was	   Indonesia	   that	  insisted	   it	   still	  held	  assets	  worth	  more	   than	  Rp1	   trillion	  (US$	  1.3	  billion)	   in	  Timor-­‐Leste,	   including	  destroyed	  government	  buildings	   that	  had	  been	  built	  with	   foreign	   loans	   (Townsville	   Bulletin,	   2001).	   The	   Prime	   Minister	  categorically	  stated	  that	  he	  would	  reject	  any	  claims	  for	  compensation	  made	  by	   Indonesians.	   The	   President	   disagreed	   with	   him.	   In	   an	   interview	   with	  Portuguese	   news	   agency	   LUSA,	   Gusmão	   argued	   that	   Alkatiri’s	   statements	  ‘need	   to	   be	   avoided’	   and	   instead	   called	   for	   dialogue	   with	   Indonesia	   (Lusa,	  2002c).	  	  Another	   difference	   of	   opinion	   came	   to	   light	   after	   Indonesia’s	   ad	   hoc	  human	   rights	   court	   decided	   to	   acquit	   four	   Indonesian	   army	   officers	   and	   a	  policeman	  over	  one	  of	   the	  worst	  massacres	   in	  Timor-­‐Leste.	  During	  the	  Suai	  massacre	  on	  6	  September	  1999	  between	  27	  and	  200	  people	  were	  killed.	  The	  Prime	  Minister	   considered	   ‘the	  whole	  process	   a	   farce’	   (Moore	   et	   al.,	   2002).	  President	  Gusmão,	   for	  his	  part,	  was	  concerned	   that	  Abílio	  Soares	   -­‐	   the	  only	  Timorese	  who	  was	  convicted	  by	  the	  Jakarta	  court	  -­‐	  would	  be	  seen	  as	  the	  sole	  culprit.	  Some	  days	  before	  the	  verdict,	  Gusmão	  wrote	  a	   letter	   to	  the	  court	   in	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which	  he	  had	  pleaded	  for	  clemency.	  The	  act	  was	  widely	  criticised	  by	  Alkatiri,	  observers	   and	   analysts	   who	   considered	   the	   plea	   ‘unconstitutional’	   (Lusa,	  2002d).	   Institutional	   tensions	   also	   developed	   over	   the	   Prime	   Minister’s	  initiative	  to	  establish	  an	  International	  Court.	   In	  the	  aftermath	  of	   the	   Jakarta	  trials,	  in	  August	  2002,	  Prime	  Minister	  Alkatiri	  declared	  he	  was	  ‘confident	  that	  the	   Government	   would	   ask	   the	   United	   Nations	   to	   set	   up	   an	   International	  Tribunal’	  (Jolliffe,	  2002b).	  A	  UN-­‐led	  International	  Tribunal,	  akin	  to	  those	  for	  the	  former	  Yugoslavia	  and	  Rwanda,	  would	  be	  established	  to	  bring	  to	   justice	  those	   responsible	   for	   the	  1999	  atrocities.	  However,	  Gusmão	  argued	  against	  the	   idea	   in	  his	  speech	  to	  the	  National	  Parliament	   in	  October	  2002.	   ‘There	   is	  talk	  of	  an	  International	  Court,	  but	  an	  International	  Court	  for	  whom?	  For	  the	  Timorese?	   I	   would	   be	   the	   first	   to	   disagree’,	   the	   President	   told	   Dili's	  legislature	   in	  a	  90-­‐minute	  speech	  (Gusmão,	  2005).	  He	  also	  admitted	  that	  he	  opposed	   the	   former	   UN	   Transition	   Administration's	   decision	   to	   set	   up	   a	  special	  court	  in	  Dili,	  the	  Serious	  Crimes	  Unit	  (SCU),	  to	  try	  crimes	  committed	  around	  the	  time	  of	  the	  independence	  plebiscite	  in	  1999.	  ‘Ninety-­‐five	  percent	  of	   the	   crimes	   were	   committed	   during	   the	   previous	   24	   years’	   Gusmão	   said	  (ETAN,	  2002c).	  Gusmão	   strongly	   opposed	   war	   crime	   charges	   against	   former	  Indonesian	   Defence	   Minister	   and	   Military	   Chief,	   General	   Wiranto.	   On	   24	  February	  2003,	  the	  SCU	  in	  Dili	  indicted	  General	  Wiranto	  and	  seven	  others	  for	  the	  murder,	  deportation	  and	  persecution	  of	  independence	  supporters	  before	  and	  after	  Timor-­‐Leste	  voted	  in	  August	  1999	  for	  independence.	  According	  to	  the	  President,	  the	  indictment	  was	  a	  ‘mistake’	  and	  the	  Court’s	  decision	  did	  not	  form	   part	   of	   Timor-­‐Leste’s	   policy	   (Agence	   France	   Presse,	   2003a).	   Gusmão	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explained	   that	   peace,	   stability	   and	   progress	   ‘greatly	   depend	   on	   the	  relationship	   we	   will	   forge	   with	   the	   Republic	   of	   Indonesia’	   and	   such	  indictments	  were	  not	  in	  the	  national	  interest	  (Agence	  France	  Presse,	  2003c).	  Alkatiri,	  however,	  publicly	  dissociated	  himself	  from	  the	  remarks	  made	  by	  the	  President	  (Jolliffe,	  2003c).	  In	   late	   May,	   early	   June	   2003	   President	   and	   Prime	   Minister	   found	   a	  middle	   ground	   regarding	   delicate	   issues	   like	   the	   establishment	   of	   an	  international	   court,	   the	   indictment	  of	  General	  Wiranto	  and	  war	   reparations	  to	  Indonesia.	  During	  a	  trip	  to	  Jakarta,	  Alkatiri	  declared	  that	  the	  international	  community	  was	  responsible	  to	  try	  Indonesian	  officers	  accused	  of	  war	  crimes	  and	   criticised	   the	   United	   Nations	   for	   trying	   to	   wash	   its	   hands	   of	   the	  prosecutions	   (Jolliffe,	   2003b).	   ‘The	   responsibility	   for	   things	   like	   this	   is	   an	  international	   responsibility,	   we	   are	   not	   looking	   for	   ways	   to	   push	   for	   an	  international	   court,’	   he	   told	   in	   a	  press	   conference.	  According	   to	  Alkatiri,	   he	  had	   been	   misquoted	   by	   media	   reports	   that	   he	   was	   pushing	   for	   an	  International	   Tribunal	   (Agence	   France	   Presse,	   2003b).	   On	   the	   issue	   of	  remaining	   Indonesian	  assets	   in	  Timor-­‐Leste,	  Alkatiri	   said	   the	   issue	  must	  be	  solved	  through	  ‘a	  step-­‐by-­‐step’	  approach	  (Agence	  France	  Presse,	  2003b).	  The	  President	  and	  the	  Government	  differed	  over	  other	  foreign	  policy	  issues.	   The	   first	   conflict	   emerged	   after	   Gusmão	   declared	   his	   opposition	   to	  Australia's	   involvement	   in	   the	   US-­‐led	   war	   on	   Iraq.	   The	   President’s	   views	  conflicted	  with	  those	  of	  Foreign	  Minister,	  Ramos-­‐Horta,	  who	  had	  previously	  endorsed	   the	   use	   of	   force	   in	   Iraq	   (Rood,	   2003).	   The	   second	   difference	  concerned	  Gusmão’s	  statement	  that	  dialogue	  with	  Al-­‐Qaeda	  was	  necessary	  to	  combat	   terrorism.	  The	  President	  compared	   the	  situation	  with	   the	  Timorese	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struggle	   for	   independence	   from	   Indonesia	   and	   said	   that	   the	   Indonesians	  initially	   rejected	   dialogue	   but	   were	   forced	   to	   accept	   it	   in	   1999.	   Foreign	  Minster	   Ramos-­‐Horta	   considered	   the	   comparison	   ‘inappropriate’	   for	   the	  President’s	   statement	   offended	   the	   Indonesian	   military	   authorities	   by	  equating	   them	   with	   Al-­‐Qaeda	   (Lusa,	   2004).	   Finally,	   the	   Foreign	   Minister	  criticised	   the	   President’s	   meeting	   with	   Indonesian	   presidential	   candidate	  General	  Wiranto	  who,	  as	  noted	  earlier,	  had	  been	  indicted	  for	  war	  crimes	  by	  the	  SCU	  for	  his	  role	  in	  the	  1999	  atrocities.	  He	  told	  reporters	  that	  he	  disagreed	  with	   the	   timing	   of	   the	   President’s	   visit	   with	   the	   controversial	   presidential	  candidate	  and	  called	  upon	   the	  Government	  not	   to	  damage	   its	   reputation	  or	  the	  judicial	  process.	   ‘The	  Government	  of	  East	  Timor	  has	  to	  be	  prudent	  so	  as	  not	  to	  discredit	  ourselves	  and	  the	  judicial	  process.’	  (Guillart,	  2004).	  A	  serious	  conflict	  between	  the	  President	  and	  Prime	  Minister	  erupted	  over	   defence	   policy.	   In	   March	   2006	   Defence	   Force	   Commander	   Ruak	  dismissed	  591	  soldiers	  because	  they	  had	  breached	  discipline.	  Prime	  Minister	  Alkatiri	   and	   Defence	   Minister	   Rodrigues	   supported	   the	   Defence	  Commander’s	   decision,	   but	   President	   Gusmão	   was	   strongly	   opposed.	   In	   a	  nation-­‐wide	   speech	  Gusmão	  declared	   that	  Ruak’s	  decision	   to	   expel	   the	  591	  soldiers	   was	   ‘erroneous	   and	   unjust’	   (Nautilus	   Institute,	   2006).	   In	   addition,	  the	   President	   criticised	   the	   Defence	   Minister	   and	   the	   Defence	   Force	  Commander	   for	   being	   unable	   or	   unwilling	   to	   solve	   the	   problem	   and	   he	  urgently	   asked	   them	   to	   change	   their	   policy	   towards	   the	   petitioners	   and	   to	  ‘carefully	  consider’	  the	  option	  to	  re-­‐accept	  the	  ex-­‐F-­‐FDTL	  soldiers	  ‘in	  order	  to	  resolve	   the	   matter	   accordingly’	   (Nautilus	   Institute,	   2006).	   Prime	   Minister	  Alkatiri	  denounced	  the	  President’s	  speech	  and	  declared	  that	  ‘the	  decision	  [to	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dismiss	  the	  soldiers]	  is	  correct	  and	  just’	  (ETAN,	  2006e).	  According	  to	  Alkatiri	  ‘the	   decision	   came	   from	   the	   commander	   of	   F-­‐FDTL,	   following	   consultation	  with	  me	  and	  I	  agreed	  and	  fully	  support	  the	  decision	  of	  the	  Commander	  who	  has	  the	  capacity	  to	  make	  that	  decision’	  (UNOTIL	  Daily	  Media	  Review,	  2006).	  The	   Prime	   Minister	   also	   added	   that	   the	   soldiers	   have	   been	   out	   of	   their	  headquarters	   for	   over	   two	  months	   so	   they	   should	  no	   longer	   be	   considered	  soldiers.	   The	   President	   of	   Parliament,	   Francisco	   Guterres	   of	   FRETILIN,	  shared	   the	   opinion	   that	   even	   President	   Gusmão	   could	   not	   reverse	   the	  Defence	  Commander’s	  decision.	  	  In	  April	  2006	  President	  Gusmão	  announced	  that	  the	  country’s	  military	  leadership	  was	   in	  crisis	   (ETAN,	  2006b).	  Against	   the	  background	  of	  growing	  tensions	   and	   anti-­‐Government	   demonstrations	   organized	   by	   the	   former	  soldiers	   Prime	   Minister	   Alkatiri	   proposed	   to	   set	   up	   a	   Government	  Commission	   to	   look	   into	   the	   petitioners’	   complaints	   (Independent	   Special	  Commission	   of	   Inquiry	   for	   Timor-­‐Leste,	   2006).	   In	   addition,	   the	   Foreign	  Minister	   was	   nominated	   to	   talk	   with	   the	   protestors	   to	   put	   an	   end	   to	   the	  demonstrations.	   However,	   these	   measures	   proved	   too	   little	   too	   late.	   The	  demonstration	  turned	  violent	  and	  the	  police	  did	  not	  control	  the	  situation.	  In	  an	  attempt	  to	  restore	  stability	  Prime	  Minister	  Alkatiri	  called	  for	  the	  army	  to	  intervene.	  During	  the	  April	  2006	  riots	  five	  people	  were	  killed	  and	  more	  than	  one	   hundred	   houses	   were	   destroyed	   (ICG,	   2006).	   Some	   15,000	   persons	  sought	  refuge	   in	  churches,	  public	  buildings	  and	  the	  United	  Nations	   facilities	  in	   Dili,	   while	   others	   left	   for	   the	   districts.	   The	   outbreak	   of	   another	  wave	   of	  violence	  in	  late	  May	  2006	  heightened	  friction	  between	  the	  President	  and	  the	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Prime	   Minister.	   In	   clashes	   between	   the	   army	   and	   police	   nine	   unarmed	  policemen	  were	  killed	  and	  another	  27	  wounded.	  	  In	  a	  response	  to	  the	  political	  crisis,	  the	  President	  declared	  the	  state	  of	  emergency	   in	   an	   address	   to	   the	   Nation	   on	   30	   May	   2006	   (ETAN,	   2006g).	  Following	   the	   presidential	   speech,	   Interior	   Minister	   Rogério	   Lobato	   and	  Defence	   Minister	   Roque	   Rodrigues	   resigned.	   As	   noted	   earlier,	   the	  presidential	   declaration	   of	   emergency	   was	   not	   ratified	   by	   a	   presidential	  decree.	  Moreover,	   the	  state	  of	  emergency	  was	  declared	  without	  the	  express	  consent	   of	   the	   National	   Parliament.	   The	   Parliament	   only	   authorized	   the	  President	   to	   declare	   the	   state	   of	   emergency	   on	   5	   June	   2006,	   six	   days	   after	  Gusmão’s	  speech	  to	  the	  nation.117	  In	  addition,	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  denied	  that	  he	  handed	  over	  control	  of	  the	  country’s	  two	  security	  forces	  to	  the	  President	  (Newsfeed,	  2006).	  In	  a	  nationally	  televised	  speech	  on	  20	  June	  2006	  President	  Gusmão	  threatened	  to	  resign	  if	  Prime	  Minister	  Alkatiri	  refused	  to	  do	  so.	  The	  President	   gave	   FRETILIN	   an	   ultimatum	   to	   either	   ask	   Alkatiri	   to	   resign	  immediately	   and	   take	   responsibility	   for	   the	   current	   political	   crisis	   or	   he	  would	  tender	  his	  resignation	  to	  Parliament.	  Alkatiri	  bowed	  to	  pressure	  from	  the	  President	  and	  resigned	  on	  26	  June	  2006.	  	  In	   sum,	   the	   President	   used	   presidential	   proclamations	   to	   criticize	  foreign	   and	   defence	   policy.	   President	   Gusmão’s	   attacks	   on	   foreign	   policy	  brought	  him	  on	  a	  collision	  course	  with	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  and,	  in	  some	  cases,	  with	   the	   Foreign	   Minister.	   Yet,	   Gusmão	   and	   Alkatiri	   managed	   to	   reach	   a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117	  Resolução	  do	  Parlamento	  12/2006	  de	  5	  de	  Junho	  ‘Sobre	  as	  medidas	  de	  emergência	  para	  ultrapassar	  a	  crise	  decretadas	  por	  sua	  excelência	  o	  presidente	  da	  república,	  Kay	  Rala	  Xanana’.	  
	   142	  
middle	   ground	   with	   regard	   to	   Timor-­‐Leste’s	   reconciliation	   policy	   with	  Indonesia.	  By	  contrast,	  Prime	  Minister	  Alkatiri	  and	  President	  Gusmão	  did	  not	  manage	   to	   align	   their	   political	   agendas	  with	   respect	   to	   defence	   policy.	   The	  President	   publicly	   expressed	   his	   objections	   to	   the	   decision	   made	   by	   the	  Prime	   Minister	   to	   dismiss	   the	   591	   soldiers.	   The	   President	   then	   used	   his	  proclamatory	  powers	  to	  call	  upon	  those	  responsible	  for	  national	  security	  to	  resign.	  	  
Conclusion	  In	   the	   literature	   cohabitation	   is	   associated	   with	   intensive	   conflict.	   In	   this	  chapter	   we	   found	   conflict	   between	   President	   Gusmão	   and	   Prime	   Minister	  Alkatiri,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  between	  President	  Gusmão	  and	  the	  FRETILIN	  majority	  in	  the	  National	  Parliament,	  on	  the	  other.	  	  President	  Gusmão	  vetoed	  four	  laws	  and	  requested	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  three	   times	   to	  review	  the	  constitutionality	  of	   legislation.	  The	  parliamentary	  majority,	   in	   turn,	   overrode	   all	   presidential	   vetoes	   and	   even	   adopted	   a	   law	  that	  had	  been	  judged	  unconstitutional	  by	  the	  Court.	  The	  President	  challenged	  the	   parliamentary	   majority	   and	   disrupted	   legislation	   in	   other,	   sometimes	  unconstitutional	   ways.	   For	   example,	   Gusmão	   promulgated	   the	   Timorese	  Penal	   Code	   outside	   the	   time	   limit	   set	   by	   the	   Constitution.	   Most	   conflict	  occurred	   over	   defence	   and	   foreign	   policy.	   The	   President	   and	   the	   Prime	  Minister	  disagreed	  over	  defence	  and	  foreign	  policy	  laws,	  the	  appointment	  of	  ambassadors	  and	  asked	   for	   the	   resignation	  of	   the	  Ministers	   responsible	   for	  National	   Security.	   Also,	   there	  were	   very	   serious	   institutional	   conflicts	   as	   to	  whether	   the	   President	  was	   authorized	   to	   call	   for	   a	   state	   of	   emergency	   and	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call	   in	   foreign	   troops	   to	   restore	   the	   peace	   and	   the	   rule	   of	   law.	   Using	  proclamatory	   powers	   the	   President	   sought	   public	   support	   for	   a	   change	   in	  defence	   policy.	   The	   President	   publicly	   opposed	   the	   decision	   of	   the	   Prime	  Minister	   and	   army	   commander	  Ruak	   to	   dismiss	   around	   600	   rebel	   soldiers.	  Whereas	  several	  disagreements	  over	  defence	  issue	  were	  left	  unresolved,	  the	  President	  and	  Prime	  Minister	  did	  manage	  to	  align	  their	  foreign	  policy	  agenda.	  Some	  indicators	  of	  conflict	  were	  absent.	  We	  found	  that	  the	  legislative	  framework	   that	   provided	   power	   for	   the	   President	   to	   fully	   carry	   out	   his	  mandate	  was	  incomplete.	  The	  absence	  of	  enabling	  legislation	  and,	  hence,	  the	  non-­‐existence	   of	   the	   President’s	   consultative	   bodies	  may	   have	   discouraged	  the	  President	   from	  intervening	   in	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  state	  affairs.	  For	  some	  time	   in	  the	   period	   2002-­‐2006	   it	  was	   unclear	  whether	   President	   Gusmão	   could	   use	  his	  power	  to	  request	  the	  Court	  to	  review	  the	  constitutionality	  of	   legislation,	  to	  declare	  the	  state	  of	  siege,	  the	  state	  of	  emergency,	  war	  and	  peace,	  and	  play	  a	  role	   in	   policy	  making	   in	   the	   field	   of	   defence	   and	   international	   relations.	   In	  addition,	  the	  President	  was	  not	  able	  to	  call	  for	  a	  referendum.	  Therefore,	  the	  absence	  of	  these	  indicators	  does	  not	  imply	  the	  absence	  of	  conflict.	  Overall,	   we	   found	   institutional	   conflict	   under	   cohabitation.	   In	   the	  previous	   chapter	   we	   demonstrated	   that	   long	   before	   the	   introduction	   of	  Timor-­‐Leste’s	   semi-­‐presidential	   system	   Gusmão	   and	   Alkatiri	   experienced	  serious	   difficulties	   working	   together.	   However,	   the	   fact	   that	   a	   semi-­‐presidential	   system	   allows	   political	   opponents	   to	   share	   government	   power	  increases	   the	   likelihood	   of	   institutional	   conflict	   and,	   possibly,	   policy	  paralysis.	   In	   this	   chapter	   we	   demonstrated	   that	   cohabitation	   provided	   a	  mechanism	   for	   institutional	   conflict	   because	   it	   allowed	   President	   Gusmão	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and	  Prime	  Minister	  Alkatiri	   to	   govern	   against	   each	  other.	   The	  next	   chapter	  will	  examine	  the	  effect	  of	  divided	  government	  on	   incidences	  of	   institutional	  conflict.	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CHAPTER	  5	  
Divided	  Government	  	  The	  period	  from	  July	  2006	  to	  May	  2007	  was	  a	  period	  of	  divided	  government	  in	  Timor-­‐Leste.	  In	  the	  weeks	  following	  Prime	  Minister	  Alkatiri’s	  resignation,	  Timor-­‐Leste	  found	  itself	  in	  what	  was	  called	  a	  ‘surreal	  political	  world’	  (Jolliffe,	  2006a).	   No	   fewer	   than	   eight	   Cabinet	   Ministers	   resigned	   before	   the	   Prime	  Minister	  decided	   to	   step	  down	  on	  26	   June	  2006,	   leaving	  only	   a	   shell	   of	   the	  former	   structure,	   drawn	   from	   Alkatiri’s	   staunchest	   supporters.	   Although	  Timor-­‐Leste	   did	   not	   have	   an	   effective	   government,	   the	   parliamentary	  majority	   needed	   to	   approve	   its	   budget	   for	   coming	   fiscal	   year	   as	   well	   as	  electoral	  laws	  that	  would	  allow	  citizens	  to	  choose	  a	  new	  government.	  On	  10	  July	   President	   Gusmão	   appointed	   José	   Ramos-­‐Horta	   as	   the	   new	   but	   non-­‐partisan	   Prime	  Minister	   of	   Timor-­‐Leste.	   Ramos-­‐Horta	   decided	   to	   reappoint	  most	  of	  the	  Ministers	  who	  had	  served	  under	  Alkatiri.	  His	  Cabinet	  was	  sworn	  in	  on	  14	  July	  2006.	  The	  political	  configuration	  that	  emerged	  on	  14	  July	  2006	  and	  continued	  until	  19	  May	  2007	  when	  President	  Gusmão	   left	  office	  can	  be	  classed	  as	  a	  ‘divided	  government’.	  Divided	  government	  refers	  to	  the	  situation	  in	   which	   a	   legislative	   majority	   is	   held	   by	   a	   party	   or	   pre-­‐election	   coalition	  which	  is	  different	  from	  that	  of	  the	  president	  (Shugart	  as	  cited	  in	  Elgie,	  2001:	  4).	  Although	  the	  appointment	  of	  a	  non-­‐partisan	  Prime	  Minister	  narrowed	  the	  gap	   between	   the	   President	   and	   Prime	  Minister,	   President	   Gusmão	   and	   the	  FRETILIN	  parliamentary	  majority	  were	  still	  bitterly	  divided.	  	  	   We	   find	   that	   the	   locus	   of	   conflict	   shifted	   from	   President-­‐Prime	  Minister	  conflict	   into	  a	  President-­‐Parliament	  conflict.	  As	  a	  consequence,	   the	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President	   was	   relatively	   more	   active	   in	   the	   legislative	   process	   than	   in	   the	  appointment	   and	   dismissal	   process.	   In	   addition,	   in	   the	   run	   up	   to	   the	  presidential	  and	  the	  legislative	  elections	  of	  April	  and	  June	  2007	  respectively,	  the	  President	  openly	  criticised	  the	  FRETILIN	  party	  in	  press	  statements	  and	  in	  speeches	  to	  the	  National	  Parliament	  and	  to	  the	  Nation.	  The	  chapter	  is	  divided	  into	  four	  sections.	  The	  first	  section	  presents	  the	  main	   arguments	   that	   associate	   divided	   government	   with	   institutional	  conflict.	  The	  second	  section	  looks	  at	  the	  political	  situation	  in	  Timor-­‐Leste	  and	  justifies	  why	  we	   consider	   the	   government	   to	   be	   divided.	   The	   third	   section	  presents	   the	  main	   findings	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   hypotheses.	   The	   final	   section	  concludes	  if	  the	  findings	  correspond	  to	  the	  arguments.	  	  	  
Hypotheses	  on	  divided	  government	  Divided	  government	  refers	  to	  the	  situation	  in	  which	  a	  legislative	  majority	  is	  held	  by	   a	  party	  or	  pre-­‐election	   coalition	  which	   is	  different	   from	   that	  of	   the	  president	  (Shugart	  as	  cited	  in	  Elgie,	  2001:	  4).	  Institutional	  conflict	  stems	  from	  political	  infighting	  between	  officials	  over	  policy	  and	  is	  expected	  to	  take	  place	  when	   the	   institutions	   are	   controlled	   by	   different	   political	   parties.	   The	  situation	   differs	   from	   cohabitation	   in	   that	   the	   President	   and	   the	   Prime	  Minister	  are	  political	  allies.	  	  	   The	   Constitution	   of	   Timor-­‐Leste	   provides	   that	   the	   Prime	   Minister	  selects	   and	   deselects	   Cabinet	  Ministers.	   The	   Prime	  Minister	   rules	   over	   the	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Ministers	   and	   indeed	   overrules	   them.118	   The	   situation	  where	   the	   President	  and	   Prime	  Minister	   are	   political	   allies,	   hence,	   largely	   cancels	   out	   potential	  conflict	   between	   the	   President	   Gusmão	   and	   FRETILIN	   ministers.	   Yet	   the	  FRETILIN	  parliamentary	  majority	  is	  likely	  to	  (continue	  to)	  obstruct	  the	  policy	  agenda	  of	  the	  President.	  So,	  the	  first	  hypothesis	  is:	  
	  
H1:	   When	   the	   government	   is	   divided,	   conflict	   is	   expected	   to	   occur	  
between	  the	  President	  and	  the	  parliamentary	  majority.	  	  	   In	  the	  field	  of	  foreign	  affairs	  and	  defence	  presidents	  traditionally	  hold	  constitutional	   and/or	   legal	  powers.	   Institutional	   conflict	   is	   thus	  more	   likely	  to	   hold	   back	   the	   political	   process	   in	   these	   policy	   areas.	   In	   Timor-­‐Leste,	  however,	   as	   we	   will	   see	   the	   Prime	   Minister	   took	   charge	   of	   the	   defence	  portfolio	   and	   appointed	   a	   political	   ally	   of	   the	   President	   to	   become	   Foreign	  Minister.	  So,	  the	  second	  hypothesis	  is:	  	  
H2:	  Under	  divided	  government,	   the	  President	  and	  Prime	  Minister	  were	  
likely	  to	  regulate	  institutional	  conflict	  over	  defence	  and	  foreign	  affairs.	  	   In	  chapter	  2	  we	  identified	  different	  indicators	  of	  institutional	  conflict	  under	   divided	   government.	   These	   observable	   implications	   of	   institutional	  conflict	  included	  the	  use	  of	  formal	  powers	  such	  as	  the	  President’s	  prerogative	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118	  The	  Constitution	  defines	  that	  “Government	  statutes	  shall	  be	  signed	  by	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  and	  the	  Ministers	  in	  charge	  of	  the	  respective	  subject	  matter”	  (Section	  117). 
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to	   request	   the	   Court	   to	   determine	   the	   constitutionality	   of	   legislation	   and	  informal	  powers	  like	  press	  statements.	  Under	  divided	  government	  we	  expect	  the	  President	  to	  use	  such	  powers	  to	  change	  parliamentary	  laws.	  For	  its	  part,	  the	   parliamentary	   majority	   is	   expected	   be	   reluctant	   to	   countersign	  presidential	  decisions.	  	  We	  do	  not	  test	  the	  hypotheses	  separately	  because	  H1	  presupposes	  H2.	  Instead,	  similar	  to	  the	  previous	  chapter	  our	  findings	  are	  organized	  into	  three	  categories	   of	   presidential	   power:	   legislative	   powers,	   special	   powers	   in	   the	  appointment	   and	   dismissal	   process	   and	   proclamatory	   powers.	   In	   the	  conclusion	   we	   reflect	   on	   whether	   or	   not	   there	   is	   evidence	   to	   support	   the	  hypotheses.	   In	   the	   next	   section	   we	   present	   the	   empirical	   findings	   and	  conclude	  whether	  the	  findings	  support	  the	  theoretical	  expectations.	  	  	  
Divided	  government	  in	  Timor-­Leste	  In	   this	   chapter,	  we	   consider	   the	   Government	   to	   be	   divided	   from	   July	   2006	  when	   Ramos-­‐Horta	   was	   appointed	   as	   Prime	   Minister	   to	   May	   2007	   when	  President	  Gusmão	  left	  office.	  In	  Timor-­‐Leste,	  the	  President	  and	  the	  FRETILIN	  majority	  were	  bitterly	  divided	  and	  an	  independent	  Prime	  Minister	  was	  called	  in	  to	  bridge	  the	  political	  cleavage.	  The	  exceptional	  circumstances	  forced	  the	  President	   and	   the	   FRETILIN	   majority	   to	   agree	   on	   an	   independent	   Prime	  Minister	  while	  most	  of	   the	  Cabinet	  members	  who	  had	  served	  under	   former	  Prime	  Minister	  Alkatiri	  were	  reappointed.	  	  In	   the	   wake	   of	   Prime	   Minister	   Alkatiri’s	   resignation,	   there	   was	   no	  effective	  government,	  yet	  the	  Parliament	  was	  asked	  to	  approve	  its	  budget	  as	  well	  as	  electoral	  laws	  that	  would	  allow	  citizens	  to	  choose	  a	  new	  government.	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A	   Prime	   Minister	   was	   urgently	   needed	   because	   Parliament	   needed	   to	  approve	  the	  2006/2007	  budget	  before	  15	  July.	  One	  solution	  to	  the	  emerging	  power	   vacuum	   would	   have	   been	   to	   dissolve	   Parliament	   and	   convoke	   new	  parliamentary	  elections.	  However,	  the	  President	  did	  not	  and	  could	  not	  call	  for	  fresh	   parliamentary	   elections	   for	   different	   reasons.	   First	   and	   foremost,	   no	  election	  laws	  existed.	  Only	  on	  15	  May	  2006,	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  a	  political	  crisis,	  were	   new	   presidential	   and	   parliamentary	   election	   laws	   introduced	   into	  Parliament.119	  However,	  the	  legislation	  lapsed	  following	  Alkatiri’s	  resignation	  and	  the	  fall	  of	  his	  Cabinet	  in	  June	  2006.	  Second,	  the	  UN	  rejected	  the	  proposal	  to	  hold	  early	  elections	   in	  Timor-­‐Leste.	  An	  UN	  official	   stated	   that	   ‘it	  was	   too	  short	  a	  time	  and,	  given	  the	  current	  situation,	  it	  [the	  UN]	  would	  be	  unable	  to	  prepare	   the	   logistics	   and	   organise	   voter	   security,	   so	   the	   idea	   had	   been	  abandoned’	  (Dodd	  and	  Fitzpatrick,	  2006).	  	  Another	   option	   to	   end	   the	   political	   standoff	   was	   to	   appoint	   a	  government	  of	  ‘presidential	  initiative’.	  However,	  FRETILIN	  was	  opposed	  to	  a	  caretaker	   government	   appointed	   by	   the	   President.	   An	   inside	   source	  reportedly	  stated	  that	  FRETILIN	  did	  not	  agree	  with	  the	  idea	  that	  a	  short-­‐term	  caretaker	   government	   should	   be	   appointed	   now	   to	   be	   replaced	   later	   by	  FRETILIN	  nominees	  (Jolliffe,	  2006b).	  With	  early	  elections	  no	  longer	  an	  option	  and	   the	   possibility	   of	   appointing	   a	   government	   of	   presidential	   initiative	  excluded	   as	   well,	   the	   only	   option	   was	   to	   appoint	   another	   FRETILIN-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119	  Secretariado	  Do	  Parlamento	  Nacional	  (2012)	  'Projectos	  e	  Propostas	  de	  Lei	  Vetados	  
de	  2002	  a	  2012',	  Dili:	  Parlamento	  Nacional	  da	  República	  Democrática	  de	  Timor-­‐Leste.	  In	  author’s	  collection.	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dominated	  government.	  The	  President	  needed	  to	  decide	  in	  consultation	  with	  FRETILIN	   who	   would	   become	   the	   new	   prime	   minister.	   However,	   a	  compromise	   was	   not	   easily	   reached.	   According	   to	   a	   western	   diplomat	   ‘the	  standoff,	   which	   looked	   to	   have	   broken	  was	   threatening	   to	   broaden	   from	   a	  Gusmão	   versus	   Alkatiri	   contest	   to	   a	   Gusmão	   versus	   FRETILIN	   conflict''	  (Fitzpatrick	  and	  Dodd,	  2006).	  Under	   the	   Constitution,	   the	   resignation	   of	   the	   Prime	   Minister	  automatically	   results	   in	   the	   dissolution	   of	   the	   Government	   as	   a	   whole,	  although	  the	  Ministers	  remain	  in	  office	  until	  a	  new	  Government	  is	  sworn	  in.	  The	   President	   appoints	   a	   new	   Prime	   Minister	   who	   is	   designated	   by	   the	  majority	  party	  in	  Parliament.	  In	  reality,	  President	  Gusmão	  initially	  refused	  to	  receive	   a	   proposal	   for	   a	   candidate	   for	   the	   post	   of	   Prime	   Minister	   from	  FRETILIN,	   stating	   that	   the	   current	   FRETILIN	   leadership	   lacked	   legitimacy	  since	   it	   had	  been	   elected	   at	   the	  party’s	  May’s	   congress	  by	   a	   show	  of	   hands	  instead	   of	   by	   secret	   ballot,	   as	   prescribed	   by	   the	   Law	   on	   Political	   Parties	  (Jolliffe,	   2006b).120	   President	   Gusmão	   eventually	   agreed	   to	   enter	   into	  discussions	  with	  FRETILIN	  representatives,	  after	   the	  President	  of	  FRETILIN	  made	  a	  public	  appeal	   for	   the	   return	  of	  weapons	   (United	  Nations	  Secretary-­‐General,	   2006).	   Moreover,	   FRETILIN’s	   Central	   Commission	   agreed	   that	   the	  new	   Prime	  Minister	   did	   not	   have	   to	   be	   a	   FRETILIN	  member	   (Cave,	   2006).	  FRETILIN	  proposed	  the	  non-­‐partisan	  and	  former	  Minister	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs,	  José	   Ramos-­‐Horta,	   the	   non-­‐partisan	   outgoing	   Health	   Minister,	   Rui	   Araújo,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120	  Lei	  do	  Parlamento	  Nacional	  3/2004	  de	  10	  de	  Fevereiro	  ‘Sobre	  Partidos	  Políticos’.	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and	   former	   FRETILIN	   Minister	   for	   Agriculture,	   Estanislau	   da	   Silva,	   as	  contenders	   to	   replace	   the	   former	   Prime	   Minister.	   FRETILIN	   wanted	  Estanislau	  da	  Silva	  or,	  alternatively,	  Rui	  Araújo	  to	  head	  the	  new	  government	  whereas	   Ramos-­‐Horta	   was	   the	   President’s	   first	   choice	   for	   the	   position	  (Murdoch,	  2006b).	  On	  8	  July	  President	  Gusmão	  announced	  that	  Ramos-­‐Horta	  would	   become	   the	   new	   Prime	   Minister	   of	   Timor-­‐Leste	   (United	   Nations	  Secretary-­‐General,	   2006).	   Gusmão	   nominated	   Da	   Silva	   and	   Araújo	   as	   vice-­‐Prime	  Minister’s	   in	  a	  deal	  negotiated	  with	  FRETILIN.121	  Four	  days	   later,	   the	  Cabinet	   was	   inaugurated	   with	   most	   of	   the	   Ministers	   reappointed	   to	   their	  previous	  portfolios.	  The	  two	  Ministries	  that	  needed	  most	  to	  coordinate	  with	  the	   President,	   namely	  Defence	   and	   Foreign	   Affairs,	  were	   entrusted	   to	   non-­‐FRETILIN	  members.	  Prime	  Minister	  Ramos-­‐Horta	  took	  charge	  of	  Defence	  and	  José	   Luis	   Guterres,	   a	   member	   of	   the	   FRETILIN	   splinter	   party	   FRETILIN	  Mudança,	  became	  Minister	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs.	  	  We	   consider	   this	   a	   period	   of	   divided	   government	   because,	   firstly,	  there	   was	   still	   conflict	   between	   the	   President	   and	   FRETILIN.	   Alkatiri’s	  resignation	  did	  not	  resolve	  the	  political	  impasse	  between	  President	  Gusmão	  and	   the	   FRETILIN	  majority.	   In	   fact,	   at	   the	   swearing	   in	   ceremony	   of	   Prime	  Minister	  Ramos-­‐Horta	  on	  10	  July	  2006,	  Gusmão	  again	  denounced	  the	  former	  Government.	  The	  speech	   is	  worth	  quoting	  because	   it	   reveals	   the	  continuing	  animosity	  between	  President	  Gusmão	  and	  the	  FRETILIN	  majority.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121	  In	  an	  interview	  with	  the	  Portuguese	  newspaper	  Público,	  the	  President	  of	  FRETILIN,	  Francisco	  Guterres	  (Lu-­‐Olo),	  confirmed	  that	  Ramos-­‐Horta	  was	  the	  President’s	  first	  choice.	  FRETILIN	  wanted	  Estanislau	  da	  Silva	  or,	  alternatively,	  Rui	  Araújo	  to	  head	  the	  new	  government	  Gomes,	  A.	  (2007,	  1	  May)	  'Entrevista	  a	  Lu-­‐Olo:	  "Xanana	  Tem	  um	  Ódio	  Obsessivo	  Contra	  a	  Fretilin"',	  Público.	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‘…	  the	  former	  Government	  has	  demonstrated	  incompetence,	  inertia	  and	  
negligent	   behaviour	   in	   the	   public	   sectors	   and	   also	   in	   its	   relationship	  
with	  the	  private	  sector.	  So,	  I	  have	  asked	  FRETILIN	  and	  the	  Government	  
to	   redress	   the	  wrongdoings	   of	   what	   it	   failed	   to	   do	   and	   of	  what	   it	   did	  
wrong.	  Dr.	  Ramos-­Horta	  also	  said	  that	  the	  previous	  Government	  should	  
not	  make	   excuses	   for	   their	   inaction,	   for	   its	   failure	   to	   progress,	   for	   not	  
having	  done	  anything.	  (…)	  this	  Government	  wants	  transparency	  and	  an	  
end	   to	   corruption.	   We	   ask	   the	   new	   Government,	   which	   remains	   a	  
FRETILIN	  Government,	  to	  take	  all	  of	  it	  into	  account.	  It	  is	  up	  to	  the	  new	  
Government	   to	   demonstrate	   that	   it	   really	   wants	   to	   improve	   and	   to	  
correct	   the	   mistakes	   it	   has	   made	   in	   the	   recent	   past’	   (Gusmão,	   2012:	  
187).	  
	  Secondly,	   chapter	   3	   demonstrated	   that	   Ramos-­‐Horta	   and	   Gusmão	  were	  political	  allies	  since	  the	  mid-­‐1980s	  when	  they	  broke	  with	  FRETILIN	  and	  together	   founded	   the	   CNRM.	   Under	   the	   UN	   Transitional	   Administration	   in	  October	  2000,	  Gusmão	  supported	  Ramos-­‐Horta’s	  appointment	  as	  Minister	  of	  Foreign	   Affairs	   in	   Timor-­‐Leste’s	   Transitional	   Cabinet	   against	   the	   will	   of	  FRETILIN.	   In	   July	   2006,	   Ramos-­‐Horta	   was	   the	   President’s	   first	   choice	   to	  succeed	  Alkatiri.	  Last	  but	  not	  least,	  Gusmão	  would	  prove	  to	  be	  Ramos-­‐Horta’s	  staunchest	   supporter	   in	   the	   latter’s	  bid	   for	   the	  presidency	   in	  2007.	   In	   sum,	  the	   relationship	   between	   the	  President	   and	   the	   parliamentary	  majority	   did	  not	   change	   under	   Ramos-­‐Horta’s	   leadership.	   However,	   his	   appointment	  narrowed	  the	  ideological	  gap	  between	  the	  President	  and	  the	  Prime	  Minister.	  In	  the	  next	  section	  we	  discuss	  whether	  we	  have	  found	  incidences	  of	  conflict	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between	   President	   Gusmão	   and	   the	   single-­‐party	   majority	   commanded	   by	  FRETILIN.	   Presidential	   intervention	   in	   the	   policymaking	   process	   indicates	  institutional	  conflict	  whereas	  the	  absence	  of	  presidential	  intervention	  points	  to	  the	  President’s	  assent	  to	  the	  Government’s	  policy.	  The	  President	  has	  three	  types	  of	  powers	  at	  his	  disposal	   to	   influence	   the	  political	  process:	   legislative	  powers,	  powers	  in	  the	  appointment	  and	  dismissal	  process,	  and	  proclamatory	  powers.	   The	   following	   three	   subsections	   will	   discuss	   the	   extent	   to	   which	  President	  Gusmão	  used	  the	  respective	  powers	  to	  influence	  the	  Government’s	  policy	  between	  July	  2006	  and	  May	  2007.	  	  
Presidential	  activism	  in	  the	  legislative	  domain	  	  As	   noted	   in	   the	   previous	   chapter,	   the	   President	   could	   not	   call	   for	   a	  referendum	  due	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  referendum	  law.	  Under	  divided	  government	  the	  Council	  of	  State	  and	   the	  Supreme	  Council	  of	  Defence	  and	  Security	  were	  functioning.	  Both	  consultative	  Councils	  broadened	   the	  scope	  of	  presidential	  powers	  in,	  especially,	  the	  area	  of	  security	  and	  defence.	  	  Between	  July	  2006	  and	  May	  2007,	  Parliament	  passed	  ten	  laws.	  In	  this	  period	  President	  Gusmão	   issued	   two	  vetoes.	   In	  addition,	   the	  President	   sent	  one	   bill	   to	   the	   Court	   for	   constitutional	   review.	  On	   21	  August	   2006,	   the	   bill	  entitled	  ‘Monthly	  Life	  Pension	  and	  Others	  Privileges	  for	  Former	  Members	  of	  Parliament’	   was	   passed	   by	   Parliament	   and	   sent	   to	   the	   President	   for	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promulgation.122	   The	   Pension	   Bill	   stipulated	   that	   former	   members	   of	   the	  Parliament	  were	  entitled	  to	  a	  monthly	  life	  pension	  equivalent	  to	  100	  per	  cent	  of	  his	  or	  her	  salary.	  President	  Gusmão	  vetoed	  the	  bill	  on	  political	  grounds.123	  Parliament	   then	   amended	   the	   Bill	   according	   to	   Gusmão's	   suggestions	   and	  returned	  it	  for	  approval.	  The	  President	  finally	  promulgated	  the	  Law	  on	  23	  of	  December	  2006.	  Due	  to	  the	  Christmas	  recess,	  the	  Law	  came	  into	  force	  on	  18	  January	  2007	  after	  it	  was	  published	  in	  the	  official	  Gazette.124	  Another	   Pension	   Bill,	   the	   ‘Bill	   on	   Pension	   for	   Former	   Officials’,	   was	  passed	   in	   Parliament	   and	   sent	   to	   the	   President	   for	   promulgation	   on	   14	  December	  2006.	  The	  former	  holders	  of	  the	  office	  of	  President	  of	  the	  Republic,	  President	  of	  the	  National	  Parliament	  and	  the	  Prime	  Ministers	  were	  entitled	  to	  a	  monthly	  life	  pension	  equal	  to	  100	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  salary	  and	  benefits	  earned	  in	   those	   duties.	   According	   to	   President	   Gusmão,	   the	   Bill	   was	  unconstitutional.125	  The	  President	  issued	  a	  constitutional	  veto	  for	  the	  reason	  that	   the	   draft	   law	   did	   not	   define	   accurately	   who	   was	   entitled	   to	   receive	   a	  lifelong	  pension	  (La'o	  Hamutuk,	  2007).	  The	  President’s	  veto	  letter	  was	  read	  to	  a	  plenary	  session	  of	  Parliament.	  The	  Parliament	  did	  not	  react	  for	  90	  days	  after	  the	  presidential	  veto	  and,	  therefore,	  the	  legislation	  expired.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122	  Secretariado	  Do	  Parlamento	  Nacional	  (2012)	  'Projectos	  e	  Propostas	  de	  Lei	  Vetados	  de	  2002	  a	  2012',	  Dili:	  Parlamento	  Nacional	  da	  República	  Democrática	  de	  Timor-­‐Leste.	  123	  Author	  e-­‐mail	  exchange	  with	  Mr	  Anildo	  da	  Cruz,	  legal	  advisor	  to	  the	  National	  Parliament	  of	  Timor-­‐Leste,	  11	  October	  2012.	  124	  Lei	  do	  Parlamento	  Nacional	  1/2007	  de	  18	  de	  Janeiro	  ‘Pensão	  Mensal	  Vitalícia	  dos	  Deputados	  e	  Outras	  Regalias’.	  	  125	  Author	  e-­‐mail	  exchange	  with	  Mr	  Anildo	  da	  Cruz,	  legal	  advisor	  to	  the	  National	  Parliament	  of	  Timor-­‐Leste,	  12	  October	  2012.	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The	  President	  and	  the	  parliamentary	  majority	  disagreed	  over	  certain	  provisions	  in	  the	  Bill	  on	  the	  Election	  of	  the	  President	  of	  the	  Republic	  and	  the	  Bill	  on	  the	  Election	  of	  the	  National	  Parliament.	  As	  noted	  above,	  both	  election	  bills	  were	  drafted	  by	  Parliament	  and	  accepted	  for	  discussion	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  a	  political	  crisis	  on	  15	  May	  2006.126	  However,	  the	  legislation	  lapsed	  after	  the	  fall	  of	  the	  Alkatiri	  Government	  in	  May	  2006.	  One	  of	  the	  first	  acts	  of	  the	  new	  Government	   under	   the	   leadership	   of	   Prime	   Minister	   Ramos-­‐Horta	   was	   to	  draft	  presidential	  and	  parliamentary	  election	  bills.	  Whereas	  previous	  election	  bills	   were	   drafted	   by	   the	   Parliament,	   the	   new	   bills	   were	   prepared	   by	   the	  Government.	   An	   alternative	   draft	   law	   for	   parliamentary	   elections	   that	   was	  prepared	  and	  introduced	  by	  the	  opposition	  was	  not	  accepted	  for	  discussion	  in	   the	   Parliament	   (States	   News	   Service,	   2006).127	   The	   Parliament	   received	  the	   legislation	   from	  the	  Government	  on	  13	   July	  and	  approved	  both	  election	  bills	   on	   18	   December	   2006.	   The	   President,	   in	   turn,	   promulgated	   the	  parliamentary	   and	   presidential	   election	   laws	   on	   22	   December	   and	   26	  December	   2006	   respectively.128	   The	   tug-­‐of-­‐war	   between	   the	   President	   and	  the	   FRETILIN	   majority	   that	   preceded	   the	   promulgation	   of	   the	   Bill	   on	   the	  Election	  of	  the	  National	  Parliament	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  the	  section	  below	  on	  ‘Proclamatory	  Powers’	  given	  that	  the	  President	  used	  public	  speeches	  to	  voice	  his	  objections	  against	  the	  legislation	  that	  was	  prepared	  by	  FRETILIN.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126	  Secretariado	  Do	  Parlamento	  Nacional	  (2012)	  'Projectos	  e	  Propostas	  de	  Lei	  Vetados	  de	  2002	  a	  2012',	  Dili:	  Parlamento	  Nacional	  da	  República	  Democrática	  de	  Timor-­‐Leste.	  In	  author’s	  collection.	  127	  Ibid.	  128Lei	  do	  Parlamento	  Nacional	  7/2006	  de	  28	  de	  Dezembro	  ‘Lei	  Eleitoral	  para	  o	  Presidente	  da	  República’;	  Lei	  do	  Parlamento	  Nacional	  6/2006	  de	  28	  de	  Dezembro	  ‘Lei	  Eleitoral	  para	  o	  Parlamento	  Nacional’.	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With	  regard	  to	  the	  Bill	  on	  the	  Election	  of	  the	  President	  of	  the	  Republic,	  the	   President	   only	   stepped	   in	   after	   FRETILIN	   adopted	   an	   amendment	   one	  month	  before	   the	  presidential	   elections.	  On	  20	  March	  2007,	   the	  Parliament	  changed	   the	   election	   bill	   so	   as	   to	   allow	   political	   parties	   to	   use	   party	   or	  national	   symbols	   on	   the	   ballot	   paper	   (see	   Figure	   5.1).	   Five	   of	   the	   eight	  presidential	   candidates	   accused	   FRETILIN	   of	   ‘manipulating	   ‘	   voters	   (Lusa,	  2007d).	  According	  to	  five	  presidential	  candidates,	  José	  Ramos-­‐Horta,	  Fernando	  Lasama	   de	   Araújo,	   Lúcia	   Lobato,	   Francisco	   Xavier	   do	   Amaral	   and	   Avelino	  Coelho,	   the	  President	  was	   ‘an	   individual	   supported	  by	  a	  minimum	  of	  5,000	  voters’	   and	   ‘the	   Constitution	   obstructed	   possibilities	   for	   presidential	  candidates	   to	   be	   proposed	   by	   political	   parties’	   (Lusa,	   2007d).	   President	  Gusmão	  shared	  their	  concern	  and	  sent	  the	  amended	  electoral	  bill	  to	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	   on	  21	  March	   in	  order	   to	   verify	  whether	   the	   amendment	   violated	  the	  Constitution.	  The	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  ruled	  that	  the	  legislation	  was	  consistent	  with	  the	  Constitution	  and	  both	  party	  and	  national	  symbols	  were	  permitted	  to	  be	  printed	  on	  the	  ballot	  paper	  (UNMIT,	  2007).	  Following	  the	  Court’s	  decision,	  the	  President	  promulgated	   the	  presidential	   election	   law	  on	  26	  March	  2007	  (UNMIT,	  2007).129	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129	  Lei	  do	  Parlamento	  Nacional	  5/2007	  de	  28	  de	  Março	  ‘Lei	  Eleitoral	  para	  o	  Presidente	  da	  República’.	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Figure	  5.1:	  Ballot	  paper	  for	  the	  2007	  presidential	  elections	  in	  Timor-­
Leste	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One	   of	   the	   presidential	   candidates	   explained	   that	   the	   President	  was	  very	  preoccupied	  with	  the	  law,	  stressing	  that	  the	  President	  did	  not	  veto	  the	  law	  only	  because	  the	  approved	  text	  included	  many	  other	  matters	  besides	  the	  use	  of	  party	  symbols	  (Lusa,	  2007d).	  	  In	  March	  2007	  President	  Xanana	  Gusmão	  invoked	  emergency	  powers	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  quell	  unrest	  in	  Dili,	  the	  capital	  city	  of	  Timor-­‐Leste.	  ‘The	  state	  will	   use	   all	   legal	   means,	   including	   force,	   to	   stop	   violence	   and	   prevent	  destruction	  of	  property	  and	  killing	  and	   to	  restore	   law	  and	  order,’	  President	  Gusmão	   said,	   giving	   peacekeepers	   and	   police	   the	   right	   to	   carry	   out	   arrests	  and	  searches	  without	  warrants	  (ETAN,	  2007g).	  He	  also	  granted	  them	  special	  powers	  to	  break	  up	  public	  gatherings.	  The	  President’s	  declaration	  of	  a	  state	  of	   emergency	   delegitimized	   the	   FRETILIN	   Minister	   Alcino	   Barris	   who	   was	  responsible	  for	  internal	  security.	  A	  state	  of	  emergency	  was	  never	  confirmed	  by	  Parliament.	  In	  sum,	  we	  found	  evidence	  of	  conflict	  between	  President	  Gusmão	  and	  the	   FRETILIN	   majority.	   President	   Gusmão	   intervened	   in	   the	   legislative	  process,	   using	   his	   veto	   power	   and	   his	   authority	   to	   send	   legislation	   to	   the	  Court	   for	   constitutional	   review.	   All	   presidential	   legislative	   acts	   targeted	  ‘projectos	   de	   lei’.	   These	   bills	   are	   written	   by	   deputies	   and	   do	   not	   need	   the	  signature	   of	   the	  Prime	  Minister	   to	   pass.	   Indeed,	   both	  Pension	  Bills	   and	   the	  Law	  on	  National	  Symbols	  were	  proposed	  by	  FRETILIN	  deputies.	  By	  contrast,	  President	  did	  not	  reject	  ‘propostas	  de	  lei’	  –	  bills	  written	  by	  the	  Government.	  The	   parliamentary	  majority	   limited	   the	   President’s	   power	   when	   it	   did	   not	  confirm	   the	   state	   of	   emergency.	   Yet,	   it	   refrained	   from	   overriding	   the	  Presidential	  vetoes	  or	  rejecting	  Gusmão’s	  requests	   to	  make	  state	  visits.	  The	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President	   supported	   the	  Prime	  Minister’s	  defence	  and	   foreign	  affairs	  policy	  agenda.	  During	  his	  dual	  mandate	  as	  Minister	  of	  Defence	  and	  Prime	  Minister,	  crucial	   legislation	   regarding	   Timor-­‐Leste’s	   national	   defence	   policy	   was	  promulgated.	   New	   legislation	   was	   adopted	   promulgating	   the	   Regime	   for	  Military	  promotions,	   the	  Code	  of	  Military	  Discipline,	   the	  Organic	  Law	  of	   the	  Ministry	  of	  Defence,	  amendments	   to	   the	  Organic	  Law	  of	   the	  Defence	  Forces	  and	   a	   draft	   law	   on	   Conscription	   into	   Military	   Service.130	   Prime	   Minister	  Ramos-­‐Horta	   was	   successful	   in	   the	   area	   of	   Foreign	   Affairs	   as	   well.	   During	  Ramos-­‐Horta’s	   period	   as	   Prime	   Minister	   two	   crucial	   agreements	   with	  Australia	   over	   the	   management	   of	   oil	   and	   gas	   resources	   were	   passed	   by	  Parliament.	  Both	  agreements,	  the	  Treaty	  on	  Certain	  Maritime	  Arrangements	  in	   the	   Timor	   Sea	   (CMATS131)	   and	   the	   Sunrise	   International	   Unitisation	  Agreement	   (IUA132),	   were	   signed	   by	   former	   Prime	   Minister	   Alkatiri	   in	  January	   2006,	   but	   rejected	   by	   President	   Gusmão	   and	   the	   parliamentary	  majority	   during	   Alkatiri’s	   term	   as	   Prime	  Minister.133	   So	   this	   shows	   us	   that	  President	   Gusmão	   agreed	   with	   Timor-­‐Leste’s	   defence	   and	   foreign	   policy	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130	  Decreto-­‐Lei	  do	  Governo	  15/2006	  de	  8	  de	  Novembro	  ‘Estatuto	  Orgânico	  das	  FALINTIL-­‐FDTL’;	  Decreto-­‐Lei	  do	  Governo	  16/2006	  de	  8	  de	  Novembro	  ‘Estatuto	  Orgânico	  do	  Ministério	  da	  Defesa’;	  Decreto-­‐Lei	  do	  Governo	  17/2006	  de	  8	  de	  Novembro	  ‘Regulamento	  de	  Disciplina	  Militar’;	  Decreto-­‐Lei	  do	  Governo	  18/2006	  de	  8	  de	  Novembro	  ‘Regíme	  das	  Promoções	  Militares’.	  131	  Resolução	  do	  Parlamento	  Nacional	  4/2007	  de	  8	  de	  Março	  ‘Que	  Ratifica	  o	  Tratado	  entre	  o	  Governo	  da	  República	  Democrática	  de	  Timor-­‐Leste	  e	  o	  Governo	  da	  Austrália	  sobre	  Determinados	  Ajustes	  Marítimos	  no	  Mar	  de	  Timor’.	  	  132	  Resolução	  do	  Parlamento	  Nacional	  5/2007	  de	  8	  de	  Março	  ‘Acordo	  Entre	  o	  Governo	  da	  Austrália	  e	  o	  Governo	  da	  República	  Democrática	  de	  Timor-­‐Leste	  Relativo	  a	  Unitização	  dos	  Campos	  do	  Sol	  Nascente	  e	  do	  Travado’.	  	  133	  In	  2005,	  President	  Gusmão	  threatened	  to	  veto	  the	  CMATS	  agreement.	  Alkatiri’s	  government	  ultimately	  signed	  the	  agreement	  on	  12	  January	  2006.	  The	  IUA	  agreement,	  in	  turn,	  was	  signed	  on	  6	  March	  2003.	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during	   Ramos-­‐Horta’s	   prime	   ministership.	   Yet,	   the	   President	   vetoed	   more	  parliamentary	  laws	  under	  the	  divided	  government	  than	  under	  cohabitation:	  20	  per	  cent	  and	  9	  per	  cent	  respectively.	  In	  addition,	  the	  President	  sent	  more	  parliamentary	  laws	  to	  the	  Court	  for	  constitutional	  review	  under	  the	  divided	  government	   than	   under	   cohabitation:	   10	   per	   cent	   and	   6.6	   per	   cent	  respectively.	  It	  should	  be	  noted,	  however,	  that	  the	  sample	  is	  very	  small	  given	  that	  under	  divided	  government	  only	  ten	  parliamentary	  laws	  were	  passed,	  of	  which	  two	  were	  vetoed.	  By	  contrast,	  international	  agreements	  were	  reached	  quickly	   whereas	   under	   cohabitation	   this	   shared	   responsibility	   led	   to	  confusion	   and	   serious	   conflicts	   between	   the	   President	   and	   Prime	  Minister.	  Likewise,	   no	   conflicts	   between	   the	   President	   and	   Prime	   Minister	   occurred	  over	  the	  former’s	  power	  to	  pardon	  or	  to	  commute	  sentences.	  	  
Presidential	  activism	  in	  the	  appointment	  and	  dismissal	  process	  The	  tug-­‐of-­‐war	  between	  President	  Gusmão	  and	  the	  FRETILIN	  majority	  about	  the	  appointment	  of	  a	  new	  Prime	  Minister	  demonstrated	  how	  power-­‐sharing	  under	   unfavourable	   political	   circumstances	   may	   transform	   into	   a	   power	  struggle.	   Ramos-­‐Horta	   was	   the	   President’s	   first	   choice.	   For	   FRETILIN,	   Da	  Silva	  and	  Araújo	  were	  the	  ideal	  appointees	  for	  the	  post	  of	  prime	  minister.	  The	  net	  result	  was	  that	  in	  addition	  to	  a	  Prime	  Minister	  two	  Vice-­‐Prime	  Ministers	  were	   appointed.	   Prime	   Minister	   Ramos-­‐Horta	   took	   charge	   of	   the	   Defence	  portfolio	  and	  entrusted	  his	  previous	  portfolio	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  to	  José	  Luís	  Guterres,	   a	   fervent	   Alkatiri	   opponent.	   All	   other	   Cabinet	  Ministers	  who	   had	  served	  under	  Alkatiri	  were	  reappointed	  to	  Ramos-­‐Horta’s	  new	  Cabinet.	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While	   the	   cabinet	   formation	   process	   went	   relatively	   smoothly,	   the	  Prime	  Minister	  could	  not	  prevent	  an	  institutional	  confrontation	  between	  the	  President	   and	   the	   Parliamentary	   majority	   over	   the	   appointment	   of	   the	  Prosecutor	  General	   (also	   called	  Attorney	  General).	  The	  Constitution	  defines	  that	  the	  President	  may	  unilaterally	  appoint	  the	  Prosecutor	  General	  for	  a	  term	  of	   four	   years	   (Section	   86k).	   President	   Gusmão’s	   decision	   to	   appoint	  Longuinhos	   Monteiro	   for	   the	   post	   of	   Prosecutor	   General	   met	   with	   great	  resistance	   from	   the	   FRETILIN	   party.	   Prior	   to	   Monteiro’s	   appointment,	   the	  party	   had	   introduced	   a	   draft	   resolution	   to	   restructure	   the	   criminal	  investigation	   branch	   and	   the	   prosecutor’s	   office	   within	   the	   Public	   Affairs	  Ministry	   in	   an	   unsuccessful	   attempt	   to	   get	   rid	   of	   Monteiro	   (ETAN,	   2006h;	  Jolliffe,	   2006c;	   Murdoch,	   2006a).	   The	   FRETILIN	   leadership	   was	   embroiled	  with	  Monteiro	  following	  the	  latter’s	  criminal	  charges	  against	  former	  Minister	  of	  Interior	  Rogério	  Lobato	  and	  ex-­‐Prime	  Minister	  Mari	  Alkatiri.	  Both	  Lobato	  and	   Alkatiri	   were	   accused	   of	   being	   involved	   in	   arming	   a	   hit	   squad	   to	  eliminate	   political	   opponents	   during	   the	   violence	   of	   2006.	   Lobato	   was	  eventually	   condemned	   to	   seven-­‐and-­‐a-­‐half	   years	   of	   imprisonment.	   Alkatiri	  was	   summonsed	   to	   appear	   in	   court	   over	   his	   alleged	   involvement	   in	   the	  distribution	  of	  weapons,	  but	  prosecutors	  dropped	  charges	  against	  the	  former	  Prime	  Minister	   in	  February	  2007	  because	  of	   a	   lack	  of	   evidence.	  FRETILIN’s	  endeavour	  to	  deprive	  the	  President	  of	  his	  power	  to	  appoint	  the	  Prosecutor-­‐General	  failed.	  Monteiro	  was	  eventually	  appointed	  on	  16	  July	  2006.	  On	  8	  November	  2006	  the	  non-­‐partisan	  Vice-­‐Minister	  for	  Justice,	  Isabel	  Ferreira,	   submitted	   her	   resignation	   letter	   following	   a	   request	   by	   the	  President	  of	  the	  Republic	  to	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  (ETAN,	  2006j).	  Vice-­‐Minister	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Ferreira	  resigned	  because	  she	  was	  a	  paid	  member	  of	  the	  Commission	  for	  the	  Truth	  and	  Friendship	  Commission	  (CVA134).	  According	  to	  the	  Prime	  Minister,	  the	   law	   enjoins	   Government	  members	   from	   having	   a	   double	   salary.	   Prime	  Minister	  Ramos-­‐Horta	  advised	  Ferreira	  to	  continue	  to	  work	  for	  the	  CVA.	  	  So,	  the	  resignation	  of	  Vice-­‐Minister	  Ferreira	  demonstrated	  once	  again	  that	  President	  Gusmão	  and	  Prime	  Minister	  Ramos-­‐Horta	  were	  on	   the	   same	  political	  wavelength.	   As	   predicted,	   the	   conflictual	   relationship	   between	   the	  President	  and	   the	  FRETILIN	  majority	  continued	  under	  divided	  government.	  The	  President’s	  use	  of	  his	  appointment	  powers	  brought	  him	  into	  conflict	  with	  the	  FRETILIN	  majority	  when	  the	  latter	  disagreed	  with	  the	  nomination	  of	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  and	  the	  Prosecutor-­‐General.	  The	  designation	  of	  the	  President	  of	   the	   Court	   of	  Appeal	   did	   provoke	  problems	   given	   that	   his	   reappointment	  was	   postponed	   until	   June	   2007.	   When	   compared	   with	   cohabitation,	   the	  divided	   government	   situation	  was	   virtually	   conflict-­‐free	  with	   regard	   to	   the	  appointment	   and	   dismissal	   process.	   It	   should	   be	   remembered	   that	   under	  cohabitation	   an	   institutional	   battle	   was	   fought	   by	   President	   Gusmão	   and	  Prime	   Minister	   Alkatiri	   over	   the	   appointment	   of	   an	   ambassador,	   the	  dismissal	  of	  two	  ministers	  and,	  eventually,	  over	  the	  resignation	  of	  the	  Prime	  Minister.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134	  Comissão	  de	  Verdade	  e	  Amizade.	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Proclamatory	  powers	  Under	  the	  Constitution,	  the	  President	  is	  empowered	  to	  address	  messages	  to	  the	   National	   Parliament	   and	   the	   country.	   In	   this	   context,	   we	   expect	  presidential	  messages	  more	  critical	  about	  parliamentary	  legislation	  than	  over	  government	  policy,	  given	  that	  the	  President	  and	  Prime	  Minister	  are	  political	  allies	   and	   the	   parliamentary	   majority	   was	   controlled	   by	   FRETILIN,	   the	  President’s	  political	  opponent.	  On	   10	   July	   2006,	   President	   Gusmão	   made	   his	   first	   address	   to	   the	  Nation	   after	   the	   fall	   of	   the	   Alkatiri	   government.	   The	   President	   seized	   the	  opportunity	  to	  pressure	  Parliament	  to	  change	  the	  parliamentary	  election	  bill.	  The	   Bill	   for	   the	   Election	   of	   the	   National	   Parliament	   was	   prepared	   by	  FRETILIN	   in	   the	   middle	   of	   a	   political	   crisis	   on	   15	   May	   2006.135	   The	   main	  point	   of	   divergence	   between	   the	   President	   and	   the	   FRETILIN	   majority	  concerned	   the	   electoral	   system.	   Gusmão	   favoured	   an	   electoral	   system	   that	  allowed	   smaller	   parties	   to	   be	   represented	   in	   Parliament.	   FRETILIN,	   for	   its	  part,	   preferred	   a	   system	   that	   reduced	   proportionality	   and	  weeded	   out	   the	  smaller	  parties	  from	  the	  legislature.	  In	  his	  speech	  delivered	  at	  the	  swearing-­‐in	   ceremony	   for	   the	   new	   Prime	   Minister,	   Ramos-­‐Horta,	   President	   Gusmão	  advised	   the	   Government	   to	   disregard	   the	   draft	   law,	   given	   that	   it	   ‘harmed	  small	   parties	   and	   favoured	   only	   one’	   (Gusmão,	   2012:	   181).	   Moreover,	   the	  President	   called	  on	   the	  Parliament	   to	   ‘approve	   laws	   that	   favour	  democracy	  and	  not	  one	  that	  serves	  the	  interest	  of	  only	  one	  group’	  (Gusmão,	  2012:	  181).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135	  Secretariado	  Do	  Parlamento	  Nacional	  (2012)	  'Projectos	  e	  Propostas	  de	  Lei	  Vetados	  
de	  2002	  a	  2012',	  Dili:	  Parlamento	  Nacional	  da	  República	  Democrática	  de	  Timor-­‐Leste.	  In	  author’s	  collection.	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In	   his	   next	   address	   to	   the	   Nation	   on	   29	   September	   2006,	   President	  Gusmão	  reiterated	  his	  preoccupation	  with	   the	  electoral	   law	  when	  he	  stated	  that	  he	  would	  not	  like	  to	  see	  it	  ‘killing	  minority	  parties’	  (Gusmão,	  2012:	  195).	  Together	  with	  the	  opposition,	  the	  President	  prepared	  another	  parliamentary	  election	  bill	   (States	  News	  Service,	  2006).	  However,	   the	  Parliament	  chose	   to	  discuss	  only	  FRETILIN’s	  proposal.136	  Following	  the	  decision,	  members	  of	  the	  opposition	   walked	   out	   of	   the	   Parliament	   in	   protest	   (ETAN,	   2006d).	   The	  Parliament	   passed	   the	   parliamentary	   election	   bill	   on	   18	  December	   and	   the	  President	   promulgated	   it	   on	   28	   December	   2006.	   The	   new	   law	   effectively	  ruled	  out	  half	   the	  parties	  running	   in	   the	  2007	  elections,	  some	  of	  which	  had	  previously	  won	  one	  or	  two	  seats	  in	  2001	  elections	  (Leach,	  2009).	  On	  16	  May	  2007,	  the	  Parliament	  accepted	  new	  amendments	  to	  the	  Law	  on	  the	  Election	  of	  the	  National	  Parliament,	  resulting	  in	  all	  opposition	  parties	  walking	  out	  in	  a	  unilateral	  protest	  against	   the	  act	   (MediaNet	  Press	  Release	  Wire,	  2007).	  The	  main	  changes	  concerned	  the	   location	  of	  vote	  counts,	  which	  would	  now	  take	  place	  in	  the	  thirteen	  district	  capitals,	  rather	  than	  at	  each	  polling	  centre.	  The	  intention	  was	   to	   prevent	   the	   identification	   of	   voting	   patterns	   at	   the	   village	  level,	   but	   critics	   raised	   concerns	   that	   the	   new	   policy	   would	   reduce	  transparency	   and	   public	   legitimacy,	   and	   lead	   to	   increased	   complaints.	  President	   Gusmão	   was	   reluctant	   to	   accede	   to	   the	   changes	   but	   decided	   to	  promulgate	  the	  law	  on	  29	  May	  (Lusa,	  2007c).	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The	  President’s	  speech	  on	  28	  November	  2006	  stood	  in	  stark	  contrast	  to	  all	  other	  speeches.	   In	  his	  speech	  delivered	  during	  the	  commemoration	  of	  independence	  of	   the	  4th	  Anniversary	  of	   Independence,	   the	  President	   lauded	  the	   work	   done	   by	   the	   Prime	   Minister.	   According	   to	   Gusmão,	   the	   Prime	  Minister	   made	   powerful	   strides	   towards	   national	   reconciliation	   when	   the	  Prime	   Minister	   appealed	   to	   martial	   arts	   groups	   to	   immediately	   stop	   their	  violence.137	   The	   President	   stated	   that	   it	   was	   ‘a	   very	   good	   message	   from	   a	  leader	  of	  our	  Nation.	  I	  believe	  those	  words	  are	  shared	  by	  all	  the	  leaders	  and	  by	   the	   entire	   people.	   In	   today’s	  message,	   I	   declare	  my	   total	   support	   to	   the	  appeal	  made	  by	  the	  Prime	  Minister’	  (ETAN,	  2006c).	  	  In	  addition	  to	  speeches	  to	  the	  Nation	  and	  in	  Parliament,	  the	  President	  used	   the	   media	   to	   criticize	   FRETILIN.	   The	   first	   media	   row	   between	   the	  President	   and	   FRETILIN’s	   Secretary-­‐General	   and	   deputy	   Alkatiri	   occurred	  after	  the	  publication	  of	  a	  UN	  report	  by	  the	  Independent	  Special	  Commission	  of	   Inquiry	   for	  Timor-­‐Leste	   (COI)	   in	  October	  2006.	  The	  UN	  commission	  was	  established	   following	   a	   request	   of	   the	   former	   Minister	   of	   Foreign	   Affairs,	  Ramos-­‐Horta,	  to	  establish	  the	  facts	  and	  circumstances	  that	  led	  to	  the	  security	  crisis	   in	   April-­‐June	   2006	   and	   to	   clarify	   responsibility	   and	   recommend	  measures	  of	  accountability	  for	  crimes	  and	  serious	  violations	  of	  human	  rights	  allegedly	   committed	   during	   the	   violence	   in	   April,	   May	   and	   June	   2006.	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  According	  to	  Scambary,	  political	  parties	  have	  used	  members	  of	  martial	  art	  groups	  to	  intimidate	  political	  opponents.	  For	  instance,	  the	  Korka	  martial	  art	  group	  is	  aligned	  to	  FRETILIN	  and	  Persuadaraan	  Setia	  Hati	  Terate	  (PHST)	  linked	  to	  the	  PSD	  and	  PD.	  It	  is	  commonly	  believed	  that	  PSHT	  and	  Korka	  were	  involved	  in	  the	  2006	  crisis	  and	  several	  other	  violent	  conflicts.	  See:	  Scambary,	  J.	  (2009)	  'Anatomy	  of	  a	  conflict:	  the	  2006-­‐2007	  communal	  violence	  in	  East	  Timor',	  Conflict,	  Security	  &	  
Development,	  9,	  265-­‐288.	  	  
	   166	  
According	   to	   Alkatiri,	   the	   Commission	  was	   not	   independent	   and	   its	   report	  served	   to	   legitimise	   Alkatiri’s	   resignation	   (Agência	   de	   Informação	   de	  Moçambique,	   2006).	   In	   a	   lengthy	   interview	   published	   in	   a	   Timorese	  newspaper,	  Alkatiri	  claimed	  that	  the	  security	  crisis	  was	  a	  ‘constitutional	  coup	  d’état’	   orchestrated	   by	   unnamed	   ‘internal	   and	   external	   actors’	   bent	   on	  toppling	  its	  government	  and	  constitutional	  order	  (ETAN,	  2006a).	  In	  response	  to	  Alkatiri’s	  statements,	  President	  Gusmão	  accused	  the	  FRETILIN	  leadership	  of	  ‘a	  total	  lack	  of	  political	  honesty’	  (ETAN,	  2006a).	  The	  polemic	  continued	  in	  several	   newspaper	   articles	   in	  which	   the	   President	   blamed	   Alkatiri	   and	   the	  FRETILIN	  leadership	  for	  the	  violence	  and	  crisis	  (ETAN,	  2006i).	   	  The	  timing	  of	  the	  parliamentary	  elections	  caused	  another	  institutional	  row	  between	   the	  President	   and	   the	  parliamentary	  majority.	  When,	   in	   early	  February	  2007,	  President	  Gusmão	  set	  9	  April	  2007	  as	  the	  date	  of	  presidential	  elections,	   FRETILIN	   threatened	   to	   withdraw	   from	   the	   parliamentary	  elections	  unless	   the	  parliamentary	  elections	  were	  held	  before	  20	  May	  2007	  (Dodd	   and	   Wilson,	   2007;	   Lusa,	   2007a).	   Under	   the	   electoral	   law,	  parliamentary	   elections	   must	   take	   place	   a	   minimum	   of	   80	   days	   after	   the	  presidential	   vote.	   This	  meant	   the	   parliamentary	   poll	   would	   be	   held	   in	   late	  June	   or	   early	   July.	   Former	   Prime	   Minister	   Alkatiri	   stated	   that	   presidential	  elections	  after	  20	  May	  2007	  were	  unconstitutional	  given	  that	  the	  Parliament	  was	   on	   the	   end	   of	   its	  mandate	   and,	   therefore,	   could	   not	   inaugurate	   a	   new	  president	  (Lusa,	  2007b).	  The	  case	  was	  not	  brought	  to	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  and	  FRETILIN	  participated	  in	  the	  parliamentary	  elections	  on	  30	  June	  2007.	  	  In	   the	   run	  up	   for	   the	  presidential	  and	   legislative	  elections,	  President	  Gusmão	   clashed	   with	   the	   FRETILIN	   majority	   on	   several	   occasions.	   First,	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President	  Gusmão’s	  affiliation	  with	  a	  new	  political	  party,	  the	  CNRT	  (National	  Congress	   for	   Timorese	   Reconstruction),	   brought	   him	   on	   a	   serious	   collision	  course	  with	   the	   FRETILIN	   leadership.	   In	   February	  2007,	   President	  Gusmão	  announced	  that	  he	  would	  not	  run	  in	  the	  2007	  presidential	  elections.	  Instead,	  Gusmão	  established,	  together	  with	  members	  of	  FRETILIN	  Mudança,	  a	  splinter	  party	   of	   FRETILIN,	   the	   CNRT	   that	   reportedly	   intended	   to	   ‘knock	   the	  FRETILIN	  party	  off	  its	  pedestal	  as	  the	  dominant	  political	  force	  and	  remove	  its	  majority	   in	   the	   parliament’	   (McDonald,	   2007).	   The	   party's	   name	   was	   a	  deliberate	  reference	  to	   the	   former	  CNRT	  -­‐	   the	  National	  Council	  of	  Timorese	  Resistance	  -­‐	  a	  non-­‐partisan	  body	  formed	  by	  Gusmão	  in	  1998,	  which	  won	  the	  vote	   for	   independence	   from	   Indonesia	   in	   the	   1999	   referendum.138	   Alkatiri	  said	   that	   the	   use	   of	   the	   initials	   was	   ‘cynical’	   and	   ‘opportunistic’	   and	  threatened	   legal	   action	   (FRETILIN,	   2007).	   ‘When	   more	   than	   half	   of	   the	  electorate	   is	   illiterate,	   there	   is	   a	   moral	   obligation	   on	   all	   parties	   to	   be	  transparent	   and	   unambiguous	   in	   their	   identity,	   campaign	   messages	   and	  policy,’	   the	   former	  premier	   told	   journalists	   (FRETILIN,	  2007).	  So,	  according	  to	  Alkatiri,	  the	  new	  party	  had	  been	  given	  a	  misleading	  name	  to	  confuse	  and	  deceive	   voters.	   The	   President,	   for	   his	   part,	   accused	   FRETILIN	  members	   of	  holding	   illegal	   weapons.	   In	   a	   response,	   the	   President	   of	   the	   Parliament,	  Francisco	   Lu-­‐Olo	   Guterres,	   said	   that	   the	   President	   should	   be	   ashamed	   of	  himself	   for	   accusing	   FRETILIN	  members	   of	   illegal	   arms	   possession.	   (ETAN,	  2007h).	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  Chapter	  3.	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Two	   days	   after	   the	   CNRT	  was	   formally	   launched,	   President	   Gusmão	  announced	   that	   he	   would	   to	   support	   Prime	   Minister	   Ramos-­‐Horta	   in	   the	  latter’s	  bid	   for	   the	  presidency.	  President	  Gusmão	   told	   journalists	   that	   there	  was	   no	   alternative	   for	   him	   but	   to	   vote	   for	   Ramos-­‐Horta	   and	   support	   his	  campaign	   (ETAN,	   2007j).	   FRETILIN’s	   Central	   Committee	  member	   Filomeno	  Aleixo	   accused	   outgoing	   President	   Gusmão	   of	   abuse	   of	   office	   after	   the	  President	  was	  broadcast	  on	  national	  television	  attending	  a	  rally	  in	  support	  of	  rival	   independent	  candidate	  Ramos-­‐Horta.	   ‘The	  President	  of	   the	  Republic	   is	  supposed	   to	   be	   an	   independent	   person	   and	   should	   not	   be	   endorsing	  candidates	   in	   elections,’	   Aleixo	   said.	   ‘This	   is	   a	   clear	   abuse	   of	   his	   power	   as	  President.	  (…)	  The	  President	  has	  no	  right	  to	  use	  his	  office	  to	  try	  to	  hand	  pick	  his	  successor’	  (Michelmore,	  2007).	  Tension	   between	   the	   President	   and	   FRETILIN	   rose	   when	   the	  President	  accepted	  the	  leadership	  of	  the	  CNRT,	  which	  was	  labelled	  as	  ‘a	  nest	  of	   liars’	   by	   former	   Prime	   Minister	   Alkatiri.	   ‘We	   have	   to	   beware	   of	   CNRT	  because	   CNRT	   lies	   to	   people,’	   Alkatiri	   told	   journalists	   without	   elaborating	  (Adnkronos	   International,	  2007).	   In	  a	  response,	  on	  30	  March,	   the	  President	  accused	   the	   ruling	  party	  of	   corruption,	   arrogance	  and	  mismanagement	   that	  had	  put	  the	  fledgling	  country	  on	  a	  path	  of	  violence	  and	  economic	  stagnation	  since	   its	   2002	   independence.	   In	   an	   interview	   with	   the	   Financial	   Times,	  Gusmão	  said	  that	  the	  young	  country’s	  governing	  elite	  had	  built	  a	  record	  that	  compared	   unfavourably	   even	   with	   Indonesia’s	   brutal	   24-­‐year	   rule,	   which	  came	   to	   a	   bloody	   end	   in	   1999	   following	   a	   United	   Nations-­‐sponsored	  referendum	   (Aglionby,	   2007).	   One	   week	   later,	   on	   5	   April	   2007,	   President	  Gusmão	  spoke	  about	  bad	  governance.	  ‘Key	  among	  these’,	  he	  continued,	  ‘was	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the	   failure	   to	   provide	   adequate	   healthcare,	   education	   and	   other	   important	  social	  needs,	  or	  even	  to	  make	  sure	  people	  had	  enough	  to	  eat’	  (ETAN,	  2007d).	  FRETILIN	  reiterated	  that	  President	  Gusmão	  was	  using	  state	  power	  to	  influence	  national	  politics.	  The	  President	  of	   the	  Parliament	  and	  presidential	  candidate,	  Francisco	  Guterres	  (Lu-­‐Olo),	  told	  journalists	  that	  the	  President	  of	  the	  Republic	  was	  not	  a	  neutral	  state	  figure	  but	  used	  his	  position	  of	  power	  to	  influence	  politics	   (ETAN,	  2007i).	   In	  another	   tirade	  against	   the	  President,	  he	  accused	  Gusmão	  of	  corruption	  in	  the	  presidency	  (Gomes,	  2007).	  According	  to	  Alkatiri,	   ‘Xanana	  and	  Ramos-­‐Horta	  will	  not	  resolve	  the	  crisis,	  but	  rather	  will	  increase	  the	  crisis,’	  (ETAN,	  2007a).	  A	   close	   reading	   of	   the	   official	   speeches	   and	   in	   particular	   his	   press	  statements	   revealed	   President	   Gusmão’s	   underlying	   hostility	   towards	   the	  FRETILIN	  majority.	  Instead	  of	  persuading	  the	  FRETILIN	  majority	  of	  changing,	  for	   instance,	   the	   electoral	   law	   the	   President’s	   speeches	   aimed	   to	   bring	   his	  objections	   against	   legislation	   to	   public	   attention.	   In	   the	   run	   up	   to	   the	  presidential	  and	  parliamentary	  elections	  Gusmão’s	  press	  statements	  exposed	  and	   possibly	   deepened	   the	   political	   divergence	   between	   the	   President	   and	  Alkatiri,	   the	   leader	   of	   FRETILIN.	   Importantly,	   however,	   the	   President	  refrained	  from	  criticizing	  the	  Government	  and	  its	  policies.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  in	  his	  message	  on	  Independence	  Day	  on	  28	  November	  2006	  President	  Gusmão	  lauded	  the	  work	  done	  by	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  and	  declared	  his	  ‘total	  support’	  for	  the	  Prime	  Minister’s	  policy	  to	  restore	  peace	  in	  the	  country	  (ETAN,	  2006c).	  In	   total,	   therefore,	   there	   were	   fewer	   critical	   presidential	   speeches	   under	  divided	   government	   because	   of	   Gusmão’s	   ideological	   proximity	   to	   Prime	  Minister	  Ramos-­‐Horta.	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Conclusion	  The	   hypotheses	   that	   were	   formulated	   at	   the	   beginning	   of	   this	   chapter	  predicted	  the	  locus	  and	  intensity	  of	  institutional	  conflict.	  Firstly,	  we	  expected	  to	  find	  conflict	  between	  President	  Gusmão	  and	  the	  FRETILIN	  parliamentary	  majority.	  Secondly,	  we	  expected	  to	  find	  little	  conflict	  over	  defence	  and	  foreign	  policy.	  	  We	   found	   several	   incidences	   of	   conflict	   between	   the	   President	  Gusmão	  and	  the	  FRETILIN	  majority.	  Gusmão	  targeted	  several	  draft	  laws	  that	  were	  written	  by	  FRETILIN:	  one	  bill	  was	  sent	   to	   the	  Court	   for	  constitutional	  review	   and	   two	   other	   bills	   were	   vetoed.	   In	   addition,	   the	   President	   used	  proclamatory	  powers	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  put	  pressure	  on	  the	  National	  Parliament	  to	  change	  certain	  provisions	  in	  the	  draft	  law	  on	  parliamentary	  elections.	  The	  President’s	   appointment	   powers	   also	   led	   to	   confrontations	   with	   the	  FRETILIN	   majority	   about	   the	   appointment	   of	   a	   new	   Prime	   Minister	   and	  Prosecutor-­‐General	   Monteiro.	   For	   its	   part,	   Parliament	   did	   not	   confirm	   the	  President’s	  declaration	  of	  the	  state	  of	  siege.	  We	  found	  no	  conflict	  between	  the	  President	  and	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  over	  defence	  and	  foreign	  affairs	  policy.	   In	  truth,	   during	   his	   term	   as	   Prime	   Minister	   and	   Minister	   of	   Defence,	   crucial	  legislation	   regarding	  Timor-­‐Leste’s	  national	  defence	   and	   foreign	  policy	  was	  promulgated.	  When	   compared	   with	   cohabitation,	   divided	   government	   was	   a	   less	  conflictual	   political	   situation.	   President	   Gusmão	   did	   send	  more	   laws	   to	   the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  and	  used	  more	  often	  his	  veto	  power.	  Yet,	  as	  noted	  earlier,	  the	  sample	   was	   very	   small	   in	   that	   under	   divided	   government	   only	   ten	  parliamentary	   laws	  were	   passed,	   of	  which	   two	  were	   vetoed.	  Regarding	   the	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President’s	   use	   of	   his	   appointment	   and	   dismissal	   powers,	   his	   power	   to	  pardon	   or	   to	   commute	   sentences,	   and	   his	   proclamatory	   powers,	   the	  cohabitation	   period	   was	   far	   more	   conflictual	   than	   the	   situation	   of	   divided	  government.	   Under	   cohabitation,	   the	   President	   and	   Prime	  Minister	   clashed	  four	  times	  over	  the	  appointment/dismissal	  of	  state	  officials,	  whereas	  during	  divided	   government	   such	   conflict	   was	   virtually	   absent.	   Likewise,	   the	  President’s	   power	   to	   pardon	   and	   commute	   sentences	   led	   to	   four	   serious	  confrontations	   between	   Gusmão	   and	   Alkatiri,	   but	   did	   not	   provoke	   any	  conflict	  under	  divided	  government.	  Finally,	  President	  Gusmão	  criticised	   the	  Government	   in	   19	   different	   formal	   speeches	   between	   May	   2002	   and	   June	  2006,	  whereas	  under	  divided	  government	  the	  President	  criticised	  FRETILIN	  in	  just	  two	  formal	  speeches.	  	  Under	  Alkatiri’s	  prime	  ministership	  the	  President’s	  intervention	  in	  the	  appointment	   and	   dismissal	   process	   led	   to	   serious	   institutional	   conflicts	  between	   the	   two	   leaders	  whereas	  during	   the	  period	  of	  divided	  government	  period	   institutional	   conflict	   over	   selection	   and	   deselection	   of	   state	   officials	  was	   virtually	   absent.	   Likewise,	   no	   conflict	   occurred	   over	   the	   President’s	  power	   to	   pardon	   or	   to	   commute	   sentences.	   Under	   cohabitation	   differences	  between	   President	   Gusmão	   and	   Prime	   Minister	   Alkatiri	   about	   whether	  Indonesian	   officers	   and	   Timorese	   pro-­‐Indonesian	   militias	   should	   be	  pardoned	   almost	   led	   to	   a	   diplomatic	   dust-­‐up	  with	   Indonesia.	   Finally,	   there	  were	  fewer	  critical	  presidential	  speeches	  due	  to	  the	  cooperative	  relationship	  between	  the	  President	  and	  the	  Prime	  Minister.	  Overall,	   therefore,	   we	   found	   institutional	   conflict	   under	   divided	  government.	  Yet,	  this	  conflict	  was	  less	  intense	  when	  compared	  to	  the	  period	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of	  cohabitation.	  The	  reason	  for	  the	  amelioration	  of	  the	  institutional	  relations	  was	   the	   ideological	   proximity	   between	   the	   President	   and	   Prime	   Minister	  which	  erased	  a	  large	  chunk	  of	  conflict	  from	  the	  political	  process.	  In	  the	  next	  chapter	  we	  will	   the	   effect	   of	   unified	  majority	   government	   on	   incidences	   of	  institutional	  conflict.	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CHAPTER	  6	  
Unified	  Majority	  Government	  	  With	   the	   election	   of	   José	   Ramos-­‐Horta	   as	   the	   new	   President	   and	   the	  appointment	   of	   Xanana	   Gusmão	   as	   the	   new	   Prime	   Minister,	   Timor-­‐Leste	  entered	  a	  new	  political	   era.	  From	  August	  2007	  until	  May	  2012,	  when	  Ruak	  replaced	  Ramos-­‐Horta	   as	   President,	   there	  was	   a	   period	   of	   unified	  majority	  government.	  	  	   In	   the	   literature,	   unified	   majority	   government	   refers	   to	   a	   situation	  where	   the	   president,	   the	   prime	   minister	   and	   the	   parliamentary	   majority	  belong	   to	   the	   same	   political	   force.	   In	   these	   circumstances	   scholars	   predict	  minimal	  conflict	  between	  the	  president	  and	  prime	  minister.	  However,	   if	   the	  president	  is	  supported	  by	  the	  prime	  minister	  and	  the	  parliamentary	  majority,	  there	  is	  the	  risk	  that	  the	  president	  may	  try	  to	  accumulate	  power.	  	  	   We	  find	  that	  President	  Ramos-­‐Horta	  and	  Prime	  Minister	  Gusmão	  were	  able	   to	   coordinate	   their	   different	   policy	   agendas.	  We	   also	   find	   that	  Ramos-­‐Horta	  often	  acted	  outside	  of	   the	  president’s	  constitutional	  authority.	  All	   the	  same,	  intra-­‐executive	  conflict	  never	  escalated	  as	  Ramos-­‐Horta	  always	  backed	  down.	  	  	   The	  chapter	  is	  organised	  as	  follows.	  In	  the	  first	  section	  we	  describe	  the	  process	   of	   government	   formation	   and	   justify	   why	   we	   call	   this	   situation	  unified	   majority	   government.	   In	   the	   second	   section,	   we	   present	   the	   main	  hypotheses	   that	   are	   associated	  with	   unified	  majority	   government.	  We	   then	  present	   the	   main	   empirical	   findings.	   In	   the	   last	   section	   of	   the	   chapter	   we	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conclude	   whether	   the	   Timorese	   politicians	   behaved	   according	   to	   the	  literature	  on	  political	  behaviour	  in	  semi-­‐presidential	  systems.	  	  	  
Unified	  majority	  government	  in	  Timor-­Leste	  In	  the	  literature,	  unified	  majority	  government	  refers	  to	  a	  situation	  where	  the	  president	   and	  prime	  minister	   belong	   to	   the	   same	  political	   force	   and	  where	  the	  cabinet	  is	  composed	  of	  a	  single	  party	  or	  coalition	  of	  parties	  that,	  in	  turn,	  enjoy(s)	   the	   support	   of	   the	   majority	   of	   the	   deputies	   in	   parliament	   (Elgie,	  2011a).	   We	   consider	   the	   period	   from	   August	   2007	   when	   Gusmão	   became	  Prime	  Minister	  to	  May	  2012	  when	  President	  Ramos-­‐Horta	  left	  office	  to	  be	  a	  period	  of	  unified	  majority	  government.	  President	  Ramos-­‐Horta’s	  decision	  to	  appoint	   Gusmão	   as	   the	   new	   cabinet	   formateur	   opened	   the	   way	   for	  cooperation	   between	   the	   President,	   the	   Prime	   Minister	   and	   the	  parliamentary	  majority.	  	  	   To	   some	   extent	   both	  men	  owed	   their	   position	   to	  mutual	   support.	   In	  April	  2007	  during	  the	  presidential	  campaign,	  President	  Gusmão	  had	  publicly	  supported	  Ramos-­‐Horta’s	  candidacy	  for	  the	  presidency.	  In	  media	  statements	  President	  Gusmão	   announced	   that	   he	  would	   vote	   for	  Ramos-­‐Horta	   and	   the	  President	   attended	   Ramos-­‐Horta’s	   campaign	   rallies	   (ETAN,	   2007j).	   In	   the	  lead	   up	   to	   the	   second	   round	   ‘runoff’	   ballot	   on	   9	   May,	   Ramos-­‐Horta	   was	  backed	   by	   all	   political	   parties	   bar	   FRETILIN	   and	   KOTA,	   which	   backed	   the	  FRETILIN	   candidate	   Francisco	   Guterres	   (Lu-­‐Olo).	   At	   the	   second	   ballot,	  Ramos-­‐Horta	  won	  69.18	  per	   cent	  of	   the	  votes	  and	  Guterres	  30.82	  per	   cent.	  Ramos-­‐Horta	  was	  inaugurated	  as	  the	  second	  President	  of	  Timor-­‐Leste	  on	  20	  May	  2007.	  With	  Ramos-­‐Horta	  as	  the	  new	  President,	  vice-­‐Prime	  Minister	  and	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FRETILIN	  member	  Estanislau	  da	  Silva	  was	  appointed	  the	  third,	  albeit	  interim	  Prime	  Minister	  of	  Timor-­‐Leste.	  His	  cabinet	  was	  to	  last	  from	  20	  May	  until	  the	  parliamentary	  elections	  on	  30	  June	  2007.	  	  For	   reasons	   that	  we	   outlined	   in	   chapter	   2,	  we	  will	   not	   examine	   this	  short	  period	  of	  divided	  government	  in	  any	  detail.	  However,	  it	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  President	  Ramos-­‐Horta	  did	  not	  allow	  FRETILIN	  to	  govern	  as	  it	  pleased.	  Under	  Da	  Silva’s	  premiership,	  the	  President	  issued	  one	  veto	  threat	  and	  sent	  one	  bill	   to	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  for	  constitutional	  review.	  Four	  days	  after	  his	  inauguration	  on	  29	  May	  2007,	  President	  Ramos-­‐Horta	  threatened	  to	  veto	  the	  First	  Amendment	   to	   the	   Law	  on	  Parliamentary	  Elections	   (ETAN,	   2007c).139	  The	   President	   was	   reportedly	   unhappy	   with	   various	   articles	   in	   the	   law	  (Riseup,	  2007b).	  Then,	  on	  4	  June,	  Timor-­‐Leste's	  National	  Parliament	  passed	  the	   Bill	   on	   Truth	   and	   Measures	   of	   Clemency	   for	   Diverse	   Offenses,	   which	  provided	  an	  amnesty	  for	  the	  perpetrators	  of	  more	  than	  180	  specific	  types	  of	  crimes	  committed	  between	  20	  April	  2006	  and	  30	  April	  2007.	  On	  5	   July,	   the	  President	  asked	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  to	  provide	  advice	  as	  to	  whether	  the	  bill	  violated	   the	   Constitution.	   The	   Court	   of	   Appeal	   issued	   its	   opinion	   on	   16	  August,	  finding	  the	  bill	  in	  violation	  of	  the	  constitutional	  principle	  of	  equality	  because	  only	  crimes	  committed	  during	  a	  particular	  time	  period	  were	  covered	  (La'o	   Hamutuk,	   2007).	   Parliamentary	   elections	   brought	   the	   interim	  government	   under	   Da	   Silva	   to	   an	   end.	   The	   new	   AMP	   government	   was	  inaugurated	  in	  early	  August	  2007.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139	  Lei	  do	  Parlamento	  Nacional	  6/2007	  de	  31	  de	  Maio	  ‘Alteração	  da	  Lei	  No	  6/2006’.	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The	   process	   of	   government	   formation	   was	   delayed	   partly	   because	  Timor-­‐Leste’s	   largest	  political	  parties,	  FRETILIN	  and	  CNRT,	   failed	   to	   form	  a	  coalition	  government.	   In	   the	  parliamentary	  elections	  FRETILIN	  obtained	  29	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  national	  vote	  and	  the	  CNRT	  24	  per	  cent	  (see	  Table	  6.1).	  	  	  
Table	  6.1:	  Parliamentary	  Election	  Results,	  30	  June	  2007	  Party*	  	   Votes	   %	   Seats	  FRETILIN	   120	  592	   29.0	   21	  CNRT	   100	  175	   24.1	   18	  PSD-­‐ASDT	  	   65	  358	   15.7	   11	  PD	   46	  946	   11.3	   8	  PUN	  	   18	  896	   4.6	   3	  AD	   13	  294	   3.2	   2	  UNDERTIM	   13	  247	   3.2	   2	  PNT	   10	  057	   2.4	   0	  PDRT	   7718	   1.9	   0	  PR	   4408	   1.1	   0	  PDC	   4300	   1.0	   0	  PST	   3982	   1.0	   0	  UDT	   3753	   0.9	   0	  PMD	   2878	   0.7	   0	  Total	   415	  604	   100	   65	  *See	  List	  of	  abbreviations	  
Source:	  Vasconcelos,	  P.	  B.	  D.	  and	  Cunha,	  R.	  S.	  D.	  (2009),	  p.	  257.	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The	  electoral	  system	  used	  in	  the	  2007	  parliamentary	  elections	  was	  a	  party-­‐list	   proportional	   representation	   system.	   It	   was	   a	   closed	   list	   system	  where	  seats	  were	  assigned	   to	  candidates	   in	   the	   fixed	  order	   that	   their	  party	  had	  chosen.	  The	  ASDT-­‐PSD	  coalition	  came	  in	  third	  place	  with	  15.7	  per	  cent.	  The	  PD	  became	  the	  fourth	  largest	  party	  in	  Timor-­‐Leste,	  obtaining	  11	  per	  cent.	  Given	  that	  no	  party	  gained	  a	  parliamentary	  majority,	  a	  coalition	  was	  necessary	  for	  a	  majority	   government,	   though	   Alkatiri	   argued	   that	   FRETILIN	   should	   form	   a	  minority	  government.	  President	  Ramos-­‐Horta	  raised	  the	  prospect	  of	  an	   ‘all-­‐inclusive	   government’	   (Agence	   France	   Presse,	   2007)	   comprising	   the	   four	  largest	   political	   parties.	   Meanwhile,	   the	   CNRT	   managed	   to	   form	   a	   post-­‐election	  coalition	  with	  the	  ASDT-­‐PSD	  and	  PD	  known	  as	  the	  Aliança	  da	  Maioria	  Parlamentar	  (AMP)140.	  By	  contrast,	  FRETILIN	  with	  the	  support	  of	  AD	  (KOTA-­‐PPT)	  could	  only	  secure	  a	  minority	  coalition.	  Though	  on	  16	  July	  the	  President	  stated	  that	  broad	  agreement	  had	  been	  reached	  for	  a	  government	  of	  national	  unity,	  FRETILIN	  and	  the	  AMP	  alliance	  could	  not	  decide	  on	  the	  choice	  of	   the	  Prime	   Minister	   (Dodd,	   2007).	   On	   30	   July	   Parliament	   was	   sworn	   in	   and	  Fernando	  ‘Lasama’	  de	  Araújo	  of	  the	  PD	  was	  elected	  President	  of	  Parliament.	  In	   electing	   PD	   leader	   Lasama	   as	   President	   of	   Parliament	   over	   FRETILIN	  candidate	  Aniceto	  Guterres	   by	   44	   votes	   to	   21,	   the	   legislature	  made	   it	   clear	  that	  FRETILIN	  could	  not	  expect	  its	  support	  if	  it	  were	  to	  attempt	  to	  govern	  in	  its	  own	  right	  (Leach,	  2009).	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On	  3	  August	  President	  Ramos-­‐Horta	  announced	  that	  he	  would	  ask	  the	  CNRT-­‐led	   AMP	   to	   form	   a	   new	   cabinet	   if	   an	   agreement	   on	   a	   national	   unity	  government	  could	  not	  me	  reached	  before	  6	  August.	  The	  negotiations	   failed,	  so	  on	  6	  August	  the	  President	  invited	  Gusmão	  to	  form	  a	  cabinet.	  The	  cabinet	  composition	   was,	   however,	   not	   directly	   accepted	   by	   the	   President	   who	  claimed	  to	  have	  exercised	   ‘informal	  veto’	  power	  (Lusa,	  2007e).	   ‘I	  have	  used	  the	   'veto'	  and	  do	  not	  hesitate	   to	  use	   it	  again’,	  Ramos-­‐Horta	   told	  Portuguese	  press	   agency	   Lusa.	   ‘Without	   imposing	   myself	   on	   the	   prerogatives	   of	   the	  Prime	  Minister-­‐designate	   to	   form	  the	  Government,	   I	  have	  made	  clear	  who	   I	  think	  should	  stay	  or	  who	  should	  not’	  (Lusa,	  2007e).	  President	  Ramos-­‐Horta	  had	  rejected	  the	  Prime	  Minister’s	  candidate	  for	  the	  post	  of	  Finance	  Minister.	  Instead,	   the	   President’s	   candidate,	   Emilia	   Pires,	   was	   appointed	   Finance	  Minister.141	  Ramos-­‐Horta	   also	   added	   that	  he,	   together	  with	   the	  Prosecutor-­‐General,	  would	   analyse	   the	   criminal	   record	   of	   each	   of	   the	   nominees	   before	  the	  Government	  was	   inaugurated.	  On	  8	  August	   the	  Government	  was	   sworn	  in,	  comprising	  the	  CNRT,	  ASDT-­‐PSD	  and	  the	  PD.	  Prime	  Minister	  Gusmão	  took	  charge	  of	  the	  defence	  portfolio.	  He	  appointed	  Zacarias	  Albano	  da	  Costa	  (PSD)	  as	  the	  new	  Minister	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  and	  João	  Luís	  Guterres	  of	  the	  dissident	  FRETILIN	  faction	  Mudança	  as	  his	  vice-­‐Prime	  Minister.	  	  Meanwhile,	   in	   a	   statement	   to	   Parliament	   on	   7	   August,	   FRETILIN	  announced	   that	   it	   considered	   the	   AMP	   to	   have	   no	   legal	   basis	   and	   to	   be	  unconstitutional.	   The	   legal	   debate	   centred	   on	   the	   interpretation	   of	   the	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  Author	  e-­‐mail	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Constitution	  which	  entitles	   the	   ‘most	  voted	  party	  or	   the	  alliance	  of	  political	  parties	  with	  a	  parliamentary	  majority’	   to	  designate	   the	  Prime	  Minister,	  and	  thereby	   determine	   the	   composition	   of	   the	   government	   (Section	   106).	  FRETILIN	   sought	   to	   claim	   that	   right	   as	   the	   ‘most	   voted	  party’	   and	  declared	  that	   it	   would	   challenge	   the	   President’s	   decision	   to	   grant	   that	   right	   to	   the	  Gusmão-­‐led	   AMP	   coalition.	   FRETILIN	   also	   announced	   that	   it	   would	  temporarily	   suspend	   its	   participation	   in	   Parliament	   in	   order	   to	   explain	   its	  position	  to	  the	  electorate.	  Moreover,	  FRETILIN	  called	  for	  a	  campaign	  of	  civil	  disobedience.	   The	   tug-­‐of-­‐war	   about	   the	   interpretation	   of	   the	   Constitution	  went	   hand	   in	   hand	   with	   a	   wave	   of	   violence	   mainly	   in	   the	   heartlands	   of	  FRETILIN	   in	  areas	  such	  as	  Los	  Palos	  and	  Viqueque.	  At	   that	  point,	  President	  Ramos-­‐Horta	  ordered	   the	  army	   to	  quell	   the	  unrest	  but	  did	  so	  without	   legal	  authority	   since	   there	  was	  no	   state	  of	   emergency	   and	  no	   consultations	  with	  other	   security	   organs	   (ICG,	   2008).	   Though	   FRETILIN	   did	   not	   recognise	   the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  AMP	  government	  and	  threatened	  to	  boycott	  parliament,	  the	  party	  returned	  to	  Parliament	  by	  the	  end	  of	  August	  2007.	  	  With	   President	   Ramos-­‐Horta	   at	   the	   helm	   of	   the	   state	   and	   Prime	  Minister	  Gusmão	  leading	  the	  AMP	  coalition,	  Timor-­‐Leste	  entered	  a	  period	  of	  unified	   majority	   government.	   A	   unified	   majority	   government	   differs	   from	  divided	   government	   executive	   in	   that	   the	   President	   and	   the	   parliamentary	  majority	  represented	  the	  same	  political	  force.	  So,	  whereas	  under	  the	  divided	  government	   the	   President	   and	   the	   parliamentary	   majority	   were	   political	  opponents,	  under	  the	  new	  situation	  the	  President,	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  and	  the	  Cabinet	  and	  the	  parliamentary	  majority	  were	  politically	  unified.	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Hypotheses	  on	  unified	  majority	  government	  According	   to	   Skach	   (2005b),	   unified	   majority	   government	   is	   semi-­‐presidentialism’s	   best	   subtype	   for	   minimizing	   institutional	   conflict.	   The	  legislative	  majority,	  she	  argued,	  increases	  the	  chances	  that	  governments	  will	  be	  more	  stable,	  which	  in	  turn	  lends	  governments	  a	  greater	  time	  horizon	  for	  accomplishing	   their	   agendas	   (Skach,	   2005b:	   15).	   In	   her	  work	   she	   cited	   the	  first	   two	   governments	   of	   the	   Weimar	   Republic	   as	   examples	   where	  consolidated	  majority	  governments	  supported	  the	  democratic	  system.	  Under	  President	   Ebert	   of	   the	   Social	   Democratic	   Party	   of	   Germany	   (SPD),	   both	  coalition	  governments	  were	  headed	  by	  an	  SPD	  Prime	  Minister	  who	  enjoyed	  strong	   support	   in	   the	   Reichstag.	   Skach	   (2005b:	   16)	   warned	   that	   a	   unified	  majority	  government	  is	  not	  immune	  from	  conflicts	  that	  impede	  effective	  and	  efficient	   policy-­‐making.	   Potential	   conflict	   is	   inherent	   in	   a	   semi-­‐presidential	  constitution,	  she	  argued,	  given	  that	   the	  executive	   is	  divided	   into	   two	  heads.	  For	   example,	   personality	   differences	   between	   the	   president	   and	   prime	  minister	   may	   lead	   to	   increased	   disagreements	   over	   policy	   and	   over	   who	  should	   direct	   government.	  Nevertheless,	   Skach	   (2005b:	   16)	   believed	   that	   a	  unified	  majority	   government	  maximises	   the	   chances	   that	   the	  president	   and	  the	  prime	  minister	  will	  have	   the	   same	  policy	  agenda,	   and	  will	   cooperate	   to	  accomplish	   their	   joint	   agenda.	   The	   first	   hypothesis	   derived	   from	   work	   on	  unified	  majority	  governments	  is,	  therefore:	  
	  
H1:	   Under	   unified	   majority	   government,	   the	   President	   and	   Prime	  
Minister	  are	  likely	  to	  regulate	  institutional	  conflict.	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As	   noted	   earlier,	   the	   President	   traditionally	   has	   more	  constitutional/legal	   power	   in	   the	   area	   of	   defence	   and	   foreign	   affairs.	  Institutional	  conflict	   is	  thus	  more	  likely	  to	  hold	  back	  the	  political	  process	  in	  these	   policy	   areas.	   Similar	   to	   the	   divided	   government	   situation,	   the	   Prime	  Minister	   took	   charge	   of	   the	  defence	  portfolio.	  However,	   the	  Prime	  Minister	  appointed	   a	  member	   of	   the	   coalition	  party	   to	   become	  Foreign	  Minister.	   So,	  the	  second	  hypothesis	  is:	  	  
H2:	   Under	   unified	   majority	   government,	   the	   President	   and	   Prime	  
Minister	   are	   likely	   to	   regulate	   institutional	   conflict	   over	   defence	   and	  
foreign	  affairs.	  
	   Others	   associate	   unified	   majority	   government	   with	   hyper-­‐presidentialism	  and	  democratic	  instability	  (Linz,	  1994;	  Lijphart,	  2004).	  They	  believe	  that	  a	  situation	  in	  which	  he	  president	  and	  the	  parliamentary	  majority	  belong	   to	   the	   same	   political	   force	   encourages	   the	   latter	   to	   act	   beyond	   his	  constitutional	   authority.	   This	   is	   because	   the	   prime	   minister	   becomes	   the	  president’s	  subordinate.	  So,	  the	  situation	  in	  which	  the	  president’s	  ambition	  is	  not	  countered	  by	  the	  ambition	  of	   the	  prime	  minister	  and	  the	  parliamentary	  majority	  makes	  it	  possible	  for	  the	  president	  to	  be	  even	  more	  powerful	  than	  in	  pure	  presidential	  systems	  (Lijphart,	  2004;	  Samuels	  and	  Shugart,	  2010).	  Thus,	  the	  third	  hypothesis	  is:	  	  
H3:	  The	  President	  is	  likely	  to	  accumulate	  power	  under	  unified	  majority	  
government.	  	  
	   182	  
	   In	   the	   section	   ‘Observing	   institutional	   conflict’	   in	   chapter	   2	   we	  identified	  the	  observable	  implications	  of	  conflict	  both	  generally	  as	  well	  as	  in	  defence	  and	  foreign	  policy.	  We	  pointed	  out	  that	  the	  observable	  implications	  of	  conflict	  are	  likely	  to	  manifest	  themselves	  through	  formal	  procedures,	  such	  as	   presidential	   vetoes	   and	   informal	   procedures,	   like	   veto	   threats.	   Under	  unified	  majority	  government	  we	  expect	  most	  of	  the	  observable	   implications	  of	  conflict	  to	  be	  largely	  absent.	  Yet,	  we	  may	  expect	  Parliament	  to	  correct	  the	  President	   when	   the	   latter	   acts	   beyond	   his	   constitutional/legal	   power.	   The	  Parliament	   could,	   for	   instance,	   reject	   the	   President’s	   request	   to	  make	   state	  visits.	  	  	   Similar	  to	   the	  organization	  of	   the	  previous	   chapters,	  we	  will	   not	   test	  H1	  and	  H2	  separately	  given	  that	  the	  latter	  hypothesis	   is	  a	  sub-­‐hypothesis	  of	  the	   former.	   Instead,	  we	   organize	  our	   findings	   into	   three	   categories	   of	  presidential	   power:	   legislative	   powers,	  special	  powers	   in	   the	   appointment	  and	   dismissal	   process,	   and	   proclamatory	   powers.	  In	   the	   conclusion,	   we	  reflect	  on	  whether	  there	  is	  evidence	  in	  these	  areas	  to	  support	  the	  hypotheses.	  By	   contrast,	   we	   will	  test	   H3	   separately	   in	   the	   section	  ‘Accumulation	  of	  power’.	  	  
Presidential	  activism	  in	  the	  legislative	  domain	  During	  unified	  majority	  government,	  President	  Ramos-­‐Horta	  sent	  five	  bills	  to	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  and	  twice	  threatened	  to	  use	  his	  veto	  power.	  Ultimately,	  however,	   Ramos-­‐Horta	   vetoed	   only	   one	   bill.	   As	   noted	   in	   chapter	   4,	   the	  President	  could	  not	  call	  for	  a	  referendum	  due	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  referendum	  law.	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The	   President	   doubted	   about	   the	   constitutionality	   of	   the	   rectified	  2008	  budget	  which	  was	  sent	  to	  for	  him	  approval	   in	  the	  summer	  of	  2008.142	  The	   bill	   proposed	   a	   doubling	   of	   total	   budgetary	   expenditure	   of	   which	   a	  significant	  part	  would	  be	  allocated	  to	  an	  Economic	  Stabilisation	  Fund,	  which	  was	  designed	  to	  combat	  rising	  oil,	  food	  and	  construction	  prices.	  The	  growing	  expenditure	   would	   be	   funded	   through	   a	   withdrawal	   of	   US$686.8	   million	  dollars	  from	  the	  Petroleum	  Fund.	  On	  5	  August	  2008	  Ramos-­‐Horta	  announced	  that	  he	  would	  ask	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  to	  rule	  on	  the	  constitutionality	  of	  the	  rectified	  budget.	  However,	  the	  bill	  was	  promulgated	  before	  the	  Court’s	  ruling.	  Due	  to	  errors	  in	  the	  President's	  office,	  his	  staff	  had	  sent	  the	  document,	  signed	  by	   the	  President,	   to	   the	  National	  Parliament	  after	  Ramos-­‐Horta’s	  departure	  to	   the	   Philippines	   and	   China,	   even	   though	   the	   President	   had	   said	   that	   he	  would	  wait	  for	  the	  Court’s	  ruling	  (Lusa,	  2008).	  The	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  ruled	  that	  the	   rectified	   budget	   was	   unconstitutional,	   given	   that	   the	   newly	   created	  Economic	   Stabilisation	   Fund	   violated	   Timor-­‐Leste’s	   constitutional	  prohibition	  against	  secret	  budgets	   (Section	  145)	  and	  Parliament’s	  power	   to	  oversee	   budgetary	   operations	   (Section	   95q,	   Section	   115d).	   The	   Court	   also	  considered	  the	  additional	  withdrawal	  from	  the	  Petroleum	  Fund	  to	  be	  illegal	  as	   it	  violated	   the	  2005	  Petroleum	  Fund	  Law’s	   requirements	   that	  petroleum	  resources	  must	  be	  managed	  for	  the	  benefit	  of	  current	  and	  future	  generations	  (East	   Timor	   Law	   and	   Justice	   Bulletin,	   2008).	   The	   judgment	   was	   heavily	  criticised	  by	  the	  Government	  and	  the	  President	  of	  Parliament	  petitioned	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142	  Lei	  do	  Parlamento	  12/2008	  de	  5	  de	  Agosto	  ‘Lei	  que	  Aprova	  O	  Orçamento	  Geral	  do	  Estado	  para	  2008	  (1a	  Alteração	  a	  Lei	  No.	  10-­‐2007	  de	  31	  de	  Dezembro)´.	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Court,	  albeit	  unsuccessfully,	  to	  reverse	  its	  decision.	  In	  a	  last-­‐ditch	  attempt	  to	  stop	  it	  from	  taking	  effect,	  Prime	  Minister	  Gusmão	  blocked	  the	  publication	  of	  the	  Judge's	  ruling	  in	  the	  official	  Jornal	  da	  República	  (McDonald,	  2008).	  At	  the	  same	  time,	   the	  Superior	  Council	   for	   the	   Judiciary,	  which	  was	  headed	  by	   the	  Secretary-­‐General	  of	  Gusmão's	  party,	  Dionísio	  Babo,	  declared	  that	  he	  would	  not	  accept	  the	  Court’s	  ruling.	  After	  the	  Court’s	  decision,	  Babo	  terminated	  the	  contract	  of	  the	  acting	  President	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal,	  the	  Portuguese	  Judge	  Ivo	  Rosa	  (McDonald,	  2008).	  Given	  that	  the	  judgment	  was	  not	  retroactive	  and	  came	  towards	  the	  end	  of	  the	  fiscal	  year,	  it	  had	  limited	  practical	  effect;	  as	  at	  31	  December	   2008	   US$396	   million	   had	   been	   withdrawn	   from	   the	   Petroleum	  Fund	  (United	  Nations	  Secretary-­‐General,	  2009).	  	  Ramos-­‐Horta	  promulgated	  both	   the	   general	   and	   the	   rectified	  budget	  of	   2010	   but	   threatened	   that	   he	   would	   veto	   the	   budget	   of	   2011	   if	   the	  Government	  failed	  to	  include	  provision	  for	  road	  repairs	  in	  rural	  areas	  (ETAN,	  2010f).	   On	   28	   January	   2011,	   the	   budget	   was	   approved	   and	   sent	   to	   the	  President	  for	  approval.	  Six	  days	  later,	  the	  President	  decided	  to	  ask	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  to	  review	  the	  constitutionality	  of	  the	  budget	  (La'o	  Hamutuk,	  2011).	  The	   President	   doubted	   the	   constitutionality	   of	   establishing	   two	   new	   funds,	  the	  ‘Infrastructure	  Fund’	  and	  the	  ´Human	  Capital	  Development	  Fund’,	  worth	  respectively	   US$599	   and	   US$25	   million.	   The	   Infrastructure	   Fund	   was	  designed	  to	  finance	  infrastructural	  projects,	  like	  roads,	  bridges,	  ports,	  power	  grids	   etc.	   that	  would	   cost	  more	   than	  one	  million	  dollars	   or	   take	  more	   than	  one	   year	   to	   build.	   The	   Human	   Capital	   Development	   Fund	  was	   designed	   to	  improve	   the	   nation’s	   education,	   health	   and	   justice	   sector.	   According	   to	   the	  President,	   the	   funds	   lacked	   transparency	   because	   the	   government	   failed	   to	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provide	  details	  on	  how	  they	  would	  be	  spent.	  The	  President	  also	  believed	  that	  the	  transfer	  of	  US$321	  million	  from	  the	  Petroleum	  Fund	  was	  illegal.	  The	  2011	  budget	   was	   a	   98	   per	   cent	   increase	   over	   the	   original	   2010	   state	   budget.	  According	   to	   a	   CNRT	   deputy,	   the	   President	   had	   requested	   a	   constitutional	  review	   out	   of	   vengeance	   and	   not	   because	   he	   thought	   that	   the	   budget	   was	  unconstitutional:	   ‘President	   Horta	   is	   frustrated,	   because	   Xanana	   [Gusmão]	  and	  AMP	  [the	  Parliamentary	  Majority	  Alliance]	  will	  not	  support	  his	  candidacy	  in	  2012’	   (Riseup,	   2011c).	  He	   added	   that	   the	  President	  bore	   ill	  will	   because	  the	  Government	  had	  rejected	  the	  request	  to	  set	  up	  an	  asylum	  seeker	  centre	  in	  the	  country	  (see	  below)	  and	  Parliament	  had	  removed	  US$1	  million	  that	  was	  allocated	  to	  his	  office.	  The	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  ruled	  that	  the	  budget	  bill	  did	  not	  violate	   the	   Constitution	   and	   the	   President	   promulgated	   it	   into	   law	   on	   14	  February	  2011.	  	  Again	   in	   May	   2011,	   the	   President	   warned	   that	   the	   budget	   of	   2012	  should	   not	   exceed	   the	   budget	   of	   2011,	   given	   that	   the	   government	   was	  incapable	  of	  executing	  previous	  budgets	  and	   ‘probably	  will	  not	  succeed	  this	  year’	  (Ramos-­‐Horta,	  2011c).	  Ramos-­‐Horta	  again	  threatened	  to	  veto	  the	  2012	  state	  budget	  because,	  in	  his	  opinion,	  too	  much	  money	  was	  spent	  by	  members	  of	  the	  cabinet	  on	  trips	  abroad	  and	  because	  he	  did	  not	  want	  to	  see	  ‘any	  cent	  of	  money	   allocated	   for	   international	   visits’	   (ETAN,	   2011).	   The	   President’s	  critique	   prompted	   the	   Prime	   Minister	   to	   comment	   that	   the	   President	   of	  Republic	  could	  reject	  or	  disagree	  with	  the	  amount	  of	  the	  budget	  proposed	  but	  only	  the	  Parliament	  had	  the	  constitutional	  competence	  to	  approve	  it	  (Diário	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Nacional,	   2011).	   The	  2012	  budget	  was	   approved	  on	  25	  November	  2011.143	  The	  President	  promulgated	  the	  budget	  on	  15	  December	  2011	  but	  expressed	  concern	  that	  it	  would	  be	  difficult	  to	  spend	  such	  a	  large	  amount	  of	  money	  with	  most	  political	  leaders	  preoccupied	  with	  the	  election	  of	  2012.	  	  President	   Ramos-­‐Horta	   also	   sent	   two	   electoral	   bills	   to	   the	   Court	   of	  Appeal	   for	   constitutional	   review.	   On	   18	   June	   2009	   President	   Ramos-­‐Horta	  asked	  the	  Court	   to	  review	  the	  constitutionality	  of	   the	  bill	  on	   the	  Election	  of	  Village	  Chiefs	   and	  Councils.144	  The	  Bill	   defined	   the	   scope	  of	   the	   community	  leadership	  structures	  and	  the	  procedures	  for	  their	  election.	   It	  provided	  that	  political	  parties	  were	  barred	  from	  submitting	  candidates	  and	  prohibited	  any	  link	   between	   candidacies	   and	   political	   parties.	   It	   also	   defined	   the	   electoral	  system,	   the	   competencies	   for	   the	   Suco145	   Chiefs	   and	   Councils	   and	   the	  allowance	  of	  Suco	  authorities.	  The	  bill	  was	  approved	  by	  Parliament	  on	  4	  June	  2009.	   The	   President	   of	   Republic,	   in	   accordance	   to	   Section	   149	   of	   the	  Constitution	  of	  Timor-­‐Leste,	   requested	   the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	   to	  undertake	  an	  anticipatory	   review	  of	   the	   constitutionality	  of	   the	  bill	   on	   the	  grounds,	   inter	  alia,	  of	  the	  non-­‐participation	  of	  political	  parties,	  the	  violation	  of	  the	  principle	  of	   representation	   and	   the	   fact	   that	   Suco-­‐bodies	   were	   not	   considered	   local	  government	   and	  were	  not	   part	   of	   the	  Public	  Administration.	   The	  President	  promulgated	  the	  bill	  on	  8	  July	  2009	  after	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  had	  ruled	  that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
143	  Lei	  do	  Parlamento	  Nacional	  16/2011	  de	  21	  de	  Dezembro	  ‘Aprova	  o	  Orçamento	  Geral	  do	  Estado	  da	  República	  Democrática	  de	  Timor	  Leste	  para	  2012’.	  144	  Lei	  do	  Parlamento	  Nacional	  3/2009	  de	  8	  de	  Julho	  2009	  ‘Lideranças	  Comunitárias	  e	  Sua	  Eleição’.	  145	  Composite	  villages.	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the	  bill	  was	  constitutional.	  The	   first	   local	   elections	   took	  place	  on	  9	  October	  2009.	   The	   President	   also	   doubted	   the	   constitutionality	   of	   the	   Bill	   on	  Municipal	   Elections.	   President	   Ramos-­‐Horta	   refused	   to	   sign	   the	   legislation	  and	  asked	   the	  Court	   to	  examine	   its	   constitutionality	  on	  6	   July	  2009	   (ETAN,	  2009).	  In	  April	  2010	  the	  President	  suggested	  postponing	  municipal	  elections	  to	  2013	  given	  that	  no	   legislation	  on	  decentralization	  had	  been	  approved	  by	  Parliament	  and	  no	  political	  consensus	  existed	  on	  administrative	  boundaries	  and	   other	   related	   issues.	   Prime	   Minister	   Gusmão	   then	   announced	   that	  municipal	  elections	  would	  be	  postponed	  to	  2014.	  In	   June	  2011,	   the	  President	  approved	   the	  bills	  on	   legislative	  and	   the	  presidential	   elections.146	   The	   bills	   provided	   that	   Timor-­‐Leste	   citizens	   who	  were	   living	   abroad	   could	   participate	   in	   the	   presidential	   and	   parliamentary	  elections	   of	   2012.	   Despite	   ‘doubts	   and	   hesitations’,	   the	   President	  promulgated	  the	  bills	   into	   law	  after	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  assured	  him	  that	  he	  would	  submit	  additional	  legislation	  that	  would	  regulate	  a	  mechanism	  to	  vote	  by	  mail	  (Lusa,	  2011).	  Yet,	  following	  his	  election	  defeat	  in	  March	  2012,	  which	  coincided	  with	  the	  end	  of	  unified	  majority	  government,	  the	  President	  harshly	  criticised	  both	   laws,	  accusing	   legislators	  of	   ‘brainless	   stupidity’	   (East	  Timor	  Law	   and	   Justice	   Bulletin,	   2012a).	   According	   to	   Ramos-­‐Horta,	   legislation	  should	  ‘facilitate	  people	  to	  participate	  [in	  elections],	  not	  to	  create	  difficulties’	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146	  Lei	  do	  Parlamento	  Nacional	  7/2011	  de	  22	  de	  Junho	  ‘Segunda	  Alteração	  à	  Lei	  6/2006,	  de	  28	  de	  Dezembro	  -­‐	  Lei	  eleitoral	  para	  o	  Parlamento	  Nacional’;	  Lei	  do	  Parlamento	  Nacional	  8/2011	  de	  22	  de	  Junho	  ‘Segunda	  Alteração	  à	  Lei	  7/2006,	  de	  28	  de	  Dezembro	  -­‐	  Lei	  eleitoral	  para	  o	  Presidente	  da	  República’.	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(East	   Timor	   Law	   and	   Justice	   Bulletin,	   2012a).	   The	   electoral	   laws	  were	   not	  amended	  due	  to	  lack	  of	  quorum.	  The	   fifth	  and	   last	  bill	   that	  was	  sent	  by	  Ramos-­‐Horta	   to	   the	  Court	   for	  posteriori	   constitutional	   review	   concerned	   the	   First	   Amendment	   Statute	   of	  the	   Public	   Prosecutor’s	   Office	  which	   passed	   in	   Parliament	   in	   June	   2011.147	  The	   bill	   amended	   the	   2005	   Statute	   on	   the	   Public	   Prosecution	   Service	   and	  stipulated	   that	   only	   judges	   or	   prosecutors	   could	   be	   nominated	   Prosecutor-­‐General	   (PG).	   If	   the	   Court	   found	   that	   the	   law	   violated	   the	   Constitution,	   the	  incumbent	  PG	  and	   former	  wife	  of	   the	  President,	  Ana	  Pessoa,	  would	  need	  to	  resign	   (Riseup,	  2011b).	  President	  Ramos-­‐Horta	   sent	   the	  bill	   to	   the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	   on	   16	   September	   2011.	   After	   the	   Court	   held	   that	   the	   law	   was	  constitutional,	   the	  President	  promulgated	  the	  bill	   into	  law	  on	  19	  September	  2011.	  The	  Court’s	  ruling	  did	  not	  have	  practical	  effect	  for	  the	  PG	  remained	  in	  office.	   According	   to	   the	   President,	   it	  was	   agreed	   that	   the	   PG	  Pessoa	   should	  serve	  out	  her	  full-­‐term.148	  	  During	   unified	  majority	   government,	   President	   Ramos-­‐Horta	   vetoed	  the	  Law	  on	  Precedence	   in	  State	  Protocol.149	  On	  19	  April	  2010	   the	  Law	  was	  passed	  by	  Parliament	  and	  sent	  to	  the	  President	  for	  approval.150	  According	  to	  the	  President	  the	  Bill	  was	  written	  by	  people	  ‘who	  had	  not	  the	  slightest	  notion	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
147	  Lei	  do	  Parlamento	  Nacional	  11/2011	  de	  28	  de	  Setembro	  ‘Primeira	  alteração	  à	  Lei	  n.o	  14/2005,	  de	  16	  de	  Setembro	  Estatuto	  do	  Ministério	  Público’.	  148	  Author’s	  e-­‐mail	  exchange	  with	  former	  Prime	  Minister	  and	  President	  José	  Ramos-­‐Horta,	  19	  April	  2013.	  149	  PPL	  32/II	  ‘Precedências	  do	  Protocolo	  do	  Estado.	  	  150	  Secretariado	  Do	  Parlamento	  Nacional	  (2012)	  'Projectos	  e	  Propostas	  de	  Lei	  Vetados	  de	  2002	  a	  2012',	  Dili:	  Parlamento	  Nacional	  da	  República	  Democrática	  de	  Timor-­‐Leste.	  In	  author’s	  collection.	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of	  protocol	  and	  precedence.	  It	  was	  an	  absolute	  mess’.151	  Whereas	  Ministry	  of	  Foreign	   Affairs	   made	   some	   suggestions	   on	   how	   to	   improve	   the	   bill	   the	  Parliament	  did	  not	  react	  so	  the	  legislation	  expired.152	  President	  Ramos-­‐Horta’s	  use	  of	  his	  power	  to	  pardon	  brought	  him	  into	  conflict	  with	  the	  parliamentary	  majority	  but	  also	  manifested	  the	  President’s	  ideological	   proximity	   to	   Prime	  Minister	   Gusmão.	   In	   a	   concerted	  move,	   the	  President	  and	  Prime	  Minister	  Gusmão	  and	  with	  the	  ‘reluctant’	  cooperation	  of	  the	  Minister	  of	  Justice	  released	  Maternus	  Bere	  (La'o	  Hamutuk,	  2009).	  Bere,	  a	  former	   pro-­‐Indonesian	   militia	   leader,	   was	   indicted	   by	   the	   United	   Nations	  Serious	  Crimes	  Unit	  for	  war	  crimes,	  crimes	  against	  humanity	  and	  genocide.153	  Bere’s	   release	  sparked	  a	  heated	  debate	   in	  parliament.	  Deputies	  accused	   the	  leaders	  of	  obstructing	  the	  prosecution	  of	  those	  responsible	  for	  abuses	  during	  Indonesia’s	   occupation	   of	   Timor-­‐Leste.	   Yet,	   the	   President	   believed	   that	  restoring	   good	   relations	   with	   Indonesia	   was	   more	   important	   than	  ‘prosecutorial	   justice’	   (Agence	   France	   Presse,	   2009).	   In	   protest,	   the	  Parliament	  voted	  against	   the	  President’s	   state	  visits	   to	  New	  York,	  Denmark	  and	  Germany	  (Timor	  Post,	  2009).	  The	  President	  then	  threatened	  to	  resign	  if	  he	   was	   not	   permitted	   to	   travel	   abroad.	   The	   President’s	   threat	   led	   the	  Parliament	   to	   reverse	   its	   decision	   (Agence	   France	   Presse,	   2009).	   After	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
151	  Author	  e-­‐mail	  exchange	  with	  former	  Prime	  Minister	  and	  President	  José	  Ramos-­‐Horta,	  19	  April	  2013.	  152	   According	   to	   the	   former	   Foreign	  Minister,	   deputies	   disagreed	   on	   the	   hierarchy	  within	   Parliament.	   Interview	  with	   former	   Foreign	  Minister	   Zacarias	   da	   Costa,	  Dili,	  16	  May	  2013.	  153	  In	  February	  2003,	  the	  UN/RDTL	  Serious	  Crimes	  Unit	  issued	  indictment	  9/2003,	  charging	   Maternus	   Bere	   and	   others	   with	   ‘crimes	   against	   humanity:	   murder,	  extermination,	   enforced	   disappearance,	   torture,	   inhumane	   acts,	   rape,	   deportation	  and	  persecution.’	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Gusmão	   stated	   in	   a	   national	   televised	   address	   that	   he	   was	   responsible	   for	  Bere’s	   release,	   the	   party	   bench	   leader	   of	   FRETILIN	   introduced	   a	  motion	   of	  no-­‐confidence	  in	  parliament.	  The	  motion	  was	  rejected,	  however.	  	  In	  2010,	  a	  similar	  political	  compromise	  between	  the	  President	  and	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  was	  reached	  over	  the	  fate	  of	  ex-­‐rebel	  leader	  Gastão	  Salsinha.	  Salsinha	  had	  been	  sentenced	  to	  ten	  years	  and	  eight	  months	  in	  prison	  for	  his	  role	  in	  the	  attacks	  on	  the	  President	  and	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  in	  February	  2008.	  Prior	  to	  the	  Independence	  Restoration	  Day	  celebrations	  on	  20	  May	  2010,	  the	  President	   received	   the	   government’s	   proposal	   for	   approximately	   100	  prisoners	   to	   be	   pardoned.	   Yet,	   the	   President	   refused	   to	   pardon	   prisoners	  who,	   in	   the	   view	   of	   the	   Government,	   were	   eligible	   for	   a	   reduced	   sentence	  given	   that	  Salsinha	  and	  23	  other	  rebels	  were	  not	   included	   in	   the	   list.	  Three	  months	  later,	  in	  August	  2010,	  all	  rebels	  who	  were	  convicted	  for	  their	  role	  in	  the	   attacks	   on	   the	  President	   and	  Prime	  Minister	  were	   freed.	   The	  President	  stated	   that	   the	   rebels	   were	   released	   because	   they	   were	   victims	   as	   well	  (Murdoch,	   2010).	   In	   2011	   the	   Minister	   of	   Justice	   again	   expressed	   concern	  over	   the	   President’s	   excessive	   use	   of	   his	   pardon	   power.154	   In	   2011	   the	  President	  asked	  the	  government	  to	  compose	  a	  list	  of	  100	  prisoners	  who	  were	  to	   be	   pardoned	   on	   Christmas	   day.	   In	   a	   press	   conference	   the	   Minister	   of	  Justice	   expressed	   her	   frustration	   about	   the	   President’s	   intervention	   but	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
154	   Between	   2007	   and	   2010	   President	   Ramos-­‐Horta	   granted	   32	   ‘full	   pardons’	   and	  132	   commutations.	   See:	   Center	   for	   International	   Governance	   Innovation	   (2011)	  'Timor-­‐Leste'.	   Available	   at	  http://www.jsmp.minihub.org/English/webpage/reso/SSR%20Monitor%20-­‐%20Timor-­‐Leste%20Pardons%20-­‐%20Jan%202011.pdf	  (last	  accessed	  30th	  August	  2011).	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explained	  that	  the	  Government	  could	  not	  do	  anything,	  ‘because	  the	  President	  has	  prerogative	  power	   to	  give	  pardon	   to	   the	  prisoners’	   (Timor-­‐Leste	  Media	  Development	  Center	  (TLMDC),	  2011).	  	  Tension	  between	  the	  President	  and	  the	  Justice	  Minister	  in	  this	  domain	  revolved	  around	  Rogério	  Lobato,	   the	   former	  FRETILIN	  Minister	   for	   Interior	  Affairs.	   Lobato	  was	   jailed	   in	   2006	   and	  was	   serving	   a	   seven-­‐and-­‐a-­‐half-­‐year	  term	  of	  imprisonment	  for	  manslaughter	  and	  illegally	  distributing	  weapons	  to	  civilians	  during	  the	  2006	  crisis.	  Lobato	  left	  Timor-­‐Leste	  in	  August	  2007	  after	  the	  Court	   granted	  him	  permission	   to	   fly	   to	  Malaysia	   for	  medical	   treatment.	  The	  new	  AMP	  government	  had	  tried	  to	  prevent	  the	  plane	  from	  taking	  off	  but	  failed	  (Murdoch,	  2007).	  In	  April	  2008	  Ramos-­‐Horta	  announced	  that	  he	  would	  pardon	   Lobato	   despite	   the	   government’s	   advice	   not	   to	   do	   so.	   The	   Justice	  Minister	   declared	   that	   Lobato	   was	   unlikely	   to	   benefit	   from	   any	   sentence	  reduction	  and	  she	  would	  ‘take	  steps	  to	  bring	  him	  back	  by	  force	  if	  necessary’	  (Jolliffe,	   2008).	   According	   to	   the	   Justice	   Minister	   and	   cousin	   of	   the	   ex-­‐Minister,	  the	  President	  could	  only	  reduce	  sentences	  but	  not	  issue	  an	  amnesty,	  which	   was	   the	   exclusive	   domain	   of	   the	   parliament.	   However,	   the	   Justice	  Minister	   caved	   in	   to	   the	   President’s	   demands.	   In	   a	   televised	   speech,	   the	  Justice	  Minister	  announced	  that	  the	  government	  had	  listed	  100	  prisoners	  for	  remission,	  including	  Lobato.	  Lobato	  was	  released	  from	  jail	  in	  June	  2008.	  	   So	   we	   observed	   some	   conflict	   between	   the	   President,	   the	   Prime	  Minister	  and	  parliamentary	  majority.	  President	  Ramos-­‐Horta	  vetoed	  one	  law	  made	   by	   Parliament.	   He	   also	   doubted	   on	   the	   constitutionality	   of	   five	   other	  laws.	   Instead	   of	   vetoing	   them,	   he	   decided	   to	   request	   the	   Court	   to	   review	  whether	   these	   laws	   violated	   the	   Constitution.	   The	   President	   did	   not	   even	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protest	   when	   the	   Government	   approved	   a	   law	   that	   was	   declared	  unconstitutional.	   The	   Government	   and	   Parliament,	   for	   their	   part,	   accepted	  that	  PG	  Pessoa	  could	  serve	  out	  her	  full-­‐term	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  according	  to	  the	  newly	   adopted	   law	   she	  needed	   to	   resign.	   Likewise,	   the	  President’s	   sole	  veto	  was	  not	   overridden	  by	  Parliament	   but	   expired.	   It	  might	   also	   be	  noted	  that	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  his	  defeat	  in	  the	  2012	  presidential	  election,	  President	  Ramos-­‐Horta	   vetoed	   three	   bills	   on	   land,	   namely	   the	   Land	   Law,	   the	  Expropriation	  Law	  and	  the	  Real	  Estate	  Fund	  Law.155	  Due	  to	   lack	  of	  quorum	  the	  bills	  were	  neither	  overridden	  nor	  amended	  (East	  Timor	  Law	  and	  Justice	  Bulletin,	   2012b).The	   three	   vetoes	   were,	   however,	   issued	   after	   the	   period	  under	  consideration	  in	  this	  chapter.	  The	   enactment	   of	   important	   national	   security	   legislation	   indicated	  that	   President	   Ramos-­‐Horta	   agreed	   with	   Gusmão’s	   defence	   policy.	   The	  February	   2008	   attacks,	   which	   resulted	   in	   the	   near	   fatal	   injury	   of	   the	  President	  and	  the	  wounding	  of	  the	  Prime	  Minister,	  prompted	  both	  leaders	  to	  work	  together	  to	  improve	  the	  internal	  security	  situation.	  Unlike	  in	  2006	  and	  2007	   under	   the	   situation	   of	   cohabitation	   and	   divided	   government	  respectively,	   Parliament	   confirmed	   the	   state	   of	   emergency	   and	   authorized	  the	  President	  to	  renew	  the	  state	  of	  emergency	  another	  three	  times.156	  In	  an	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
155	  Decreto	  do	  Parlamento	  Nacional	  34/II	  ‘Regime	  Especial	  para	  a	  Definição	  da	  Titularidade	  dos	  Bens	  Imovéis’;	  Decreto	  do	  Parlamento	  Nacional	  35/II	  ‘Lei	  das	  Expropriações’;	  Decreto	  do	  Parlamento	  Nacional	  36/II	  ‘Fundo	  Financeiro	  Imobiliário’.	  Secretariado	  Do	  Parlamento	  Nacional	  (2012)	  'Projectos	  e	  Propostas	  de	  
Lei	  Vetados	  de	  2002	  a	  2012',	  Dili:	  Parlamento	  Nacional	  da	  República	  Democrática	  de	  Timor-­‐Leste.	  In	  author’s	  collection.	  156	  Lei	  do	  Parlamento	  1/2008	  de	  11	  de	  Fevereiro	  ‘Lei	  que	  Autoriza	  o	  Presidente	  da	  República	  a	  Declarar	  o	  Estado	  do	  Sítio	  (De	  11	  de	  Fevereiro	  ate	  13	  de	  Fevereiro	  de	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effort	   to	   capture	   the	  ones	   responsible	   for	   the	  attacks	   the	  police	  was	  placed	  under	   military	   command.157	   The	   so-­‐called	   Joint	   Operation	   Command	   was	  disbanded	  in	  June	  2008	  but	  cooperation	  continued	  between	  the	  two	  security	  forces.	   In	  this	  context,	   the	  Ministry	  of	  Security	  and	  Defence	  was	  established	  which	  brought	  the	  armed	  forces	  and	  the	  police	  under	  a	  unified	  authority.158	  Moreover,	   a	   package	   of	   three	   laws	   was	   passed	   in	   March	   2010	   that	   was	  designed	   to	   create	   a	   legislative	   basis	   for	   legitimating	   joint	   police-­‐army	  operations.159	  The	  successful	  cooperation	  between	  the	  military	  and	  the	  police	  forces	  was	  exceptional,	  to	  say	  the	  least.	  Barely	  two	  years	  previously,	  security	  forces	  were	  involved	  in	  deadly	  confrontations,	  forcing	  the	  Government	  to	  call	  for	   foreign	   troops	   to	   restore	   peace	   and	   stability.	   So,	   due	   to	   the	   close	  cooperation	  between	  Ramos-­‐Horta	   and	  Gusmão	  crucial	  defence	  policy	   laws	  passed	  under	  divided	  government	  and,	   in	  particular	  under	  unified	  majority	  government.	   The	   President’s	   use	   of	   his	   pardoning	   power	   brought	   him	   into	  conflict	  with	  the	  Minister	  of	   Justice	  and	  the	  parliamentary	  majority.	  Yet,	  his	  forgive-­‐and-­‐forget	  policy	  enjoyed	  full	  support	  of	  the	  Prime	  Minister.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2008)’;	  Lei	  do	  Parlamento	  2/2008	  de	  13	  de	  Fevereiro	  ‘Lei	  que	  Autoriza	  o	  Presidente	  da	  República	  a	  Renovar	  a	  Declaração	  do	  Estado	  de	  Sítio	  (De	  13	  de	  Fevereiro	  ate	  23	  de	  Fevereiro	  de	  2008)’;	  Lei	  do	  Parlamento	  4/2008	  de	  22	  de	  Fevereiro	  ‘Lei	  que	  Autoriza	  o	  Presidente	  da	  República	  a	  Renovar	  a	  Declaração	  do	  Estado	  do	  Sítio	  (de	  23	  de	  Fevereiro	  ate	  23	  de	  Março	  de	  2008)’;	  Lei	  do	  Parlamento	  7/2008	  de	  22	  de	  Abril	  ‘Lei	  que	  Autoriza	  o	  Presidente	  da	  República	  a	  Renovar	  a	  Declaração	  do	  Estado	  de	  Sítio	  no	  Distrito	  de	  Ermera	  (de	  22	  de	  Abril	  ate	  21	  de	  Maio	  2008).	  157	  Decreto	  do	  Presidente	  da	  República	  45/2008	  de	  22	  de	  Fevereiro,	  Resolução	  do	  Governo	  3/2008	  de	  17	  de	  Fevereiro	  .	  	  158	  Decreto-­‐lei	  do	  Governo	  31/2008	  de	  13	  de	  Agosto	  ‘Orgânica	  do	  Ministério	  da	  Defesa	  e	  Segurança’.	  159	  Lei	  do	  Parlamento	  Nacional	  2/2010	  de	  21	  de	  Abril	  ‘Lei	  de	  Segurança	  Nacional’;	  Lei	  do	  Parlamento	  Nacional	  3/2010	  de	  21	  de	  Abril	  ‘Lei	  de	  Defesa	  Nacional’;	  Lei	  do	  Parlamento	  Nacional	  4/2010	  de	  21	  de	  Abril	  ‘Lei	  de	  Segurança	  Interna’.	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Presidential	  activism	  in	  the	  appointment	  and	  dismissal	  process	  The	   Constitution	   of	   the	   Democratic	   Republic	   of	   Timor-­‐Leste	   gives	   the	  President	  certain	  powers	  to	  appoint	  or	  dismiss	  state	  officials.	   In	  the	  area	  of	  Foreign	   Affairs,	   the	   Constitution	   empowers	   the	   President	   to	   appoint	   and	  dismiss	   ambassadors,	   following	   a	   proposal	   by	   the	   government,	   permanent	  representative	  and	  special	  envoys	  (Section	  87b).	   In	  the	  area	  of	  Defence,	   the	  Constitution	   requires	   the	   President	   to	   appoint	   and	   dismiss,	   following	   a	  proposal	  by	  the	  Government,	  the	  General	  Chief	  of	  Staff	  of	  the	  Defence	  force,	  the	  Deputy	  General	  Chief	  of	  Staff	  of	  the	  Defence	  Force,	  and	  the	  Chiefs	  of	  Staff	  of	   the	   Defence	   force,	   after	   consultation	   with	   the	   General	   Chief	   of	   Staff	  regarding	  the	  latter	  two	  cases	  (Section	  86m).	  President	  Ramos-­‐Horta	  opposed	  Timor-­‐Leste’s	  foreign	  policy	  towards	  Myanmar.	   A	   rift	   emerged	   between	   the	   President	   and	   Foreign	   Minister	   Da	  Costa	   about	   the	   question	   as	   to	  whether	   to	   vote	   in	   favour	   of	   or	   against	   UN	  resolutions	  condemning	  the	  internal	  situation	  in	  Myanmar.	  On	  23	  December	  2009,	  the	  Timorese	  Ambassador	  to	  the	  United	  Nations,	  Nelson	  Santos,	  voted	  in	   favour	   of	   a	   General	   Assembly	   resolution	   on	   human	   rights	   violations	   in	  Myanmar,	  which	  was	  passed	  by	  86	  votes	   to	  23	  with	  39	  abstentions.	  Santos	  was	   continuing	   Timor-­‐Leste's	   previous	   policy	   of	   supporting	   this	   annual	  resolution,	   following	   guidance	   from	   the	   President	   (Roughneen,	   2010).	  However,	   Da	   Costa	   instructed	   Santos	   to	   abstain	   from	   this	   vote	   so	   as	   to	   be	  more	   in	   line	   with	   ASEAN	   countries.	   When	   Santos	   voted	   in	   favour	   of	   the	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resolution,	  Da	  Costa	  fired	  him.160	  The	  President	  opposed	  the	  abrupt	  decision	  of	   the	   Minister	   of	   Foreign	   Affairs,	   even	   more	   so	   because	   Prime	   Minister	  Gusmão	  had	  not	  been	  consulted	  on	  the	  recall	  of	  the	  Ambassador	  to	  the	  UN.161	  	  Nelson’s	  dismissal	  was	  widely	   criticised	   in	  Parliament	  with	  deputies	  saying	   that	  Da	  Costa	  had	  damaged	   the	   country's	   image	   (Timor	  Post,	  2010).	  During	   the	   first	   week	   of	   February	   2010,	   Nelson	   Santos,	   the	   President,	   the	  Foreign	  Minister	  and	  deputy	  Prime	  Ministers	  had	  several	  discussions	  in	  Dili	  about	  how	  to	  salvage	  the	  situation	  (La'o	  Hamutuk,	  2010).	  In	  December	  2010	  Nelson	   Santos	   was	   appointed	   Ambassador	   to	   Belgium	   and	   the	   European	  Union.162	  The	  problem	  was	  solved	  given	  that	  the	  UN	  did	  not	  adopt	  any	  new	  resolutions	  on	  Myanmar	  after	  2010.	  	   The	  President	  mediated	  in	  a	  dispute	  between	  Prime	  Minister	  Gusmão	  and	  Foreign	  Minister	  Da	  Costa	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  save	  the	  coalition	  government.	  Tension	  between	  the	  two	  Ministers	  arose	  after	  Gusmão	  recalled	  the	  country’s	  ambassadors	   to	   Dili	   to	   attend	   the	   Development	   Partners	   meeting	   in	   April	  2010.	   The	   Prime	   Minister’s	   recall	   order,	   however,	   overrode	   the	   Foreign	  Minister’s	  previous	  order	  that	  the	  ambassadors	  should	  remain	  at	  their	  posts.	  According	  to	  Da	  Costa,	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  bypassed	  his	  orders.	  Therefore,	  he	  threatened	  to	  resign.	  The	  Foreign	  Minister’s	  party,	  the	  PSD,	  backed	  Da	  Costa	  and	  announced	  that	  it	  would	  withdraw	  from	  the	  coalition	  Government	  if	  the	  Foreign	  Minister	  were	   fired.	   For	   his	   part,	   the	  Prime	  Minister	   threatened	   to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
160	  Interview	  with	  former	  Foreign	  Minister	  Zacarias	  da	  Costa,	  Dili,	  16	  May	  2013.	  161	  Author’s	  e-­‐mail	  exchange	  with	  José	  Ramos-­‐Horta,	  19	  April	  2013.	  	  162	  Decreto	  do	  Presidente	  da	  República	  55/2010	  de	  1	  de	  Dezembro	  ‘É	  nomeado	  Embaixador	  Extraordinário	  e	  Plenipotenciário,	  da	  República	  Democrática	  de	  Timor-­‐Leste,	  o	  Sr.	  Nelson	  Santos,	  para	  a	  União	  Europeia	  e	  o	  Reino	  da	  Bélgica’.	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call	  early	  elections	  in	  the	  event	  that	  Da	  Costa	  tendered	  his	  resignation.	  In	  an	  effort	   solve	   the	   standoff,	   President	   Ramos-­‐Horta	   urged	   both	   parties	   to	  immediately	   solve	   the	   problem	   (Riseup,	   2010c).	   He	   also	   promised	   to	   hold	  dialogue	   with	   the	   Prime	   Minister	   and	   the	   PSD	   leadership,	   including	   the	  Foreign	  Minister.	   Eventually,	   Da	   Costa	   remained	   in	   his	   post	   as	   Minister	   of	  Foreign	   Affairs	   and,	   hence,	   institutional	   conflict	   did	   not	   lapse	   into	   political	  instability.	  	  In	   sum,	   we	   observed	   some	   friction	   between	   the	   President	   and	   the	  Minister	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  about	  the	  dismissal	  of	  the	  Timorese	  Ambassador	  to	   the	   United	  Nations,	   Nelson	   Santos.	   Yet,	   the	   conflict	   did	   not	   escalate	   and	  Santos	   was	   offered	   another	   position.	   We	   also	   observed	   the	   President’s	  willingness	   to	   help	   the	   Prime	  Minister’s	   AMP	   Government	   to	   survive	   after	  one	   of	   its	   coalition	   partners,	   the	   PSD,	   threatened	   to	   withdraw	   from	   the	  Government.	   The	   President	   also	   asked	   for	   a	   cabinet	   reshuffle	   but	   accepted	  the	  Prime	  Minister’s	  refusal	  to	  do	  so.	  	  
Proclamatory	  powers	  The	   President	   may	   use	   proclamatory	   powers	   to	   influence	   day-­‐to-­‐day	  government.	  The	  Constitution	  authorises	  the	  President	  to	  address	  messages	  to	   the	   National	   Parliament	   and	   the	   country	   (Section	   86e).	   Presidential	  speeches	  can	  either	  support	  or	  criticise	  the	  government	  and	  its	  policies.	  Ramos-­‐Horta	  used	  presidential	  proclamations	   to	  express	  his	  opinion	  on	  the	  state	  budgets.	  In	  2007	  the	  President	  publicly	  supported	  2007	  budget,	  urging	  Parliament	  to	  approve	  it.	  In	  his	  2008	  New	  Year’s	  speech	  Ramos-­‐Horta	  showed	  a	  similar	  confidence	   in	   the	  Government	  when	  he	   told	   the	  people	  of	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Timor-­‐Leste	  not	  to	  worry	  given	  that	  the	  state	  budget	  of	  2008	  ‘would	  benefit	  thousands	   of	   people	   in	   the	   nation’	   (Ramos-­‐Horta,	   2011a).	   However,	   from	  August	   2008	   onwards,	   the	   President	   demonstrated	   an	   increasing	  preoccupation	  with,	   in	   particular,	   the	   growing	   size	   of	   the	   budget.	   As	   noted	  earlier,	   the	  President	   sent	   the	  2008	   rectified	  budget	   to	   the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  for	  constitutional	  review.	  In	  a	  speech	  to	  the	  Nation	  in	  2009	  President	  Ramos-­‐Horta	   expressed	   his	   concerns	   about	   the	   growth	   of	   the	   budget	   and	   openly	  questioned	   whether	   the	   Government	   was	   capable	   of	   executing	   it	   (Radio	  Televisaun	  Timor-­‐Leste,	  2009).	  The	   2010	   presidential	   proclamations	   revealed	   a	   President	   who	   had	  become	   increasingly	   intolerant	   of	   corruption	   within	   the	   Government’s	  offices.	  In	  his	  New	  Year’s	  speech	  in	  early	  January	  2010	  the	  President	  accused	  the	   Government	   of	   gross	   mismanagement,	   waste	   and	   corruption.	   The	  President	   concluded	   his	   tirade	   by	   saying	   that	   he	   respected	   his	   ‘brother’	  Gusmão	   and	   trusted	   that	   under	   his	   leadership	   the	   Fourth	   Constitutional	  Government	  would	  perform	  better	  to	  serve	  the	  people	  (Ramos-­‐Horta,	  2010).	  In	  early	  January	  2010	  Ramos-­‐Horta	  told	  an	  New	  Zealand	  newspaper	  that	  he	  did	  not	  want	  a	  nation	  whose	  name	  was	  dirty	  in	  the	  international	  world	  due	  to	  corruption	  and	  hence	  had	  asked	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  Gusmão	  to	  reshuffle	  his	  cabinet	   (Pacific	   Scoop,	   2010).	   Yet,	   Gusmão	   refused.	   The	   Prime	   Minister	  believed	   the	   members	   of	   his	   government	   were	   competent	   and	   said	   that	   a	  reshuffle	   would	   destabilize	   the	   fragile	   coalition	   (ETAN,	   2010h).	   Despite	  increasing	  concern	  about	  corruption	  and	   the	  growing	  budget,	   the	  President	  promulgated	   both	   the	   general	   and	   the	   rectified	   budget	   of	   2010	   but	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threatened	   to	   veto	   the	   2011	   budget	   if	   the	   government	   failed	   to	   include	  provision	  for	  road	  repairs	  in	  the	  rural	  areas	  (ETAN,	  2010f).	  Presidential	   proclamations	   also	   disclosed	   that	   Ramos-­‐Horta	  supported	  the	  Government’s	  defence	  policy	  and	  in	  particular	  its	  approach	  to	  resolving	   the	   so-­‐called	   ‘petitioners	   problem’.	   Problems	  with	   the	  petitioners	  started	   back	   in	   2006	  when	   army	   commander	   Taur	  Matan	   Ruak	   decided	   to	  fire	   600	   F-­‐FDTL	   soldiers.	   Their	   dismissal	   led	   to	   large	   anti-­‐government	  demonstrations,	   which	   ultimately	   forced	   former	   Prime	  Minister	   Alkatiri	   to	  resign.	   The	   petitioners’	   problem	   was	   not	   resolved	   under	   Ramos-­‐Horta’s	  premiership,	  partly	  because	  Ruak	  continued	  to	  refuse	  to	  accept	  the	  soldiers	  back	  into	  the	  army.	  During	  the	  2006	  crisis,	  Alfredo	  Reinado,	  a	  former	  military	  police	   commander	   of	   the	   F-­‐FDTL,	   along	  with	   some	  of	   his	   subordinates	   and	  former	   police	   officers	   broke	   ranks	   and	   posed	   an	   additional	   threat	   to	   the	  political	  stability	  of	  the	  country.	  Reinado	  portrayed	  himself	  as	  the	  protector	  of	  the	  600	  ex-­‐soldiers.	  He	  was	  captured	  but	  escaped	  from	  jail	  in	  August	  2006.	  His	  group	  was	  held	  responsible	  for	  the	  violence	  that	  flared	  up	  in	  the	  eastern	  part	  of	  the	  country	  after	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  Government	  in	  August	  2007.	  In	  November	   2007,	   Reinado	   promised	   the	   petitioners	   that	   if	   they	   were	   not	  reinstated	   in	   the	   army	   he	   would	   lead	   his	   soldiers	   down	   to	   Dili.	   In	   early	  January	   2008	   a	   video	   became	   available	   on	   the	   internet	   in	   which	   Reinado	  accused	  Prime	  Minister	  Gusmão	  of	  being	  the	  ‘mastermind’	  of	  the	  2006	  crisis	  (ICG,	   2008).	  On	  11	  February	  2008,	   an	   armed	  group	   led	  by	  Reinado	   carried	  out	   separate	   armed	   attacks	   against	   the	   President	   and	   the	   Prime	   Minister,	  resulting	  in	  the	  near	  fatal	  injury	  of	  the	  President,	  the	  wounding	  of	  the	  Prime	  Minister,	   and	   the	   death	   of	   Reinado	   himself.	   However,	   his	   death	   opened	   up	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new	  opportunities	   to	  resolve	   the	  standoff	  between	   the	  government	  and	   the	  petitioners.	  	  Initially,	  President	  Ramos-­‐Horta	  and	  Prime	  Minister	  Gusmão	  differed	  as	   to	  whether	   the	   former	   soldiers	   should	   be	   allowed	   to	   re-­‐enter	   the	   army	  and,	   if	   so,	  whether	   they	  needed	   to	   go	   through	  a	   recruitment	  process	   again.	  Before	  the	  attacks	  in	  November	  2007,	  President	  Ramos-­‐Horta	  had	  promised	  Reinado	   that	   he	   and	   his	   followers	   could	   enter	   the	   army	   without	   going	  through	  a	  re-­‐application	  process.	  By	  contrast,	  in	  March	  2008	  Prime	  Minister	  Gusmão	  told	  the	  petitioners	  that	  they	  were	  no	  longer	  welcome	  in	  the	  army.	  The	  President	  and	  Prime	  Minister	  then	  agreed	  to	  a	  ‘compromise	  solution’;	  ex-­‐soldiers	  could	  rejoin	  military	  but	  needed	  to	  go	  through	  a	  recruitment	  process	  whereas	  those	  who	  wanted	  to	  return	  to	  civilian	  life	  would	  receive	  a	  financial	  compensation	   from	   the	   Government	   (ABC	   Premium	   News,	   2008).163	  President	   Ramos-­‐Horta	   urged	   the	   petitioners	   to	   accept	   the	   Government’s	  offer	  (ETAN,	  2008).	  In	  June	  President	  Ramos-­‐Horta	  said	  that	  the	  petitioners'	  problem	  was	  resolved	  given	  that	  more	  than	  90	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  ex-­‐soldiers	  had	  accepted	   the	  government’s	  proposal	   to	  be	  reintegrated	   into	  civilian	   life	  and	  thus	  to	  leave	  the	  armed	  forces	  (Ramos-­‐Horta,	  2011a).164	  Some	  argue	  that	  the	  surge	  in	  oil	  and	  gas	  money	  allowed	  the	  AMP	  government	  to	  pursue	  a	  strategy	  of	   ‘buying	  peace’	  with	   the	  petitioners	   (ICG,	   2013).	  To	  be	   sure,	   according	   to	  data	  provided	  by	  the	  World	  Bank	  (2013),	  Timor-­‐Leste’s	  economy	  grew	  from	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
163	  Decreto	  do	  Governo	  12/2008	  de	  11	  de	  Junho	  ‘Integração	  dos	  ex-­‐militares	  na	  vida	  civil’.	  164	   According	   to	   former	   Prime	   Minister	   Alkatiri,	   no	   petitioner	   has	   reentered	   the	  army.	  Interview	  with	  Dr.	  Marí	  Alkatiri,	  Dili,	  17	  May	  2013.	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an	  estimated	  2,42	  per	  cent	  in	  2002	  to	  10,6	  per	  cent	  in	  2011	  mainly	  because	  of	  the	   oil	   and	   gas	   revenues	   from	   the	   Timor	   Sea.165	   The	   International	   Crisis	  Group	   (2013)	   reported	   that	   these	   revenues	   gave	   the	   AMP	  Government	   the	  resources	   ‘to	   spend	   its	  way	  out	  of	   conflict’.	  So,	   the	   large	   inflow	  of	   revenues	  from	   the	   exploitation	   of	   oil	   and	   gas	  may	   have	   enabled	   the	   Government	   to	  prevent	  another	  outbreak	  of	  violent	  conflict.	  As	   noted	  previously,	   in	   the	  wake	   of	   the	   separate	   attacks	   against	   the	  President	   and	   Prime	   Minister	   the	   police	   was	   placed	   under	   military	  command166	   The	   so-­‐called	   Joint	   Operation	   Command	   launched	   ‘Operasaun	  Halibur’	  (Operation	  Gather	  Up),	  which	  led	  to	  the	  surrender	  of	  several	  armed	  groups	   and,	   eventually,	   the	   leader	   of	   the	   petitioners,	   Gastão	   Salsinha.	   The	  Joint	   Operation	   Command	   was	   disbanded	   in	   June	   2008	   but	   cooperation	  continued	  between	  Timor-­‐Leste’s	  security	  forces.	  A	  new	  Ministry	  of	  Security	  and	  Defence	  was	  established	  which	  brought	  the	  armed	  forces	  and	  the	  police	  under	  a	  unified	  authority.167	  In	  his	  speech	  to	  the	  National	  Parliament	  in	  2009	  Ramos-­‐Horta	   spoke	   about	   ‘very	   positive	   developments’	   in	   the	   area	   of	  national	  security	  due	   to	  cooperation	  between	  the	  President,	  Prime	  Minister	  and	  Parliament	  (Ramos-­‐Horta,	  2009).	  Ramos-­‐Horta	   tried	   to	   change	   Government	   policy	   regarding	   the	  exploitation	   of	   the	   Greater	   Sunrise	   oil	   and	   gas	   field	   through	   presidential	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
165	  World	  Bank	  (2013)	  'Timor-­Leste'.	  Available	  at	  http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/timor-­‐leste	  (last	  accessed	  20	  April	  2013).	  166	  Decreto	  do	  Presidente	  da	  República	  45/2008	  de	  22	  de	  Fevereiro,	   resolução	  do	  Governo	  3/2008	  de	  17	  Fevereiro.	  	  167	   Decreto-­‐lei	   do	   Governo	   31/2008	   de	   13	   de	   Agosto	   ‘Orgânica	   do	   Ministério	   da	  Defesa	  e	  Segurança’.	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proclamations.	   The	   Greater	   Sunrise	   field	   is	   located	   in	   the	   Timor	   Sea	   in-­‐between	   North	   Australia	   and	   Timor-­‐Leste.	   Under	   the	   Treaty	   on	   Certain	  Maritime	   Arrangements	   in	   the	   Timor	   Sea	   (CMATS),	   neither	   country	   can	  exploit	   the	   Greater	   Sunrise	   fields	   without	   approval	   from	   the	   other	   side.168	  The	  CMATS	  treaty	   lays	  down	  an	  equal	  distribution	  of	  revenue	  derived	  from	  the	  oil	  and	  gas	  field	  in	  the	  Timor	  Sea.	  In	  addition,	  it	  stipulates	  that	  Australia	  pays	   Timor-­‐Leste	   US$13.9	   billion	   in	   exchange	   for	   postponing	   talks	   on	   the	  maritime	  boundary	  between	  the	  countries	   for	   the	  next	  50	  years.	  Australia’s	  largest	   oil	   company,	  Woodside	   Petroleum	   Ltd.,	   together	  with	   joint	   venture	  partners	   ConocoPhilips,	   Royal	   Dutch	   Shell,	   and	   Osaka	   Gas	   are	   licensed	   to	  develop	  the	  Greater	  Sunrise.	  The	  CMATS	  treaty	  provides	  that	  if	  Timor-­‐Leste	  or	  Australia	  does	  not	  ratify	  the	  Sunrise	  exploitation	  plan	  by	  February	  2013,	  then	  either	  country	  can	  unilaterally	  cancel	  most	  of	  the	  provisions	  of	  CMATS	  treaty.	   In	   mid-­‐2008,	   the	   Sunrise	   Joint	   Venture	   assessed	   five	   development	  concepts	   regarding	   the	   processing	   of	   oil	   and	   gas	   from	   the	   Greater	   Sunrise,	  including	  a	  Liquefied	  natural	  gas	  (LNG)	  processing	  plant	  in	  Darwin,	  a	  floating	  LNG	  and	  an	  onshore	  LNG	  plant	   in	  Timor–Leste.	  The	   report	  decided	  against	  piping	   gas	   to	   a	   liquefied	   natural	   gas	   plant	   in	   Timor-­‐Leste	   and	   favoured	  processing	  the	  gas	  either	   in	  Darwin,	  via	  a	  pipeline,	  or	  by	  building	  a	   floating	  plant	  in	  the	  Timor	  Sea.	  However,	  in	  Timor-­‐Leste,	  state	  officials	  opted	  for	  the	  LNG	  plant	  on	  the	  southern	  coast	  of	  Timor-­‐Leste.	  It	  was	  argued	  that	  the	  plant	  would	   boost	   the	   economy	   and	   develop	   a	   skilled	   workforce.	   Ramos-­‐Horta	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
168	  Chapter	  4	  and	  5	  provide	  more	  information	  on	  the	  CMATS	  agreement.	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declared	  that	  he	  would	  prefer	  to	  forgo	  the	  whole	  Greater	  Sunrise	  project	  than	  ‘to	   surrender	   to	   the	  dictates	  of	   a	  bunch	  of	  oil	   executive	  millionaires’	   (Grigg	  and	  Garvey,	  2008).	  The	  Government	  supported	  the	  President’s	  statement	  and	  contracted	   the	   Malaysian	   energy	   company	   Petronas	   in	   conducting	   a	  feasibility	  study	  into	  the	  Timorese	  option.	  Political	  consensus	  among	  Timor-­‐Leste’s	  state	  officials	  on	  how	  best	  to	  develop	  the	  Greater	  Sunrise	  fields	  started	  to	  break	  down	  in	  early	  2010	  when	  the	   Government	   decided	   to	   take	   a	   harder	   line	   in	   the	   negotiations	   with	   oil	  company	  Woodside.	   In	  a	  press	  release	   the	  Government	  stated	  that	   it	  would	  not	  approve	  any	  development	  plan	  that	  did	  not	  include	  a	  pipeline	  to	  Timor-­‐Leste	  and	  an	  LNG	  plant	  on	  the	  south	  coast	  of	  Timor-­‐Leste.	  The	  Government	  also	   announced	   that	   the	   energy	   company	   Petronas	   was	   approached	   to	  develop	   the	  offshore	  Great	  Sunrise	   field.	  The	  President,	  by	  contrast,	   argued	  that	  the	  best	  option	  for	  Timor-­‐Leste	  would	  be	  to	  agree	  to	  a	  floating	  platform	  (Riseup,	   2010d).	  Ramos-­‐Horta	   sought	   a	  middle	  way	   solution	   to	   resolve	   the	  stalemate	   between	   the	   Government	   and	  Woodside	   over	   the	   exploitation	   of	  the	   Greater	   Sunrise.	   The	   President’s	   statements	   were	   not	   well	   received	   in	  parliament.	  Deputies	  from	  both	  the	  governing	  coalition	  parties	  and	  FRETILIN	  urged	  the	  President	  ‘to	  be	  quiet	  and	  not	  to	  comment’	  because	  his	  interference	  complicated	   negotiations	   with	   Woodside	   (ETAN,	   2010d).	   Despite	  Parliament’s	   warnings,	   Ramos-­‐Horta	   reiterated	   in	   an	   interview	   with	   the	  Australian	   radio	   channel	   ABC	   that	   it	   was	   time	   to	   break	   the	   impasse	   in	  negotiations	  and	  finally	  develop	  the	  Greater	  Sunrise	  oil	  and	  gas	  field	  between	  Timor-­‐Leste	  and	  Australia.	  According	  to	  the	  President,	  Timor-­‐Leste	  could	  not	  afford	   to	   further	   postpone	   the	   negotiations	   given	   that	   ‘the	   country	   has	   a	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growing	   population	   and	   growing	   needs’	   (Everingham,	   2010).	   Whereas	  Ramos-­‐Horta	   thus	   hinted	   that	   a	   floating	   platform	   would	   be	   the	   best	   way	  forward,	  the	  government	  reasserted	  Dili's	  resolve	  to	  veto	  the	  floating	  LNG	  or	  Darwin	  expansion	  options.	  	  Notwithstanding	  the	  President’s	  promise	  to	  give	  up	  his	  engagement	  in	  the	   Greater	   Sunrise	   negotiations	   (ETAN,	   2010e),	   in	   January	   2011	   Ramos-­‐Horta	   argued	   that	   the	   Government	   should	   be	   more	   flexible	   in	   talks	   with	  Woodside	   over	   the	   Greater	   Sunrise	   project.	   Speaking	   in	   Dili,	   Ramos-­‐Horta	  urged	   the	  Government	  not	   to	  close	   the	  door	  on	   talks	   (Dodd,	  2011).	  He	  also	  suggested	   that	   it	   should	   seek	   the	   help	   of	   former	   Prime	   Minister	   Alkatiri	  (Riseup,	   2011d).	   The	  National	   Petroleum	  Authority	   (ANP),	   led	   by	   the	   AMP	  government,	  refused	  to	  cooperate	  with	  the	  former	  Prime	  Minister.	  As	  Timor-­‐Leste	   entered	   the	   2012	   election	   season,	   the	   Greater	   Sunrise	   negotiations	  became	   fodder	   for	   political	   squabbles,	   with	   the	   President	   blaming	   the	  Government	   for	   making	   the	   pipeline	   a	   matter	   of	   national	   pride,	   saying	   it	  should	   be	   decided	   on	   the	   best	   available	   technical	   and	   economic	   advice	  (Murdoch,	   2012b).	   In	   an	   interview	   on	   28	   April	   2012	   Ramos-­‐Horta	   said	   he	  was	   'frankly	  perplexed'	   that	   for	  12	  months	   the	  Government	  had	   refused	   to	  talk	   with	   the	   Woodside-­‐led	   consortium.	   According	   to	   the	   President,	   the	  government	  even	  organised	  demonstrations	  against	  Woodside	  executives	  in	  Dili.	   'We	   must	   be	   the	   only	   country	   in	   the	   world	   that	   has	   organised	  demonstrations	  against	  international	  investors,'	  he	  said	  (Murdoch,	  2012a).	  	  Despite	   these	   ‘institutional	   irritants’	   Ramos-­‐Horta	   largely	   supported	  the	   Government	   and	   its	   policies.	   In	   his	   speeches	   he	   defended	   the	  Government’s	  approach	  to	  resolve	  the	  petitioners’	  problem	  but	  criticised	  the	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Government	   with	   respect	   to	   two	   policy	   issues,	   namely	   the	   annual	   budgets	  and	  its	  position	  on	  the	  Greater	  Sunrise	  project.	  As	  compared	  to	  cohabitation	  where	   the	   President	   systematically	   criticised	   the	   Government	   on	   a	   wide	  range	   of	   government	   policies,	   presidential	   speeches	   under	   unified	  majority	  government	   reveal	   only	   moderate	   institutional	   conflict.	   More	   importantly,	  the	  President	  abandoned	  attempts	  to	  change	  the	  policy	  after	  he	  realized	  that	  his	   initiatives	   were	   not	   supported	   by	   the	   Prime	   Minister.	   In	   so	   doing,	  institutional	  tension	  did	  not	  escalate.	  	  	  
Accumulation	  of	  power	  Critics	  of	  semi-­‐presidentialism	  hypothesise	  that	  unified	  majority	  government	  encourages	  a	  president	  to	  accumulate	  power.	  The	  president’s	  power	  grab,	  it	  is	   argued,	   may	   destabilise	   young	   democracies.	   Our	   findings	   confirm	   that	  President	   Ramos-­‐Horta	   over-­‐stepped	   his	   constitutional	   power,	   using	  presidential	   proclamations	   as	   executive	   orders.	   Presidential	   proclamations	  serve	  to	  support	  the	  President’s	  main	  function,	  namely	  to	  guarantee	  national	  independence	   and	   unity	   of	   the	   State	   and	   the	   smooth	   functioning	   of	  democratic	  institutions	  (Section	  74(1)).	  Whereas	  presidential	  proclamations	  confer	   controlling	   powers	   to	   the	   President,	   Ramos-­‐Horta	   attempted	   to	   use	  presidential	  proclamations	  as	  governing	  powers.	  	  	   In	  his	  address	  to	  the	  nation	  in	  August	  2007,	  the	  President	  announced	  the	  establishment	  of	  an	  ‘anti-­‐poverty	  task	  force’	  to	  combat	  poverty	  (Ramos-­‐Horta,	   2011a).	   As	   early	   as	   the	   2007	   presidential	   elections,	   Ramos-­‐Horta	  promised	   to	   serve	   as	   a	   ‘President	   of	   the	   Poor’	   (Ramos-­‐Horta,	   2011b).	   He	  pledged	   to	   remain	  dedicated	   to	  eradicating	  poverty	   in	  Timor-­‐Leste	   through	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improved	   public	   health	   and	   education.	   Yet,	   his	   election	   promises	  contradicted	   the	   Constitution,	   which	   does	   not	   endow	   the	   President	   with	  executive	  powers	  in	  the	  area	  of	  economy	  and	  development.	  The	  2007	  budget	  allocated	   a	  mere	   250	  million	   dollars	   to	   the	   anti-­‐poverty	   task	   force	   for	   the	  transition	   period	   between	   July	   and	   December	   2007	   (Hamutuk,	   2007).	  Despite	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   parliamentary	   majority	   approved	   the	   budget,	   a	  growing	   number	   of	   deputies	   turned	   against	   the	   presidential	   initiative.	  Initially,	  protests	  came	  from	  the	  FRETILIN	  bench	  who	  argued	  that	  it	  was	  not	  the	   responsibility	   of	   the	  President	   to	   reduce	  poverty	   (ETAN,	  2007e).	   Later,	  deputies	  of	  the	  coalition	  government	  shared	  FRETILIN’s	  concerns,	  suggesting	  the	  President	   ‘should	  work	  within	  his	  duties	   rather	   than	  mixing	  everything	  randomly’	   (ETAN,	   2007f).	   FRETILIN	   then	   requested	   the	   Court	   of	   Appeal	   to	  carry	   out	   an	   abstract	   review	   of	   constitutionality	   of	   the	   bill.	   Much	   to	   the	  President’s	   dismay,	   the	   Court	   ruled	   that	   the	   poverty	   reduction	   program	  under	  the	  Office	  of	  the	  President	  of	  the	  Republic	  was	  unconstitutional	  (ETAN,	  2007b).	  Notwithstanding	  the	  Court’s	  ruling,	  the	  President	  declared	  he	  would	  continue	  to	  use	  funds	  that	  have	  been	  allocated	  to	  his	  department	  in	  order	  to	  combat	  poverty	  (Riseup,	  2007a).	  Ramos-­‐Horta	   also	   acted	   beyond	   his	   constitutional	   authority	   in	   the	  area	   of	   infrastructure.	   In	   October	   2008,	   the	   Government	   revealed	   to	   the	  public,	   through	   a	   press	   communiqué,	   that	   thirteen	   districts	   in	   Timor-­‐Leste	  would	  have	  electricity	  24	  hours	  a	  day	  by	   the	  end	  of	  2009.	  The	  Government	  had	  just	  signed	  a	  contract	  with	  Chinese	  Construction	  Company	  to	  build	  three	  electric	  power-­‐generating	  stations,	  based	  on	  used	  generators	  that	  burn	  heavy	  fuel	  oil.	  In	  the	  budget	  speech	  to	  Parliament	  in	  early	  January	  2009	  the	  Prime	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Minister	  guaranteed	  that	  all	  sub-­‐districts	  would	  have	  electricity	  by	  the	  end	  of	  2010.	   However,	   the	   project	   encountered	   growing	   criticism	   of	   its	   expense,	  design,	  environmental	  impacts,	  procurement	  procedures	  and	  legal	  processes.	  Environmental	   groups	   warned	   the	   plants	   would	   create	   acid	   rain,	   water	  pollution,	  toxic	  solid	  waste,	  air	  pollution	  and	  greenhouse	  gas	  emissions.	  In	  his	  speech	  to	  the	  UN	  Security	  Council	  President	  Ramos-­‐Horta	  promised	  that	  an	  independent	   adviser	  would	  be	   appointed	   to	   oversee	   the	   implementation	  of	  the	  project	  ‘to	  ensure	  that	  the	  project	  would	  be	  in	  full	  compliance	  with	  World	  Bank	   environmental	   standards	   and	   the	   Kyoto	   Protocol’	   (United	   Nations	  Security	  Council,	  2009).	  In	  a	  speech	  to	  the	  National	  Parliament	  the	  President	  reiterated	  that	  he	  had	  asked	  the	  Government	  to	  hire	  an	  independent	  body	  to	  carry	   out	   an	   environmental	   impact	   assessment	   and	   a	   technological	  evaluation	  to	  determine	  the	  risks	  that	  the	  project	  posed	  to	  the	  environment.	  According	   to	   the	   President,	   the	   Prime	   Minister	   promised	   to	   accept	  ‘whichever	  recommendation	  the	  independent	  body	  produced’	  (Ramos-­‐Horta,	  2009).	   Despite	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   President	   encroached	   on	   executive	   power,	  the	   Government	   acted	   on	   the	   President’s	   wishes	   and	   contracted	   an	   Italian	  consultant,	  Electroconsult	  and	  Bonifica,	  SpA	  (EB),	  to	  supervise	  the	  project.	  In	  response	   to	   EB’s	   report,	   the	   government	   decided	   to	   re-­‐assign	   the	  responsibility	   for	   building	   the	   power	   stations	   to	   another	   company.	   The	  reassignment	   further	   delayed	   the	   project	   and	   in	   November	   2011	   the	   first	  generators	  were	  inaugurated.	  During	  the	  ceremony	  the	  President	  lauded	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  for	  his	   ‘brilliant	   idea	  of	  setting	  up	  this	  power	  plant’	  (Riseup,	  2011a).	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President	  Ramos-­‐Horta	  also	  used	  his	  proclamatory	  power	  to	  criticize	  the	   Minister	   of	   Infrastructure,	   Pedro	   Lay,	   and	   his	   Secretary	   of	   State,	   José	  Manuel	  Carrascalão.	   In	   January	  2010	   the	  President	  even	   threatened	   to	   take	  Minister	  Lay	   to	  Court	  because	  of	   the	  poor	   conditions	  of	  Timor-­‐Leste’s	   road	  network	  (ETAN,	  2010c).	   In	  March	  2011	  he	  reiterated	  his	  concerns	  with	   the	  conditions	  of	  the	  roads,	  saying	  the	  Minister	  of	  Infrastructure	  and	  Secretary	  of	  State	   for	   Infrastructure	   were	   not	   working	   well	   (ETAN,	   2010g).	   As	   noted	  earlier,	  Ramos-­‐Horta	  even	  threatened	  not	  to	  promulgate	  2011	  general	  state	  budget	   if	   the	  government	   failed	   to	   include	  road	  repair	   in	   rural	  areas	  Timor	  Post,	  2010b).	  	  Ramos-­‐Horta	  again	  over-­‐stepped	  presidential	  powers	  when	  he	  asked	  the	   Provedoria	   for	   Human	   Rights	   and	   Justice	   (PDHJ),	   the	   Timor-­‐Leste	  ombudsman,	  to	  investigate	  whether	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Tourism,	  Commerce	  and	  Industry	   (MTCI)	   had	   been	   involved	   in	   a	   corruption	   scandal	   (East	   Timor	  Action	   Network	   (ETAN),	   2009).	   The	   Constitution	   stipulates	   that	   the	  ombudsman	   examines	   citizens’	   complaints	   against	   public	   bodies,	   certifying	  the	  conformity	  of	  the	  acts	  with	  the	  law	  in	  order	  to	  remedy	  injustice	  (Section	  27).	  Apart	   from	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  President	   is	  not	  a	  citizen	  in	   juridical	  terms	  and,	  additionally,	  represents	  a	  public	  body,	   the	  Parliament	   is	  responsible	   to	  call	   for	   a	   commission	   of	   inquiry	   to	   start	   an	   investigation	   into	   cases	   of	  corruption	   in	   which	   government	   officials	   are	   involved.	   The	   corruption	  scandal,	  known	  as	   ‘rice-­‐gate’,	  encompassed	  government	  contracts	  that	  were	  awarded	   to	   companies	   linked	   to	   the	   Prime	   Minister’s	   daughter	   and	   to	  companies	   part-­‐owned	  by	   the	  wife	   of	   the	  Minister	   of	  Minister	   of	   Economic	  Development,	   João	   Gonçalves.	   In	   November	   2009,	   the	  Minister	   responsible	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for	   managing	   the	   rice	   contracts,	   Gil	   Alves,	   was	   being	   questioned	   by	   a	  Parliamentary	   Commision	   of	   Inquiry.	   The	   Commission	   was	   established	   to	  investigate	   the	   facts	   and	  circumstances	  of	   the	   rice	   contracts.	   In	  an	  effort	   to	  combat	   the	   growing	   number	   of	   corruption	   cases	   in	   which	   government	  officials	  were	   involved,	   the	  President	  urged	   the	  Prime	  Minister	   to	   reshuffle	  his	   cabinet.	   Although	   Ramos-­‐Horta’s	   request	   was	   supported	   by	   a	  parliamentary	  majority,	  the	  President	  was	  allowed	  by	  the	  Constitution	  to	  ask	  for	   the	   dismissal	   of	   cabinet	   ministers.	   Alves,	   the	   Minister	   of	   Tourism,	  Commerce	  and	  Industry,	  then	  said	  he	  would	  resign	  from	  his	  post	  if	  the	  Prime	  Minister	   decided	   to	   reshuffle	   the	   cabinet	   (ETAN,	   2010b).	   As	   noted	   earlier,	  Gusmão	  refused	  to	  reshuffle	  his	  cabinet.	  	  President	  Ramos-­‐Horta	  was	  intent	  on	  accumulating	  power	  in	  the	  area	  of	  foreign	  affairs	  as	  well.	  The	  Constitution	  requires	  the	  President	  to	  conduct,	  in	   consultation	  with	   the	   Government,	   any	   negotiation	   process	   towards	   the	  completion	  of	   international	   agreements	   in	   the	   field	   of	   defence	   and	   security	  (Section	  87	  d).	  In	  the	  summer	  of	  2010	  Australian	  Prime	  Minister	  Julia	  Gillard	  announced	   the	   plan	   to	   establish	   an	   asylum	   seeker	   centre	   in	   Timor-­‐Leste.	  Under	   the	  plan,	   asylum	  seekers	  arriving	   in	  Australia	  by	  boat	  would	   first	  be	  taken	  to	  Timor-­‐Leste	  to	  be	  processed.	  Ramos-­‐Horta	  proclaimed	  that	  Timor-­‐Leste	   supported	   the	   idea	   and	   hence	  welcomed	   a	   conversation	  with	  Gillard.	  However,	   the	   President	   failed	   to	   consult	   the	   government	   beforehand.	  Notwithstanding	   the	   President’s	   transgression,	   Gusmão	   supported	   the	  President’s	  position	  and	  announced	  he	  was	  prepared	  to	  consider	  Australia’s	  proposal.	   By	   contrast,	   deputies	   of	   both	   the	   coalition	   government	   and	   the	  opposition	   were	   strongly	   opposed	   to	   the	   plan.	   In	   July	   2010	   Parliament	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adopted	   a	   resolution	   that	   rejected	   the	   establishment	   of	   the	   asylum-­‐processing	   centre	   in	   Timor-­‐Leste.169	   The	   President	   and	   Prime	   Minister	  ignored	   the	   resolution	   and	   continued	   negotiations	  with	   Australia.	   Deputies	  then	   urged	   the	   President	   ‘not	   to	   interfere’	   and	   simultaneously	  warned	   the	  Prime	  Minister	   ‘to	   respect	   the	   parliament’	   (Riseup,	   2010a;	   Riseup,	   2010b).	  Protest	   in	   Parliament	   against	   the	   establishment	   of	   the	   asylum	   centre	   may	  have	  persuaded	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  to	  change	  his	  position	  given	  that	  in	  April	  2011	   Gusmão	   publicly	   rejected	   the	   Australian	   proposal.	   By	   contrast,	   the	  President	   insisted	   that	   he	   had	   not	   yet	   turned	   his	   back	   on	   the	   plan	   (Salna,	  2011).	  The	  issue	  was	  resolved	  when	  the	  Australian	  government	  withdrew	  its	  proposal	  to	  build	  an	  asylum	  centre	  in	  Timor-­‐Leste.	  	   Ramos-­‐Horta	  unconstitutionally	   intervened	  during	   the	  Government’s	  negotiations	   with	   oil	   company	   Woodside	   over	   the	   development	   of	   the	  Greater	   Sunrise	   oil	   and	   gas	   field.	   Whereas	   the	   Government	   rejected	   the	  company’s	   proposal	   and	   decided	   to	   discontinue	   further	   negotiations,	  President	   Ramos-­‐Horta	   invited	   Woodside	   to	   the	   Presidential	   palace	   to	  discuss	  the	  latest	  developments.	  The	  Government,	  openly	  displeased	  with	  the	  President's	  behaviour,	   stated	   that	   it	  was	   ‘completely	  unacceptable’	   for	  both	  Woodside’s	   chief	   executive,	   Don	   Voelte,	   and	   the	   President	   to	   by-­‐pass	   the	  established	  mechanisms	  (Shoesmith,	  2013).	  The	  anger	  of	  the	  government	  at	  the	   President’s	   unconstitutional	   intervention	   was	   reflected	   in	   the	   fact	   that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
169	   Resolução	   do	   Parlamento	   20/2010	   de	   12	   de	   Junho	   ‘Rejeita	   a	   Instalação	   em	  Timor-­‐Leste	  de	  um	  Centro	  de	  Detenção	  e	  Processamento	  de	  Migrantes’.	  Hayward,	  A.	  (2010,	   13th	   July)	   'Timor	   votes	   'no'	   to	   asylum	   centre'.	   Available	   at:	  http://www.lexisnexis.com.	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the	  AMP	  coalition	  forbade	  the	  State	  Secretary	  for	  Natural	  Resources,	  Alfredo	  Pires,	   from	   publicising	   the	   feasibility	   study’s	   findings	   (ETAN,	   2010a).	   The	  Government’s	   overt	   refusal	   to	   include	   the	   President	   in	   the	   Greater	   Sunrise	  negotiations	   prompted	   the	   latter	   to	   declare	   to	   withdraw	   from	   the	   Greater	  Sunrise	  negotiations	  (ETAN,	  2010e).	  	   In	  sum,	  our	  findings	  confirm	  that	  during	  unified	  majority	  government	  Ramos-­‐Horta	   pushed	   for	   more	   power.	   President	   Ramos-­‐Horta	   frequently	  over-­‐stepped	   his	   constitutional	   power.	   Despite	   the	   presidential	  transgressions	  which,	  at	  times,	  provoked	  intra-­‐executive	  tension	  conflict	  did	  not	  escalate	  because	  President	  Ramos-­‐Horta	  always	  backed	  down	  and	  abided	  by	  the	  Constitution.	  	  	  
Conclusion	  An	   argument	   in	   favour	   of	   semi-­‐presidentialism	   is	   that	   unified	   majority	  government	   encourages	   the	   president,	   prime	   minister	   and	   parliamentary	  majority	  to	  regulate	  institutional	  tensions,	  thereby	  preventing	  the	  escalation	  of	   institutional	   conflict	   both	   generally	   as	   well	   as	   in	   defence	   and	   foreign	  affairs.	   Critics	   of	   semi-­‐presidentialism	   expect	   a	   period	   of	   hyper-­‐presidentialism	  under	  unified	  majority	  government.	  We	  confirm	  that	  under	  unified	  majority	  government	  the	   institutional	  relations	   were	   largely	   characterized	   by	   cooperation.	   In	   the	   legislative	  domain,	   the	   President	   vetoed	   one	   bill	   and	   asked	   the	   Court	   of	   Appeal	   to	  review	   the	   constitutionality	   of	   five	   bills.	   Parliament	   did	   not	   override	   the	  presidential	   veto.	   The	   close	   cooperation	   between	   the	   President	   and	   Prime	  Minister	  led	  them	  sometimes	  to	  ignore	  the	  Court’s	  rulings.	  In	  addition,	  their	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decision	   to	   ‘pardon’	  war	   criminal	   Bere	   led	   to	   a	  motion	   of	   no-­‐confidence	   in	  Parliament	   and	   a	   threat	   from	   Parliament	   to	   refuse	   to	   grant	   the	   President	  permission	  to	  travel	  abroad.	  Yet,	  the	  parliamentary	  majority	  did	  not	  support	  the	  motion	  and	  bowed	  to	  the	  President’s	  demands	  after	  the	  latter	  threatened	  to	   resign.	   President	   Ramos-­‐Horta	   also	   intervened	   in	   the	   appointment	   and	  dismissal	   process	   of	   state	   officials.	   Again,	  we	   found	   that	   disagreements	   did	  not	  escalate	  because	  the	  political	  leaders	  were	  able	  to	  reach	  a	  compromise.	  In	  official	   speeches	   and	   press	   statements	   the	   President	   revealed	   that	   he	   was	  largely	  positive	  about	  the	  work	  done	  by	  the	  Government.	  During	  the	  second	  half	   of	   his	   term	   Ramos-­‐Horta	   expressed	   growing	   concern	   with	   the	   ever-­‐expanding	  budget	  and	  the	  growing	  number	  of	  corruption	  cases	  that	  involved	  government	  officials.	  	  An	   argument	   against	   semi-­‐presidentialism	   is	   that	   a	   unified	  majority	  government	  may	  encourage	  presidents	  to	  accumulate	  power.	  We	  found	  that	  President	  Ramos-­‐Horta	  frequently	  over-­‐stepped	  his	  constitutional	  authority.	  In	  an	  interview	  conducted	  in	  2008,	  Ramos-­‐Horta	  indicated	  his	  preference	  for	  a	  powerful	   French-­‐style	  presidency,	   an	   ‘enlightened	  autocracy’	   (ICG,	   2008).	  Our	   findings	   suggest	   that	   as	   President,	   from	   2007	   to	   2012	   Ramos-­‐Horta	  tested	  and	  sometimes	  exceeded	  the	  limits	  of	  his	  constitutional	  authority.	  Yet,	  the	  President	  did	  not	  push	  through	  his	  political	  agenda	  when	  he	   found	  that	  his	   initiatives	   were	   not	   supported	   by	   the	   Prime	   Minister.	   Therefore,	   we	  cannot	   confirm	   the	   argument	   that	   unified	   majority	   government	   generated	  hyper-­‐presidentialism.	  	  Compared	  with	  the	  situation	  of	  cohabitation	  and	  divided	  government,	  institutional	   relations	   were	   the	   least	   conflictual	   under	   unified	   majority	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government.	   In	   the	   latter	   situation	   the	  President	  vetoed	  1.5	  per	   cent	  of	   the	  parliamentary	  laws	  whereas	  under	  cohabitation	  the	  veto	  rate	  was	  9	  per	  cent.	  President	   Horta	   preferred	   to	   send	   legislation	   to	   the	   Court	   instead;	   7.6	   per	  cent	  of	  the	  laws	  were	  subject	  to	  constitutional	  review	  during	  unified	  majority	  compared	  to	  6.6	  per	  cent	  under	  cohabitation.	   It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	   in	   the	  legislative	   domain	   the	   President	   was	   more	   active	   during	   the	   divided	  government	   situation:	   one	   out	   of	   five	   parliamentary	   laws	  were	   vetoed	   and	  one	  out	  of	   ten	   laws	  were	  send	  to	   the	  Court	  of	  Appeal.	   In	  addition	  we	  found	  that	   the	   institutional	   relationship	   between	   the	   President	   and	   the	  parliamentary	   majority	   was	   most	   conflictual;	   only	   during	   this	   government	  situation	   did	   the	   parliamentary	  majority	   override	   (four	   times)	   presidential	  vetoes.	   We	   also	   found	   that	   unlike	   under	   cohabitation	   and	   divided	  government	  Parliament	  confirmed	  the	  state	  of	  emergency	  in	  February	  2008	  and	  agreed	  to	  renew	  the	  state	  of	  emergency	  another	  three	  times.	  Due	  to	  the	  close	  cooperation	  between	  Ramos-­‐Horta	  and	  Gusmão	  crucial	  defence	  policy	  laws	   were	   passed	   under	   divided	   government	   and	   under	   unified	   majority	  government.	   In	   the	   next	   chapter	   we	   provide	   an	   overview	   of	   the	   findings,	  draw	  conclusions	  about	  the	  hypothesised	  effects	  of	  semi-­‐presidentialism,	  and	  identify	  avenues	  for	  future	  research.	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CHAPTER	  7	  
Conclusion	  
	  The	  purpose	  of	  this	  final	  chapter	  is	  to	  summarise	  and	  draw	  together	  the	  main	  insights,	   findings	  and	  arguments	  of	   this	  research.	  First,	   the	  main	  arguments	  of	  this	  study	  will	  be	  re-­‐iterated,	  followed	  by	  a	  summary	  of	  the	  findings.	  The	  implications	  and	  context	  of	  this	  research	  and	  how	  this	  project	  contributes	  to	  the	   literature	   on	   semi-­‐presidentialism	   and	   democratic	   performance	  will	   be	  explored.	   Finally,	   some	   suggestions	   for	   further	   research,	   based	   on	   the	  findings	  of	  this	  study,	  will	  be	  considered.	  	  
Semi-­presidentialism	  and	  democratic	  performance	  The	  aim	  of	  this	  thesis	  has	  been	  to	  test	  arguments	  about	  semi-­‐presidentialism	  and	   democratic	   performance.	   Critics	   argue	   that	   semi-­‐presidentialism	  provokes	   a	   damaging	   power	   struggle	   that	   threatens	   the	   stability	   of	   young	  democracies,	   whereas	   some	   others	   maintain	   that	   the	   system	   can	   allow	  power-­‐sharing	   between	   competing	   forces,	   increasing	   the	   prospects	   of	  democratic	   consolidation.	   The	   literature	   thus	   suggests	   the	   following	   causal	  sequence:	  	  	  
Figure	  7.1:	  Causal	  chain	  between	  semi-­presidential	  situations	  and	  
democratic	  performance	  	  Semi-­‐presidential	  situations	  	  -­‐>	  Conflict	  -­‐>	  Democratic	  Performance	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The	   literature	   indentified	   four	   semi-­‐presidential	   government	  situations	  -­‐	  divided	  minority	  government,	  cohabitation,	  divided	  government	  and	   unified	  majority	   government.	   Each	   of	   these	   types	   is	   associated	   with	   a	  particular	   level	   of	   conflict.	   Critics	   of	   semi-­‐presidentialism	   expect	   more	  conflict	   under	   divided	   minority	   government	   than	   under	   the	   other	   three	  periods	   and	   more	   conflict	   under	   cohabitation	   than	   under	   a	   divided	  government.	   Unified	   majority	   government	   is	   believed	   to	   be	   the	   least	  conflictual	   institutional	  configuration,	   though	  some	  scholars	   fear	   that	   it	  will	  lead	   to	   an	   accumulation	   of	   presidential	   power	   that	   can	   be	   damaging	   for	  democracy.	  Using	  Timor-­‐Leste	  as	  a	  case,	  this	  project	  tested	  whether	  the	  semi-­‐presidential	  government	  situations	  generated	  the	  level	  of	  conflict	  that	  theory	  predicts.	  	  	  
The	  findings	  This	  work	  tested	  propositions	  that	  are	  associated	  with	  cohabitation,	  divided	  government	   and	   unified	   majority	   government	   in	   Timor-­‐Leste.	   From	   May	  2002	  to	  June	  2006	  there	  was	  a	  period	  of	  cohabitation	  followed	  by	  a	  period	  of	  divided	   government	   from	   July	   2006	   to	   May	   2007.	   Unified	   majority	  government,	  finally,	  was	  generated	  in	  August	  2007	  and	  ended	  in	  March	  2012.	  	  We	   used	   a	   list	   of	   observable	   implications	   to	   identify	   institutional	  conflict	   in	   the	   three	   situations	   and	   decided	   that	   the	   absence	   of	   these	  indicators	   corresponded	   to	   the	   absence	   of	   conflict.	   Chapter	   3	   discussed	  political	   elite	   relations	   in	   Timor-­‐Leste	   before	   the	   introduction	   of	   the	   semi-­‐presidential	  system.	  By	  doing	  so,	  we	  aimed	  to	  control	  for	  institutional	  conflict	  prior	  to	  independence.	  This	  chapter	  focused	  on	  the	  development	  of	  informal	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power	  structures	  given	  that	  the	  Timorese	  were	  largely	  excluded	  from	  formal	  power	  structures,	  which	  were	  dominated	  by	  Indonesia,	  the	  occupying	  power.	  We	   concluded	   that	   the	   Timorese	   political	   elite	  was	   not	   a	  monolithic	   entity	  when	  Timor-­‐Leste	  adopted	  a	  semi-­‐presidential	  system.	  	  Chapter	   4	   examined	   the	   effects	   of	   cohabitation,	   the	   situation	  where	  the	  president	  and	  prime	  minister	  are	   from	  opposing	  parties	  and	  where	   the	  president’s	   party	   is	   not	   represented	   in	   the	   cabinet.	   Critics	   of	   semi-­‐presidentialism	   suggest	   that	   young	   democracies	   may	   collapse	   under	   the	  weight	   of	   institutional	   conflict.	   This	   is	   because	   the	   president	   faces	   a	  government	   and	   a	   parliamentary	   majority	   that	   pursue	   a	   policy	   that	   is	  diametrically	   opposed	   to	   his	   or	   her	   own	   political	   agenda.	   Excessive	  competition	   between	   the	   president	   and	   prime	   minister	   may	   cause	   policy	  paralysis	  with	   the	  president	   and	  prime	  minister	   clashing	  over	   state	  power.	  This	  context	  is	  thought	  to	  encourage	  the	  military	  to	  assume	  all	  power,	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  restore	  the	  political	  process.	  Institutional	  conflict	  is	  likely	  to	  occur	  over	   defence	   and	   foreign	   affairs,	   it	   is	   suggested,	   given	   that	   the	   president	  traditionally	  holds	  more	  power	  over	   these	  policy	   areas.	  By	   contrast,	   others	  argue	   that	   semi-­‐presidential	   democracies	   will	   not	   collapse	   under	  cohabitation.	  Their	  main	  argument	   is	   that	   the	  president	  has	  an	   incentive	   to	  work	  with	  the	  prime	  minister	  because	  both	  actors	  have	  a	  stake	  in	  keeping	  the	  system	  going	  (Elgie,	  2011a:	  31).	  	  Chapter	  4	  demonstrated	  that	  the	  legislative	  framework	  that	  provided	  power	   for	   the	  President	   to	   fully	  carry	  out	  his	  mandate	  was	   incomplete.	  For	  some	  time	  between	  2002	  and	  2006,	  the	  President’s	  power	  to	  influence	  policy	  was	  limited	  to	  political	  vetoes	  and	  proclamatory	  powers.	  Despite	  the	  weak	  de	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jure	   position	   of	   President	   Gusmão	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   the	   FRETILIN	   majority	   we	  observed	   institutional	   conflict	   between	   President	   Gusmão	   and	   Prime	  Minister	   Alkatiri	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   and	   between	   President	   Gusmão	   and	   the	  parliamentary	   majority,	   on	   the	   other.	   In	   the	   legislative	   domain	   President	  Gusmão	  vetoed	   four	   laws	  and	  requested	   the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	   three	   times	   to	  review	   the	   constitutionality	   of	   legislation.	   The	   parliamentary	   majority,	   in	  turn,	   cancelled	   out	   the	   influence	   of	   the	  President	   in	   the	   legislative	   process.	  First,	   it	   overrode	   all	   presidential	   vetoes	   and	   even	   adopted	   a	   law	   that	   was	  rejected	  by	  both	  the	  President	  and	  the	  Court	  on	  constitutional	  grounds.	  Also,	  the	   parliamentary	   majority	   was	   reluctant	   to	   authorize	   the	   President	   to	  assume	  emergency	  powers.	  	  The	   tug-­‐of-­‐war	   concentrated	   on	   Timor-­‐Leste’s	   defence	   and	   foreign	  policy.	  Most	   laws	   that	  were	   vetoed	   concerned	   laws	   in	   the	   area	   of	   national	  security.	  The	  President	  and	  Prime	  Minister	  also	  disagreed	  over	  appointments	  and	  dismissals	  of	  state	  officials,	  such	  as	   the	  appointment	  of	  an	  ambassador,	  the	  dismissal	  of	  the	  Minister	  of	  Interior	  and	  the	  Minister	  of	  Defence	  and	  the	  dismissal	  of	  591	  soldiers.	  The	  President's	  competence	  to	  play	  an	  active	  role	  towards	   the	   conclusion	   of	   international	   agreements	   in	   the	   field	   of	   defence	  and	  security	  caused	  a	  damaging	  power	  struggle	  between	  Gusmão	  and	  Alkatiri	  on	   the	   question	   of	  whether	   the	   President	  was	   authorized	   to	   call	   in	   foreign	  troops	   to	   restore	   the	   peace	   and	   the	   rule	   of	   law.	   Chapter	   4	   concluded	   that	  cohabitation	   facilitated	   conflict	   because	   it	   provided	   an	   institutional	   forum	  which	  allowed	  for	  political	  opponents	  to	  govern	  against	  each	  other.	  	  Chapter	   5	   tested	   the	   arguments	   that	   associate	   divided	   government	  with	  political	  conflict.	  Divided	  government	  refers	  to	  the	  situation	  in	  which	  a	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legislative	   majority	   is	   held	   by	   a	   party	   or	   pre-­‐election	   coalition	   which	   is	  different	  from	  that	  of	  the	  president	  (Shugart	  as	  cited	  in	  Elgie,	  2001:	  4).	  In	  this	  type	   of	   government,	   Ramos-­‐Horta,	   a	   Gusmão	   ally,	   was	   appointed	   Prime	  Minister	   and	   Minister	   of	   Defence.	   Except	   for	   the	   Minister	   of	   Defence	   and	  Foreign	   Affairs,	   all	   other	   cabinet	   ministers	   were	   FRETILIN	   members.	  FRETILIN	   continued	   to	   control	   Parliament.	   We	   tested	   whether	   conflict	  between	   the	   President	   and	   the	   FRETILIN	  majority	   continued	   and	   whether	  Ramos-­‐Horta’s	   appointment	   as	   head	   of	   Government	   and	   Defence	   Minister	  reduced	  institutional	  conflict.	  	  We	   found	   that	   under	   divided	   government	   the	   locus	   of	   institutional	  conflict	   shifted	   from	   a	   President-­‐Prime	   Minister	   conflict	   to	   a	   President-­‐Parliament	   conflict.	   President	   Gusmão’s	   sanctions	   did	   not	   target	   Prime	  Minister	   Ramos-­‐Horta	   but	   the	   FRETILIN	   parliamentary	   majority.	   Gusmão	  vetoed	   two	   bills	   that	   were	   drafted	   by	   Parliament	   and	   asked	   the	   Court	   of	  Appeal	   to	   review	   the	   constitutionality	  of	   another	  bill	   that	  had	  been	  drafted	  and	   passed	   in	   Parliament.	   Being	   aware	   of	   the	   Prime	   Minister’s	   limited	  influence	   in	  Parliament,	   President	  Gusmão	   tried	   to	   influence	   the	   content	  of	  legislation	   directly	   in	   his	   addresses	   in	   Parliament.	   The	   President’s	  appointment	  powers	  also	   led	   to	  confrontations	  with	   the	  FRETILIN	  majority	  about	   the	   appointment	   of	   a	   new	   Prime	   Minister	   and	   Prosecutor-­‐General	  Monteiro.	   For	   its	   part,	   the	   parliamentary	   majority	   did	   not	   confirm	   the	  President’s	  declaration	  of	  the	  state	  of	  siege.	  In	  line	  with	  the	  expectations,	  we	  found	  no	  conflict	  between	  the	  President	  and	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  over	  defence	  and	   foreign	   affairs	   policy.	   In	   truth,	   during	   Ramos-­‐Horta’s	   term	   as	   Prime	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Minister	  and	  Minister	  of	  Defence,	  crucial	  legislation	  regarding	  Timor-­‐Leste’s	  national	  defence	  and	  foreign	  policy	  was	  promulgated.	  	  Chapter	   6	   tested	   the	   hypotheses	   that	   associate	   unified	   majority	  government	  with	   reduced	   levels	  of	   conflict.	  Again,	  we	   tested	  arguments	   for	  and	   against	   the	   semi-­‐presidential	   system.	   One	   hypothesis	   predicts	   that	  unified	   majority	   government	   generates	   some	   institutional	   conflict	   but	   also	  expects	  that	  the	  system	  encourages	  political	  actors	  to	  regulate	  these	  conflicts.	  Another	  hypothesis	  says,	  or	  implies,	  that	  a	  situation	  in	  which	  the	  president	  is	  supported	   by	   the	   prime	   minister	   and	   the	   parliamentary	   majority	   may	  encourage	  the	  president	  to	  accumulate	  power.	  	  We	   concluded	   that	   under	   unified	   majority	   government	   the	  institutional	   relations	  were	   largely	   characterized	   by	   cooperation.	   President	  Ramos-­‐Horta	  vetoed	  only	  one	  law	  which,	  in	  turn,	  was	  not	  overridden	  by	  the	  parliamentary	   majority.	   Instead	   of	   vetoing	   legislation,	   Ramos-­‐Horta	  preferred	  to	  request	  the	  Court	  to	  review	  the	  constitutionality	  of	  five	  bills.	  We	  also	  found	  that	  the	  ideological	  proximity	  between	  the	  two	  leaders	  sometimes	  led	   them	   to	   ignore	   the	   Court’s	   rulings	   for	   the	   sake	   of	   maintaining	   good	  institutional	   relations.	   President	   Ramos-­‐Horta	   also	   intervened	   in	   the	  appointment	   and	   dismissal	   process	   of	   state	   officials	   but	   once	   again	  disagreements	   did	   not	   escalate	   because	   the	   political	   leaders	   were	   able	   to	  reach	  a	  compromise.	  In	  official	  speeches	  and	  press	  statements	  the	  President	  revealed	   to	   be	   largely	   positive	   about	   the	   work	   done	   by	   the	   Government	  although	   during	   the	   second	   half	   of	   his	   term	   Ramos-­‐Horta	   expressed	   a	  growing	  concern	  with	  the	  ever-­‐expanding	  budget	  and	  the	  growing	  number	  of	  corruption	  cases	  that	  involved	  government	  officials.	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We	  found	  evidence	  that	  President	  Ramos-­‐Horta	  tested	  and	  sometimes	  exceeded	  the	  limits	  of	  his	  constitutional	  authority.	  Yet,	  disagreements	  never	  lead	   to	   serious	   confrontations	   between	   the	   two	   leaders.	   President	   Ramos-­‐Horta	  preferred	  not	  to	  force	  through	  his	  political	  agenda	  when	  he	  understood	  that	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  did	  not	  support	  his	  political	  initiatives.	  Therefore,	  we	  concluded	  that	  in	  Timor-­‐Leste	  unified	  majority	  government	  did	  not	  generate	  hyper-­‐presidentialism.	  	  In	   sum,	   the	   empirical	   chapters	  demonstrated	   that	   the	   three	   types	  of	  semi-­‐presidential	  situations	  –	  cohabitation,	  divided	  government	  and	  unified	  majority	   government	   -­‐	   generated	   different	   types	   and	   levels	   of	   institutional	  conflict.	   Critics	   of	   semi-­‐presidentialism	   believe	   that	   cohabitation	   provokes	  more	   institutional	   conflict	   than	   divided	   government	   and	   unified	   majority	  government.	   They	   also	   expect	   more	   institutional	   conflict	   under	   a	   divided	  government	   than	  under	  unified	  majority	   government.	   So,	  did	   the	   change	   in	  the	   political	   situation	   correspond	   with	   a	   linear	   decrease	   of	   institutional	  conflicts	  in	  Timor-­‐Leste?	  	  We	   confirm	   that	   there	   was	   more	   conflict	   under	   cohabitation	   than	  under	  the	  other	  two	  periods	  and	  more	  conflict	  under	  a	  divided	  government	  than	   under	   unified	   majority	   government.	   First,	   institutional	   relations	  improved	  after	  a	  period	  of	  ‘conflictual	  cohabitation’.	  The	  main	  reason	  for	  the	  decline	  of	   institutional	   conflict	  was	   the	  appointment	  of	  Ramos-­‐Horta	  as	   the	  new	   Prime	   Minister	   which	   narrowed	   the	   gap	   between	   the	   President	   and	  Prime	   Minister.	   Their	   ideological	   proximity	   could,	   however,	   not	   prevent	  confrontations	  between	  the	  President	  and	  the	  parliamentary	  majority	  in	  the	  legislative	   domain;	   compared	   to	   cohabitation	   President	   Gusmão	   sent	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relatively	  more	   laws	   to	   the	   Court	   of	   Appeal	   and	  more	   often	   used	   his	   veto	  power	  during	  the	  divided	  government	  situation.	  As	  noted	  earlier,	  the	  sample	  was	   very	   small	   in	   that	   under	   divided	   government	   only	   ten	   parliamentary	  laws	  were	  passed,	  of	  which	  two	  were	  vetoed.	  Yet,	  whereas	  during	  Alkatiri’s	  prime	   ministership	   the	   President’s	   use	   of	   his	   appointment	   and	   dismissal	  powers	   led	   to	   serious	   institutional	   conflicts	   between	   both	   political	   actors	  such	  conflicts	  were	  virtually	  absent	  under	  divided	  government.	  Likewise,	  no	  conflict	   occurred	   over	   the	   President’s	   use	   of	   his	   power	   to	   pardon	   or	   to	  commute	   sentences.	   The	   President	   supported	   the	   Prime	  Minister’s	   defence	  and	   foreign	   policy	   as	   a	   number	   of	   crucial	   laws	   in	   the	   area	   of	   defence	   and	  foreign	  policy	  were	  quickly	  enacted	  and	  promulgated.	  Finally,	  the	  tone	  of	  the	  often	   highly	   critical	   speeches	   of	   President	   Gusmão	   changed	   during	   Ramos-­‐Horta’s	  term	  in	  office	  where	  the	  President	  once	  lauded	  the	  work	  done	  by	  the	  Prime	  Minister.	  	  Second,	   compared	   with	   divided	   government,	   institutional	   relations	  were	   the	   least	   conflictual	   under	   unified	   majority	   government.	   The	   main	  reason	   for	   improved	   institutional	   relations	   was	   that	   less	   conflict	   occurred	  between	  the	  President	  and	  the	  parliamentary	  majority.	  Indeed,	  under	  divided	  government	   President	   Ramos-­‐Horta	   (continued	   to)	   face	   a	   parliamentary	  majority	   dominated	   by	   FRETILIN.	   In	   the	   new	   political	   situation,	   Gusmão’s	  coalition	  controlled	  the	  majority	  of	  seats	  in	  Parliament.	  Accordingly,	  the	  veto	  rate	   was	   20	   per	   cent	   under	   divided	   government	   and	   1.5	   per	   cent	   during	  unified	  majority	   government.	   In	   a	   similar	   fashion,	   7.6	   per	   cent	   of	   the	   laws	  were	  subject	  to	  constitutional	  review	  during	  unified	  majority	  compared	  to	  10	  per	   cent	   under	   divided	   government.	   We	   also	   found	   that	   unlike	   under	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cohabitation	   and	   divided	   government	   Parliament	   confirmed	   the	   state	   of	  emergency	   in	   February	   2008	   and	   agreed	   to	   renew	   the	   state	   of	   emergency	  another	   three	   times.	   The	   close	   cooperation	   between	   Ramos-­‐Horta	   and	  Gusmão	  not	  only	  prompted	  speedy	  legislation	  in	  the	  area	  of	  defence	  but	  also	  brought	  the	  President	  into	  conflict	  with	  the	  parliamentary	  majority	  when,	  for	  instance,	   he	   used	   his	   pardoning	   power	   to	   free	   Maternus	   Bere.	   The	  presidential	   speeches	   also	   demonstrated	   that	   institutional	   relations	  improved	   under	   unified	   majority	   government.	   Under	   divided	   government	  President	   Gusmão	   criticized	   parliamentary	   bills,	   called	   for	   a	   state	   of	  emergency	   and	   in	   press	   statements	   accused	   FRETILIN	   of	   corruption,	  arrogance	  and	  mismanagement	  that	  had	  put	  the	  fledgling	  country	  on	  a	  path	  of	   violence	   and	   economic	   stagnation	   since	   its	   2002	   independence.	   Under	  unified	  government,	  the	  President	  only	  occasionally	  resorted	  to	  speeches	  to	  criticize	   legislation.	   In	   one	   of	   his	   most	   critical	   speeches	   the	   President	  concluded	   his	   tirade	   by	   saying	   that	   he	   respected	   his	   ‘brother’	   Gusmão	   and	  trusted	   that	   under	   his	   leadership	   the	   Fourth	   Constitutional	   Government	  would	   perform	   better	   to	   serve	   the	   people.	   Once	   again,	   the	   cooperative	  relationship	   between	   the	   President	   and	   Prime	   Minister	   warded	   off	  institutional	  conflict.	  So,	  overall,	  we	  found	  more	  conflict	  under	  cohabitation	  than	  under	  the	  other	   two	   periods.	   In	   addition,	   we	   found	   more	   conflict	   under	   divided	  government	   than	   under	   unified	   majority	   government.	   Some	   people	   may	  argue	  that	  the	  amount	  of	  institutional	  conflict	  between	  cohabitation	  and	  the	  period	   of	   unified	   majority	   government	   do	   not	   differ	   much.	   We	   think	   that	  Timor-­‐Leste’s	   post-­‐conflict	   situation	   together	   with	   the	   Constitution	   limited	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institutional	  conflict	  under,	  principally,	  cohabitation.	  Timor-­‐Leste’s	  quick	  but	  violent	  separation	  from	  Indonesia	  created	  a	  legal	  vacuum	  that	  may	  have	  pre-­‐empted	  institutional	  conflict.	  Several	  institutions	  that	  enable	  the	  President	  to	  restrain	   the	   executive	   power	   of	   the	   Government	   did	   not	   work	   when	   the	  country	   became	   independent	   in	   2002.	   The	   Court	   of	   Appeal	   only	   started	   to	  function	   in	   June	   2003	   (Judicial	   System	   Monitoring	   Programme,	   2003a).	  Before	   this	   time	   Gusmão	   could	   neither	   refer	   legislation	   to	   the	   Court	   for	  constitutional	  review	  nor	  issue	  a	  constitutional	  veto.	  Also,	  the	  absence	  of	  an	  organic	   law	  on	   the	  regulation	  of	  a	   referendum	  deprived	   the	  President	   from	  submitting	   issues	   of	   national	   interest	   to	   a	   referendum.	   In	   addition,	   the	  President	   could	   not	   call	   for	   new	   elections	   because	   the	   Parliament	   had	   not	  passed	  electoral	  laws.	  Finally,	  President	  Gusmão	  could	  not	  seek	  advice	  from	  the	  Council	  of	  State	  and	  the	  Supreme	  Council	  of	  Defence	  and	  Security	  because	  neither	   consultative	   institution	   was	   established	   until	   March	   2005.	   The	  Constitution	  determines	  that	  in	  these	  areas	  presidential	  decisions	  need	  to	  be	  preceded	  by	  consultation	  with	  the	  Council	  of	  State	  and/or	  with	  the	  Superior	  Council	  for	  Defence	  and	  Security.	  Therefore,	  from	  2002	  to	  2005	  the	  President	  could	  not	  use	  emergency	  powers	  or	  declare	  war	  or	  make	  peace	  with	  a	  foreign	  country	   due	   to	   the	   absence	   of	   necessary	   legislation.	   These	   legal	   voids	   thus	  deprived	   the	   President	   of	   several	   powers	   that	   would	   have	   allowed	   him	   to	  restrain	   executive	   power	   and	   oversee	   the	   legislature.	   Relatively	   moderate	  institutional	  conflict	  during	  cohabitation	  may	  also	  stem	  from	  the	  role	  that	  the	  Constitution	   ascribes	   to	   the	   president	   of	   Timor-­‐Leste.	   To	   be	   sure,	   the	  Constitution	   of	   Timor-­‐Leste	   gives	   the	   president	   few	   powers	   to	   oppose	   the	  government’s	   policy.	  As	  noted	   in	  Chapter	  2,	   the	  powers	  of	   the	  president	   of	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Timor-­‐Leste	   are	   not	   proactive	   powers.	   They	   are	   reactive,	   corresponding	   to	  the	   notion	   of	   an	   arbiter.	   The	   president	   may	   seek	   to	   influence	   the	   overall	  policy	  of	  a	  government,	  for	  instance,	  through	  the	  exercise	  of	  veto	  powers,	  by	  calling	  a	  referendum	  or	  directing	  a	  message	  to	  parliament,	  but	  the	  president	  may	  seldom,	  if	  at	  all,	  actively	  propose	  a	  course	  of	  action,	  as	  his	  or	  her	  powers	  of	  initiative	  are	  limited.	  Put	  differently,	  Timorese	  presidents	  are	  arbiters	  who	  protect	   the	   rules	   of	   the	  decision-­‐making	  process	   and,	   therefore,	   are	   largely	  excluded	   from	   day-­‐to-­‐day	   government.	   Accordingly,	   there	   was	   less	  institutional	  conflict	  over	  policy	   in	  Timor-­‐Leste	   than	  there	  might	  have	  been	  in	  other	  countries	  with	  different	  constitutional	  powers.	  	  	  
The	  implications	  for	  the	  literature	  on	  semi-­presidentialism	  and	  
democratic	  performance	  While	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  make	  universal	  generalisations	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  only	  one	  case	   with	   a	   distinct	   political	   background,	   nonetheless	   the	   findings	   of	   this	  research	   may	   have	   some	   implications	   for	   the	   literature	   on	   semi-­‐presidentialism	  and	  democratic	  performance.	  	  Firstly,	  our	  findings	  support	  arguments	  that	  are	  levelled	  against	  semi-­‐presidentialism.	  Critics	  are	  right	  to	  be	  concerned	  about	  semi-­‐presidentialism	  in	   that	   it	   facilitates	   institutional	   conflict.	   Under	   cohabitation	   pre-­‐existing	  conflicts	  were	  institutionalized	  as	  the	  system	  allowed	  political	  opponents	  to	  govern	  against	  each	  other.	  We	   found	  more	  conflict	  under	  cohabitation	   than	  under	  the	  other	  two	  periods.	  We	  also	  found	  that	  unified	  majority	  government	  was	   the	   least	   conflictual	   institutional	   configuration	   under	   semi-­‐presidentialism.	   So,	   consonant	   with	   the	   general	   criticism	   that	   is	   levelled	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against	   semi-­‐presidentialism	   we	   confirm	   that	   the	   existence	   of	   a	   president	  with	   executive	  and	   legislative	   powers	   introduces	   institutional	   conflicts	   into	  the	  system.	  Secondly,	  we	   found	  that	  some	  policy	  areas	  were	  more	  susceptible	   to	  institutional	  conflict	  than	  others.	  During	  cohabitation	  President	  Gusmão	  was	  particularly	  active	  in	  the	  area	  of	  defence	  and	  foreign	  policy.	  As	  noted	  before,	  the	  President	  has	  more	  constitutional/legal	  power	   to	   influence	  defence	  and	  foreign	   policy,	   when	   compared	   with	   other	   policy	   areas.	   Whereas	   during	  cohabitation	   power-­‐sharing	   over	   defence	   policy	   led	   to	   a	   power	   struggle,	  under	   divided	   government	   and	   unified	  majority	   government	   it	   encouraged	  efficient	   policy-­‐making	   between	   the	   President	   and	   Prime	   Minister.	   More	  generally,	  the	  notion	  that	  certain	  presidential	  powers	  provoke	  more	  conflicts	  than	   others	   brings	   an	   important	   nuance	   to	   arguments	   that	   associate	   semi-­‐presidentialism	  with	  democratic	  performance.	  	  
Discussion	  Critics	   argue	   that	   semi-­‐presidentialism	   generates	   institutional	   conflict	   that	  may	  lead	  to	  democratic	  collapse;	  supporters	  believe	  that	  institutional	  conflict	  does	  not	  kill	  semi-­‐presidential	  democracies.	  This	  project	  tested	  only	  the	  first	  part	   of	   the	   argument,	   namely	   whether	   semi-­‐presidential	   situations	   cause	  institutional	   conflict.	   The	   general	   argument	   against	   semi-­‐presidentialism	  does	  not	  hold	  when	   there	   is	  no	  evidence	  of	   institutional	   conflict.	  We	   found	  that	   semi-­‐presidentialism	   facilitated	   institutional	   conflict	   in	   Timor-­‐Leste	  between	  2002	  and	  2012.	  Yet,	  data	  provided	  by	  Freedom	  House	  and	  Polity	  IV	  on	   democratic	   performance	   do	   not	   record	   the	   collapse	   of	   Timor-­‐Leste’s	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democratic	   regime.	   Does	   the	   fact	   that	   Timor-­‐Leste’s	   democracy	   did	   not	  collapse	  under	  the	  weight	  of	   institutional	  conflict	   imply	  that	  critics	  of	  semi-­‐presidentialism	  were	  wrong	  after	  all?	  	   We	   argue	   that	   Timor-­‐Leste’s	   democratic	   system	   did	   not	   collapse	  because	  both	   institutional	   and	  non-­‐institutional	   factors	  may	  have	  mitigated	  deleterious	   effects	   of	   institutional	   conflict	   on	   the	   performance	   of	   its	  democratic	   regime.	   Institutional	   factors	   include	   Timor-­‐Leste’s	   semi-­‐presidential	   constitutional	   formula	   which	   gives	   the	   President	   only	   limited	  power	  to	  influence	  policy.	  We	  might	  extrapolate	  from	  this	  observation	  that	  if	  the	   President	   were	   endowed	   with	   more	   constitutional/legal	   power,	  institutional	  conflict	  would	  have	  been	  more	  likely.	  Non-­‐institutional	   factors	   such	   as	   Timor-­‐Leste’s	   post-­‐conflict	   context	  may	  have	  limited	  institutional	  conflict	  as	  well.	  In	  May	  2002,	  Timor-­‐Leste	  not	  only	  became	  a	  new	  democracy,	  it	  also	  became	  a	  new	  state.	  Hill	  and	  Saldanha	  (2001)	  noted	  that	  the	  country’s	  starting	  point	  could	  hardly	  have	  been	  more	  difficult.	  In	  1999	  Timor-­‐Leste	  was	  one	  of	  the	  poorest	  countries	  of	  the	  world	  with	  a	  per	  capita	  income	  of	  about	  US$300.	  During	  the	  1999	  violence	  Timor-­‐Leste’s	  GDP	  declined	  by	  about	  one-­‐third;	  over	  70	  per	  cent	  of	   the	   territory’s	  physical	  infrastructure	  was	  destroyed;	  more	  than	  a	  quarter	  of	  the	  population	  was	   displaced;	   and	   the	   largely	   Indonesian	   civil	   service	   fled	   (Hill	   and	  Saldanha,	  2001).	  Dili	   lost	  one-­‐third	  of	   its	  electricity-­‐generating	  capacity	  and	  government	   buildings	   as	   well	   as	   the	   files	   that	   constituted	   the	   formal	  institutions	   of	   government	   (such	   as	   titles	   to	   land,	   and	   records	   of	   civil	  registration	  and	  education)	  were	  destroyed.	  Timor-­‐Leste	  was	   left	  with	  only	  two	   power	   engineers,	   20	   per	   cent	   of	   its	   secondary	   school	   teachers,	   23	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medical	  doctors,	  one	   surgeon	  and	  no	  pharmacists	   (World	  Bank,	  2005).	  The	  World	  Bank	  reported	  that	  in	  1999	  ‘Timor-­‐Leste’s	  civil	  service	  simply	  ceased	  to	  exist’	  (1999).	  Timor-­‐Leste	  lacked	  a	  high-­‐level	  bureaucratic	  capacity,	  given	  that	  during	  Indonesian	  occupation	  senior	  echelons	  were	  dominated	  by	  non-­‐Timorese.	   In	   addition,	   the	   country	   did	   not	   have	   a	   constitution	   or	   a	   legal	  system.	   In	   short,	   modern	   state	   institutions	   needed	   to	   be	   built	   up	   from	  scratch.	   In	   such	   circumstances,	   political	   actors	   may	   have	   had	   different	  priorities	  than	  to	  obstruct	  the	  political	  process.	  	  In	  addition,	  it	  should	  come	  as	  no	  surprise	  that	  Timor-­‐Leste’s	  political	  institutions	  were	  either	  absent	  or	  weak	  in	  2002	  when	  the	  semi-­‐presidential	  system	   was	   introduced.	   Feijó	   (2006)	   points	   out	   that,	   in	   particular,	   the	  Presidency	  was	  weak.	  The	  presidential	  impotence	  was,	  according	  to	  him,	  not	  only	   a	   result	   of	   Timor-­‐Leste	   post-­‐conflict	   background	   but	   also	   a	   deliberate	  strategy	   of	   FRETILIN	   to	   keep	   the	   President’s	   powers	   to	   an	   absolute	  minimum.	   The	   FRETILIN	   government	   enjoyed	   the	   support	   of	   a	   disciplined	  parliamentary	  majority	  and	  the	  party’s	  de	  facto	  alliance	  with	  the	  ASDT	  gave	  the	  party	  the	  two-­‐thirds	  majority	  it	  needed	  under	  the	  Constitution	  to	  approve	  revisions	  to	  it	  (Smith,	  2004a).	  So,	  FRETILIN’s	  powerful	  position	  provided	  the	  party	   with	   the	   opportunity	   to	   purposely	   obstruct	   legislation	   that	   would	  strengthen	  the	  position	  of	  the	  President	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  Government.	  	  External	  funding	  and	  technical	  assistance	  may	  also	  have	  increased	  the	  relative	  weakness	  of	  the	  President	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  Government.	  The	  Presidency	  was	  Timor-­‐Leste’s	  newest	   state	   institution	  and	  started	   to	   function	  after	   the	  presidential	  election	  of	  April	  2002.	  Under	  the	  UN	  transitional	  administration,	  the	  predecessor	  of	  the	  Parliament,	  the	  Constituent	  Assembly,	  began	  its	  duties	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in	   September	   2001	   and	   the	   First	   Constitutional	   Government,	   which	   took	  office	  after	  the	  ceremonial	  restoration	  of	  Independence,	  succeeded	  previous	  governments	   that	   had	   been	   operating	   since	   the	   installation	   of	   the	   First	  Transitional	   Cabinet	   in	   July	   2000.	   In	   addition,	   most	   international	   advisors	  worked	  for	  the	  Government	  and	  very	  few,	  if	  any,	  were	  assigned	  by	  the	  UN	  to	  assist	   the	   President.	   By	   UN	   Resolution	   1599	   (2005),	   the	   Security	   Council	  authorized	  the	  deployment	  of	  up	  to	  45	  civilian	  advisers	  to	  strengthen	  Timor-­‐Leste’s	  main	   state	   institutions.	   Of	   the	   45	   international	   advisers,	   only	   2	   had	  been	   assigned	   to	   assist	   the	   Office	   of	   the	   President	   whereas	   27	   had	   been	  deployed	  across	  various	  Government	  offices.	  According	  to	  Feijó	  (2006),	  one	  advisory	  post	  was	  never	   filled,	  whereas	  another	  advisor	   finished	  his	  or	   her	  job	   in	   March	   2006.	   The	   World	   Bank	   (2006)	   recognised	   the	   imbalance	   of	  resources	  between	  the	  different	  institutions	  and	  called	  upon	  the	  Government	  to	  ensuring	  that	  independent	  institutions	  had	  statutory	  budgets	  approved	  by	  Parliament.	   In	   sum,	   the	   urgent	   need	   to	   fill	   the	   legislative	   vacuum,	   the	  restricted	  constitutional	  powers	  of	  the	  President	  to	  influence	  policy,	  and	  the	  unequal	  distribution	  of	  UN	  resources	  are	  factors	  that	  may	  have	  decreased	  the	  level	  of	  institutional	  conflict.	  	  Others	   may	   point	   to	   the	   influence	   of	   international	   forces	   on	  democratization	  in	  Timor-­‐Leste.	  International	  actors,	  like	  the	  United	  Nations,	  may	  have	  played	  a	  supporting	  role	  in	  helping	  a	  fledging	  democracy	  complete	  a	   democratic	   transition.	   To	   what	   extent	   international	   forces	   have	   been	  responsible	   for	   the	   survival	   of	   Timor-­‐Leste’s	   young	   democratic	   regime?	  Although	   Timor-­‐Leste’s	   democracy	   did	   not	   collapse,	   the	   situation	   in	   2006	  was	   perilously	   close	   to	   civil	   war	   (Kingsbury,	   forthcoming).	   Local	   political	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actors	   were	   incapable	   to	   regain	   civilian	   control	   over	   the	   rebelling	   soldiers	  and	   needed	   to	   call	   for	   foreign	   assistance	   to	   establish	   law	   and	   order.	   So,	  foreign	   assistance	   may	   have	   prevented	   Timor-­‐Leste’s	   democracy	   from	  collapsing.	  	  Overall,	  we	   found	  empirical	  evidence	   to	  support	  different	  arguments	  that	   hold	   that	   institutional	   factors	   are	   responsible	   for	   institutional	   conflict.	  Despite	   the	   fact	   that	   semi-­‐presidentialism	   facilitated	   institutional	   conflict	  Freedom	   House	   and	   Polity	   IV	   do	   not	   record	   the	   collapse	   of	   Timor-­‐Leste’s	  democratic	   regime.	  We	   outlined	   several	   factors	   that	  may	   have	   confounded	  the	  relationship	  between	  semi-­‐presidential	  types	  of	  government	  and	  Timor-­‐Leste’s	   democratic	   performance.	   In	   the	   next	   section	   we	   identify	   some	  avenues	  for	  future	  research.	  	  	  
Future	  research	  This	  project	  demonstrated	  that	  semi-­‐presidentialism	  facilitated	   institutional	  conflict	  in	  Timor-­‐Leste.	  It	  supports	  the	  criticism	  of	  semi-­‐presidentialism	  that	  a	  president	  with	  executive	  and	  legislative	  powers	  alongside	  a	  prime	  minister	  and	   parliament	   introduces	   competing	   incentives	   into	   the	   system.	   Yet,	   our	  study	   cannot	   confirm	   the	   argument	   that	   institutional	   conflict	   leads	   to	   poor	  democratic	   performance.	   In	   Timor-­‐Leste,	   democracy	   survived	   despite	  institutional	   conflict.	   Future	   research	   should	   test	   the	   relationship	   between	  institutional	  conflict	  and	  the	  performance	  of	  semi-­‐presidential	  democracies.	  	   In	   Timor-­‐Leste	   institutional	   conflict	   manifested	   itself	   predominantly	  in	   the	   area	   of	   defence	   and	   foreign	   policy.	   Whereas	   the	   President	   and	   the	  Prime	   Minister	   could	   align	   their	   foreign	   policy	   agenda	   a	   disagreement	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between	   both	   leaders	   over	   defence	   policy	   escalated	   into	   a	   serious	   political	  crisis.	  More	  research	  is	  needed	  to	  test	  whether	  defence	  policy	  is,	   in	  fact,	  the	  Achilles	   heel	   of	   semi-­‐presidential	   democracies.	   Is	   the	   semi-­‐presidential	  system	  inherently	  weak	  in	  keeping	  the	  military	  under	  civilian	  control?	  In	  addition,	  the	  literature	  on	  semi-­‐presidentialism	  largely	  ignores	  the	  existence	  of	  non-­‐partisan	  prime	  ministers	  and	  presidents.	  Indeed,	  the	  effects	  of	  semi-­‐presidential	  systems	  are	  premised	  on	  the	  notion	  that	  political	  actors	  are	  partisan.	  Yet,	  general	  studies	  on	  the	  effects	  of	  political	  institutions	  insist	  that	   the	   presence	   of	   non-­‐partisan	   actors	   have	   far-­‐reaching	   implications	   on	  democratic	   performance	   (Neto	   and	   Strøm,	   2006).	   The	   study	   on	   semi-­‐presidentialism	   would	   benefit	   from	   more	   research	   on	   the	   effects	   of	   non-­‐partisan	  actors	  on	  the	  performance	  of	  semi-­‐presidential	  democracies.	  	  Finally,	  the	  literature	  on	  semi-­‐presidentialism	  predominantly	  focuses	  on	  the	  system’s	  institutional	  flaws.	  Little	  effort	  has	  been	  spent	  to	  compare	  the	  relative	   merits	   of	   president-­‐parliamentarism	   and	   premier-­‐presidentialism	  with	   presidential	   and	   parliamentary	   systems.	   Under	   which	   of	   the	   four	  systems	   do	   young	   democracies	   live	   longer?	   Recent	   work	   concluded	   that	  democracies	   with	   a	   president-­‐parliamentary	   form	   of	   semi-­‐presidentialism	  run	   a	   greater	   risk	   of	   collapse	   than	   premier-­‐presidential	   systems	   (Elgie,	  2011a).	   However,	   not	   much	   is	   known	   whether	   presidential-­‐parliamentary	  systems	   score	   better	   than	   presidential	   systems	   in	   terms	   of	   democratic	  performance.	   Moreover,	   Shugart	   and	   Carey	   (1992:	   286)	   posit	   that	  presidentialism	   and	   premier-­‐presidentialism	   properly	   crafted	   ‘might	   even	  offer	  better	  opportunities	  for	  conflict	  regulation	  than	  would	  a	  parliamentary	  regime’.	  Again,	  so	  far	  this	  hypothesis	  has	  not	  been	  tested.	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Looking	  ahead	  One	   of	   the	   first	   countries	   that	   adopted	   a	   semi-­‐presidential	   system	  was	   the	  Weimar	   Republic	   in	   1919.	   According	   to	   the	   members	   of	   the	   Eighth	  Commission	  of	  the	  Constituent	  Assembly	  the	  system	  was	  designed	  to	  tackle	  inadequacies	   of	   the	   French	   Third	   Republic	   that	   was	   dominated	   by	   the	  parliament:	  According	  to	  the	  intention	  of	  the	  Constituent	  Assembly,	  the	  President	  of	  the	  Reich	  was	  conceived	  of	  a	  democratic	  counterweight	  to	  parliamentary	  omnipotence	   in	   order	   to	   avoid	   the	   excesses	   of	   French	   ‘absolute	  parliamentarism’…	   These	   two	   authorities,	   the	   legislature	   as	   well	   as	   the	  President,	   originate	   from	   that	   same	   source,	   that	   is,	   from	   the	   will	   of	   the	  people.	  Because	  of	  that,	  we	  have	  the	  guarantee	  that	  if	  the	  will	  of	  one	  of	  these	  supreme	  organs	  goes	  astray	  in	  some	  direction,	  the	  other	  would	  correct	  it.	  We	  wind	  up	  therefore	  having,	  in	  the	  person	  of	  the	  President,	  a	  counterweight	  to	  the	  omnipotence	  of	  the	  Reichstag	  (cited	  in	  Skach,	  2005b:	  43).	  Semi-­‐presidentialism	   was	   thus	   thought	   to	   provide	   an	   equilibrium	  institutional	   solution.	   Yet,	   in	   the	   search	   of	   balance	   of	   power	   between	   the	  branches,	  the	  president	  lacked	  reciprocal	  responsibility	  before	  the	  Reichstag.	  Seen	   through	   the	   lens	   of	   the	   framers	   of	   the	   semi-­‐presidential	   system,	   the	  president’s	   intervention	   in	   the	   day-­‐to-­‐day	   affairs	   of	   the	   state	   is	   a	   way	   to	  counterbalance	  the	  power	  of	  the	  parliament.	  The	  president	  intervenes	  so	  as	  to	   prevent	   the	   parliament	   from	   dominating	   the	   political	   system.	   Following	  this	  line	  of	  reasoning,	  presidential	  intervention	  in	  the	  political	  process	  would	  be	   beneficial	   to	   democratic	   performance.	   Institutional	   conflict,	   the	   political	  outcome	   of	   presidential	   activism	   in	   day-­‐to	   day	   government	   would	   signal	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democratic	   viability	   rather	   than	   forewarn	   the	   definitive	   collapse	   of	  democracy.	  	  We	  found	  lots	  of	  institutional	  conflict	  in	  Timor-­‐Leste.	  Perhaps	  counter	  intuitively,	  Timor-­‐Leste’s	  democracy	  survived.	  This	  outcome	  does	  not	   imply	  that	   institutional	   conflict	  encourages	  democratic	  viability	  and	   that	   critics	  of	  semi-­‐presidentialism	   were	   wrong	   after	   all.	   As	   noted	   earlier,	   many	   other	  factors	  may	  have	  prevented	  democratic	  collapse.	  Foreign	  soldiers	  and	  police,	  for	   instance,	  may	  have	  played	  an	   important	  role	   in	   the	  restoration	  of	  peace	  and	  security	  in	  Timor-­‐Leste	  in	  2006.	  Nevertheless,	  our	  findings	  do	  raise	  the	  question	   of	   whether	   institutional	   conflicts	   are	   truly	   ‘bad’	   for	   democratic	  performance.	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